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The chapters in this volume are all based on contributions to a Colloquium 
on Money, Finance and Demography – the Consequences of Ageing
organised by SUERF in October 12 – 14, 2006 in Lisbon in cooperation with 
Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Chapters 2 to 7 provide a global view of 
demographic trends in fertility, mortality, migration and retirement behaviour 
and the implications of these trends for economic growth, public ﬁ  nances 
and ﬁ  nancial markets. Chapters 8 to 12 are country case studies in which the 
authors look more closely at pension problems, ﬁ  scal sustainability, savings 
behaviour and the ﬁ  nancial system in a sample of individual countries.
In chapter 2, Ignazio Visco, (Central Manager for Economic Research, 
Banca d'Italia) discusses longevity risk and ﬁ  nancial markets. The author 
documents the long-term increase in old-age dependency ratios all over the 
world. Population ageing affects on public ﬁ   nances, labour markets and 
corporate strategies. The predicted increase in life expectancy is in most 
countries being met with higher pension contributions, lower replacement 
rates and later retirement. The concept of longevity risk refers to uncertainty 
about changes in life expectancy. In designing appropriate pension systems, 
accurate mortality projections are important. The author mentions several 
projections that are applied in company pension schemes as well as in public 
pension programs. 
Applying observed improvements in life expectancy since 1990 as a basis 
for forecasting extra pension payments in the Italian pension system, the 
author arrives at an amount of more than EUR 300 billion in net present value 
terms. Longevity risk of this magnitude should affect portfolio allocation. The 
question is, however, whether people behave rationally. Do they suffer from 
myopia? Farsighted individual investors take longevity risk into account. 
Some work longer and save more. Since many people are not farsighted, 
mandatory public pension schemes could be important to reduce undersaving. 
The trends pose challenges to the retirement savings industry and ﬁ  nancial 
markets. Annuities are the classical answer to longevity risk, but not the only 
one. The author mentions reverse mortgages as another appropriate ﬁ  nancial 
instrument. He concludes with some policy recommendations: Economic 
growth should be supported, markets for under-supplied ﬁ  nancial instruments 
should be facilitated, regulatory and supervisory frameworks should be 
developed and ensure better governance of private pension funds and the 
protection of pension beneﬁ  ciaries should be improved.
In chapter 3, Barry Eichengreen, (Professor of Economics and Political 
Science, University of California, Berkeley) looks at the possible impact of 
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demographic factors on global imbalances. He focuses in particular on China 
and the United States. There is a huge deﬁ  cit on the US balance of payments 
current account while China has a large current account surplus. The United 
States has a more rapidly growing population than Europe and Japan and it 
has a well functioning ﬁ  nancial system. Other things equal, this should make 
it an attractive place to invest. China has a relatively low old-age dependency 
ratio and underdeveloped ﬁ  nancial markets. Consequently, the country is 
saving a lot and runs a current account surplus. While the elderly share of 
the labour force will rise modestly in the United States, it will rise sharply in 
China less than a decade from now.
The author expresses some scepticism regarding the ability of demographic 
factors to improve our understanding of global imbalances. Demographic 
factors are just one among many factors that can inﬂ  uence global imbalances. 
The decline in public savings in the United States is a consequence of 
discretionary ﬁ  scal policy. Federal tax revenue as a share of GDP has declined 
while public spending on health care and defence has increased. Private 
savings have declined partly due to high asset valuations, which increase 
households’ perceived wealth. Regarding the high Chinese savings rate, the 
author mentions the extraordinary high savings rates of enterprises, which 
were running in excess of 20 per cent of GDP in 2005. The low exchange rate 
has boosted the proﬁ  tability of Chinese manufacturing and the ﬁ  rms’ ability 
to retain earnings.
In the view of the author, the imbalances will have to be corrected. For 
political reasons, it will be unacceptable if foreigners end up holding half 
of the country’s capital stock. A strong negative reaction against extensive 
foreign ownership of productive assets in the United States can be expected. 
Foreign investors, not willing to continue accumulating low-yielding US 
Treasury bills and not permitted to accumulate claims on productive assets 
will grow reluctant to ﬁ  nance US deﬁ  cits. Higher long-term interest rates and 
slower global growth will follow. Ultimately, the bill for the high level of US 
absorption and the world economy’s dependence on the US consumer will 
come due.
In chapter 4, Gilles Mourre and his colleagues (Directorate General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission) assess the overall 
economic impact of ageing for the EU Member States on the basis of long-term 
macroeconomic projections developed by the Economic Policy Committee 
and the European Commission. The authors list three main demographic 
drivers: fertility, life expectancy and migration ﬂ  ows.  They  describe  the 
methodology of the applied long-term economic projections based on Eurostat 
data. Projections for the impact of ageing on employment, productivity and 
potential growth in real GDP and GDP per capita are presented. They analyse 
labour market characteristics in terms of participation and employment rates. Morten Balling, Ernest Gnan & Frank Lierman 3
The projections show that the population in the EU-25 will be both smaller 
and older in 2050 than it is now. However, the authors remind the readers that 
projections are not forecasts. The projections just provide an indication on 
the potential timing and scale of challenges that could result from an ageing 
population based on a “no policy change” scenario. 
In their discussion of policy implications, the authors leave out issues 
of public ﬁ  nances and focus on general labour market and economic policy 
implications. The labour market is key to successful policy adjustment. 
Ultimately, it is the economic output of a country that determines its capacity 
to sustain high quality welfare systems. Raising employment rates of older 
workers, including those aged over 65, will remain a critical policy objective 
for EU Member States. Financial incentives, ﬂ  exible retirement pathways 
and policies to tackle age-discrimination are needed. Immigration could be a 
positive factor in labour market adjustment. It is a key challenge for the EU 
to better integrate immigrants into the labour market. In order to improve 
productivity, innovation and R&D activities should be strengthened.
In chapter 5, Vincenzo Galasso (Associate Professor of Economics at 
Bocconi University, Milan) applies a political economy approach to evaluate 
decisions concerning postponement of retirement. In democratic countries, 
it is necessary to obtain the support of a majority of the Parliament or the 
electorate. Most countries run unfunded pay-as-you-go pension systems which 
imply that they are ﬁ  nanced through taxation. The ageing of the population 
undermines the ﬁ  nancial sustainability of these systems. Ageing societies 
will have to place larger ﬁ  nancial burdens on the working generations or to 
reform the pension systems. The author provides a quantitative assessment 
of the future political sustainability of the current pension systems. He asks: 
Will voters be willing to postpone retirement? Retirees will according to 
the author always support a system where workers pay through taxes. Other 
individuals will consider current and future contributions to the system and 
expected future beneﬁ  ts. The median age among voters is expected to increase 
monotonously from 2005 to 2050. The political inﬂ  uence of the elderly voters 
will increase. So will contribution rates. Simulations suggest that a rise in the 
effective retirement age would be pivotal in reducing the expected increase 
in pension spending. In his model, the author tries to capture the main 
economic, demographic and political aspects, and the institutional elements 
of the different social security systems in France, Italy, the UK and the US. 
The model is fed with forecast values of relevant variables for the year 
2050. The ageing process modiﬁ  es the demographic balance of the social 
security as well as the political representation of the different generations of 
workers and retirees. It turns out that in all countries median voters choose an 
increase in the retirement age. In all countries, except Italy, the social security 
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In chapter 6, Mark Weth (Economics Department, Deutsche Bundesbank) 
and Sebastien Schich (Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, 
OECD) present estimates of future retirement-ﬁ  nancing-related bond demand 
over the next four decades. Volatile ﬁ  nancial markets have led managers 
of deﬁ  ned-beneﬁ   t pension funds to sharpen their focus on asset-liability 
management. Pension fund portfolios consist of both bonds and equities. The 
authors focus on the question of how future bond demand may develop given 
future demographic developments. They try to estimate potential demand for 
government bonds for retirement-ﬁ  nancing purposes. They use demographic 
projections and mortality statistics for the G-10 country populations to 
derive estimates of bond demand until 2050. In the analysis, they apply an 
overlapping generations model with uncertain lifetime and a rule for portfolio 
choice between risky and riskless assets. In the model, aggregate bond demand 
becomes a function of longevity, age of entry into retirement and labour 
productivity. In the baseline scenario, retirement-ﬁ  nancing-related demand 
for bonds will increase continuously from today until 2050. The authors 
study the sensitivity of the results to changes in assumptions concerning 
respectively labour productivity growth, retirement age and longevity.
In chapter 7, Etienne  de Callataÿ, (Chief Economist, Bank Degroof) 
studies private retirement saving. Ageing is likely to increase signiﬁ  cantly 
age-related social expenditures in Europe. There is a broad consensus among 
economists that structural reforms will have to be implemented in order to 
widen the funding basis. Proposals to implement a higher effective retirement 
age and to make health care more selective are discussed in most countries. 
Younger generations will anticipate both an increasing ﬁ  scal pressure and 
declining social protection. Younger generations will also face uncertainty 
about the future shape of social security systems and their own long term 
ﬁ   nancial needs. Anticipating at best a stagnating disposable income and 
facing longevity risk, young generations can be expected to smooth their 
consumption patterns out by increasing their savings rates. Policy makers 
can therefore be inclined to promote individual savings and to provide ﬁ  scal 
incentives in favour of private pension schemes. Such a policy seems to be 
relatively cheap for the Government budget and to be an appropriate way 
to achieve a rebalancing in pension provision in countries where most of 
the elderly income is coming from unfunded public schemes. The author 
emphasizes, however, ﬁ  ve caveats:
First, ﬁ  nancial markets might fail to transfer purchasing power over time. 
Large savings aiming at retirement could push asset prices up for some years, 
which could be followed by an asset meltdown when savers retire. Second, 
promoting long-term private savings could act as a brake on structural 
reforms that pension regimes do need. If promotion of private savings is 
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reforming public schemes is alleviated. Third, when reliance on private 
savings forms the key part of the policy answer to the ageing challenge, 
consumption patterns may be suboptimal. People do not know for how long 
they will live and how much they will have to spend on old-age care. Since 
they are risk-averse they will over-save for the case of becoming very old 
and being in need for medical care. Fourth, people do not have satisfactory 
information regarding their long-term savings decisions. A higher aggregate 
savings ratio can be achieved through a higher budgetary surplus. Fifth, there 
are drawbacks in the way long term private savings are managed. There are 
costs in pension fund management and pension funds may abuse their market 
power. The author concludes that private savings should complement, not 
substitute ﬁ  scal orthodoxy and structural reforms. 
Chapter 8 is the ﬁ   rst country case study in this volume. The author 
Martin Werding (Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich) studies 
the implicit pension debt in the German pension system in relation to the 
existing pay-as-you-go public pension scheme. EU-level authorities are 
currently working on new sophisticated measures of ﬁ  scal  sustainability. 
They are meant to support consultations regarding sound ﬁ  scal policies and 
the observation of the criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact. Unfunded 
liabilities of public pension schemes are an important ingredient in calculating 
any of these indicators, but explicit calculations regarding the aggregate size 
of implicit pension debt are so far not part of these efforts. The author argues 
that this may change in the future. The EU Commission and international 
rating agencies have expressed their interest in including measures of the 
future public pension burden in evaluations of sustainability. Cross-country 
comparisons of the size of implicit pension debt are difﬁ  cult partly because 
there seems to be a conﬂ  ict between reliability and comparability. If calculation 
assumptions are harmonized country-speciﬁ  c features of pension systems are 
lost. In countries with notionally deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t systems it is the implicit 
debt involved in future beneﬁ  t entitlements that is of highest importance. 
By contrast, in countries with notionally deﬁ   ned contribution schemes, 
projecting future contributions is at least equally important. The author 
distinguishes between two notions of implicit pension debt. “Accrued-to-date 
liabilities” are the present value of outstanding beneﬁ  t entitlements of current 
pensioners plus future entitlements of the active population to the extent 
that these are linked to their past and current contributions. “Open-system 
liabilities” include most of the elements mentioned plus the future beneﬁ  t 
entitlements of the currently active population that will arise from their future 
contributions to be paid over the regular course of a working life and future 
beneﬁ  t entitlements of all future contributors, estimated with an inﬁ  nite time 
horizon. Whatever deﬁ  nition is used, implicit debt can be really sizeable. 
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that covers expenditures and revenues of all branches of the German social 
insurance system and on ofﬁ  cial demographic projections by Statistisches 
Bundesamt spanning the period until 2050. After the 2004 pension reform, 
the accrued-to-date liabilities and open-system net liabilities are estimated 
at between 260 per cent and 207 percent of German GDP. The calculations 
indicate that the recent German pension reforms noticably improved the 
long-term sustainability of the German public pension scheme.
In chapter 9, Marianna Brunetti and Costanza Torricelli (University of 
Modena and Reggio Emilia and CEFIN) assess the impact of ageing on 
household portfolios in Italy. In comparison with other countries, ageing in 
Italy is exceptional. Elderly people usually have lower saving rates and higher 
average risk aversion than the rest of the population. Consequently, ageing 
affects ﬁ  nancial markets. The authors utilise historical and forecast data on 
the structure of the Italian population. Their analysis relies on birth, mortality 
and immigration rates and on data from a Bank of Italy survey of households’ 
income and wealth. Included are data from the United Nations Population 
Prospects covering a 100 year long period: 1950 to 2050. They rank countries 
according to their old-age dependency ratio. In 2050, the highest ratios are 
expected in Japan, Italy and Spain. The proportion of elderly people has 
progressively enlarged. The share of the working-age population is shrinking. 
There has been a strong increase in net migration to Italy. 
The evidence on the composition of households’ wealth conﬁ  rms that a 
large fraction of households holds very few types of ﬁ  nancial instruments 
and tends to concentrate wealth in safe assets. Since 1995, the share of 
Government bonds in household portfolios has declined. The shares invested 
in the safest assets (cash and deposits) are particularly high for both very 
young and very old households. The share invested in stocks is almost 
negligible in younger-household portfolios, peaks in those of late-middle-age 
households and shrinks once again when the households reach the retirement 
age. Managed investments seem to be the investment preferred by any 
age-class. The data support a life-cycle theory of portfolio behaviour. 
In their conclusion, the authors combine the facts on Italian population 
ageing with the observed age-related portfolio behaviour. On this basis they 
expect on the Italian ﬁ  nancial markets a substantial shift from risky assets 
such as stocks and corporate bonds, towards safer ones such as managed 
investments, government bonds and deposits. 
In chapter 10, Wim Boonstra, (Chief Economist, Rabobank Nederlands, 
Utrecht) discusses whether or not it is useful for policymakers to aim at the 
creation of a large international asset position when preparing for population 
ageing. The Netherlands have a well-developed capital-based system of old 
age provisions. The system is compulsory for all employees and implies a 
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surplus. There has been a surplus on the balance of payments current account 
most of the years after Second World War. The Dutch system of old age 
provision is based on the so-called three pillar system. Under capital based 
pension schemes, working people save for their own old-age provision, 
leading to savings surpluses and a build-up of pension wealth in the years 
in which the working group is at its largest. The system can be improved 
by cross-border investments. If in the future the current account turns into 
deﬁ  cit, this can be ﬁ  nanced by bringing down foreign assets. As a result of 
the huge net outﬂ  ows of capital, one would expect the Netherlands to be an 
important creditor nation. The importance of the current account balance 
for the development of the international investment position has, however, 
declined due to the globalisation of companies. Today, investment ﬂ  ows are 
much larger than trade ﬂ  ows and certainly much larger than current account 
balances. Adjustments of the book value of foreign direct investments 
and gains and losses on cross-border holding of securities do not result in 
cross-border cash ﬂ  ows and are therefore outside the scope of the balance of 
payments. Especially for small open economies such as the Netherlands and 
Finland, the cumulative current account balance is affected by the change 
in the international investment position. As concerns cross-border holdings 
of securities, foreign investors have usually realized higher capital gains 
on their portfolio holdings of Dutch securities than the other way around. 
Foreigners have beneﬁ  ted from the relatively good performance of the Dutch 
stock market, while Dutch investors have paid a price for the strength of their 
currency. According to the author, this is an unintended and irrational way 
of spending national wealth. The Dutch experience shows that it is far from 
certain that the creation of extremely large national savings surpluses is of any 
help in meeting the challenges of ageing. 
In chapter 11, Stefan W. Schmitz (Oesterreichische Nationalbank) analyzes 
the impact of demographic developments in Austria on funded pension 
provision in Austria. It is well known that demographic changes have 
implications for the sustainability of public pension systems. The paper 
questions the implicit assumption that private pension provision would 
not be negatively affected by demographic change. The author criticizes 
the so-called “Asset Meltdown” Hypothesis according to which dissaving 
by pensioners may trigger declines in asset prices. The paper contains an 
overview over the expected demographic development in Austria until 2050. 
The share of people above the age of 65 is expected to increase to 28.48 per 
cent. Since 1999, savings products geared to capital markets have gained in 
relative importance. That includes tax-subsidized pension saving products. 
The combined investments of funded pension provision schemes amount to 
some 25 per cent of GDP. This amount is expected to increase considerably 
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author refers to several studies on how ageing can be expected to affect GDP 
growth per capital and labour productivity. All in all, the quantitative studies 
of the impact of demographic change on the macroeconomy conclude that 
demographic change has a negative impact on GDP per capita growth in 
2004  –  2050. The author’s own model is based on a number of simplifying 
assumptions. The economy is supposed to be closed and it excludes monetary 
policy, inﬂ  ationary expectations and ﬁ  nancial market volatility. The effects of 
a decline in the rise of the number of economically active persons are studied. 
The model shows that the impact of demographic change on funded pensions is 
complex. Demographic developments trigger a decrease in long-term average 
real interest rates in Austria. Future productivity growth will fall, which will 
negatively affect funded pension provision. Also an increase in longevity will 
have a strong negative impact on the level of funded pensions. 
In chapter 12, Hana Genorio (Bank of Slovenia) presents estimates of 
the impact of demographic changes on pension and health care expenditures 
in Slovenia. Currently, Slovenian Government debt is relatively low by 
international standards. Data from Eurostat demonstrates that in 2004, Slovenia 
had the ﬁ  fth lowest government debt as percentage of GDP in the EU-25. 
Unfavourable demographic trends endanger, however, debt sustainability 
in the future. The Slovenian population is expected to become the seventh 
oldest population in the world by the year 2050. Long-term sustainability is 
also threatened by low fertility rates, leading to an ever-smaller working-age 
population to support the increasing number of pensioners. The author 
calculates debt sustainability coefﬁ  cients under different scenarios. All the 
coefﬁ   cients are calculated under three different pension indexation rules 
and eight alternative macroeconomic scenarios. The calculations show that 
demographic changes will have a strong impact on future pension and health 
care expenditures. Medium-term debt sustainability coefﬁ  cients show that 
ﬁ  scal adjustments would be needed under almost all scenarios.
*    *    *    *    *
Demographic changes are of great importance. Peoples’ behaviour changes 
as they grow older. So do their needs. Together, decreasing fertility, increasing 
life expectancy and migration explain the ageing trend that can be observed 
in Europe and in other parts of the world. The papers in the present volume 
analyze the far reaching implications for the economy and for the ﬁ  nancial 
markets of these demographic changes. We are conﬁ  dent that the readers will 
appreciate the insight and knowledge that the contributors to this SUERF 
volume have provided concerning these important issues.9
“Then the Lord said, ‘My Spirit will not contend with man forever, for he 
is mortal; his days will be a hundred and twenty years’.” (Genesis, 6:3)
“Youth is sweet and well / But doth speed away! / Let who will be gay, / 
To-morrow, none can tell.” (Lorenzo de’ Medici “il Magnifico”, Trionfo di 
Bacco e Arianna; trans. L. de’ Lucchi)
“…the average duration of human life is proved to have increased in 
recent years. The calculations of various life assurance and annuity offices, 
among other figures which cannot go wrong, have established the fact … 
it is governed by the laws that govern lives in the aggregate.” (Charles
Dickens, Hard Times)
2.1   Introduction 
In his millennial perspective on The World Economy, the eminent 
economic historian Angus Maddison underlined the spectacular rise of 
average life expectation that occurred in the nineteenth and in the twentieth 
century: from a life of 24 years expected at birth in the year 1000 in Western 
Europe, the Western Offshoots (United States, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand) and Japan, a ﬁ  gure of 36 years is estimated for the year 1820, 
reaching 46 years in 1900, 66 in 1950 and 78 at the turn of the century. Less 
spectacular, but still very large, is the progress in the rest of the world, where 
on average life expectation at birth is currently around 65 years. This result 
reﬂ  ects for a large part the dramatic fall in infant mortality. Over the last half 
a century, however, life expectancy at old age has also increased dramatically. 
Following this secular rise in longevity, and partly due to the lower fertility 
rates, as the baby-boom generation reaches retirement the world population 
is now ageing at a very rapid rate (Fig. 2.1). This is particularly evident in 
OECD countries, but is also taking place in several emerging economies, 
most notably in China.
2  Longevity Risk and Financial 
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Figure 2.1  Old-age dependency ratios
Ratio of the population aged 65 years or over to the population aged 15 – 64, in per cent
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: the 2004 Revision.
Living longer and in good health is certainly a marvellous achievement, 
especially if one has the resources to enjoy it. It also poses, however, a series 
of challenges for public ﬁ  nances and the working of labour markets, with 
wide-ranging effects on consumer preferences and corporate strategies. With 
an increasing number of elderly people requiring care and the necessity of 
reforming pension systems devised in an era of lower life expectancy and 
higher fertility rates, the consequences on age-related public expenditures 
might be severe, as many studies by the OECD, the European Commission, 
national agencies and academic economists have indicated. 
Macroeconomic effects of population ageing range from impacts on labour 
supply and its rate of utilisation to investment, productivity and consumption 
patterns, external balances and cross-border capital ﬂ  ows. Among them, an 
educated reading of some recent empirical work suggests that:
Growth and saving rates might tend to fall relative to trend. However, 
if rather than relying on increases in pension contributions to balance 
pay-as-you-go pension systems, contribution rates were held constant, 
retirement age were gradually increased and replacement rates for new 
retirees were gradually reduced, savings might increase signiﬁ  cantly over 
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the next couple of decades in order for consumption levels to be sustained 
upon retirement. 
Without substantial changes in retirement age and in other public pension 
system parameters, strong public spending pressures would be observed, 
while general government revenues would be depressed. A considerable 
increase in age-related public spending would also come through the 
health chapter.
As industrial countries age faster than younger developing countries, shifts 
toward current account surpluses might be observed for some time in the 
former, which would invest in the latter and shift to deﬁ  cits as ageing 
becomes more acute. While this fails to match the current constellation of 
current accounts around the world (the large US current account deﬁ  cit or 
the still rising current account in Japan, with China not being an obvious 
case), the prediction of current accounts moving towards higher surplus in 
industrial countries is widely shared.
 To the extent that retirees sell their ﬁ  nancial assets to a smaller middle-aged 
generation in order to fund consumption, an increasing old-age dependency 
ratio may temporarily translate into downward pressure on asset prices, 
but the size of this effect is likely to be relatively small. Similarly, while 
changes in population structure may affect potential output growth, real 
interest rates and the importance of household wealth in the transmission 
of monetary policy, this should not be such as to require speciﬁ  c policy 
interventions or framework changes.
On the pension front, the expected increase in life expectancy is being 
generally met with higher contributions, lower replacement rates and later 
retirement, even if the process is by no means linear, necessary additional 
reforms are under consideration, and the generation of sufﬁ  cient consensus in 
society has often proved rather laborious. There is no question, however, that 
if life expectancy continues to grow at the rates we have been experiencing 
over the last decades, the exceptional rise in well-being that has been 
achieved so far, in particular since the Second World War, will be maintained 
only by keeping a balance between the increase in longevity and a higher age 
of retirement. 
This said, overall the changes in public pensions are likely to imply, ceteris 
paribus, a noteworthy reduction in retirement income relative to wages. 
Therefore, demographic developments coupled with the growing need to 
provide for retirement privately will probably prompt an increase in the ﬂ  ow 
of saving directed to fund retirement, whether or not this is accompanied by 
an increase in national saving rates. Furthermore, increases in life expectancy 
seem lately to have consistently exceeded forecasts and life expectancy 




life expectancy, which is a loose deﬁ  nition of longevity risk, must also be 
considered in order to ensure that the elderly do not experience signiﬁ  cant 
drops in consumption. While changes in life expectation at old ages certainly 
still call for policy reforms, the longevity risk can be tackled with the help 
of ﬁ  nancial markets, which have already developed an expertise in managing 
various forms of risk. 
In this speech I will ﬁ  rst deﬁ  ne longevity risk and discuss some measurement 
issues; I will then illustrate how longevity risk affects individual behaviour, in 
particular savings patterns, and how this may impact on ﬁ  nancial markets; ﬁ  nally 
I will discuss the availability and development of ﬁ  nancial instruments and 
markets needed to deal with longevity risk. I will conclude by sketching a few 
policy implications arising from increasing longevity and the associated risk.
2.2   Longevity risk: deﬁ  nition and measurement issues
Demographic changes cause both accidental and systematic deviations of 
the number of deaths from their expected values. As observed in a fascinating 
lecture delivered a couple of years ago by Mervyn King on What Fates 
Impose, the former is a proper insurance risk, the random variation around a 
ﬁ  xed known mortality probability. By its very nature it is a pooling risk and 
can therefore be swept away by increasing the number of policies. The latter, 
a collective longevity risk, is due to unexpected changes in mortality trends, 
i.e. a systematic differential between the number of deaths per cohort and its 
expected value. This longevity risk is non-diversiﬁ  able across individuals, 
since it affects all of them in the same way and affects the whole portfolio of 
the insurance provider.
The dynamics of mortality over the last ﬁ  fty years shows a consistent 
pattern across all high-income economies. In particular, data show:
An increase in life expectancy at old ages (65 years and older).
An increase in the mode of the age of death distribution.
A decrease in mortality rates at old ages.
In terms of the shape of the survival function, which plots the number/
fraction of survivors against age, and the curve of deaths, which plots the 
number/fraction of deaths against age, the following features are worthy of 
note:
  The survival function tends to shift towards a rectangular shape due to the 
increasing concentration of deaths around the mode (at old ages) of the 





  The survival function expands to the right, i.e. the mode of the curve of 
deaths moves towards very old ages.
Basically, the cohorts that show the greatest improvement in life 
expectancy are steadily moving upwards. Even more striking is the fact that 
the pace of mortality improvement at older ages seems to be accelerating over 
time. It is not clear whether this counters the view that assumes biological 
limits to the human life-span, say a limit of 120 years as postulated by the 
Bible (after the ages of patriarchs….), and it may very well be that survival 
rates at old ages gradually approach some positive limit rather than converge 
exponentially towards zero. 
To put numbers in perspective, life expectancy at the age bracket 65 – 69 
was between 13 and 14 years for the French, the Japanese and the Italian 
populations in 1950, between 16 and 17 in 1980 and between 19 and 21 in 
2000. This impressive improvement has been common to most industrialised 
countries as well as to the developing world (though to a lesser extent and 
with the grievous exception of Sub-Saharan Africa). In per cent, the ratio of 
life expectancy improvement between 1980 and 2000 has tended to be larger 
at older ages (85 years and older).
From a ﬁ  nancial point of view, while the concentration of deaths around 
the mode reduces the variance of the distribution and so the related risk, the 
expansion phenomenon, i.e. the risk of systematic deviations of mortality 
from the assumed projected behaviour, together with the accelerating trend 
of mortality decline at old ages, increases risk. These trends highlight the 
importance of accurate mortality projections based on stochastic analysis in 
order to provide reliable measures of mortality and of its uncertainty. 
Unfortunately, national statistical agencies in industrial countries seem to 
have systematically under-predicted life expectancy gains, leading to signiﬁ  cant 
under-estimation of the numbers of the elderly, markedly the oldest old. Ofﬁ  cial 
mortality forecasts are traditionally based on forecasters’ subjective judgments, 
in light of historical data and expert opinions. A range of uncertainty is indicated 
by high and low scenarios, built on the basis of subjective opinions. It is 
common practice to deﬁ  ne some upper bound to improvements in mortality, 
usually in terms of a maximum level of life expectancy, based on biomedical 
considerations. This leads to a targeting approach, which consists in interpolating 
between current mortality rates and targets assumed to hold at a given future date, 
thus leaving room for subjective judgment, and perhaps excessive sensitivity to 
short-term trends in mortality. In the actuarial profession parametric methods 
are also popular: they assume a given distribution law for mortality, ﬁ  t the 
parameterised curve to past data and project trends in the parameters forward; 
of course, parameter uncertainty is crucial. Selecting different values for the 
parameters, one may construct different scenarios. 
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Even though multiple scenarios may then be produced, under these two 
approaches it remains difﬁ  cult to attribute a probability assessment to each 
scenario and so obtain measures of uncertainty useful for evaluating ﬁ  nancial 
risks, something akin to conﬁ  dence intervals. On the contrary, methods of 
trend extrapolation, i.e. time-series analysis applied to project historical 
trends in the future, that are widely accepted among demographers, do not 
suffer from these drawbacks. Particularly popular is the model proposed 
by Lee  and  Carter in 1992, where the possibility of age-speciﬁ  c  patterns 
in mortality decline (e.g. that old ages register stronger improvements) is 
explicitly taken into account. This might prove very useful in forecasting 
dependency ratios between retirees and active population. Furthermore, this 
method provides easily understandable uncertainty measures as it allows for 
a stochastic error term and seems to ﬁ  t better the actual mortality trend at old 
ages, not only in terms of life expectancy but also in terms of age distributions 
of death. 
For instance, the Lee-Carter model retroactively applied to US data up 
to 1925 projects a life expectancy for the year 2000 of 72 years at birth, 
reasonably close to the actual ﬁ  gure of 77 and much closer than the ﬁ  gure 
of 65 projected in 1930 by the National Resources Committee of the US 
Government. Using this method, Tuljapurkar, Li and Boe produced in the 
year 2000 projections for the G7 countries that show average life expectancy 
gains by 2050 of about 7 years, twice as large as the average gains in ofﬁ  cial 
projections.
The Lee-Carter model assumes a constant rate of decline in mortality, 
a fact in contrast with the accelerating pattern of mortality improvement. 
Indeed, new recent research has suggested that the ofﬁ  cial forecast error 
might prove even larger than that implied by the Lee-Carter methodology. 
Indeed, there is strong evidence in favour of a historical linear trend in life 
expectancy across all high-income/low-mortality countries: life expectancy 
has increased linearly at a very remarkable pace, with gains exceeding 2 years 
per decade. At this rate, life expectancy would rise by as much as about 
11 years in 2050. 
One should also observe that there are not only forecast errors but also 
lags in the production, adoption and disclosure of mortality tables. The 
cross-country variations in mortality assumptions used by company pension 
schemes seem to be too great to be justiﬁ  ed by the differences in the proﬁ  les 
of their members, as a recent study at Cass Business School has convincingly 
shown. Indeed, this may have dramatic consequences on ﬁ  nancial markets 
and institutions: according to a much quoted calculation by UBS, the FTSE 
100 companies’ combined pension deﬁ  cit of more than £40 billion would rise 
to a £63 billion deﬁ  cit using French mortality tables, but would become a £3 
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simply too large, and call for substantial investment to be made in producing 
and updating timely mortality tables, as well as in better modelling the 
uncertainty around the projections. 
So as the 2005 G10 report concluded: “Regulators should promote 
transparent disclosure of mortality and disability projections and pension 
actuaries should determine the extent to which these projections reﬂ  ect 
actual plan experience and how they model and allow for the uncertainty 
surrounding these estimates in their funding strategies”. Indeed, more could 
and should also come through the market process: in this respect the recent 
launch of the Credit Suisse Longevity Index for the US population is a major 
advance.
Obviously longevity risk is not only faced by company pension schemes 
but by public programmes as well. In order to provide a rough estimate of the 
longevity risk faced by the Italian pension system, for example, if we take the 
population aged 50 years and older (assuming that younger individuals would 
bear most of the cost of pension reforms aimed at correcting the effects of 
longer life expectancy), we can compute the extra pension payments that they 
would receive if they lived longer than expected. Applying from 2005 forward 
the same percentage improvements observed in life expectancy between 1990 
and 2002 (year of the latest ofﬁ  cial mortality table) in net present value terms 
the cost of the shock would be a little under 320 billion euros, corresponding 
to about 10 per cent of the present value of pension liabilities implicit in the 
current system (22 per cent of 2005 GDP, with an average annual ﬂ  ow of 
about half a percentage point of GDP for the next decade, and one percentage 
point in the 2020s and 2030s). Note that this is a conservative estimate of the 
total cost of longevity risk since it does not take into account the fact that 
households will be bearing more of it in the future owing to the decreasing 
substitution rates (pensions are projected to decrease from 60 – 80 to 40 – 60 
per cent of the last wage, with households likely to ﬁ  ll the income gap with 
proceeds from their investments in second and third pillar instruments). 
From this perspective as well, therefore, it is crucial to have better and 
timely updated mortality tables that would allow timely changes to be 
introduced in the pension schemes and the projections to be surrounded by 
an uncertainty band so as to better evaluate the longevity risk. In order to 
reduce the forecast bias, attention should also be given to smoothing the crude 
mortality rates published by government statistical agencies on the basis of 
observed cohort data. After all, we may agree with Charles Dickens’ Mr. 
Gradgrind in Hard Times when he says “the average duration of human life is 
proved to have increased in recent years”, while wishing that his faith in the 
“facts” and especially in the ability of “life assurance and annuity ofﬁ  ces” to 
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2.3   Longevity risk and individual behaviour 
When making their saving and portfolio choices, farsighted investors 
take longevity risk into account. However, their choices are constrained by 
the size and structure of public pension systems and by the degree of market 
incompleteness (in particular, by the limited availability of well-functioning 
annuity markets), which in turn may depend on the level of potential demand 
and the same longevity risk. Indeed, perfectly rational investors in an 
economy with complete markets are in any case exposed to the aggregate 
uninsurable consequences of unexpected changes in average longevity. It has 
also been convincingly argued that, in general, individuals and households 
fail to properly weigh the long-run consequences of their own present 
decisions. Therefore, longevity risk is likely to affect households’ behaviour 
in many ways. 
Under certainty, one not so surprising implication of the life-cycle model 
is that individuals should react to an unexpected increase in longevity by 
working longer and by saving more. When longevity itself is (perceived 
as) uncertain, there is empirical evidence showing that the precautionary 
component of household savings is not negligible. Indeed, it is reasonable to 
assume that the saving rate of agents increases with the amount of longevity 
risk that they face. After all, the precaution motive (“to build up a reserve 
against unforeseen contingencies”) was readily recognised by Keynes in The 
General Theory as one of the main “objects of a subjective character which 
lead individuals to refrain from spending out of their incomes”. The strength 
of this relationship is also inﬂ  uenced by the institutional characteristics of 
the economy. In particular, if fairly priced annuities were available, savings 
would be only modestly affected by longevity risk (or at least its idiosyncratic 
component). The precautionary motive would also be less strong if a 
sizeable public pension system were in place (at least if we assume away 
intergenerational altruism); in countries where the social security system 
has means-tested elements and/or displays a high degree of progressiveness 
(as in the USA or the UK) this is especially true for the poorer groups in the 
population. Even without considering public pensions and privately provided 
annuities, implicit intergenerational contracts inside the household may act as 
a substitute for precautionary savings, by allowing the sharing of the parent’s 
longevity risk with the children. 
The amount of desired precautionary savings decreases if individuals can 
change their labour supply and their portfolio allocation. On the other hand, 
labour market uncertainty and ﬁ  nancial market ﬂ  uctuations can themselves be 
causes of additional saving. While it is reasonable to expect that an increase 
in expected longevity increases the desired portfolio share of risky assets, 
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premium), we do not know much about the impact of longevity risk on 
optimal portfolio allocation. It is plausible, however, to assume that investors 
should react to an increase in longevity risk with a reduced willingness to 
take other kinds of risks, even if they are unrelated to longevity. This in 
turn should imply that, when saving for retirement, investors may demand a 
greater amount of long-term securities, which have a lower reinvestment risk; 
the demand for stocks should also go up as short-period ﬂ  uctuations tend to 
cancel out in the long run. Using the same logic, one should note that the size 
and design of social security arrangements determine the amount of risk (and 
in particular of longevity risk) suffered by workers. As a consequence, social 
security reform could inﬂ  uence in subtle ways optimal portfolio decisions (a 
somewhat counterintuitive implication is that shrinking public pensions could 
actually discourage risk taking). 
As has been widely documented, however, investors often behave in 
less-than-rational ways. This is especially true when economic decisions 
involve a long time horizon and face several sources of uncertainty, as in 
the case of adjusting one’s saving and portfolio choices to face the risk of 
an uncertain lifespan. On one side, individuals may not discount future 
pay-offs at a constant rate. Instead, their discount factor for nearer periods 
may be larger than the discount factor applied to more remote periods. As 
a consequence, they may have a tendency to under-save, as saving implies 
short-term costs in term of consumption, while beneﬁ  ts arise only in the 
future. On the other side, a tendency to underestimate the role of uncertainty 
on the realisation of events in the distant future may reduce the perception 
of the size and impact of longevity risk on one’s future needs and means. 
There is evidence that the decision to save for retirement is indeed plagued 
by myopia and procrastination, that participants of retirement savings plans 
rarely alter their contribution levels or rebalance their portfolios, and that 
default options have long-lasting effects on both variables. As reported by 
Choi et al. in 2001, in a survey of employees 68 per cent of respondents 
complain that they save too little for retirement, 24 per cent plan to raise their 
contributions in the future, but only 3 per cent among them actually do so. 
Voluntary investment in occupational pension plans seems to be boosted if the 
plan policy is one of automatic enrolment, and if the matching contribution of 
the employer is relevant. 
As a consequence, mandatory public schemes could be important to reduce 
under-saving and the effects of inertial behaviour. Furthermore, a widespread 
presence of myopic saving decisions would imply that government laws and 
regulations should encourage the setting of default options which minimise the 
costs of investors’ mistakes. In general, however, the understanding of ﬁ  nancial 
products, concepts and risks should be encouraged through the promotion of 
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and ﬁ  ndings of behavioural economics not only show that ﬁ  nancial education 
does not seem sufﬁ  cient to ensure adequate saving for retirement, but also that 
the awareness of the need to be ﬁ  nancially educated is rather limited. 
Under certainty, an economy in which there are relatively more elderly 
people with respect to the working age population (e.g. due to an increase in 
average longevity) should have a higher saving rate, a higher steady state level 
of capital per capita, and consequently higher wage rates and lower interest 
rates. Under uncertainty, if agents face an increase in uninsurable longevity risk 
(and if we exclude the very special case of quadratic preferences and certainty 
equivalence), there should be an additional demand for savings due to the 
precautionary motive. In the real world both the effects of increased average 
longevity and those of an increase in longevity risk are likely to be present and 
to reinforce each other. Market and institutional failures that may limit a proper 
response then deserve to be investigated in depth and duly removed.
Finally, besides these steady state effects, demographics can also exert 
transitory (albeit long-lasting) effects on interest rates and asset prices. An 
example is given by the danger of the so-called asset meltdown, linked to the 
retirement of the baby boom generation (here the problem would be caused 
by a transitory increase in fertility, as opposed to a permanent decrease in 
mortality). While these effects are theoretically clear, their magnitude is 
likely to be small, due to the two factors we have highlighted in the previous 
pages: the institutional features of many economies (in particular, sizeable 
public pension systems and underdeveloped annuity markets) and the myopic 
and inertial behaviour of many investors. These two effects are likely to be 
mutually self-sustained: more farsighted individuals would probably vote 
to shrink or at least to change the structure of social security systems in the 
face of worrying demographic perspectives; they would also demand more 
annuities, reducing their costs. Also the general equilibrium effects induced 
by demographic developments on ﬁ  nancial markets are likely to be smaller 
in an open economy. Indeed, if capital is freely mobile among countries, it 
will move from ageing to young countries, reducing the volatility of interest 
rates and asset returns. 
2.4   The retirement savings industry and ﬁ  nancial markets
Longevity risk then poses a challenge to households that do not rely almost 
exclusively on public pension schemes to sustain themselves. If a signiﬁ  cant 
fraction of their income is made of returns on real and ﬁ  nancial wealth, 
individuals that live longer than expected may draw down their wealth too 
soon, thus entering their ﬁ   nal years without enough income to support 
themselves. Privately funded pension arrangements then become a natural 
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pension arrangements has already been observed, relying more heavily on 
deﬁ  ned contributions, and in some cases with pension funds becoming the 
largest class of institutional investors. Insurance companies also play an 
important role, and in some countries are currently the main provider of 
funded retirement saving products. A further substantial increase in the size 
of the pension fund industry will probably be observed in the coming years, 
accompanied by a greater inﬂ  uence on ﬁ  nancial markets. In the G10 countries, 
aggregate pension fund assets already represent more than 20 per cent and 10 
per cent of equity and bond market capitalisations, respectively, albeit with 
great variability across countries. It is therefore relevant to examine the recent 
developments and possible prospects of the pension fund industry.
Relaxed liability management experienced during the 1990s stock market 
growth, in conjunction with increases in longevity beyond earlier actuarial 
projections, the 2000  –  02 sharp fall in equity prices and declining bond 
yields (increasingly used as the basis for discounting liabilities), has led to the 
emergence of funding gaps in occupational deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans in several 
countries. In particular, relevant duration gaps have emerged between pension 
funds’ assets and liabilities, due to the mismatching of maturities and the 
insufﬁ  cient hedging of market risks.
Policy initiatives have aimed at increasing the viability of deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  ts 
pension systems in the longer run, including through strengthened supervisory 
oversight and the adoption of more rigorous risk-based approaches. A notable 
trend has been the continued move in several countries towards deﬁ  ned 
contribution schemes. Market-based, fair value accounting standards have 
been introduced. On the regulatory front, measures increasingly require 
pension plan managers to assess more fully the ﬁ   nancial cost of the 
pension beneﬁ  t promises offered to plan participants, review pension fund 
investment strategies and increasingly focus on asset-liability management 
considerations.
2.4.1  Long-horizon, index-linked and longevity bonds 
Currently, however, there is a perceived lack of instruments for pension 
funds to properly hedge interest rate, inﬂ   ation and longevity risks. The 
evidence shows that:
Most advanced economies’ markets for long-dated bonds are still too small 
relative to the size of pension fund and insurance company portfolios (Fig. 
2.2). Even in the United States, the deepest market for long-term bonds, 
the market size for maturities beyond 10 years is relatively modest. In 
the most recent years there has been a return of interest in issuing long 
and ultra long government bonds but, at around 5 years, the duration of 
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public debt in most countries is still rather short. In most mature markets 
private corporations, such as capital-intensive industries, utilities, and 
ﬁ  nancial services (banks and insurers), may also wish to issue longer-term 
securities. So far, however, price uncertainty resulting from the lack of 
public benchmarks, tax disincentives in some countries, as well as more 
cyclical factors may have been an obstacle. 
As in the case of long-dated bonds, the supply of index-linked bonds also 
remains insufﬁ  cient to meet potential demand. The scale of the shortage 
of indexed securities is illustrated by the fact that occupational pension 
funds and life insurance companies in the United Kingdom already have 
80 per cent of outstanding long-dated and index-linked gilts. This holds 
even with an asset allocation to bonds at many funds of only 20 – 30 per 
cent of their total portfolio. Indeed, the potential demand for pension funds 
and life insurance providers may exceed current supply by three times or 
more (Table 2.1). Given the limited supply of long-dated and index-linked 
bonds, fund managers have increasingly employed derivative instruments 
in order to improve the consistency between portfolio duration and pension 
liability structure and/or to obtain protection against inﬂ  ation or interest 
rate risks. It is not clear how far trustees are aware of this action.
Figure 2.2  Size of the G10 long-term and inflation-linked bond markets
      
in per cent of global pension fund assets 
Sources: Watson Wyatt; International Financial Services, London; OECD; Barclays; Merrill Lynch; 
and IMF staff estimates.
Also, longevity risk management could beneﬁ  t from the availability of 
longevity bonds, which could, in turn, encourage insurance and reinsurance 
companies to increase their supply of annuity products. Mortality-linked 
Ɣ
ƔIgnazio Visco 21
securities could also provide some hedge against longevity risk, even if 
not a perfect one as mortality, while certainly correlated with longevity, is 
unfortunately not limited to the very old. Another possibility, to date still 
hypothetical, might be the recourse to macro-swaps, through which (for 
example) the pension fund and health care industries may exchange their 
opposite exposures to longevity.
It is a fact that ﬁ  nancial institutions which are exposed to longevity risk 
and need ways to manage it have traditionally been hampered by a scarcity 
of hedging instruments. The ﬁ  rst market instruments suitable for hedging 
longevity risk have recently been introduced by ﬁ  nancial institutions: e.g. 
the 3-year mortality bond issued by Swiss Re and the 25-year longevity 
bond presented (but not placed yet) by the European Investment Bank. The 
ﬁ  rst instrument is a bond whose principal payment is tied to an international 
mortality index. The second is a (group) annuity bond whose annual coupon 
payment is tied to the survivorship of some reference population; as the 
members of this population die off, the coupon payment gradually falls. 
Table 2.1  Potential demand for long-term and inflation-linked bonds:   
Selected countries
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States 1,266 233 13,432 451 677
United
Kingdom 241 155 2,476 313 469
France 178 92 1,055 195 293
Italy 241 28 370 69 103
Japan 427 22 2,251 251 376
In billions of US dollars; amount outstanding at the end of 2004
Sources: Ageing and Pension System Reform, Report to the G10 Deputies, 2005; Pension Markets 
in Focus, OECD Newsletter, December 2005.
Although it raised a strong interest in the ﬁ  nancial community, the EIB 
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redesign. This experience has raised a number of issues which must be dealt 
with in order to create a proper market for longevity risk. Among them, as 
capital is costly and there are further risks to hedge (e.g. interest rate, inﬂ  ation, 
investment risks) which already absorb capital, it might be difﬁ  cult to stand 
by the requirement to commit the entire principal. Longevity securities 
must have a high degree of gearing in order to raise sufﬁ  cient demand from 
longevity exposed ﬁ   nancial institutions. This makes a case for mortality 
derivatives like swaps or forwards. Furthermore, demand is potentially large, 
calling for issues of signiﬁ  cant size, suitable to create adequate liquidity (the 
EIB bond was a mere GBP 540m issue). Also, as longevity risk tends to 
concentrate in the long term (due to the difﬁ  culties of projecting long-term 
mortality), 25-year maturity bonds might not be long enough. Finally, basis 
risk (i.e. imperfect hedging capacity) stems both from the maturity mismatch 
and the imperfect matching between the mortality experience of the reference 
population for the security and that of the group of annuity or pension fund 
claim holders. From this experience, however, much has been understood, 
and this is the foundation of progress.
In order to allow some degree of intergenerational risk sharing, an 
intriguing proposal (by Boeri et al., 2006) consists in promoting collective 
pension funds that mix older and younger generations of participants. The 
main idea is to shift from ﬁ  nal-pay with recovery premium schemes (which, 
by the way, distort labour markets by charging larger contributions in case 
of a shortfall of assets with respect to liabilities) to career-average with 
conditional pension rights schemes that allow younger workers to share wage 
risk with older ones and reduce the increases in contributions that would be 
needed should the fund experience a shortfall in assets with respect to its 
liabilities. In essence, older participants would have senior claims on the 
fund’s assets, while younger ones would have equity-type claims. While 
a difﬁ  culty might be raised by the fact that the attribution of participants to 
the older and younger generations might itself depend on the demographic 
changes, a question linked to the preceding discussion is that the shift from 
an equity to a bond portfolio is essentially a shift from a variable to a ﬁ  xed 
return. Again, sufﬁ  ciently deep markets for long-horizon and index-liked 
bonds would be needed.
2.4.2   Annuities
As observed, households will increasingly face longevity risk, directly or 
indirectly. Much can be done to provide insurance against its idiosyncratic 
component, to maximise the share of wealth allocated to face it and to share 
it with future generations. In general, as individuals and households are 
increasingly charged with the responsibility of managing their own retirement Ignazio Visco 23
savings, the availability of a variety of retail products becomes crucial. 
For instance, “life cycle” funds have been developed that allow portfolio 
rebalances consistent with the changing risk proﬁ  le of workers as they age. In 
principle, structured products (including capital or performance guarantees) 
offer diversiﬁ  ed risk/return proﬁ  les; however, given their higher complexity 
and risk exposure, they are likely to require the introduction or strengthening 
of consumer protection measures. Increasingly important for individuals 
and households would then be the existence of well developed markets for 
annuities, ﬁ  nancial contracts that convert long-term savings into dependable 
income streams after retirement.
Given the magnitude of longevity risk, one would expect individuals to 
insure themselves against it; however, the markets for annuities, the most 
widespread instrument devised for this purpose and a product that has been 
sold for centuries, are generally underdeveloped (especially for individuals) 
and the number of institutions providing annuity products is declining. For 
example, in the United Kingdom, a country in which Social Security offers 
only a small coverage and individuals are expected to live off their (adequately 
invested) savings, annuities cover less than 10 per cent of longevity risk in 
the private sector.
There are many possible reasons, on the demand as well as on the supply 
side, why annuity markets are less developed than expected. Among them: 
The existence of annuitised resources from (public or private) deﬁ  ned 
beneﬁ  ts plans; bequest motives; lack of understanding of annuity products 
by households.
The taxation design; in some countries, for instance, ﬁ  scal rules have 
historically favoured lump-sum withdrawals at the expense of annuities.
Real or perceived cost issues, due in part to adverse selection effects, 
although these can be partly overcome via mandatory annuitisation, as 
suggested by some recent experience, as well as opaque or inefﬁ  cient 
pricing by insurance companies.
However, on the money’s worth of annuities the evidence is mixed: 
adverse selection certainly plays a role but the discount on the fair value is 
not very high in many countries and seems to be shrinking (it is almost never 
higher than 10 per cent, often lower than 5 per cent). Furthermore, risk averse 
customers should be willing to pay for a product that does not give back 
100 per cent of its money’s worth in order to be insured.
A further issue might be that annuities insure against longevity risk but, 
as they are sold now, they do not protect against other risks, which might be 
deemed more relevant by many households. For example, most annuities do 




to a large extent. Standard annuities distribute income in an inﬂ  exible way and 
do not provide protection against liquidity shocks, for example related to health 
issues. Finally, annuities do not give back any upside of higher-than-expected 
investment returns and are therefore an inferior investment vehicle (although 
they should really be considered an insurance product). 
On the supply side, in order to match assets and liabilities insurance 
companies should invest in assets with a duration that is comparable to the 
duration of an annuity. However, the latter is high and, as we have seen, there 
are not many assets with a similar duration; therefore, insurance companies 
would be taking on some ﬁ  nancial risk on top of longevity risk. A more subtle 
issue, perhaps, is the systematic nature of longevity risk, which can only be 
shared across generations. Only the idiosyncratic component is diversiﬁ  able, 
the collective risk has no obvious hedge; sectors that might beneﬁ  t from 
increased life expectancy, such as pharmaceuticals or health-care related 
industries, are much too small compared to the extent of risk carried by the 
private sector – even if they issued liabilities contingent on longevity they 
would take on at best a small fraction of risk. 
2.4.3   Reverse mortgages 
Annuities are the classical answer to longevity risk, but not the only one. In 
fact, annuities make sense only for people whose ﬁ  nancial wealth is sufﬁ  cient 
to buy them a signiﬁ  cant income, but given that the distribution of wealth is 
skewed the number of eligible households is relatively small – and composed 
of the wealthiest ones, which hardly represent a concern in terms of old-age 
poverty. On the other hand, since real estate is for households both a major 
savings vehicle and a currently consumed asset, ﬁ  nancial instruments that 
support these two functions may also play an important role. In this regard, 
the introduction of products that allow price risk to be hedged to protect both 
existing home-owners (and institutions) and prospective purchasers (saving to 
buy a home) as speciﬁ  cally as possible, yet providing liquidity as well, might 
become a fruitful enterprise.
If one looks at Italian data on, for example, households headed by a person 
aged 65 and up to 80, three things stand out:
The share of disposable income derived from a pension is more than 
two-thirds for 75 per cent of them: in effect they are already annuitised to 
a large extent.
Even for the 25 per cent in the highest disposable income quartile, a rough 
measure of annuitisation of half of their ﬁ  nancial wealth (a rule-of-thumb 
indication of how much they could annuitise) would only yield something 
around 20 per cent of their disposable income.
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On the other hand, most ‘65-80 year old’ households have substantial 
wealth invested in real estate: more than 75 per cent of them own some 
property (55 per cent in the lowest quartile of the disposable income 
distribution) and a rough measure of annuitisation yields at least 25 per 
cent of disposable income, even for the households in the lowest quartile 
(and it could be much more if one assumes that this real estate consists 
mainly of a home and that it is possible to extract its full equity value).
Obviously today’s wealth composition and distribution depends on the 
current older generation’s expectations as to their situation at retirement and 
is likely to change in the future, but the weight of real estate will probably 
always be signiﬁ  cant. In Italy housing wealth already constitutes the largest 
part of total household wealth (60 per cent). In other countries such as the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and the Netherlands, it ranges 
between 30 and 40 per cent of total net worth. Therefore, if we want households 
to contribute more towards sustaining themselves after retirement, we must 
think of ways to extract wealth from where it is: in real estate. 
In this respect it is perhaps surprising that reverse mortgages are still rare. 
Even in the United States, where the market is most developed, the volume of 
loans is still rather low (Fig. 2.3), even if it has been increasing substantially 
in the most recent years (from 38,000 in FY 2004 it has risen to 43,000 in FY 
2005 and to 56,000 in the ﬁ  rst nine months of the current ﬁ  scal year). Sound 
policy would remove whatever regulatory and tax impediments there are to 
buying and selling them. Furthermore, reverse mortgages presumably offer a 
stream of income precisely to some of those that need it most, i.e. the elderly 
that do not have close relatives who could provide assistance. This is because 
those who do have close relatives would probably like to bequeath their real 
estate to them in exchange for care (a sort of unwritten social contract), while 
those who do not have relatives but hold some real estate are reluctant to sell 
it if their real estate provides housing services. A reverse mortgage would 
allow this class of elderly to live in their own home while consuming its 
equity value.
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Figure 2.3  Reverse mortgages in the United States
   years)
Number of federally-insured reverse mortgage loans, fiscal years
Sources: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development; U.S. Mortgage Bankers 
Association.
With standard reverse mortgages, the issuer faces two risks: longevity risk 
and housing price risk. On the other hand, the buyer forfeits the possibility 
of leaving his or her home as a bequest. Longevity risk is not currently 
hedgeable, but housing price risk could be diversiﬁ  ed away, especially if it 
were possible to trade on housing price indices – some of which are starting 
to be used in the United States. As for bequests, some companies already offer 
the possibility of keeping a share of the property’s value for this purpose. 
Making reverse mortgages possible, affordable and desirable would go a long 
way towards enabling households to insure against longevity risk.
2.5   Policy implications 
By way of conclusion, the prospective development of private pension 
systems, and the increasing need for institutions and individuals to improve 
management of longevity risk, require a comprehensive and coherent set 
of policy actions. Policy recommendations can be grouped under four 
headings:
  Support economic growth, including by increasing national saving and its 
efﬁ  cient allocation.
  Facilitate the development and expansion of markets for under-supplied 
ﬁ  nancial instruments that will be useful for retirement savings and the 
provision of pension beneﬁ  ts.
  Develop regulatory and supervisory frameworks that encourage more 
rigorous risk management, greater transparency, and better governance 
at private pension funds, including by ensuring consistent accounting 




 Provide adequate protection to pension beneﬁ  ciaries, among other through 
ﬁ  nancial education programmes.
2.5.1  Saving and growth
First of all, in order to offset the possible negative effects of ageing on 
living standards and ﬁ  scal balances, policies should support economic growth 
and the efﬁ  cient use of resources. In this regard, measures that promote 
the supply of labour and increase its productivity are crucial; national 
saving should be increased and its efﬁ  cient allocation encouraged (relaxing 
regulations restricting the amount of foreign assets held by domestic pension 
funds is an example).
Incentives are essential in order to facilitate later retirement; further 
increases in statutory retirement ages may also be necessary. Private pension 
system coverage should be broadened, especially in cases where it is still 
too low. In this respect, making enrolment mandatory and automatic would 
be of help, as already demonstrated by the experience of several countries. 
Tax systems should guarantee a level playing ﬁ   eld between different 
retirement income products; deductions for contributions are important but 
the exploitation of tax deferrals should be avoided.
2.5.2  Financial instruments and markets
Second, as long-term matching securities are needed, while supply 
should eventually be forthcoming to meet the emerging demand, policy-
makers might consider how to promote the development of markets for the 
transfer and pooling of investment and longevity risk between private agents. 
Governments might issue inﬂ   ation-indexed and ultra-long ﬁ  xed  income 
securities, also recognising, for market building purposes, that the objective of 
their issuance strategies goes beyond the minimisation of borrowing costs. 
Regarding the difﬁ  culty of hedging longevity risk (related to the scarcity 
of natural buyers), public longevity-indexed bond issues could play a catalytic 
role in developing the market, by limiting price uncertainty and information 
costs for potential issuers. Government issuance would not only provide 
a benchmark but might stimulate the improvement of mortality tables and 
projections in order to develop better indices. Even if at this stage issues 
of such bonds do not show evident net beneﬁ  ts from a purely public debt 
management perspective, governments may have an advantage over the 
private sector as underwriters, given the beneﬁ  ts of the intergenerational 
sharing of extreme old-age risk.
Measures that improve the taxation design, favour a higher degree of 
ﬁ  nancial literacy and reduce adverse selection in the market for annuities to 
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provide insurance against idiosyncratic longevity risk would be welcome. 
Insurance companies are good at pricing risk almost at an individual level, 
but for some reason they do not do it for annuities. There is a trade-off 
between encouraging them to apply their industry practices to this market, 
thus reducing adverse selection, and going too far, thus putting out of the 
market those most in need of insurance. Some level of cross-subsidy should 
be allowed in order to keep annuities affordable for everybody. In this 
perspective, the development of a market for longevity bonds to reduce the 
systematic component of longevity risk in the market for annuities would 
probably be helpful. 
Policies that would help develop a market for reverse mortgages should 
also be encouraged. The market for mortgages has greatly beneﬁ  ted from 
actions such as better data collection on housing prices and default rates, 
securitisation (which allows mortgage issuers to ofﬂ  oad  unwanted  risk), 
government guarantees, favourable tax treatment of interest payment. The 
market for reverse mortgages would beneﬁ  t from the same set of policies, 
adapted to this speciﬁ  c product.
2.5.3  Prudential regulation and supervision
Third, it is necessary to strengthen the oversight of pension providers to 
ensure solvency, satisfactory performance and good governance. Possible 
gaps with respect to regulation in banking and insurance sectors must be 
closed. Prudent asset-liability management principles should be encouraged. 
Mark-to-market valuations to preserve funding targets are generally desirable 
but may increase the volatility of funding requirements and, in turn, of 
ﬁ  nancial markets. A certain degree of regulatory forbearance, coupled with 
sufﬁ  ciently long recovery periods for eliminating funding gaps could alleviate 
the effect of under-funding on volatility.
The disclosure of mortality and disability projections should be made 
transparent and better modelling of mortality projections, as well as 
the uncertainty surrounding demographic estimates, should be promoted. 
Disclosure of their use in funding plan strategies should also be pursued. 
Tax incentives and possibly even mandatory provisions should push pension 
funds to hold buffers above full funding in order to resist adverse variations 
in assets and liabilities. 
The growing savings intermediation role of pension funds and other 
non-bank ﬁ   nancial institutions, while positive for the breadth, depth and 
efﬁ  ciency  of  ﬁ   nancial markets, may make it harder for supervisors and 
policy-makers to assess accurately the distribution of risks and the possible 
threats to the stability of the ﬁ   nancial system. Moreover, regulatory and 
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the risk of “herding” behaviour) and the development of dynamic hedging 
techniques, with potentially destabilising effects on markets. In this regard, 
policy changes should aim at preserving the long-term perspective of pension 
funds’ investment strategies (which may help dampen rather than amplify 
volatility).
2.5.4  Protection of pension beneﬁ  ciaries
I have already addressed the issue of the role that the government might 
play in addressing market failure, for example with reference to annuities 
and reverse mortgages, and in providing for a better market response to 
risk taking, from market building to perhaps some further risk taking in 
direct issues of ultra-long and index-linked bonds as well as in the case of 
longevity risk. The role of government as “insurer of last resort” is possibly 
even more delicate. As investment risks and responsibilities are increasingly 
shifted to individuals, policy measures should aim at ensuring an adequate 
level of pension beneﬁ  ciaries’ protection. Prudent funding is the fundamental 
safeguard against possible plan bankruptcy. Additional protection could 
be provided by collective pension guarantee arrangements, but premiums 
charged by guarantee funds should adequately reﬂ  ect the risks to which they 
are exposed. 
This does not seem to have been the case in recent experience, suggesting 
that careful design is required. For instance, moral hazard can be reduced by 
limiting the type and amount of beneﬁ  ts covered, unwarranted cross-subsidies 
can be avoided by charging risk-based premiums and the investment of 
the guarantee funds may also need to ensure a good duration match with 
their liabilities. Special treatment such as call on collateral from the plan 
sponsor and priority in bankrupt proceedings may also be considered. In 
general, however, one might argue that providing an insurance against the 
collective component of longevity risk might be a proper use of public 
resources. This would call a reduction in the exposure of the government to 
the more idiosyncratic components of this risk, for instance by encouraging 
a more balanced composition of pension pillars, limiting the role of the State 
and encouraging the insurance of idiosyncratic longevity risk in ﬁ  nancial 
markets.
Transparency in the information provided by ﬁ  nancial institutions should 
be enhanced and possible conﬂ  icts of interest fully disclosed. Investment in 
plan sponsor securities should be limited. Correct incentives for sales agents 
and distributors should be promoted, including through codes of conduct and 
adequate remuneration. Financial education programmes are useful; they 
increase consumers’ ﬁ  nancial consciousness and so help them avoid abuses 
and fraud, improve their investment choices, and raise their contributions Ignazio Visco 30
to private pension plans. However, as witnessed with deﬁ  ned contributions 
plans in several countries, even rational individuals who understand risks 
and expected pay-offs may exhibit inertia in their decisions and are sensitive 
to how choices are framed. This may argue for encouraging some degree of 
automatic enrolment, opt-out requirements and default options. 
To conclude, as Lorenzo il Magniﬁ  co emphasised over half a millennium 
ago, it is true that “tomorrow none can tell”. However, it is exactly his 
hyperbolic discounting (if not moral hazard) of just enjoying “youth [that] 
is sweet and well” without caring for the future that should be avoided. 
Otherwise, for the average human being, with the obvious exception of the 
Medicis of our time, and for societies at large the costs of dismissing “what 
fates impose” might be very high indeed.
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In the   United States, global imbalances are the Number 1 issue on the 
minds of ﬁ   nancial economists. Are the U.S. current account deﬁ  cit  and 
Chinese current account surplus sustainable? And if they cannot continue 
indeﬁ  nitely at current levels, then for how long will they persist? If adjustment 
is inevitable, what form will it take? Finally, what are the implications for 
other regions, not least Europe? These are among the questions that dominate 
current discussion.
Many reasons are offered for why   China should be in surplus and the 
  United States should be in deﬁ  cit and for why this situation may or may not 
change. The U.S. has a ﬂ  exible economy well adapted to the opportunities 
afforded by new information and communications technologies, making 
it an attractive place to invest. Or U.S. monetary and ﬁ  scal policies have 
artiﬁ   cially depressed national savings.   China’s underdeveloped ﬁ  nancial 
markets impose credit constraints that prevent households from borrowing 
against higher future incomes. Or its corporate sector is singularly proﬁ  table, 
producing high corporate savings, while Chinese households uncertain about 
future employment prospects in a country undergoing structural change have 
an incentive to engage in high levels of precautionary saving. In some sense, 
this last set of observations is the most striking:   China’s aggregate savings 
rates of more than 45 per cent are unprecedented for what is still a relatively 
poor country. Their existence provides the impetus for an important strand of 
thinking on global imbalances, known as the global-savings-glut view1.
Aﬁ  nal explanation for global imbalances, as participants in this meeting 
will anticipate, is demography. The   United States has a more rapidly growing 
population than Europe or   Japan, which gives it more economic ﬂ  exibility 
and, other things equal, makes it a more attractive place to invest2. Given the 
attractions of investing in America, it makes sense that the country should be 
importing capital and running a current account deﬁ  cit.   China, on the other 
hand, has a relatively low dependency ratio, and a relatively low old-age 
dependency ratio in particular. It makes sense, therefore, that the country 
should be saving a lot and perhaps also running a current account surplus3.
In thinking about the future, we should also be thinking about the impact 
of demography. While the elderly share of the labor force will rise modestly 
1 See Bernanke (2005).
2 According to analysts like Richard Cooper (2006).
3 My own view (Eichengreen 2006a) is that the sources of the U.S. and Chinese current account 
balances are more numerous than simply this, but I defer discussion of this to the last section. There is 
also an apparent inconsistency in the conventional statements summarized in this paragraph that I return 
to below.
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in the   United States, it will rise sharply in   China as early as 2015 – that is, 
starting less than a decade from now. If the life-cycle model is any guide, this 
should result in a decline in household savings rates, other things equal4.
Although the literature on these issues is extensive, it is notable for its 
lack of consensus5. Hans Fehr, Sabine Jokisch and Lawrence Kotlikoff (2005) 
and Luis Kuijs (2006) forecast no signiﬁ  cant changes in   China’s savings, 
investment, and current account as a result of demographic factors. On the 
other hand, authors like Matthew Higgins (1998) and Melanie Luhrmann 
(2003) predict a sharp fall in Chinese savings rates and a sharp deterioration 
in   China’s current account, which in turn implies a change in the pattern of 
global imbalances. 
In this lecture I will argue that this disagreement has two dimensions. 
First, different authors have in mind different time horizons, which naturally 
inﬂ  uence the conclusions they draw. We can see this in the fact that the share 
of the Chinese population over the age of 64 is projected to rise from 8 per 
cent in 2005 to 10 per cent in 2015, 15 per cent in 2025, 20 per cent in 2035, 
and 25 per cent in 20456.
Figure 3.1  Share of Chinese Population by Age Group
Source: Chamon and Prasad (2006).
Over the next decade, in other words, this change is still relatively limited, 
but over a 40 year horizon it means essentially a tripling of the elderly share 
4 The careful listener will note that the preceding sentence contained two big caveats: “if the life-cycle 
model is any guide” and “other things equal.” I will return to both of them.
5 In my own effort to survey the literature for purposes of this lecture, I counted upward of three dozen 
relevant publications, only a subset of which is included in the reference list attached to this manuscript.
6 I have rounded off the United Nations’ Population Forecasts to round numbers, reﬂ  ecting my 
assumption that those forecasts are only approximate – see Johnson (2004). Barry  Eichengreen 33
of the population. The time horizon with which we are concerned thus matters 
greatly for the implications we draw.
Second, different authors draw different conclusions from cross country 
regressions. Some studies like IMF (2004) focus on the old age dependency 
ratio, and infer from this that savings rates in countries like   China will decline 
in coming decades. Others like Marcos Chamon and Eswar Presad (2005) 
– ironically, also of the IMF – supplement this with estimates of the impact 
of the youth-dependency ratio on savings, and conclude the opposite, namely 
that household savings may in fact rise insofar as the share of young people in 
the population declines even faster than the share of elderly rises7. In practice 
it appears to be more difﬁ  cult to obtain well-deﬁ  ned estimates of the impact 
of the youth-dependency ratio on aggregate savings, but this is no excuse for 
ignoring the channel. 
In addition, while considerable attention has been paid to the effects of 
demographic variables on saving, we know less about the impact of those 
same variables on investment. Most cross country estimates suggest that 
a higher old-age dependency ratio reduces not only domestic saving but also 
domestic investment. The argument here is that “some fraction of the capital 
stock may become obsolete due to shrinking labor force and diminishing 
returns to scale, making the accumulation of capital…less attractive” 
(to quote Axel Borsch-Supan, Alexander Ludwig and Joachim Winter, 
2001). Capital having less labor to cooperate with, a smaller working-age 
population means less investment, unless one assumes a very high elasticity 
of substitution in the aggregate production function. The implication is that 
a higher old-age dependency ratio will affect savings and investment in the 
same direction. Both will decline as a population ages, minimizing the impact 
on the country’s capital account. Proper treatment of the youth dependency 
ratio introduces many of the same issues. 
In what follows I will revisit these connections. But a few caveats before 
proceeding. First, it is important to acknowledge at the outset that none of the 
conventional explanations provides a totally satisfactory explanation savings 
behavior in   China – or, for that matter, in the   United States. Thus, even when 
the conventional cross section regressions are augmented by nonstandard 
variables,   China and the   United States are still outliers – with Chinese savings 
rates signiﬁ  cantly higher than predicted and U.S. rates signiﬁ  cantly lower8.
International comparisons are useful for identifying what is distinctive about 
U.S. and Chinese experience, but at some level the sources of that distinctive 
behavior still remain unclear.
7 “May” because the estimated impact of youth dependency on savings is typically smaller than the 
impact of old-age dependency on savings, as we will see below.
8 For the Chinese case, Kraay (2000) and Kuijs (2006) make this point. On the U.S. case, see Gale and 
Sabelhaus (1999), Parker (1999), and Marquis (2002). Barry  Eichengreen 34
Second, in what follows I will have relatively little to say about the 
ﬁ  ndings of studies employing global simulation models. An important strand 
of literature relies heavily on such model simulations. But these simulations, 
virtually without exception, predict that the advanced industrial countries, 
not least the   United States, should be exporting capital while   China and the 
developing world generally should be importing it, and build their policy 
analysis on this basis. The baseline is clearly at variance with the facts, which 
implies that these models are leaving out something important9.
Third and ﬁ  nally, a more complete analysis would entail considering not 
only savings-investment balances in   China, or in   China and the U.S., but also 
in other regions. A number of similar issues in fact arise in these contexts. 
For example, it is widely argued that Europe’s current account will move 
into deﬁ  cit as its population ages and its elderly population saves less. Here, 
again, the issues are how soon – speciﬁ  cally, soon enough to matter for the 
resolution of global imbalances? – and whether it is appropriate to assume 
that population ageing will have little if any impact on investment rates. 
While these regions are not my focus in this talk, I will at least touch on them 
in passing.
Analyzing the connections between demography and current account 
balances involves considering their impact on both savings and investment, 
since the current account is the difference between these two magnitudes.
In practice, we know considerably more about the demographic 
determinants of savings. Both the macro and micro evidence – with a few 
exceptions I will mention momentarily – is convincing on the lower savings 
rates of the elderly. Studies using panels of macroeconomic data consistently 
ﬁ   nd a negative relationship between saving and the old-age dependency 
ratio10.
Controversy centers on two issues. The ﬁ  rst of these, whether the elderly 
dissave or just have lower savings rates than working age individuals, is of 
second order importance for present purposes. The answer matters for the 
elasticity of aggregate savings with respect to the old-age dependency ratio 
but not for the existence of the effect11. The second question is whether the 
pattern applies to  China. While studies using aggregate time series (e.g. Franco 
Modigliani and Shi Cao 2004) tend to answer in the afﬁ  rmative, authors using 
survey data are not so sure. Using household surveys, Aart Kray (2000) and 
Charles Horioka and Jumin Wan (2006) do not ﬁ  nd a negative impact of 
the old age dependency ratio on savings by rural households12. Horioka and 
9 Which is presumably why one of the best of these studies, by Brooks (2003), refers to its simulations 
of “a parallel universe.”
10 The standard reference here is Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (2000). A large additional 
literature could be cited; my own take on the issues is in Eichengreen and Fifer (2002) and Eichengreen 
(2006a).
11 The literature on whether the elderly in fact dissave stems from Hayashi, Ando and Ferris (1988).
12 If anything, that impact is positive and signiﬁ  cant. Barry  Eichengreen 35
Wan explain this by arguing that the elderly in   China rely heavily on support 
from their children and little if at all on their own dissaving. But while this 
can explain why one does not observe higher savings rates among elderly 
individuals, one should still see lower savings rates by their households, since 
households are simply amalgams of the individuals in question13. Extended 
families should tend to save more while Grandpa is still in the labor force 
and less when he stops working. I conclude that the Chinese data remain a bit 
of a mystery. But the aggregate evidence of a negative link running from the 
old-age dependency ratio to national savings is indisputable.
Interestingly, the two sets of evidence – those drawn from macroeconomic 
analysis of cross country data and household surveys for   China – show the 
opposite for youth dependency ratios. Here household surveys for   China (e.g. 
Horioka and Wan 2006) show a strong negative effect on savings of a higher 
youth dependency rate. On the other hand, panel-based studies of national 
aggregates ﬁ  nd this result only when estimated by random effects (allowing 
the error term to differ by country) and not by ﬁ  xed effects (which removes the 
country-speciﬁ  c mean). This is the ﬁ  nding both of my 2002 study with Molly 
Fifer and of a 2006 study by Luis Kuijs14. Some studies like IMF (2005) have 
sought to “ﬁ  nesse” this problem by including only the old-age dependency 
ratio in their savings equations. Others like Matthew Higgins (1998) have 
addressed it by distinguishing not just the youth- and old-age dependency 
ratios but each ﬁ  ve year age group, while imposing a polynomial structure 
on the coefﬁ  cients. With these additional restrictions they are able to obtain 
a signiﬁ  cant negative impact on savings of the share of the population under 
the age of ten. My reading of the literature, overall, is that there does exist 
a  negative relationship between youth-dependency and aggregate savings 
rates, although it is smaller than the effect of the old-age dependency ratio15.
13 This is essentially the insight behind the estimates of Hayashi, Ando and Ferris (1988), who assume 
that saving by the non-aged members of extended families is the same as saving by nuclear families and 
who then impute the saving by elderly individuals living in extended families as the difference. Horioka and 
Wan also suggest that the elderly may care more about the bequest motive in   China than in other countries. 
But why this should be the case is not clear.
14 That ﬁ  xed effects estimates, which rely on the time series variation in the data, do not yield precise 
estimates is troubling when one’s concern, as here, is to forecast how savings behavior will change over 
time, as demographic variables evolve. The technical explanation for this problem is probably that the 
relevant time series are short and the demographic variables in question are slow to evolve, providing little 
identifying variation – identiﬁ  cation is then easier in the cross section, where there is more variation – but 
this is not reassuring for inference. The relevant Hausman test (applied to the Eichengreen-Fifer data) 
suggests that the data prefer ﬁ  xed effects.
15 The other anomaly evident in these studies is the very strong positive relationship of the aggregate 
rate of economic growth with the national savings rate. Simple life-cycle theory would suggest a negative 
relationship, that households expecting higher future incomes would borrow against them now. In part, 
evidence of the opposite is explicable by cohort effects: young people in the labor force who save do so 
out of higher incomes than old people who dissave out of wealth accumulated from what were previously 
lower incomes. This was famously demonstrated by Modigliani (1970). In addition, in countries like China 
imperfect ﬁ  nancial markets and credit constraints may play a role. The young would like to borrow against 
higher future incomes in order to, inter alia, purchase consumer durables but cannot owing to imperfect 
markets; hence savings rates are higher than would be the case otherwise. Marcos Chamon and Eswar ĺ Barry  Eichengreen 36
Whether one agrees with this assessment is important. Between now and 
2045,   China’s old age dependency ratio will rise by 17 percentage points. 
A consensus point estimate of  – 0.75 suggests that by itself this could shave 
more than 10 percentage points off of Chinese savings. But, at the same 
time, the youth dependency ratio will fall from 30 per cent to 20 per cent. 
A consensus point estimate of  – 0.5 suggests that this will offset half of the 
impact on savings of   China’s aging population. Thus, whether one thinks that 
demographic change will importantly affect Chinese savings hinges on the 
conﬁ  dence one attaches to this last effect.
While we know a good deal about how the age structure of the population 
affects savings, we know much less about how it affects investment. The 
analytical argument for why a larger aged share of the population should 
lead to less investment is that with fewer working age people there will be 
less labor for capital to cooperate with, and less capital formation assuming 
an elasticity of substitution between capital and labor of less than one16.
Consistent with this intuition, cross-section econometrics and ﬁ  xed-effects 
panel studies both ﬁ   nd a strong negative effect on investment (see e.g. 
Eichengreen and Fifer 2002); so do Higgins’ within estimates, which run off 
of the time series variation in the data. This is a warning that, in thinking 
about the impact of demography on the current account, we should not 
neglect the impact on investment.
But questions arise when we turn to the investment impact of the 
youth dependency ratio. The standard argument is that countries with high 
youth-dependency ratios should engage in more investment – speciﬁ  cally, 
more public investment in education, training, and so forth. Unfortunately, 
empirical studies do not ﬁ  nd much support for this intuition. Kuijs ﬁ  nds 
zero effect. Higgins does ﬁ   nd a lower aggregate investment rate as the 
youth-dependency ratio rises, at least for those below age 15, but he does 
not distinguish public from private investment. Where standard logic would 
suggest that it is public investment where the action should be concentrated, 
Fifer and I actually ﬁ  nd a negative effect of higher youth-dependency ratios 
on public investment. This effect is not easy to overturn17. The most one 
can do is make the effect go to zero18. It could be that we are controlling 
inadequately for other ways in which countries with rapid population growth 
Prasad (2005) show that if credit constraints are severe they can produce a positive correlation between 
the growth rate and the savings rate. For   China this suggests that savings rates will decline both as growth 
declines from the double digits to more normal levels and as ﬁ  nancial markets develop.
16 But this assumption of a low elasticity of substitution is dubious, especially if we are considering 
a decade, or even two, three or four, which is what we need in order to get economically consequential 
effects from slowly moving demographic variables.
17 Rest assured that I have tried.
18 Here it would be nice to be able to mention other studies that reach similar conclusions, but in fact 
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and high youth-dependency rates differ19. Typically, these are less developed 
countries with binding borrowing constraints and weak ﬁ  scal systems. The 
difﬁ  culty of ﬁ  nancing public investment may be what we are observing.
Again, whether one takes these conclusions at face value is important 
for the implications one draws. The evidence, such as it is, suggests that the 
negative impact of higher overall dependency rates on domestic savings will 
be offset in good part by the negative impact of higher overall dependency 
rates on domestic investment. Again, the implication is that demographic 
developments may have a smaller impact on the evolution of global 
imbalances than sometimes supposed20.
A question here is whether we are just rediscovering the Feldstein-Horioka 
(1980) puzzle21. If an economy is closed to capital ﬂ  ows, then a variable 
which shifts the level of saving will also have to shift the level of investment, 
given the necessary equality of the two. If countries with weak ﬁ  scal systems 
and weak institutions generally ﬁ  nd it difﬁ  cult to access international capital 
markets, then something that reduces domestic saving – say, a high youth 
dependency ratio – must also reduce domestic investment in equilibrium. It is 
of course implausible that countries are completely closed to capital ﬂ  ows in 
the present environment; countries like Australia,   New Zealand, Iceland and, 
of course, the   United States have been able to signiﬁ  cantly augment domestic 
savings by borrowing abroad22.
The question is whether emerging markets can do the same. As a group, 
emerging markets have moved away from external borrowing in the last ﬁ  ve 
years. Collectively they are running current account surpluses rather than 
deﬁ  cits and paying back external debt rather than adding to it23. That said, 
there is considerable variation among them; at the time of writing, Hungary, 
Turkey and South Africa, to take three prominent examples, continue to 
ﬁ  nance investment on the order of 8 per cent of   GDP by borrowing abroad. 
19 Although we include a long list of controls.
20 We can also look at the impact of the old-age and youth dependency ratios on the current account 
directly. This is tantamount to imposing the constraint that the effect of these variables is the same in the 
underlying saving and investment equations – which increases power but imposes a restriction that tends 
to be rejected by the data. For what it is worth, Chinn and Prasad (2003) and IMF (2004), imposing this 
ancillary assumption, ﬁ  nd a negative impact of higher dependency rates on the current account balance 
– the former attributing this mainly to the youth dependency rate, the latter to the share of the elderly 
population.
21 It is often forgotten that Feldstein and Horioka themselves used the dependency ratio as an instrument 
for the savings rate in the regressions of investment (their dependent variable) on savings. Note, however, 
that this will satisfy the exclusion restriction for a valid instrument only if it doesn’t also affect investment, 
an assumption on whose validity the preceding discussion casts some doubt.
22 This is so-called “new economy” view of the U.S. current account deﬁ  cit (see e.g. Richard Cooper 
2004, David Backus and Frederic Lambert 2005, Richard Clarida 2005) pointing to the attractiveness of 
investment in the U.S. as the explanation for these capital inﬂ  ows.
23 The so-called New Bretton Woods view (of Michael Dooley and Peter Garber 2005) argues that, 
in order to secure FDI, emerging markets must accumulate claims on the creditor countries at least in 
matching amount to serve as collateral, in order to offset their otherwise limited creditworthiness. As I have 
argued elsewhere (Eichengreen 2005), I think this argument is exaggerated. Barry  Eichengreen 38
Overall, the evidence suggests that the magnitude of the Feldstein-Horioka 
savings-investment correlation has declined from 0.9 when they wrote their 
original article 25 years ago to perhaps 0.6 today. So I do not think that the 
association of dependency ratios with investment rates evident in the data is 
simply the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle reborn.
How far, then, can attention to demographic factors take us in understanding 
global imbalances? Recall the demographic story: the U.S. runs deﬁ  cits 
because a relatively fast growing labor force and an elderly share of the 
population that is lower and rising more slowly than Europe’s and  Japan’s give 
it economic ﬂ  exibility and make it an attractive place to invest, while   China 
runs surpluses because its low old-age dependency ratio translates into high 
savings. The careful reader will already have noted one limitation. This story 
essentially invokes the same factor – a relatively low old-age dependency 
ratio compared to Europe and   Japan – to explain two diametrically opposing 
outcomes, namely the U.S. deﬁ  cit and the Chinese surplus. This already 
suggests, at a minimum, that demographic factors cannot be all that is going 
on.
Indeed, there is good reason to think that these other factors, and not 
demography, dominate in both the   United States and   China. In the U.S., the 
aggregate investment rate, adjusted for the cycle, has held stable over the last 
decade, but the savings rate has fallen24.
There has been no sudden shift in demographic factors capable of accounting 
for this. In reality, the sources of the decline in the national savings rate are no 
mystery. At most recent report, U.S. gross national saving has fallen to 13.6 
per cent of   GDP on the IMF’s measure, down by 3.3 per percentage points 
from the 1983 – 2000 average and barely half the level prevailing in the rest 
of the world. This reﬂ  ects both a decline in public saving, the ﬁ  scal balance 
from +2.5 per cent of   GDP in 2001 to   –  3.5 per cent of   GDP today, and a 
decline in the personal savings rate, which after having averaged 7 per cent 
in 1984 – 2000 has fallen to essentially zero. Together these changes in public 
and personal savings would imply an even larger decline in national saving 
than observed. That this has not occurred reﬂ  ects buoyant corporate savings, 
reﬂ  ecting a rapid economic expansion and the strong performance of earnings. 
24 BIS data suggest that it is up by at most 1 per cent of   GDP relative to the 1990s decade average, and 
much of this increase may be explicable by global conditions. Barry  Eichengreen 39
Figure 3.2  US Savings and Investment and their Correlates
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, Federal Reserve Board and the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis.
Note: The exchange rate is the Federal Reserve Board trade-weighted real exchange rate, deflated 
using PPIs. The dashed line represents the average real exchange over the 1980  –  2005 period. An 
increase in the exchange rate represents an appreciation of the dollar.
Source: Yoshitomi (2007)
The reason for the decline in public savings is discretionary ﬁ  scal policy. 
It reﬂ  ects mainly the decline in the federal tax take as a share of   GDP from 22 
to 19 per cent in the course of the present decade, together with spending on 
health care, the Iraq war, and other items. The reason for the decline in private 
savings is harder to identify, but one factor is certainly high asset valuations, 
which increase households’ perceived wealth. I am inclined to ascribe the 
behavior of asset prices in the   United States to a monetary policy that was 
unusually accommodative, until recently25. Note the absence of demographic 
factors from this story.
Turning to   China, there has been a dramatic increase in both savings 
and investment rates since the advent of reform at the end of the 1970s and 
especially in the last ten years. Already between 1978 and 1995, Chinese 
savings rates averaged more than 35 per cent; since then they have averaged 
fully 40 per cent. The decline in youth dependency rates since the one-child 
25 This may not be a complete explanation. For one thing, asset prices have been high as well in 
other countries. While ﬁ  nancial markets are linked internationally and a number of other central banks, 
in addition to the Federal Reserve, followed unusually accommodative monetary policies in the ﬁ  rst half 
of the present decade, not all of them cut interest rates as fast and far as the Fed starting in 2001, which 
suggests that other factors are also at work. But again, note the absence of a role for demographic factors. 
In Europe, which has similarly enjoyed a housing boom in recent years, demographic factors work in the 
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policy implemented in 1979 is part of the savings story, but just a small part. 
International comparisons suggest that a lower dependency ratio than in 
the typical country can explain perhaps an additional 3 per cent of   GDP in 
saving in   China; this is small potatoes for a country with a national savings 
rate of more than 40 per cent26. For once, time series and cross section 
evidence point in the same direction; as the one-child policy has kicked in 
and youth dependency rates have fallen, there has been a modest decline 
in household savings in the last ten years27. Be that as it may, household 
savings at 16 per cent of   GDP is not that extraordinary for a country with 
such a rapid growth rate, or that hard to understand given imperfect capital 
markets and credit constraints28. What is extraordinary is the high savings 
rates of enterprises, which were running in excess of 20 per cent of   GDP in 
200529. Chinese enterprises, including even some state enterprises, are highly 
proﬁ  table. They have generated large retained earnings, more than even the 
investment-hungry Chinese manufacturing sector can absorb. Again, this is 
not a demographic story. Rather, it is easier to reconcile with arguments by 
non-Chinese academics and ofﬁ  cials that a low exchange rate that has boosted 
the proﬁ  tability of Chinese manufacturing also feeds to the high savings rates 
and external surpluses contributing to the problem of global imbalances.
If demographic factors do not help much in explaining the emergence 
of global imbalances, can they help us understand their resolution? Will 
demographic factors have much impact on the pattern of global imbalances 
before 2016 (since, as I will explain in a moment, I believe that the relevant 
horizon is the next ﬁ  ve to ten years)? Again, the answer is no: there will be only 
a modest increase in old-age dependency ratio in   China, from 8 to 10 per cent 
of the population, between now and then. This will be almost exactly offset by 
a decline in the youth dependency ratio. Even if the old-age dependency ratio 
has a larger impact on saving than does the youth dependency ratio, it tends 
to affect investment in the same direction, which means a modest fall in both 
savings and investment and no net impact on the current account.
In the   United States, the old-age dependency ratio (the share of the 
population 65 or older as a share of the population aged 15 to 64) is expected 
to rise from 18 per cent currently to 23 per cent in 2016. If we apply standard
parameter values, this implies a further fall in U.S. savings rates of 3 to 4 per cent 
of   GDP. This will not help from the point of view of the resolution of global 
imbalances. If the rise in the dependency ratio means that investment falls as 
well, then the most we can hope for is no effect on the current account.
26 See Kraay (2000). At the end of 2005, the Chinese authorities revised upward their estimates of 
  GDP by some 17 per cent. However, this does little to change estimated savings and investment ratios, 
since most of the revision reﬂ  ected faster price increases, which affected consumer goods and investment 
goods alike.
27 Again, see Modigliani and Cao (2004).
28 The time series suggest some.
29 Kuijs (2006), p.23 Barry  Eichengreen 41
So should we be reassured? The sanguine position is that with Chinese 
savings continuing to run at high levels and the U.S. remaining an attractive 
place to invest, nothing will have to change. The fundamentals supporting the 
current constellation of imbalances will remain in place. There is no reason, 
demographic or otherwise, to worry about their disorderly unwinding.
I am not so sanguine, albeit for political more than economic reasons. 
Simple accounting suggests that the U.S. external-debt-to-  GDP ratio would 
rise to 150 per cent by 2015 if the country continues running deﬁ  cits at current 
levels30. For an economy like the U.S. with a capital/output ratio of three, this 
means that foreigners end up holding half of the country’s capital stock. Quite 
apart from whether foreign investors would be willing to allocate such a large 
share of their portfolios to claims on the productive capacity of the   United 
States, there is the question of whether Americans would feel comfortable 
allowing them to do so. The reaction to   China’s offer to buy the U.S. oil 
company Unocal and to efforts by Dubai Ports World to purchase the right 
to manage six U.S. ports suggests there would be a strong negative reaction 
against extensive foreign ownership of productive assets in the   United States31.
If U.S. foreign investments continue to outperform foreign investments in the 
U.S., as has been the case historically, the rise in the debt/GDP   ratio will be 
somewhat more moderate – it will reach something closer to 75 per cent by 
2015, according to John Kitchen (2006) – but the basic problem will remain32.
The diagnosis is that something will have to give. Foreign investors, not 
willing to continue accumulating low-yielding U.S. Treasury bills – authors like 
Kitchen emphasizing the very fact that they are low yielding – and not permitted 
to accumulate claims on productive assets will grow reluctant to ﬁ  nance U.S. 
deﬁ  cits33. The unavoidable result will be a compression of U.S. spending, 
a combination of less consumption and less investment. The mechanism will 
be higher long-term interest rates, as foreigners stop supporting the Greenspan 
Conundrum34. And the result will be a slowdown in global growth or perhaps 
a global recession. Demographic considerations do not modify this diagnosis. 
Ultimately, the bill for the high level of U.S. absorption and the world economy’s 
dependence on the U.S. consumer will come due. 
30 Assuming a 5 per cent nominal rate of   GDP growth and a 7 ½ per cent of   GDP deﬁ  cit. Mussa (2004) 
shows that the ratio of net foreign liabilities to   GDP, denoted n, stabilizes when c = n ×Ҙ g, where c is the 
current account deﬁ  cit as a share of   GDP and g is the rate of growth of nominal income.
31 Which are regarded, rightly or wrongly, as essential to the national security in the post-9/11 world.
32 And I side with those who argue that the historical outperformance of U.S. foreign assets, relative to 
U.S. foreign liabilities, can not be taken for granted in the future. See below.
33 This will have to include foreign central banks, of course, since it is they who have been providing 
the majority of ﬁ  nance for the U.S. deﬁ  cit in recent years. I myself do not see a change in their attitude as 
implausible, as I have argued in Eichengreen (2006b).
34 For evidence that foreign purchases of U.S. Treasury bonds provide a good deal of the explanation 
for the Greenspan Conundrum, see Warnock and Warnock (2005). Barry  Eichengreen 42
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Note: z-statistics in parentheses.
Source: see text.
Table 3.1  Global Saving and Investment: Random-Effects Regressions, 
1975 – 2003
Variable 
Saving to GDP  Investment to GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Growth of GDP per capita 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06
(2.85) (3.30) (3.29) (2.98) (1.63) (1.54) (1.50) (1.82)
Interest rate 0.67 0.89 0.87 0.79 0.38 0.48 0.42 0.47
(1.97) (2.59) (2.55) (2.32) (1.08) (1.29) (1.19) (1.35)
Private credit to GDP 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
(4.22) (3.13) (3.16) (2.85) (1.87) (1.78) (2.13) (1.21)
ǻ Private credit to GDP 0.02  – 0.02  – 0.03  – 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.00
(0.83) (0.75) (0.84) (0.20) (2.22) (0.80) (0.58) (0.06)
Elderly dependency ratio  – 0.26  – 0.27  – 0.24  – 0.33  – 0.42  – 0.38  – 0.33  – 3.18
(2.48) (1.81) (1.51) (2.07) (5.64) (3.48) (2.92) (2.95)
Fiscal deﬁ  cit to GDP  – 0.03  – 0.01  – 0.01 0.00  – 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.03
(0.81) (0.22) (0.27) (0.08) (0.57) (1.13) (0.91) (0.72)
Terms of trade growth 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07  – 0.02  – 0.04  – 0.04  – 0.04
(3.12) (3.11) (3.05) (3.08) (1.04) (1.46) (1.74) (1.69)
M2 to GDP 0.03 0.04 0.02  – 0.02 0.00 0.03
(1.15) (1.55) (0.60) (0.66) (0.19) (1.25)
Domestic credit to GDP  – 0.04  – 0.04  – 0.04  – 0.04  – 0.04  – 0.03
(4.47) (4.54) (4.61) (3.91) (3.93) (3.86)
Mexican-crisis dummy applied to:
   Emerging market  0.00 0.00
(0.08) (0.47)
   Asia 0.01 0.01
(0.95) (1.41)
   Latin America  – 0.01 0.00
(0.59) (0.14)
Asian-crisis dummy applied to:
   Emerging Market  – 0.01  – 0.03
(1.68) (4.07)
   Asia 0.02  – 0.08
(1.29) (6.13)
   Latin America  – 0.03 0.01
(1.71) (0.39)
Number of observations: 453 351 351 351 454 352 352 352
Wald Chi2: 44.66 73.29 76.19 87.28 52.45 45.61 72.53 91.03 Barry  Eichengreen 46
Note: t-statistics in parentheses
Source: see text
Table 3.2  Global Saving and Investment: Fixed-Effects Regressions, 
1975 – 2003
Variable 
Saving to GDP Investment to GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Growth of GDP per capita 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05
(2.61) (3.11) (3.08) (2.85) (1.35) (1.24) (1.15) (1.42)
Interest rate 0.66  – 0.19 0.85 0.78 0.40 0.45 0.40 0.47
(1.98) (0.90) (2.47) (2.27) (1.18) (1.25) (1.16) (1.36)
Private credit to GDP 0.03  – 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.03
(2.75) (0.34) (2.98) (2.75) (0.16) (2.52) (2.67) (1.72)
ǻ Private credit to GDP 0.03  – 0.02  – 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.00
(1.17) (0.61) (0.67) (0.13) (2.43) (0.79) (0.71) (0.12)
Elderly dependency ratio  – 0.09  – 0.19  – 0.12  – 0.32  – 0.64  – 0.23  – 0.05 0.06
(0.64) (0.90) (0.57) (1.39) (4.40) (1.06) (0.21) (0.25)
Fiscal deﬁ  cit to GDP  – 0.03  – 0.02  – 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.76) (0.34) (0.37) (0.02) (0.60) (0.48) (0.40) (0.16)
Terms of trade growth 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07  – 0.02  – 0.04  – 0.04  – 0.04
(3.16) (3.09) (3.04) (3.06) (1.17) (1.76) (1.92) (1.88)
M2 to GDP 0.02 0.03 0.00  – 0.09  – 0.06  – 0.03
(0.59) (1.01) (0.15) (3.15) (2.08) (1.05)
Domestic credit to GDP  – 0.04  – 0.04  – 0.04  – 0.02  – 0.03  – 0.02
(3.71) (3.87) (3.81) (2.12) (2.57) (2.43)
Mexican-crisis dummy applied to:
   Emerging market  0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.58)
   Asia 0.01 0.01
(0.89) (0.59)
   Latin America  – 0.01 0.00
(0.49) (0.32)
Asian-crisis dummy applied to:
   Emerging Market  – 0.01  – 0.03
(1.54) (3.43)
   Asia 0.02  – 0.07
(1.43) (5.62)
   Latin America  – 0.03 0.00
(1.64) (0.28)
Number of observations: 453 351 351 351 454 352 352 352
F-Statistics 4.75 6.32 5.47 5.46 5.83 4.20 5.24 5.92 Barry  Eichengreen 47
Table 3.3  Global Saving and Investment, with Youth Dependency Ratio: 
Random-Effects Regressions, 1975 – 2003
Variable 
Saving to GDP Investment to GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Growth of GDP per capita 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.08
(2.93) (3.50) (3.49) (3.15) (1.87) (1.86) (1.74) (2.32)
Interest rate 0.68 0.92 0.92 0.84 0.42 0.54 0.48 0.60
(1.98) (2.70) (2.68) (2.45) (1.18) (1.48) (1.36) (1.73)
Private credit to GDP 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03
(4.48) (3.40) (3.39) (3.06) (2.38) (2.32) (2.46) (1.96)
ǻ Private credit to GDP 0.02  – 0.03  – 0.03  – 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02  – 0.01
(0.76) (0.80) (0.92) (0.31) (2.18) (0.72) (0.49) (0.31)
Elderly dependency ratio  – 0.22  – 0.15  – 0.15  – 0.26  – 0.28  – 0.17  – 0.20  – 0.09
(1.85) (0.91) (0.90) (1.53) (2.92) (1.36) (1.51) (0.74)
Youth dependency ratio 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.12
(0.89) (2.07) (1.74) (1.27) (2.53) (3.21) (2.09) (3.39)
Fiscal deﬁ  cit to GDP  – 0.03  – 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.04
(0.80) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.65) (1.30) (1.07) (0.89)
Terms of trade growth 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07  – 0.03  – 0.04  – 0.04  – 0.04
(3.03) (2.99) (2.93) (3.01) (1.20) (1.68) (1.89) (1.86)
M2 to GDP 0.03 0.04 0.02  – 0.02 0.00 0.03
(1.23) (1.46) (0.59) (0.67) (0.01) (1.09)
Domestic credit to GDP  – 0.05  – 0.05  – 0.05  – 0.04  – 0.04  – 0.04
(4.74) (4.76) (4.75) (4.35) (4.20) (4.16)
Mexican-crisis dummy applied to:
   Emerging market  0.00 0.00
(0.66) (0.19)
   Asia 0.01 0.02
(1.02) (1.55)
   Latin America 0.00 0.01
(0.22) (0.80)
Asian-crisis dummy applied to:
   Emerging Market  – 0.01  – 0.03
(1.48) (3.88)
   Asia 0.02  – 0.08
(1.32) (6.15)
   Latin America  – 0.03 0.00
(1.57) (0.06)
Number of observations: 453 351 351 351 454 352 352 352
Wald Chi2: 47.11 78.51 79.94 90.01 58.48 55.54 76.05 102.92
Note: t-statistics in parentheses
Source: see text Barry  Eichengreen 48
Table 3.4  Global Saving and Investment, with Youth Dependency Ratio: 
Fixed-Effects Regressions, 1975 – 2003
Variable 
Saving to GDP Investment to GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Growth of GDP per capita 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.07
(2.81) (3.35) (3.36) (3.13) (1.78) (1.66) (1.60) (2.25)
Interest rate 0.69 0.91 0.91 0.85 0.45 0.52 0.50 0.66
(2.06) (2.66) (2.66) (2.49) (1.36) (1.50) (1.44) (1.98)
Private credit to GDP 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.05
(3.11) (3.31) (3.29) (3.13) (0.96) (3.20) (3.15) (2.88)
ǻ Private credit to GDP 0.03  – 0.02  – 0.03  – 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.02  – 0.01
(1.15) (0.67) (0.80) (0.30) (2.43) (0.71) (0.53) (0.32)
Elderly dependency ratio 0.04  – 0.02  – 0.04  – 0.24  – 0.36 0.06 0.07 0.27
(0.28) (0.11) (0.19) (1.01) (2.34) (0.26) (0.34) (1.19)
Youth dependency ratio 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.19
(2.18) (2.55) (2.23) (1.90) (4.47) (4.44) (3.31) (4.94)
Fiscal deﬁ  cit to GDP  – 0.03  – 0.01  – 0.01 0.00  – 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
(0.74) (0.27) (0.25) (0.04) (1.51) (0.63) (0.59) (0.33)
Terms of trade growth 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07  – 0.05  – 0.05  – 0.05
(3.01) (2.95) (2.88) (2.98) (2.09) (2.19) (2.19)
M2 to GDP 0.02 0.02 0.00  – 0.09  – 0.07  – 0.04
(0.61) (0.83) (0.03) (3.20) (2.37) (1.41)
Domestic credit to GDP  – 0.04  – 0.04  – 0.04  – 0.03  – 0.03  – 0.03
(3.99) (4.09) (3.89) (2.64) (2.92) (2.68)
Mexican-crisis dummy applied to:
   Emerging market  0.01 0.00
(0.79) (0.66)
   Asia 0.01 0.01
(1.06) (1.04)
   Latin America 0.00 0.03
(0.11) (1.82)
Asian-crisis dummy applied to:
   Emerging Market  – 0.01  – 0.02
(1.23) (3.00)
   Asia 0.02  – 0.07
(1.56) (5.50)
   Latin America  – 0.02 0.00
(1.44) (0.24)
Number of observations: 453 351 351 351 454 352 352 352
F-Statistics 4.79 6.43 5.49 5.37 7.84 5.98 5.87 7.65
Note: t-statistics in parentheses
Source: see text49
4.0   Abstract
This paper makes an assessment of the overall economic impact of ageing 
for the EU Member States on the basis of the long-term macroeconomic 
projections developed by the Economic Policy Committee and the   European 
Commission. The projections point to pressing economic policy challenges 
for the EU as the growth rates of   GDP and living standards are projected to 
fall to levels below those observed in recent decades. The key issue there will 
be the projected decline in the labour supply, since the higher share of older 
age cohorts in the total population will cause a fall in the proportion of the 
economically active population and the already several decades continued 
low fertility rates will result in smaller age cohorts entering labour market 
than those exiting it. 
As regards policy conclusions, the paper underlines the critical need for 
further labour market reforms, and the need for the EU to look beyond the 
Lisbon employment targets and deadlines. Even if the EU as a whole achieves 
the Lisbon employment targets, this will not be sufﬁ  cient to offset the effects 
of demographic change on the number of the employed persons. Moreover, 
considerable unused labour capacity would remain in many Member States. 
The paper argues that raising the employment rates of older workers and 
increasing effective retirement ages remain a priority in order to increase 
the labour supply. Migration could also contribute to raising labour supply 
to some extent. However, boosting productivity will become the major 
challenge in the future.
4.1 Introduction
Europe’s population is to experience dramatic changes in coming decades 
due to low fertility, continuous gains in life expectancy and large-scale inward 
migration. Since the launch of the third stage of the Economic and Monetary 
Union, considerable attention has been paid to the budgetary implications 
of ageing populations. This paper focuses on the equally important issue of 
the impact of ageing on the real economy, and in particular on the labour 
market, productivity, economic growth and living standard, using a new 
round of long-term economic projections completed in 2005. Most of this 
analysis rests on the recent work by the Directorate General for Economic 
4  Looming demographic ageing: 
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and Financial Affairs of the   European Commission (henceforth DG ECFIN) 
and the Ageing Working Group1 attached to the Economic Policy Committee 
(AWG) to prepare macroeconomic assumptions used to make age-related 
expenditure projections. In particular, this paper draws heavily on EPC (2005) 
and Carone et al. (2005).
While this analysis does not directly deal with the budgetary cost of ageing 
populations, it nonetheless casts light on prospective developments in the 
real economy that are relevant when assessing the sustainability of public 
ﬁ  nances.
The paper is structured as follows:
  Section 4.2 contains a brief description of the methodology of the recent 
long-term economic projections made jointly by the AWG and DG  -CFIN, 
on the basis of new   Eurostat projections. The underlying assumptions used 
as well as the main caveats are recalled in this section.
  Section 4.3 presents projections for the impact of ageing on employment, 
productivity and potential growth in real   GDP and   GDP per capita. To this 
end, it reviews the main drivers of demographic change and summarises 
how the size and age structure of the populations of EU Member States can 
be expected to change. It then analyses the impact of ageing on the labour 
market: in particular, based on a cohort model, it presents projections for 
participation and employment rates and discusses the prospects for meeting 
the Lisbon employment targets. Furthermore, section 4.3 focuses on the 
impact of ageing on labour productivity, and also contains projections for 
  GDP growth rates and growth in living standard up to 2050 for all 25 EU 
countries2.
  Section 4.4 discusses speciﬁ  c aspects which are not fully covered by the 
projections, given their complexity or the lack of consensus in the economic 
literature, in particular the effect of ageing on the quality of labour inputs 
and on innovations and the impact of health on economic growth. 
 Section 4.5 draws policy conclusions on the scale and nature of the ageing 
challenge facing the EU. Particular emphasis is placed on the labour 
market, and especially the importance of achieving and even surpassing 
the Lisbon employment targets, raising effective retirement ages and older 
worker employment rates and designing proper immigration policies. 
1 The age-related expenditure projections cover public spending on pensions, health care, long-term 
care, education, unemployment transfers and, if possible, contributions to pensions/social security systems 
for the EU25 Member States. They are being prepared as part of the mandate given by the ECOFIN Council 
in November 2003 to the EPC to produce budgetary projections for EU Member States for 2004 – 2050: the 
projection results will be presented to the ECOFIN Council in February 2006, on the basis of the agreed 
underlying assumptions and projection methodologies, details of which can be found in EPC and   European 
Commission (2005a and 2005b).
2 The methodology for making the labour force projections is set out in Carone (2005) together with 
a detailed presentation of the projection results. The approach used regarding assumptions on labour 
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4.2.  The EPC-Commission economic projection up to 2050 
4.2.1  The challenge of making comparable cross-country 
projections
4.2.1.1  Main requirements for common long-term projections
In the coming decades, the size and age-structure of Europe’s population 
will undergo dramatic changes due to low fertility rates, continuous increases 
in life expectancy and the retirement of baby-boom generation. There has been 
a growing recognition at national and European level of the profound economic, 
budgetary and social consequences of ageing populations. Prompted by the 
launch of the euro, the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) established the 
Working Group on Ageing Populations (AWG) to examine the economic and 
budgetary consequences of ageing, which led to the publication of age-related 
expenditure projections in 2001 and 2003. In 2003, the ECOFIN Council gave 
the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) a mandate to produce a new set of 
age-related public expenditure projections for all twenty-ﬁ  ve Member States 
covering pensions, health care, long-term care, education, unemployment 
transfers and, where possible, contributions to pensions/social security 
systems3. This section brieﬂ  y presents the common economic projections, 
which were used as a basis for the age-related expenditure projections. It 
covers the EU10 Member States which has enriched the exercise, but also 
increased its complexity and the heterogeneity of the ﬁ  ndings. 
The value-added of these projections is that they are produced in 
a multilateral setting involving national authorities and international 
organisations. The projections are made on the basis of a common population 
projection and common underlying economic assumptions that have been 
endorsed by the EPC.
The projections are generally – and for the reference scenario in particular 
– made on the basis of “no policy change”, i.e. only reﬂ  ecting  enacted 
legislation but not possible future policy changes (although account is taken of 
provisions in enacted legislation that enter into force over time). The pension 
projections are made on the basis of legislation enacted by mid 2005. They are 
also made on the basis of the current behaviour of economic agents, without 
assuming any future changes in behaviour over time: for example, this is 
reﬂ  ected in the assumptions on participation rates which are based on the most 
recently observed trends by age and gender. While the underlying assumptions 
have been made by applying a common methodology uniformly to all Member 
States, for several countries adjustments have been made to avoid an overly 
3  The projections for the EPC were made by the Ageing Working Group of the EPC chaired by Henri 
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mechanical approach that leads to economically unsound outcomes and to 
take due account of signiﬁ  cant country-speciﬁ  c circumstances.
4.2.1.2  A production function framework
This framework is presented in details in Carone et al. (2006). 
A Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale is used. 
GDP can be represented by a combination of factor inputs (mainly labour 
and capital), multiplied by the technological level or total factor productivity 
(TFP). The parameters of the production function essentially determine the 
output elasticities to the individual inputs. 
This approach was the preferred option of the EPC-AWG given its 
ﬂ  exibility and sound analytical basis, especially in terms of understanding 
the main components driving labour productivity developments. It however 
requires making some speciﬁ   c assumptions regarding developments in 
speciﬁ  c labour productivity components, namely TFP and capital deepening 
in the medium run and in the long-run. 
In the long-run, according to the neo-classical growth model (Solow 
model), the economy should reach its equilibrium (also called steady state 
or balanced growth path), where both the ratio of the capital stock to labour 
expressed in efﬁ  ciency units, and output to labour expressed in efﬁ  ciency 
units (or output per effective worker), remain constant over time. As a result, 
both the capital stock per worker and productivity per worker grow at the 
same pace as labour augmenting technical progress.
4.2.2  Main underlying assumptions:
4.2.2.1 Population  projections 
The population projection used to make the age-related expenditure 
projection was prepared by   Eurostat. It is based on, but is not identical to, the 
EUROPOP2004 projection released by   Eurostat in May 20054, and hereafter 
it is referred to as the “AWG scenario”. In particular:
the fertility rate assumptions are the same as those in the baseline of 
EUROPOP2004 for all 25 Member States;
for the EU10, the assumptions on life expectancy at birth are the same as 
those in the baseline of EUROPOP2004. For the EU15, the assumptions 
on life expectancy at birth are based on an AWG scenario produced by 
 Eurostat; 
4  ‘EU25 population rises until 2025, then falls’,   Eurostat press release 448/2005 of 8 April 2005. For 
simplicity, the baseline variant of the trend scenario of EUROPOP2004 is referred to as EUROPOP2004 
baseline in the text.
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the migration assumptions are the same as those in the baseline of 
EUROPOP2004 for all Member States, except Germany, Italy and Spain, 
where speciﬁ  c adjustments were made to the level and/ or age structure of 
migrants in the AWG scenario.
4.2.2.2 Labour  force
The budgetary projections are made on the basis of a labour force projection 
made by the Commission (DG ECFIN) and extensively documented in 
Carone (2005). It:
is based on the age-cohort methodology developed by the OECD and 
by DG ECFIN and the Ageing Working Group attached to the EPC 
(see Carone 2005). The methodology explicitly takes into account the 
evolution of lifetime proﬁ  les of participation. It is based on the calculation 
of the probability of labour market entry and labour market exit for each of 
the latest cohorts available (based on the average rates observed between 
1998 and 2003). These probabilities are kept constant and, in the baseline 
scenario, reﬂ  ect a working assumption of “no policy change”. In essence, 
the cohort methodology reﬂ  ects the tendency for women belonging to any 
given cohort or generation to have their own speciﬁ  c level of participation, 
which is usually higher at all ages than the corresponding level of 
participation of older cohorts. Moreover, the methodology captures the 
effects of demographic change on the labour force;
incorporates a projection on the future impact of enacted pension reforms 
on the employment rates of older workers;
requires, for a number of Member States, the conversion of labour 
force projections based on Labour Force Surveys into national account 
equivalents.
As regards unemployment, unemployment rates converge to their structural 
level or NAIRU by 2008, remaining constant thereafter. The Commission 
estimates for the NAIRU are used. The   European Commission-DG ECFIN 
estimates for the NAIRU agreed upon in the Output Gap Working Group 
of the EPC were used. See   European Commission-EPC (2005) and Carone, 
Denis, McMorrow, Mourre and Röger (2006).The following adjustments will 
be made to this general rule: 
countries with a NAIRU rate in 2008 higher than the average rate of the 
EU15 countries can reduce their unemployment rates further to converge 
to the 2008 EU15 average (7%) by 2015;
new Member States with a NAIRU above the EU15 average (i.e. Poland 
and Slovakia) will have 20 years to allow their unemployment rates to 
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to avoid signiﬁ  cant changes in the rankings across countries, the estimate 
of structural unemployment will be adjusted for Belgium, the Czech 
Republic and Italy. 
4.2.2.3 Labour  productivity
A production function approach is used to project labour productivity. This 
means that labour productivity is derived from the calculations based on the 
labour input projections (explained above) and the assumptions concerning 
total factor productivity (TFP) and the investment scenario. The detailed 
assumption are spelled out and analysed in EPC (2005) and Carone et al. 
(2006). In particular, the EPC and the Commission agreed:
to take the medium-term scenario designed by the Output Gap Working 
Group attached to the EPC for the period up to 2009.5;
to adopt the following capital deepening assumptions. First, the investment/
  GDP ratio in 2004 will be held constant until 2010. Second, a transition to 
the constant capital/labour ratio assumption will be introduced gradually 
over the period 2010 to 2030, with the ratio of capital deepening to TFP 
held constant from 2030 to 2050 (steady state)6;
TFP growth rates in EU15 countries will converge to 1.1% by 2030, with 
different speeds of convergence for individual Member States. 
in the new Member States (EU10), TFP will converge to 1.75% by 2030 
and converge, at the same pace, to 1.1% in 2050. In order to allow for 
a  faster convergence across the EU10 countries and then between the 
EU15 and the EU10, three quarters of the convergence towards 1.75% and 
subsequently to 1.1% is achieved in 2015 and 2035 respectively.
4.2.3  A word of caution: necessary simpliﬁ  cation 
Caution must be exercised when interpreting the long-run budgetary 
projections and the degree of uncertainty increases the further into the future 
the projections go. The projections are not forecasts. Instead, they provide 
an indication on the potential timing and scale of challenges that could 
result from ageing population based on a “no policy change” scenario. The 
projection methodologies employed can not be completely comprehensive, 
and there are limitations with the data in several respects.
5 For the short-to-medium term the EPC-AWG decided to use the same approach as that used to 
estimate potential output and thus the output gap. These estimates are used in the assessment of the cyclical 
budgetary position of Member States, within the surveillance framework of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP). The statistical approach used by DG ECFIN and the Output Gap Working Group (OGWG) is applied 
to historical (starting in the mid-1960s) and forecast data.
6  This approach enables to capture the medium-term dynamics better, whilst the assumption of constant 
K/L ratio from 2030 onwards ensures that the labour productivity projections for all 25 countries (including 
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The economic projections presented in this document only portray 
a partial picture of the economic consequences of ageing populations. For 
example, the projected impact of ageing on the labour market and potential 
  GDP growth rates is based on a partial analysis that does not take account 
all channels and feedback effects through which an ageing population could 
impact on real economic activity.
This paper does not cover the impact of ageing on age-related public 
expenditure and government budgets or long-term sustainability of public 
ﬁ  nances, although the projections of age-related public expenditure were part 
of the projection exercise carried out jointly by the EPC and the   European 
Commission. These issues are deserve separate studies.
4.3  How will ageing affect the EU economy? A projection 
for EUMember States up to 2050
In this section, the economic impact of ageing is explored on the basis of 
a projection for employment and   GDP growth potential covering all EU25 
Member States up to 2050.
4.3.1  What is the nature and scale of the ageing challenge facing 
Europe: demographic prospects for the EU25 up to 2050 
4.3.1.1  Three demographic drivers: fertility, life expectancy and 
migration ﬂ  ows
According to the   Eurostat projection, the population in the EU25 will be 
both smaller and older in 2050, as a result of: 
  low fertility rates below the natural replacement rate: from 1.5 for the 
EU25 in 2004,   Eurostat only projects a limited recovery to 1.6 by 2030, 
with the largest rebound in EU10 countries where fertility slumped during 
economic transition of the 1990s;
  continuous increases in life expectancy: having increased by some 8 years 
between 1960 and 2000 life expectancy at birth for males is projected to 
rise by 6 years to 80.5 in 2050, and by 5 years for females to 85.6. Much 
of the projected gains in life expectancy will occur at older ages, and life 
expectancy at 65 is projected to increase by some 4 years by 2050;
  net inward migration inﬂ  ows to the EU25 currently amount to 1.3 million 
people, i.e. 0.35% of the population and mostly ﬂ  owing to EU15 countries, 
in particular to Spain, which has received about 0.5 million migrants in 
recent years. While this is projected to fall to 800,000 persons by 2015 
(0.2% of the population) – mainly because the immigration to Spain is 
assumed to come down to a level of 100,000 migrants –, overall inﬂ  ows 
will nonetheless cumulate to some 40 million persons by 2050.
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Table 4.1  Overview of assumptions on demographic drivers
Fertility Rate Life expectancy at birth Life expectancy at 65 Migration
males females males females 000's % of population
2004 2050 2004 2050 2004 2050 2004 2050 2004 2050 2004 2050 2004 2050
BE 1.6 1.7 75.5 82.1 81.6 87.5 15.8 20.3 19.7 24.1 24 19 0.2 0.2
DK 1.8 1.8 75.2 81.4 79.6 85.2 15.2 19.3 18.0 21.9 8 7 0.1 0.1
DE 1.4 1.5 76.1 82.0 81.7 86.8 16.1 20.1 19.5 23.4 270 200 0.3 0.3
GR 1.3 1.5 76.4 81.1 81.4 85.9 16.4 19.6 18.5 22.3 43 35 0.4 0.4
ES 1.3 1.4 76.6 81.7 83.4 87.3 16.7 20.0 20.7 23.7 508 102 1.2 0.3
FR 1.9 1.9 76.2 82.3 83.4 87.9 17.0 20.5 21.3 24.5 64 59 0.1 0.1
IE 2.0 1.8 75.5 82.2 80.7 86.8 15.4 20.2 18.6 23.4 16 12 0.4 0.3
IT 1.3 1.4 77.3 82.8 83.2 87.8 16.7 20.4 20.6 24.1 150 150 0.3 0.3
LU 1.7 1.8 75.0 81.8 81.4 86.7 15.7 19.9 19.6 23.4 3 3 0.6 0.4
NL 1.8 1.8 76.2 81.1 80.8 85.2 15.4 18.9 19.0 22.1 21 31 0.1 0.2
AT 1.4 1.5 76.2 82.8 82.1 87.2 16.2 20.4 19.7 23.6 25 20 0.3 0.3
PT 1.5 1.6 74.2 81.2 81.0 86.7 15.6 19.9 19.0 23.1 42 15 0.4 0.2
FI 1.8 1.8 75.3 81.9 81.9 86.6 15.7 20.0 19.5 23.3 6 6 0.1 0.1
SE 1.7 1.9 78.1 82.6 82.4 86.6 16.7 20.0 19.8 23.0 28 21 0.3 0.2
UK 1.7 1.8 76.4 82.4 80.9 86.7 16.1 20.4 19.0 23.3 139 98 0.2 0.2
CY 1.5 1.5 76.3 81.9 80.8 85.1 16.2 19.9 18.3 21.7 6 5 0.8 0.5
CZ 1.2 1.5 72.4 79.7 78.8 84.1 13.8 18.4 17.0 20.9 4 20 0.0 0.2
EE 1.4 1.6 65.5 74.9 76.9 83.1 12.4 17.3 16.9 20.9 1 2 0.1 0.2
HU 1.3 1.6 68.5 78.1 76.8 83.4 13.1 18.6 16.7 21.1 15 20 0.1 0.2
LT 1.3 1.6 66.5 75.5 77.6 83.7 13.3 17.9 17.4 21.5 -6 4 -0.2 0.2
LV 1.3 1.6 64.9 74.3 76.2 82.5 12.3 17.5 16.6 20.7 -2 3 -0.1 0.1
MT 1.7 1.6 76.2 81.8 80.7 85.0 15.2 19.2 18.3 21.6 3 3 0.6 0.5
PL 1.2 1.6 70.5 79.1 78.5 84.4 13.7 18.8 17.4 21.5 -28 34 -0.1 0.1
SK 1.2 1.6 69.7 77.7 77.8 83.4 12.9 17.6 16.5 20.4 -2 5 -0.0 0.1
SI 1.2 1.5 72.6 79.8 80.2 85.1 14.3 18.7 18.4 22.0 6 7 0.3 0.4
EU25 1.5 1.6 75.4 81.6 81.5 86.6 16.3 20.2 19.9 23.6 1343 879 0.3 0.2
EU15 1.5 1.6 75.4 82.1 82.2 87.0 13.5 18.5 17.2 21.2 1347 778 0.4 0.2
EU10 1.2 1.6 70.1 78.7 78.2 84.1 15.9 19.9 23.3 23.3 -3 101 -0.1 0.2
Source: EPC and   European Commission (2005).
4.3.1.2  An older and, eventually, smaller population
In 2050 the population in the EU25 will be both smaller and older 
(ﬁ  gure 4.1) as a result of the abovementioned projected trends in the main 
demographic drivers. It is projected to rise from 457 million in 2004 to a peak 
of 471 million in 2027, and thereafter to decline to 454 million in 2050. This 
aggregate picture hides sharp divergences between individual countries. 
Whereas the total population is projected to increase in some Member States 
(e.g. Belgium: +4%, France: +9%, Sweden: +13%, UK: +8%), signiﬁ  cant 
falls are projected in others (Germany: –6%, Italy: –7%, Poland: –12%). 
Even more dramatic changes are projected to occur in the age structure 
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a  snapshot contrast of the EU25 population in 2004 and 2050. In 2004, 
the large bulges represent people of working age, with the most numerous 
age cohorts being that of 39-year-olds. By 2050, an “inverted cone” shape 
appears, reﬂ  ecting the passage of baby-boomers into their retirement years 
in parallel with life expectancy increasing and the effects of prolonged low 
fertility rates taking hold. 
The share of very young people (aged 0-14) in the total population is 
projected to decline, and their overall number in the EU25 will drop by 
19% (30% in EU10). However, from an economic perspective, the most 
signiﬁ  cant change concerns the working-age population (15-64). This will 
start to fall from 2010 in the EU25 (sooner in some countries), and will drop 
by 48 million or 16% by 2050. Divergences between Member States are wide, 
with declines of more than 20 percentage points projected in 13 countries 
(Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and   Slovenia). In contrast, the 
elderly population aged 65+ will rise sharply, by 58 million (or 77%), by 2050. 
The fastest growing segment of the population will be the very old (80+), the 
number of whom will rise by almost 32 million, an increase of 174%.
4.3.2  The impact of ageing on the labour market
4.3.2.1  A new labour force projection taking account of trends by 
ageand gender
On the basis of the population projection described in the previous section, 
a labour force projection has been made where developments are explicitly 
modelled by gender and age group: this approach is justiﬁ  ed as past trends 
and future prospects differ for each group. The main results of the cohort 
approach used (which extrapolated forward the trends observed in the past 
5 years), can be summarised as follows (see Table 4.2):
young people (15-24): whilst in some EU countries the youth employment 
rate has risen, in many others it has been falling, especially in the EU10. 
This is a result of more people completing secondary education and 
enrolling in tertiary studies – a positive trend which enhances human 
capital formation and future potential labour productivity. Some EU15 
countries, meanwhile, are actually considering measures to reduce the 
length of time spent in third-level education so as to facilitate earlier entry 
into the labour market while at the same time improving the efﬁ  ciency of 
education systems;
women: the projections show female employment rates rising from just 
over 55% in 2004 to almost 65% by 2025 and remaining stable thereafter. 
This increase, which would enable the 60% Lisbon employment target to 
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be reached in 2010, can be attributed to the gradual replacement of older 
women with low participation rates by younger women who have a much 
stronger attachment to the labour force. A trend of rising employment 
rates among women has been observed for several decades, and is largely 
explained by rising educational attainment and changing socio-cultural 
factors. Whether the projected increases in female employment rates 
materialise in practice, or are even exceeded, may in part depend on 
supportive public policies or collective agreements being put in place, 
such as policies to promote access to affordable childcare, to reconcile 
professional and private lives and to achieve gender equality7;
older workers: the employment rate of older workers aged 55 to 64 is 
projected to increase sharply, by 19 p.p., from 40% in 2004 for the EU25 
to 47% by 2010 and 59% in 2050: this is well in excess of the 50% Lisbon 
target, which is projected to be reached by 2013. The projection reﬂ  ects the 
observed increase in employment rates of older workers in recent years (up 
by 4.4 p.p. since 2000). It also incorporates the expected (albeit uncertain) 
positive effects of enacted pension reforms. These reforms have, inter alia,
curtailed access to early retirement schemes, raised statutory retirement 
ages (including minimum ages when pension income can be drawn) and 
strengthened ﬁ  nancial incentives to remain in the labour force. Note that 
the increase in the employment rates for older males (by 15 p.p., from 50% 
to 65%) is less than the projected increase for older females (by 23 p.p., 
from 30% to 53%). The difference arises from a stronger cohort effect for 
females. The increase in the participation rate driven by pension reforms 
is some 10 p.p. for both male and females, whereas the cohort effect for 
females is almost 13 p.p. compared with 6 p.p. for males.
7  See chapter 3 in   European Commission (2004). Moreover, the rise in female participation may have 
an impact on fertility rates and working hours, although the magnitude of such effects and the direction of 
causality remain uncertain.
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Figure 4.1  Age pyramids for EU25 population, 2004 and 2050
Source:   EPC and   European Commission (2005a and b)G. Carone, D. Costello, N. D. Guardia, G. Mourre, B. Przywara and A. Salomäki 60
Table 4.2  Projected employment rates in EU Member States,    
2004 to 2050
Total (15 – 64) Females (15 – 64) Older workers (55 – 64)
2003 2010 2025 2050 2003 2010 2025 2050 2003 2010 2025 2050
BE 59.6 62.1 64.7 65.5 51.8 56.0 60.3 61.0 28.1 33.2 42.8 44.4
DK 74.9 76.4 77.3 77.9 70.2 72.0 72.7 73.3 59.8 61.5 65.6 66.7
DE 65.4 70.9 73.2 73.5 59.3 65.8 67.8 68.3 39.5 56.4 65.8 65.7
GR 58.9 62.7 64.9 65.1 44.6 50.0 54.6 55.6 42.1 44.4 51.9 52.9
ES 59.7 66.4 70.3 71.4 46.2 55.6 62.5 64.2 40.6 45.6 59.6 62.5
FR 63.1 64.4 66.7 68.0 57.0 58.9 61.8 63.4 36.3 42.3 49.4 52.9
IE 65.5 70.9 73.6 74.6 55.7 62.7 67.7 69.1 48.8 55.5 66.8 68.9
IT 57.2 61.0 63.6 65.7 44.9 50.0 53.9 56.1 29.4 35.9 49.4 52.9
LU 62.6 64.4 66.7 68.0 51.7 58.9 58.1 63.4 30.3 35.3 40.2 41.8
NL 73.6 75.3 76.5 77.9 66.0 70.1 73.4 75.2 44.4 48.1 53.5 55.2
AT 69.1 73.5 75.1 76.4 61.7 67.8 70.5 71.8 30.1 40.1 54.2 58.0
PT 67.8 71.9 72.9 73.4 61.2 66.4 68.7 69.5 51.4 56.5 63.0 64.7
FI 67.7 70.2 73.8 74.4 65.8 67.9 71.9 72.7 49.4 54.1 62.3 64.9
SE 73.1 74.9 77.4 77.6 71.6 73.5 76.1 76.4 68.8 70.9 75.1 76.6
UK 71.5 72.9 74.2 74.7 65.3 67.3 70.0 71.1 55.4 56.9 62.5 63.9
CY 67.7 73.6 78.2 77.3 59.3 67.0 72.8 72.0 50.2 60.7 65.2 69.1
CZ 64.8 66.8 72.1 69.7 56.6 59.8 66.5 63.8 42.5 48.1 59.8 58.9
EE 62.9 68.4 71.9 70.8 59.3 64.7 68.9 67.4 52.7 55.3 61.7 61.7
HU 56.9 60.8 65.3 63.2 50.7 54.2 60.3 58.6 28.7 39.6 49.8 49.5
LT 61.2 67.3 73.4 71.7 58.4 64.6 71.3 69.0 45.3 53.1 65.1 66.2
LV 61.9 69.9 73.1 71.4 57.8 65.3 69.1 66.7 44.1 53.4 59.2 58.7
MT 54.1 56.7 62.4 61.3 33.7 39.6 49.0 48.6 32.0 29.3 30.3 33.1
PL 51.0 57.0 68.4 66.1 45.8 51.8 64.3 60.9 26.7 35.2 42.7 48.7
SK 57.8 62.1 72.7 68.7 52.2 56.9 68.9 64.3 25.2 38.5 51.7 51.2
SI 62.8 67.7 69.9 69.3 58.0 62.5 65.9 66.4 23.5 40.4 50.0 52.6
EU25 63.1 66.9 70.3 70.9 55.4 60.2 64.7 65.5 39.9 47.1 56.8 58.9
EU15 64.6 68.1 70.5 71.5 56.5 61.2 64.6 66.1 41.4 48.6 58.0 60.2
Euro Area 62.9 66.9 69.4 70.5 54.1 59.4 63.1 64.6 37.4 46.0 56.5 58.8
EU10 55.7 60.7 69.4 67.1 50.0 55.2 65.0 62.1 31.7 39.8 49.2 51.9
Source:  EPC and   European Commission (2005a and b).
4.3.2.2  The Lisbon employment targets will be met, but behind 
schedule, especially in the euro area
Figure 4.2 shows the projected employment rates relative to the Lisbon 
employment target groups8. It indicates that the situation is not even across 
areas within the Union. For instance, the Lisbon target for overall employment 
is projected to be reached by 2015 in the EU15 but by only 2035 in the euro 
8  At the Lisbon European Council of March 2000, Heads of State and Government set targets of raising 
the overall EU15 employment rate to 70% overall and 60% for women by 2010. The Stockholm European 
Council (March 2001) added one additional target – raising the employment rate of older workers to 50% 
by the same date – and two intermediate targets to be achieved by the mid-term point of 2005: an overall 
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area9, while the EU10 will not reach the target at all, because after attaining 
a peak at 69.5 in 2025, the employment rate is projected to go down to only 
67% in 2050. The relative delay in the euro area is mainly due to the relative 
poor prospects for youth employment. For the EU10, the projected failure to 
reach 70% employment will be due to relatively poor employment prospects 
for prime-age males; the Lisbon target for females will still be reached by 
2017 and that for older workers by 2027.
Figure 4.2  Projected employment rates and Lisbon targets
    
Note: (p) means projected figure; actual figures are given for 2000 and 2004.
Source: EPC and   European Commission (2006), Carone et al. (2005).
4.3.2.3  The impact of ageing on labour supply and employment
The projected increases in the employment rates of women and older 
workers would, as illustrated in Figure 4.3 below, temporarily cushion the 
effects of ageing on the labour force. 
At the aggregate EU25 level, three distinct time periods can be observed:
2004  –  2011 – window of opportunity when both demographic and 
employment developments are supportive of growth: both the working-age 
population and the number of persons employed increase during this 
period. However, the rate of increase slows down, indicating that the effect 
of an ageing population is starting to take hold even if it is not yet visible 
9  For a more focused analysis on the impact of ageing on the euro area, see the December 2005 edition 
of the Quarterly Report on the Euro Area (  European Commission 2005d).
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in aggregate terms. This period can be viewed as a window of opportunity, 
since both demographics and labour force trends are supportive of growth. 
Conditions for pursuing structural reforms may consequently be relatively 
more favourable than in subsequent years;
2012 – 2017 – rising employment rates offset the decline in the working-age 
population: during this period, the working-age population will start to 
decline as the baby-boom generation enters retirement. However, the 
continued projected increase in the employment rates of women and older 
workers will cushion the demographic factors and the overall number of 
people employed will continue to increase, albeit at a slower pace. From 
2012 onwards, the tightening labour market conditions (lower labour force 
growth together with unemployment down to NAIRU) may increase the 
risk of labour market mismatch;
the ageing effect dominates from 2018: the trend increase in female 
employment rates will broadly have worked itself through by 2017, with 
only a very slow additional increase projected in the period 2018 – 2050. 
In the absence of further pension reforms, the employment rate of older 
workers is also projected to reach a steady state. Consequently, there 
is no counter-balancing factor to ageing, and thus both the size of the 
working-age population and the number of people employed are on 
a  downward trajectory. Having increased by some 20 million between 
2004 and 2017, employment during this last phase is projected to contract 
by almost 30 million, i.e. a fall of nearly 10 million over the entire 
projection period of 2004 to 2050. 
Figure 4.3  Projected working-age population and total employment, EU25
Source: EPC and   European Commission (2006), Carone et al. (2005).
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Table 4.3 below provides more information on the peaks and troughs as 
regards the size of the working age population and the numbers of persons 
employed per Member State. 
The broad trends described above are common to many countries, but 
they are not uniform. As shown also in Figure 4.4, ﬁ  ve, mostly smaller, 
Member States (Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, Sweden, Malta) are projected 
to experience a pronounced rise in employment between 2003 and 2050, 
while the change in employment in four EU15 Member States (France, 
Netherlands, Belgium and UK) is projected to be slightly positive or stable. 
Eleven Member States are projected to see falls in employment that are well 
above the EU25 average of –  4.6% (DE, GR, IT, PT, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, 
SK, SI). These can be grouped into the EU15 Mediterranean countries and the 
EU10 Member States that have undergone the transition to a market economy, 
plus Germany.
Figure 4.4  Employment projections (change in % of people employed aged 
15 – 64 between 2003 and 2050) for the EU25 Member States
Source: EPC and   European Commission (2006), Carone et al. (2005).G. Carone, D. Costello, N. D. Guardia, G. Mourre, B. Przywara and A. Salomäki 64
Table 4.3  Peaks and troughs for the size of the working-age population and 
the number of persons employed (aged 15 – 64)
working-age population (15 – 64) Employment (15 – 64)








BE 2011 2.9  – 10.0 2017 103  – 7.8
DK 2008 0.7  – 9.8 2009 2.4  – 8.1
DE 2003 0.0  – 19.2 2015 10.7  – 18.0
GR 2010 1.2  – 22.2 2015 10.8  – 21.6
ES 2010 6.3  – 24.3 2020 24.1  – 22.5
FR 2011 3.3  – 6.6 2015 7.3  – 3.1
IE 2035 23.1  – 4.4 2035 39.8  – 4.1
IT 2004 0.7  – 23.9 2018 8.6  – 19.0
LU 2050 30.9 2050 36.8
NL 2011 2.5  – 7.2 2019 6.0  – 4.8
AT 2012 2.3  – 16.2 2019 11.1  – 14.7
PT 2008 1.6  – 22.7 2013 7.9  – 21.4
FI 2010 1.3  – 14.5 2011 5.3  – 9.6
SE 2050 4.3 2050 10.9
UK 2011 3.8  – 6.7 2018 7.8  – 6.1
CY 2043 26.3  – 2.9 2041 44.2  – 2.8
CZ 2007 0.8  – 30.7 2013 3.4  – 27.3
EE 2006 0.2  – 26.9 2011 7.2  – 23.1
HU 2003 0.0  – 25.4 2011 5.5  – 21.5
LT 2006 0.1  – 26.1 2016 12.7  – 23.1
LV 2003 0.0  – 30.3 2012 10.5  – 27.3
MT 2041 14.5  – 0.8 2037 29.8  – 0.9
PL 2011 2.4  – 28.6 2025 20.0  – 21.0
SK 2010 2.7  – 29.5 2020 17.4  – 26.6
SI 2011 0.9  – 24.7 2012 9.0  – 23.0
EU25 2011 1.9  – 16.7 2017 10.6  – 13.8
EU15 2011 2.1  – 14.6 2017 10.2  – 12.4
Euro Area 2011 1.7  – 16.6 2016 11.0  – 14.3
EU10 2009 1.3  – 27.5 2015 13.1  – 21.8
Note: The trough for the size of the working-age population is the last year of projection, that is 
2050, for all countries except DK (2044) and NL (2039). Trough for number of persons employed is 
2050 for all countries except DK (2041) and NL (2041).
Source: Carone et al. (2005).
4.3.3  Labour productivity growth
4.3.3.1  Productivity assumed to converge to the long-term trend 
observed in the past three decades
As labour supply is expected to shrink over the next ﬁ  fty years, labour 
productivity will have to play a major role in maintaining adequate aggregate 
economic growth. As explained in section 4.2, the theoretical and empirical 
literature does not reach a ﬁ  rm conclusion about the impact of ageing on G. Carone, D. Costello, N. D. Guardia, G. Mourre, B. Przywara and A. Salomäki 65
aggregate productivity. Although there is some presumption that average 
productivity levels may differ across age groups, robust data on the age 
proﬁ  le of workers productivity are simply not available. 
In developing the macroeconomic assumptions to be used to make 
age-related expenditure projections, the EPC and   European Commission 
(2005) used a production function approach for projecting labour productivity, 
a conservative approach that is consistent with the long-run historical trends10.
Thus, the baseline productivity assumption is a useful starting point for analysis 
on the economic impact of ageing, but it is not a prediction of future trends. A 
ﬁ  rst key working assumption was to allow Total Factor Productivity (TFP) to 
converge to 1.1% by 2030 across Member States. This rate was chosen as it 
is broadly in line with trend TFP growth observed in the US and the EU over 
the past three decades. This approach, in turn, assumes that there will be a 
convergence in productivity growth rates (but not in levels). A longer period 
of convergence to the common 1.1% rate of TFP growth was provided for the 
EU10 countries to allow for more real catch-up. The assumptions, which are 
not model-based, when combined with a convergence of capital deepening 
towards its steady-state level11, yield an average labour productivity growth 
rate of some 1.7% in the EU15 for the period up to 2050. Regarding the time 
proﬁ  le, productivity growth rates are projected to temporarily pick up in the 
period 2011 – 2030 due to the capital deepening that is induced by the decline 
in labour resources combined with the slow adjustment of capital stock. As 
regards EU10 countries, a much higher productivity rate is projected, on 
average 3.1% for the period 2011 – 30 and 1.9% between 2031 and 2050. 
4.3.3.2  Productivity assumptions need to be interpreted with caution 
The productivity projections are very likely the most uncertain of all the 
projections presented here, since they are based on assumptions. Some may 
claim that they are over-optimistic. Indeed two caveats apply:
The productivity projections do not take into account the negative effect of 
changing demographic structure on productivity and TFP, the magnitude 
of which is still being debated in the economic literature (see section 2). 
On the other hand, they also do not take account of the potentially strong 
positive effect of the European economies’ catch-up in ICT towards the 
US economy. However, the use of these long-term trends which smooth 
10  Labour productivity growth is estimated with the ‘production function approach’ (see Carone et al. 
2005). Labour productivity (output per worker) is derived from the calculations based on the labour input 
projections, the assumptions concerning Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and the investment scenario. This 
approach aims to shed some light on the reasons behind productivity developments and obtain a richer 
medium-term dynamic including the effect of population growth on labour productivity in the medium run 
through the change in capital intensity. Combining employment and productivity projections provides   GDP 
and living standard projections.
11  For details see Carone, Denis, McMorrow, Mourre and Roeger (2006).
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out the recent ICT-driven productivity rise seen in the US since the second 
half of the 1990s means that a potential parallel ICT boom in Europe does 
not appear in the projections.
The assumptions de facto lead to projections with some real convergence 
for EU10 countries. However, the experience of the so-called “cohesion 
countries” (Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal) illustrates that the growth 
path of lagging countries covers the full range between success stories 
and stagnation. Real convergence is not an automatic outcome of EU 
membership, and can be affected by the policy-setting or other structural 
dimensions, which can accelerate, slow down or even block the catching-
up process. More generally, the projections are based on the assumption 
that real convergence is achieved in growth rate rather than in level, except 
for the “convergence club”, i.e. the countries characterised by a very low 
productivity level (Barrell (2005)). This is consistent with the literature on 
“conditional convergence” – though the debate about how it is achieved is 
still going on in the academic community.
4.3.4  Projected   GDP growth rates 
4.3.4.1  Lower   GDP growth rates as the employment contribution turns 
negative
By combining the employment and productivity projections, it is possible 
to obtain a projection for potential   GDP growth rates up to 2050, see ﬁ  gure 
4.5, tables 4.4 and 4.5). For the EU15, the annual average   GDP growth rate is 
projected to decline from 2.2% in the period 2004 – 10 to 1.8% in the period 
2011 – 30, and to 1.3% between 2031 and 2050 (see solid line in ﬁ  gure 4.5). 
An even steeper decline is foreseen in the EU10, from 4.7% in the period 
2004-10, to 3% in the period 2011 – 30 and 0.9% between 2031 and 2050. 
In addition to falling   GDP growth rates, the sources of growth will alter 
dramatically. Employment will make a positive contribution to growth in 
both the EU15 and EU10 up to 2010, but will become neutral in the period 
2011-2030 and turn signiﬁ  cantly negative thereafter. Over time, productivity 
will become the dominant source of growth. The projected fall in   GDP growth 
rates is much higher in the EU10 than in the EU15 (see Figure 4.5). This 
is due to even less favourable demographic developments there, while the 
convergence process is assumed to be completed and productivity growth 
rates become equal to those of EU15 countries.
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Figure 4.5  Projected (annual average)   GDP growth rates in the EU15 and 
EU10 and their determinants (employment/productivity) 
    
Source:    EPC and   European Commission (2006), Carone et al. (2005).
4.3.4.2  Large differences in the projections across countries
The dynamic proﬁ   le of projected potential   GDP growth rates for all 
countries over the period 2004  –  2050 are shown in Table 4.5. Almost all 
countries are projected to experience a steady decline. It will start to become 
apparent from 2010, and will be most signiﬁ  cant in countries with the highest 
starting point, notably the EU10. In many countries, annual   GDP growth rates 
will have dropped to close to, or below, 1% during the period 2031 to 2050. 
Over the whole period, only a few small countries (Luxembourg, Latvia, 
Cyprus, Ireland, Lithuania and Estonia) are projected to enjoy an average 
growth rate higher than 2.5%, while Germany, Greece, Italy, Austria and 
Portugal are expected to grow at a rate of or lower than 1.5%. 
4.3.4.3  A more in-depth decomposition of the projected sources of 
growth
Table 4.4 uses the standard accounting framework to assess the relative 
contribution to   GDP growth of its two main components, labour productivity 
and labour utilisation. It can be seen that an increasing employment rate 
(which on average contributed 0.2 p.p. to average   GDP growth in the EU25 
and EU15, 0.3 p.p. in the euro area and 0.4 p.p. in the EU10 over the entire 
projection period) partially compensates for the decline in the share of the 
working-age population (which is a negative drag on growth by an average 
of  – 0.3/ – 0.4 p.p.).G. Carone, D. Costello, N. D. Guardia, G. Mourre, B. Przywara and A. Salomäki 68
Table 4.4  Projected   GDP growth rate in each EU25 Member States, its 
sources and   GDP per capita growth (annual average 2004 – 50) 
























1=3+6 3=4+5 45 6=7+8+9 7 8 9 10=1 – 7
BE 1.7 1.7 1.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.3  – 0.3 1.6
DK 1.7 1.8 1.1 0.6  – 0.1 0.0 0.1  – 0.2 1.6
DE 1.3 1.6 1.1 0.5  – 0.2  – 0.1 0.3  – 0.3 1.5
GR 1.5 1.8 1.0 0.8  – 0.1  – 0.1 0.4  – 0.5 1.5
ES 1.6 1.7 1.0 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.4  – 0.5 1.5
FR 1.8 1.7 1.1 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.2  – 0.3 1.6
IE 2.9 2.3 1.5 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.3  – 0.3 2.2
IT 1.3 1.6 1.0 0.5  – 0.2  – 0.1 0.3  – 0.4 1.5
LU 3.1 1.8 1.1 0.8 1.3 0.8 0.7  – 0.2 2.4
NL 1.7 1.6 1.1 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.1  – 0.3 1.5
AT 1.5 1.7 1.1 0.6  – 0.1 0.0 0.2  – 0.4 1.5
PT 1.5 1.9 1.2 0.7  – 0.5  – 0.1 0.0  – 0.4 1.6
FI 1.8 1.9 1.4 0.5  – 0.1 0.0 0.2  – 0.3 1.8
SE 2.2 2.0 1.4 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1  – 0.2 1.9
UK 2.0 1.9 1.2 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.0  – 0.2 1.8
CY 2.9 2.4 1.4 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.3  – 0.2 2.3
CZ 2.0 2.6 1.4 1.2  – 0.7  – 0.3 0.1  – 0.5 2.3
EE 2.7 3.2 1.7 1.4  – 0.5  – 0.4 0.2  – 0.3 3.1
HU 2.1 2.5 1.4 1.1  – 0.4  – 0.3 0.2  – 0.3 2.4
LT 2.8 3.2 1.8 1.4  – 0.3  – 0.4 0.4  – 0.2 3.2
LV 3.1 3.5 1.9 1.6  – 0.5  – 0.5 0.3  – 0.3 3.5
MT 2.4 1.9 1.1 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.3  – 0.3 1.8
PL 2.4 2.7 1.7 1.0  – 0.2  – 0.3 0.5  – 0.4 2.7
SK 2.4 2.8 1.7 1.1  – 0.3  – 0.3 0.4  – 0.4 2.7
SI 2.1 2.6 1.4 1.2  – 0.4  – 0.1 0.2  – 0.5 2.2
EU25 1.7 1.8 1.2 0.6  – 0.1 0.0 0.2  – 0.3 1.7
EU15 1.6 1.7 1.1 0.6  – 0.1 0.0 0.2  – 0.3 1.6
Euro 
Area 1.5 1.6 1.1 0.6  – 0.1 0.0 0.3  – 0.4 1.5
EU10 2.4 2.7 1.6 1.1  – 0.3  – 0.3 0.4  – 0.4 2.6
Source: Carone et al. (2005), based on EPC and   European Commission (2005a and b).G. Carone, D. Costello, N. D. Guardia, G. Mourre, B. Przywara and A. Salomäki 69
Table 4.5   Time profile of projected GDP   growth rate and its sources in each 
EU25 Member states (average annual growth rates) 





















BE 2.4 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.7 1.2 0.0  – 0.2
DK 2.0 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.8 1.7 0.4  – 0.2  – 0.1
DE 1.7 1.4 1.2 0.9 1.6 1.7 0.8  – 0.2  – 0.5
GR 2.9 1.6 0.8 2.1 1.8 1.7 2.3  – 0.1  – 0.9
ES 3.0 2.0 0.6 1.1 1.9 1.7 2.9 0.1  – 1.1
FR 2.2 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.7 0.8 0.1  – 0.1
IE 5.5 3.3 1.6 3.4 2.5 1.7 2.2 0.9  – 0.1
IT 1.9 1.5 0.9 0.7 1.7 1.7 1.3  – 0.2  – 0.8
LU 4.0 3.0 3.0 1.8 1.9 1.7 2.3 1.0 1.3
NL 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.1 1.7 1.7 0.2  – 0.1 0.0
AT 2.2 1.6 1.2 1.5 1.8 1.7 1.1  – 0.1  – 0.5
PT 1.9 2.1 0.8 1.2 2.4 1.7 0.1  – 0.3  – 0.9
FI 2.7 1.7 1.5 2.1 2.0 1.7 0.7  – 0.3  – 0.2
SE 2.7 2.4 1.8 2.2 2.3 1.7 0.8 0.1 0.1
UK 2.8 2.1 1.5 2.1 2.1 1.7 0.3 0.0  – 0.2
CY 4.3 3.5 1.9 2.4 2.9 1.9 3.4 0.7 0.0
CZ 3.5 2.6 0.8 3.4 3.0 1.9  – 0.5  – 0.4  – 1.1
EE 6.1 3.0 1.2 5.3 3.6 1.9 0.5  – 0.5  – 0.7
HU 3.7 2.6 1.1 3.2 2.9 1.9 0.9  – 0.3  – 0.9
LT 6.5 3.3 1.1 5.7 3.6 1.9 1.3  – 0.3  – 0.8
LV 7.7 3.4 1.1 6.5 4.1 1.9 1.3  – 0.6  – 0.8
MT 2.2 2.8 2.0 1.0 2.2 1.9 1.6 0.7 0.0
PL 4.6 3.2 0.9 3.8 3.1 1.9 1.6 0.2  – 1.1
SK 4.6 3.4 0.6 3.9 3.3 1.9 1.4 0.2  – 1.4
SI 3.7 2.5 1.1 3.3 3.0 1.9 0.9  – 0.5  – 0.8
EU25 2.4 1.9 1.2 1.5 2.0 1.7 1.0 0.0  – 0.5
EU15 2.2 1.8 1.3 1.3 1.8 1.7 1.0 0.0  – 0.4
Euro
Area 2.1 1.7 1.2 1.1 1.8 1.7 1.2  – 0.1  – 0.5
EU10 4.7 3.0 0.9 3.6 3.1 1.9 1.1 0.0  – 1.0
Source: EPC and   European Commission (2006), Carone et al. (2005).G. Carone, D. Costello, N. D. Guardia, G. Mourre, B. Przywara and A. Salomäki 70
4.3.5  Taking stock on the magnitude of the ageing challenge: 
rising dependency ratio and falling per capita GDP   growth 
4.3.5.1  Dependency ratios summarise the magnitude of the ageing 
problem
The projections point to pressing economic policy challenges for the EU 
as a result of ageing. From an economic perspective, potential growth rates 
will fall to levels below those observed in recent decades: however, living 
standards (at least in the EU15) as measured by GDP   per capita should hold 
up somewhat better than the trend in headline GDP   growth rate suggests. 
Fiscal challenges will come from both sides of the budgetary equation. 
Pressure for increased public spending will result from a higher share of 
the total population in older age cohorts that require larger public transfers 
(e.g. pensions) and services (health care, long-term care). The ﬁ  nancing side 
may also be affected, with a decline in the support ratio of contributors to 
beneﬁ   ciaries. These developments can best be viewed by comparing the 
economic dependency ratios reported in Figure 4.6. Over the next decades, 
the old-age dependency ratio, that is, the number of people aged 65 years and 
above relative to those between 15 and 64, is projected to double, reaching 
51% in 2050. This means that we will go from the current situation of having 
four people of working-age for every elderly citizen to a ratio of 2 to 1 (even 
higher in some countries). The ‘effective economic old-age dependency’ 
ratio is also informative: this is the number of non-active persons aged 65 
and above as a percentage of employed persons aged 15 to 64. As expected, 
this ratio is higher than the old age-dependency ratio, and is projected to rise 
sharply for the EU25, from 37% in 2003 to 48% in 2025 and 70% in 2050, 
raising complex issues relating to the role of public transfers in achieving an 
appropriate distribution of resources between a smaller active population and 
a larger inactive retired population.G. Carone, D. Costello, N. D. Guardia, G. Mourre, B. Przywara and A. Salomäki 71
Figure 4.6  Projected demographic and economic dependency ratios for the 
EU 25
Source: EPC and   European Commission (2005a)
The total economic dependency ratio measures the total inactive population 
(total population less persons employed) as a percentage of persons employed 
(aged 15 to 64). It gives an indication of the average number of people 
which each economically active person ‘supports’, and thus is relevant when 
considering the prospects for potential GDP   per capita growth. For the EU25, 
this ratio actually falls from 136% in 2003 to 125% in 2025, but thereafter 
increases to 147% by 2050. Overall economic dependency is projected 
to decline up to 2025, mostly due to a better labour market performance 
(especially the projected trend increase in female employment rates), but 
also due to low fertility (as smaller numbers of young people will reduce the 
youth dependency ratio). However, these effects taper off after 2025, and the 
increase in the total economic dependency ratio between 2025 and 2050 is 
noticeably steeper.G. Carone, D. Costello, N. D. Guardia, G. Mourre, B. Przywara and A. Salomäki 72
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BE 26 36 47 21 43 55 71 28 156 150 164 8
DK 22 34 42 20 28 42 52 24 101 106 116 14
DE 26 38 52 26 39 50 69 30 127 117 135 9
GR 26 36 60 35 41 52 88 47 150 141 181 31
ES 25 33 66 41 40 45 88 48 144 118 162 18
FR 25 37 46 21 39 53 66 27 144 146 156 12
IE 16 25 45 29 23 31 56 33 125 108 132 7
IT 28 39 62 34 49 60 93 44 162 149 179 17
LU 21 28 36 15 33 42 55 22 138 137 149 11
NL 20 33 41 20 27 41 51 24 101 107 114 13
AT 23 34 52 30 33 45 67 35 113 108 128 15
PT 23 35 59 36 30 43 73 43 118 116 149 30
FI 23 41 47 24 33 54 60 27 121 128 133 12
SE 26 36 41 14 35 45 50 15 111 113 117 6
UK 24 33 45 21 32 42 57 25 113 114 128 14
CY 14 29 43 30 18 35 52 33 120 96 114  – 6
CZ 20 35 55 35 29 47 76 46 119 116 154 35
EE 23 31 43 20 35 41 57 22 135 118 137 2
HU 22 34 48 26 39 51 74 35 156 140 172 16
LT 22 29 45 23 35 38 60 25 144 107 134  – 10
LV 23 31 44 21 35 39 58 23 137 113 137 0
MT 19 34 41 22 34 54 66 32 170 154 168  – 2
PL 18 33 51 33 35 46 74 40 183 127 163  – 20
SK 16 28 51 34 28 38 73 45 146 105 151 6
SI 21 36 56 35 32 49 77 44 127 124 157 31
EU25 24 35 51 27 37 48 70 33 136 125 147 11
EU15 25 36 52 26 38 49 70 32 132 126 145 13
EU10 19 33 50 31 34 45 73 39 159 124 158  – 1
Source: EPC and   European Commission (2006), Carone et al. (2005).G. Carone, D. Costello, N. D. Guardia, G. Mourre, B. Przywara and A. Salomäki 73
Table 4.7  GDP   per capita growth: growth rates and levels relative to EU15 
average
  GDP per capita growth rates 
(%)




2004 – 10 2011 – 30 2031 – 50 2004 2030 2050 2004 2030 2050
BE 2.1 1.6 1.6 108 107 109 122 115 115
DK 1.8 1.5 1.7 110 107 111 98 100 110
DE 1.6 1.4 1.5 101 94 95 94 88 88
GR 2.6 1.6 1.1 72 72 68 84 79 79
ES 2.0 1.9 0.9 85 90 81 91 88 88
FR 1.7 1.5 1.6 105 101 103 113 110 110
IE 4.2 2.5 1.2 132 177 167 128 161 161
IT 1.6 1.6 1.3 100 97 94 116 108 108
LU 3.1 2.1 2.4 194 226 270 129 135 135
NL 1.3 1.3 1.7 108 98 103 93 92 92
AT 1.9 1.5 1.4 116 113 112 109 106 106
PT 1.5 2.1 1.1 68 73 68 60 71 71
FI 2.4 1.6 1.7 108 110 115 104 112 112
SE 2.3 2.0 1.7 112 123 129 104 116 116
UK 2.4 1.8 1.5 104 111 113 95 107 107
CY 2.9 2.7 1.6 81 107 110 77 94 97
CZ 3.6 2.8 1.3 64 89 86 59 87 90
EE 6.6 3.5 1.6 46 86 87 46 82 86
HU 3.9 2.8 1.4 54 76 75 61 81 85
LT 7.0 3.7 1.5 43 86 87 46 80 84
LV 8.3 3.9 1.5 42 93 94 42 88 92
MT 1.3 2.2 1.7 68 73 76 80 81 84
PL 4.7 3.4 1.3 45 75 73 54 76 79
SK 4.7 3.6 1.0 48 83 77 52 76 80
SI 3.6 2.5 1.4 73 94 94 71 96 100
EU25 2.2 1.8 1.4 92 97 97 93 97 98
EU15 1.9 1.7 1.4 100 100 100 100 100 100
Euro
Area 1.8 1.6 1.4 99 97 96 101 98 98
EU10 4.6 3.2 1.3 50 80 78 56 80 83
Source: EPC and   European Commission (2005a)G. Carone, D. Costello, N. D. Guardia, G. Mourre, B. Przywara and A. Salomäki 74
4.3.5.2  GDP   per capita projected to signiﬁ  cantly decline
The effects of an ageing population on living standards can more closely 
be observed by looking at growth rates in terms of GDP   per capita. Given 
that the total population growth rates are expected to drop over the period 
2004  –  2050 and the populations to shrink during the latter part of the part 
of the projection period, GDP   per capita growth rates in both the EU15 and 
EU10 are projected to fall (see dotted line in Figure 4.5 and Table 4.7) by less 
than the projected fall in GDP   growth rates. Hence, living standards should 
hold up better than the trend in headline GDP   growth rate suggests. Indeed, 
the growth in GDP   per capita depends on the change in the total population, 
while potential economic growth hinges primarily upon the change in the 
working-age population and employment among the demographic factors. 
It is also interesting to note from Table 4.7 that per capita income levels in 
EU10 are projected to increase from 50% of EU15 average in 2004 to 78% 
in 2050.
In addition to the overall slowdown in living standard increases, a shift 
could occur in the relative income position of different age cohorts. This, 
points to the core of the ageing challenge facing policy makers. Ageing raises 
the complex issue of the role of public transfers in achieving an appropriate 
distribution of resources between a smaller active population and a larger 
inactive retired population.
4.4.  Additional important aspects not fully covered by the 
long-term projections 
The long-term projections have left aside potentially important effects or 
transmission channels, on which the economic literature does not provide 
clear conclusions, namely (i) the impact of ageing on the quality of labour 
input and innovation, (ii) the effect of health status on economic growth (iii) 
other miscellaneous channels. 
4.4.1  Impact of ageing on the quality of labour input and 
innovation
4.4.1.1  Does a worker’s productivity decline with age?
If an individual’s productivity declines with age, then a rising share of 
older workers in the labour force would reduce overall labour productivity 
even though age-speciﬁ   c productivity would remain constant over time. 
Whether productivity is affected by age is a complex issue, since the 
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additional measurement problem comes from the fact that the age-proﬁ  le of 
productivity is calculated on the basis of hourly earnings, and there may be a 
divergence between wages and productivity in the older age brackets due to 
the payment of seniority wages (Hellerstein et al. 1999).
The empirical evidence is mixed. Barth et al. (1993) ﬁ  nd from a survey of 
human resource executives that older workers are seen as being more reliable 
and having better skills and work-friendly behaviour than their younger 
counterparts. Using an employer-employee dataset for the US, Hellerstein et 
al. (1999) show that prime-age workers (aged 25 – 54) are just as productive 
as younger workers, but those aged 55 and over are less productive. Surveying 
supervisors’ ratings, work-sample tests, analyses of employer-employee 
datasets and other approaches assessing individual productivity across age 
brackets, Skirbekk (2003) ﬁ  nds evidence suggesting “that productivity tends 
to follow an inverted U-shaped proﬁ  le, where signiﬁ  cant decreases take place 
from around 50 years of age”.
A possible cause of these age-related productivity declines is the reduction 
in cognitive abilities over a person’s life span. While some abilities, such 
as verbal abilities, show only small changes throughout the working life, 
others, such as perception speed, display relatively large decreases with 
age. Although older individuals have longer experience, they may learn at a 
slower pace and have reductions in their memory and reasoning abilities. This 
bell-shaped relationship between age and individual productivity is broadly 
conﬁ  rmed by Kotlikoff and Wise (1989) and Hansen (1993) for the US, and 
Meghir and Whitehouse (1996) for the UK, who ﬁ  nd that young workers 
with little experience and older workers are less productive than those of 
prime age. However, Börsch-Supan (2003) shows that, even when assuming 
a pronounced bell-shaped relationship, the projected fall in aggregate labour 
productivity remains fairly small, and is negligible compared with the 
projected impact of the reduction in labour supply.
Overall, the impact of ageing on productivity remains uncertain, although 
the effect is suspected to be negative.
4.4.1.2  The quality of labour input will also be affected by rising 
educational attainment levels
The quality of labour will improve with the rising level of education of the 
labour force resulting from a cohort effect: younger cohorts are more educated 
than the older cohorts now approaching retirement, and this is particularly 
true for women. However, while the average human capital should increase 
over time, this effect should ﬂ   atten out when the low-education cohorts 
are completely replaced in the labour market by the more highly educated 
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la Fuente and Jimeno (2005), who suggest that the elasticity of output with 
respect to the stock of human capital almost certainly stands above 0.5, i.e. 
higher than the most optimistic estimates in the previous literature. Running 
tentative projections, Montanino, Przywara and Young (2004) suggest that 
the growth of average educational attainment is likely to slow slightly in the 
future, compared to recent decades. However, education is set to continue to 
make a substantial contribution to economic growth in the EU as a whole, 
though the impact varies widely among Member States. 
4.4.1.3  Negative impact on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and 
innovation
Some economists claim that an ageing population could hamper innovation 
and weigh down TFP growth in the medium and long run (e.g. Barrell (2005)12.
Barth et al. (1993) also show that, notwithstanding their greater dedication at 
work, longer experience and better skills, older workers are considered by 
a panel of employers to be less ﬂ  exible in accepting new assignments and less 
receptive to training: this may hamper innovation and the full exploitation of 
technical progress. Skirbekk (2003) notes that older workers are less likely 
to adapt easily to changing working methods. However, there is no hard 
empirical evidence to support this claim. 
Some scenario-based projections (Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh 2004; 
Jorgenson and Motohashi 2004) speculatively attempt to quantify the effect 
of ageing on productivity. This “commonsense” view may, however, be 
questioned as innovation also depends closely upon the organisation of work, 
which could be reformed so as to better exploit the innovative potential of 
older workers. 
4.4.2  Health as a driver of economic growth in the context of 
ageing populations
Profound change in the age structure of the population is not the only 
process related to the demographic and social developments taking currently 
place in Europe. Similarly dramatic is the change in the health status of the 
population, driven by two parallel processes. The ﬁ  rst one is the change 
in prevalence and relative importance of different diseases related to the 
transformation of the age structure of populations. The second one is the 
evolution in the disease pattern linked to the general trends of increase in 
disposable income, improvement in the standard of life and the changes in the 
12  Unlike the effect of education and age quality of labour input, which are to disappear in the steady 
state, the adverse impact on innovation is meant to be dynamic, affecting not only productivity levels and 
the standard of living in the medium/long run but also the long-term growth in productivity in the steady 
state.G. Carone, D. Costello, N. D. Guardia, G. Mourre, B. Przywara and A. Salomäki 77
coverage and quality of health care services provided to the people. Broadly 
speaking, the ﬁ  rst process leads to an increase in the relative importance 
of old age-related, mainly chronic diseases, while the second one results 
in the gradual shift from the illnesses related to the poor standard of living 
(malnutrition, maternal and prenatal conditions) and the communicable 
diseases towards mainly non-communicable conditions linked to the changing 
patterns of consumption and lifestyle in the modern societies (cardiovascular 
diseases, diabetes, injuries, mental health problems etc.)
Although difﬁ  cult to quantify, the effect of health on economic growth 
works through a number of channels, on both demand and supply side of 
the economy 13. On the demand side, better health affects public and private 
budgets by reducing the opportunity cost of private and public resources 
spent to prevent, diagnose and cure the existing diseases. On the supply side, 
it operates mainly through three mechanisms: increased labour productivity, 
increased labour supply, and better skills acquired due to higher education and 
training (Bloom et al. 2001a). Each one of them is a complex issue and calls 
for a special attention (Suhrcke et al. 2005). 
First, healthy workers are normally expected to work more efﬁ  ciently, 
thus to produce more output with a given input. Arguably, this argument 
is valid much more for the less developed countries whose economies are 
relatively more (physical) labour-intensive, thus – at least theoretically 
– health deﬁ  ciencies weigh more on the aggregate productivity. However, 
given still signiﬁ  cant contribution of labour to the GDP in   the industrialised 
high-income countries, as well as the new patterns of diseases, which seem 
to ‘adjust’ to the structural changes in the economy, the impact of health on 
labour productivity should be still considered as an important transmission 
channel.
Second, it is apparently obvious that a healthy worker works more and 
loses less working days due to various illnesses. However, the issue is more 
complicated as in fact an individual’s health status affects his or her decision 
of how much work to supply through its impact on wages, preferences and 
expected time horizon. Several possible scenarios can be sketched. On the 
one hand, if wages reﬂ  ect different levels of productivity and productivity 
increases with good health, expected higher wages are an incentive for 
13  As an important caveat, it should be borne in mind that causality is two-directional. Health condition 
of a population is indeed closely interrelated with its economic and social situation. On the one hand, it 
has been proven that developed high-income societies do not only enjoy considerably longer life than their 
counterparts in poorer or less developed countries, but are also expected to spend most of their lifespan in 
good health. On the other hand, the causal link exists also in the opposite direction with health being one of 
the drivers of economic growth. The theoretical underpinning goes back to the neoclassical growth theory 
and its further extensions which relate the economic growth to three main factors: the stock of physical 
capital, the stock of labour and the productivity. Changes in productivity are driven by technological 
progress and the level of human capital, which depends among others on the level of education, skills, 
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healthier workers to provide more work. Moreover, growing life expectancy 
may inﬂ  uence life cycle savings and the pattern of capital accumulation, 
as people choose to save a higher share of their income to cover a longer 
expected spell of retirement in their old age. On the other hand, high enough 
wages may be an incentive to reduce the number of hours spent in work or to 
retire earlier if the sufﬁ  cient lifetime earnings can be gained in a shorter time 
or if marginal utility of leisure exceeds marginal utility of wages.
Third, it is generally known that healthy individuals achieve on average 
higher educational attainment in their young age and are more likely to invest 
in their education and training over the entire lifespan than people with health 
problems. Therefore, as more educated people are more productive, good 
health leads again to higher productivity. 
As shown, health should be considered as an important driving force behind 
economic development. Therefore its evolution over time, which is strongly 
inﬂ  uenced by the demographic and epidemiological changes, will necessarily 
have an impact on the future state of economy. Potential improvements in 
health status may alleviate the burden on the public ﬁ  nance and improve the 
productivity of the labour force. However, while demographical trends can be 
successfully projected with a high degree of certainty at least one generation 
ahead, it does not apply to the health status. On the one hand, given the high 
complexity of the concept of health status and volatility of its components, 
a simple extrapolation of past trends does not seem a reasonable solution. 
On the other hand, predicting future changes in epidemiological variables at 
the aggregate level is a very uncertain venture. Therefore, the debate on the 
extent to which the health status (or morbidity) of the population may change 
as life expectancy increases must be limited to the stylised hypotheses, based 
on the relations between the assumed changes in the mortality and the parallel 
evolution in the rates of morbidity (or disability). 
Traditionally, a decrease in mortality rates was considered to reﬂ  ect 
an improvement in the health status of the population, i.e. a decrease in 
morbidity. However, since reliable empirical evidence (life-tables, precise data 
on mortality, disability and morbidity) became available, such an assumption 
has not been valid any more. Three main hypotheses have emerged from the 
literature (for an overview of existing theories, see Nusselder (2003). The 
dynamic equilibrium hypothesis proposed by Manton et al. (1995) posits 
that an increase in   longevity is accompanied by a parallel postponement of 
morbidity and/or disability. Consequently, the number of years (or share of 
total lifespan) spent in ill-health remains broadly constant over time. The 
expansion of morbidity hypothesis proposed by Gruenberg (1977), Verbrugge 
(1984) and Olshansky et al. (1991) posits that as life expectancy increases, 
older people become more vulnerable to chronic diseases and spend more 
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problems survive to an advanced age. The compression of morbidity 
hypothesis, proposed by Fries (1980, 1983, 1989, 1993), posits that as life 
expectancy increases, the onset of disability will be postponed to a later stage 
in life thanks to improved living conditions, healthier lifestyles and the fact 
that more and more chronic diseases may be curable. Recent studies have 
not provided strong evidence in favour of any of the above hypotheses as the 
results have differed signiﬁ  cantly not only over time and across countries, but 
even between the sexes.
Given mentioned considerations and the scarcity of aggregate data on 
the relation between health and the economic growth, one must admit the 
difﬁ  culties behind quantitative approach to the issue. While it is practically 
feasible to project the budgetary effect of stylised changes in health status 
(see: Economic Policy Committee and   European Commission, 2006), any 
attempts to reﬂ  ect their overall macroeconomic impact are obviously very 
risky. 
4.4.3  Other effects of ageing
Other effects, such as the speciﬁ  c effect of the life cycle on savings and 
the international balances of interest rates and the feedback effect of increased 
pension spending have not been modelled explicitly, as they require speciﬁ  c 
calibrations associated with a great deal of uncertainty as well as a general 
equilibrium framework, which is not practicable for dealing with the EU25.
4.4.3.1  The impact on capital intensity
Ageing has three effects on capital intensity: the increasing marginal 
product of capital, the decline in the savings rate and the international 
allocation of capital14.
Overall, ageing should have a small positive impact on capital intensity, 
albeit only a temporary one. While the theoretical relationship between the 
dependency ratio and the saving ratio is clear according to the life-cycle 
hypothesis, the overlapping generations models (OLG) made popular by 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) reach different conclusions. OLG models 
allow the impact of ageing to be simulated using a general equilibrium 
framework and taking due account of various economic interactions, often 
neglected by partial equilibrium approaches. Simulations with an overlapping 
generations model (e.g. Miles (1999)) suggest that the positive effect of 
capital deepening on economic growth (due to a higher marginal return of 
14 An additional negative impact could be an ageing capital stock if the ageing of the workforce leads 
to slower rates of capital accumulation. The “vintage” effects (i.e. changes in technical progress depending 
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capital and despite declining savings rates) will be fairly marginal compared 
with the projected drop in labour supply. Even in the event of a 14% rise in 
the capital/labour ratio, productivity is projected to be only 3.3% higher by 
2050 on the basis of a constant population structure. An exogenous rise in 
Total Factor Productivity would then be needed to compensate for the loss in 
output resulting from a fall in the working-age population.
4.4.3.2  Labour supply shortages could aggravate mismatches in the 
labour market
The projected change in the age structure of the workforce could alter the 
composition of consumption and domestic demand (Börsch-Supan 2003). 
This might imply large reallocations between sectors, which require a rise in 
job mobility. Failing this, population ageing could lead to increasing labour 
market mismatches with even lower employment than that projected. Lastly, 
it should be noted that the rise in labour participation needed to increase 
labour supply might cause a dip in productivity growth in the short term if a 
signiﬁ  cant proportion of the newcomers to the labour market have relatively 
low skills (Wasmer 2002, Mortensen 2005)15.
4.4.3.3  Financing future age-related expenditures is an economic as 
well as budgetary challenge
There are also indirect and feed-back channels through which an ageing 
population can affect economic growth. The sharp projected increase in 
pension spending and other age-related expenditure may require considerable 
rises in taxes and social security contributions, which to some extent will 
distort labour supply and economic decisions and thus adversely impact on 
GDP   growth. Therefore, as stressed by Ehrlich and Kim (2005), the funding 
of age-related expenditure is not only a budgetary problem but also a crucial 
economic issue. 
4.5 Policy  implications 
As this paper is limited to the labour market and economic impacts of 
ageing, not discussing issues of public ﬁ  nances, also this section on policy 
implications deals only with general labour market and economic policy 
implications.
15 This is not a cause for policy concern as there is no genuine trade-off in the long run between 
policies to raise the employment rate and policies to foster productivity growth. A higher employment rate 
unambiguously raises growth in   GDP per capita in the long run. For a deeper analysis, see chapter 3 in 
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Section 4.3 presented the results of the long-term projections of the 
impact of ageing. These are witnessed with the rise of old-age and economic 
dependency ratios as well as the projected decline in per capita GDP   growth. 
Unambiguously, these ﬁ  ndings point to pressing economic policy challenges 
for the EU in order to respond to ageing. Section 4.4 stressed a great deal 
of uncertainty behind the projections, which cannot take into account all the 
economic effects of aging. As a consequence, the ageing challenge might be 
at the end even worse than projected. 
4.5.1  Lisbon strategy: crucial but not ambitious enough in the 
face of ageing?
A comprehensive set of policy actions will be needed to ensure that 
Europe’s economies can meet the ageing challenge. The projections conﬁ  rm 
the validity of the approach adopted by the EU in the Lisbon strategy. They 
show that the achievement of the overall Lisbon employment rate targets 
(although only by 2020 for the EU25) are possible but also imperative in 
order to mitigate the effects of ageing populations on the number of employed 
persons and economic growth. 
The labour market is the key to successful policy adjustment, since 
ultimately it is the economic output of a country that determines its capacity 
to sustain high quality welfare systems. Although employment rates and levels 
are projected to continue rising for at least a decade, temporarily offsetting 
the decline in the size of the working-age populations, this will provide only 
a narrow window of opportunity to undertake necessary reform measures. 
The projections also illustrate the effects of successful structural reforms, 
and show that policy action can make a big difference to the capacity to meet 
the challenge of ageing. The projections indicate that pension reforms already 
enacted by Member States could lead to a 10 p.p. increase in the employment 
rate of older workers, to levels well above the Lisbon employment targets. 
However, even if the EU as a whole achieves the Lisbon employment targets 
(albeit later than the original target date of 2010), this will not be sufﬁ  cient to 
offset the effects of demographic change. The EU may therefore need to look 
beyond the current Lisbon employment rate targets and not stop short at the 
existing targets or deadlines. Moreover, substantial unused labour capacity 
will remain in many Member States. More precisely, the following aspects 
should be investigated: 
the average number of hours worked per person employed is low in some 
countries in Europe, especially compared with the US. Although this 
might partly reﬂ  ect a stronger preference for leisure in Europe, it may 
also be caused by institutional distortions which could be removed with 
appropriate policies;
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  many countries will still have wide gender employment gaps, suggesting 
further scope for increasing female employment rates. In addition, the better 
integration of migrants, measures to tackle the grey economy, the tightening 
of access to disability schemes, and efforts to address social exclusion, 
which leads to lasting inactivity, could further raise the labour supply;
  it should be borne in mind that reaching the 60% employment target for 
older workers in 2020, while certainly representing a dramatic turnaround 
compared with the trend of recent decades towards ever earlier retirement, 
will only bring the EU up to the level of older-worker employment 
observed in the US today. A signiﬁ  cant number of people will continue to 
withdraw early from the labour force despite increasing life expectancy 
and improving health at older ages. 
As regards the other aspects of the Lisbon strategies, the projections 
indicate that the sources of economic growth will alter over time, with 
productivity becoming the dominant source. This conﬁ   rms the need for 
policies to raise productivity potential, as mentioned in the Lisbon strategies. 
Higher levels of investment in physical and human capital, together with 
efforts to strengthen innovation and R&D activities, could yield substantial 
productivity gains over the long run, especially against a background of 
a knowledge-based society. There is for instance strong evidence that higher 
educational attainment leads to enhanced labour productivity and adaptability 
to a knowledge-based economy. The higher enrolment rates in second- and 
third-level education observed in many countries, coupled with a greater 
focus on quality and efﬁ  ciency, may contribute to improved productivity in 
the future, albeit with a lag of several years, or even decades. The interaction 
between labour market and product reforms is worth highlighting in this 
context, as more ﬂ  exibility in these markets facilitates resource reallocation 
to more innovative and productive activities.
4.5.2  Raising the employment rates of older workers and 
increasing effective retirement ages remain a priority
Raising the employment rates of older workers, including those aged over 
65, will remain a critical policy objective for EU Member States. Achieving 
the necessary extension in working lives will not be easy. It not only requires 
that tax/beneﬁ  t and wage systems provide ﬁ  nancial incentives for people to 
remain economically active and invest in building their own human capital, 
but also means that there must be job opportunities for older people with 
appropriate skill sets. Policies to tackle age-discrimination and to promote 
life-long learning, ﬂ  exible retirement pathways and healthy work conditions 
also need to be considered.
Ɣ
ƔG. Carone, D. Costello, N. D. Guardia, G. Mourre, B. Przywara and A. Salomäki 83
Perhaps the most challenging aspect of efforts to rise effective retirement 
ages is the need to change the expectations and behaviour of employers and 
employees alike. Moreover, the concept of ageing is evolving, and with life 
expectancy projected to continue rising, retirement behaviour may also need 
to adjust continuously. 
Despite the fact that life expectancy is projected to increase by some 6 
years between 2004 and 2050 (having already increased by some 8 years 
from 1960), the threshold for categorising a person as being of working-age 
(15 – 64) and as older (65+) remains unchanged. This is not simply a matter 
of ensuring constancy in a statistical indicator. It is reﬂ   ected in public 
policies: for example, statutory retirement ages in most countries are ﬁ  xed 
at 65. It is also reﬂ  ected in the expectations and behaviour of citizens as 
demonstrated by the effective retirement age, which is closer to 60. While 
people appear to have adjusted their life course at younger ages in response 
to increased   longevity (e.g. longer period spent in education; later entry 
into the labour market, family formation and the birth of the ﬁ  rst child), the 
same does not appear to have occurred with respect to what is considered as 
a ‘normal’ age to retire. There is an incompatibility between the continuous 
gains in life expectancy, the apparent demand for early withdrawal from 
the labour force and the desire for adequate and secure retirement income16.
This neatly illustrates the ever-evolving nature of the retirement challenge. 
Notwithstanding recent pension reforms aimed at increasing the average age 
of retirement, the percentage of adult life spent in retirement is projected to 
increase in all Member States, with the exception of   Slovenia (for both males 
and females) and Poland and Slovakia (for females). This is the combined 
result of the projected signiﬁ  cant gains in life expectancy, which outweigh 
the prospected increases in the average age of exit from the labour market. In 
order to keep the percentage of adult life spent in retirement constant, some 
countries need to postpone the exit age by a substantial number of years. 
Table 4.9 suggests that the exit age should be put off by almost 2 years for 
males in the EU15, euro area and the EU10, and by just over 2 years for 
females in the EU15 and the euro area (but only one year in the EU10). The 
situation appears particularly critical in a number of speciﬁ  c countries such 
as Greece, Portugal, UK and Hungary (although these are countries that start 
from a relatively lower percentage of age spent in retirement), where the 
average exit age should be deferred by 3  –  4 years in order to keep constant 
16 For illustrative purposes, DG ECFIN has calculated an adjusted old-age dependency ratio which 
adjusts the age at which one is considered older in line with projected gains in life expectancy. The threshold 
for being classiﬁ  ed as elderly would rise from 65 in 2004 to 69 in 2050. Instead of doubling from 24% in 
2004 to 51% in 2050, the ‘life expectancy adjusted’ old-age dependency ratio would increase to 36%. In 
other words, one half of the demographic ageing effect would ‘disappear’ if expectations of being elderly 
and taking retirement adjusted in line with gains in life expectancy. In practice, effective retirement ages 
would not need to rise by the same number of years as life expectancy in order to keep pension schemes 
in ﬁ  nancial balance. Rather, a less than proportionate increase is needed – one which maintains the ratio of 
years in work relative to years in retirement.G. Carone, D. Costello, N. D. Guardia, G. Mourre, B. Przywara and A. Salomäki 84
the percentage of adult life spent in retirement. However, a priori, there is 
no economic rationale for favouring a constant share of adult life spent in 
retirement, and indeed a preference for a longer period of leisure time in 
retirement could be justiﬁ  ed on the basis of rising living standards. However, 
it must be economically and ﬁ  nancially viable. Achieving a rising share of 
adult life spent in retirement could be an interesting challenge for retirement 
policy in the future.
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2003 2050 2003 2050 2003 2050 2003 2050 2003 2050 2003 2050
BE 59.3 60.2 21.5 25.3 32.7 35.9 2.3 59.3 60.4 25.4 29.4 36.5 39.3 2.1
DK 63.3 63.5 17.0 20.1 26.0 29.3 2.3 62.9 62.4 20.1 23.1 29.6 32.8 2.2
DE 62.7 63.7 18.4 21.4 27.8 30.5 1.9 62.0 62.3 22.5 26.2 32.3 35.6 2.4
GR 65.2 62.5 16.1 21.8 24.3 31.5 5.0 64.2 62.1 19.4 24.2 28.2 34.0 4.1
ES 63.0 63.3 18.7 21.8 28.1 28.1 2.1 62.3 62.3 23.3 26.9 33.0 36.3 2.4
FR 60.6 61.7 21.4 24.4 32.0 34.3 1.6 60.5 61.4 25.7 29.3 36.1 38.7 2.0
IE 63.7 64.3 16.6 21.0 25.4 29.9 3.1 64.4 64.6 19.2 23.9 27.9 32.5 3.4
IT 59.7 62.3 22.0 23.5 33.0 33.1 0.1 60.7 61.3 24.9 28.5 35.2 38.1 2.2
LU 58.7 59.7 22.0 25.2 33.5 36.0 1.8 59.7 59.3 25.0 29.3 35.8 39.8 2.9
NL 62.1 62.3 18.3 20.4 28.0 30.1 1.4 60.8 61.0 23.2 24.9 33.6 35.1 1.1
AT 60.1 62.2 21.1 23.7 31.9 33.4 1.1 58.8 60.8 25.9 28.2 37.2 38.1 0.7
PT 64.5 64.2 16.1 20.6 24.6 29.5 3.4 61.1 63.4 22.9 24.5 33.2 33.6 0.3
FI 61.6 63.4 19.1 21.6 29.0 30.8 1.3 60.6 62.5 23.9 25.8 34.4 35.3 0.6
SE 63.5 64.6 18.2 20.4 27.3 29.1 1.3 62.7 63.9 22.0 23.8 31.6 32.8 0.9
UK 63.8 63.8 17.3 22.0 26.2 31.1 3.5 62.7 63.2 21.3 25.1 30.8 34.2 2.5
CY 64.6 65.3 16.5 19.6 25.0 28.1 2.1 61.0 61.7 22.3 24.9 32.6 34.8 1.5
CZ 62.0 63.1 16.8 20.3 26.3 29.7 2.3 60.0 61.0 22.0 24.9 32.9 35.1 1.6
EE 61.8 63.0 15.6 19.3 25.0 28.7 2.5 61.0 62.1 20.9 23.8 31.2 33.5 1.6
HU 61.5 62.2 16.6 21.4 26.4 31.3 3.4 62.0 61.0 19.7 25.0 29.5 35.2 4.1
LT 63.1 63.5 15.2 19.4 24.0 28.6 3.2 63.3 62.0 19.1 24.5 28.3 34.3 4.2
LV 61.6 63.1 15.7 19.3 25.2 28.7 2.4 60.9 61.9 20.8 23.8 31.2 33.7 1.8
MT 59.9 60.3 20.3 24.0 31.2 34.6 2.4 56.3 56.1 27.0 30.5 39.5 42.6 2.2
PL 60.5 62.7 18.2 21.1 28.6 30.6 1.4 57.1 59.9 25.3 26.6 37.6 37.2  – 0.3
SK 60.6 61.6 17.4 21.0 27.6 31.0 2.3 56.5 59.5 25.0 25.9 37.6 36.7  – 0.6
SI 57.6 62.0 21.7 21.7 33.7 31.6  – 1.4 55.8 60.6 27.5 26.4 40.3 36.6  – 2.6
EU25 61.9 62.9 19.0 22.1 28.8 31.6 1.9 61.1 61.9 23.3 26.6 33.6 36.2 1.9
EU15 62.1 63.0 19.3 22.4 29.0 31.8 1.9 61.6 62.1 23.3 26.7 33.3 36.2 2.1
EU10 61.0 62.7 17.6 20.9 27.6 30.5 1.9 58.7 60.4 23.5 25.9 34.9 36.3 1.0
Euro
Area 61.7 62.7 19.7 22.6 29.7 32.1 1.7 61.3 61.8 23.8 27.2 33.9 36.8 2.1
Note: percentage of adult life spent in retirement is given by life expectancy at retirement/ retirement 
age plus life expectancy at retirement minus 15.G. Carone, D. Costello, N. D. Guardia, G. Mourre, B. Przywara and A. Salomäki 85
4.5.3  Migration could also be used to raise labour supply
Ageing might stimulate migration, which would increase labour supply 
and stimulate growth provided the skills of the migrants broadly match the 
economic needs of the host country (e.g. Fehr et al. 2004). European countries 
already rely on migrants to ﬁ  ll shortages for certain skilled and unskilled 
tasks (e.g. in the health care sector). Immigration could be a positive factor in 
labour market adjustment. 
It has also been argued that migration could bolster, at least temporarily 
(as immigrants contributing to pension schemes will be future pensioners 
as well), the ﬁ   nancial sustainability of public (pay-as-you-go) pension 
schemes. However, for these beneﬁ  ts to materialise fully migrants must be 
employed in the formal economy (thus contributing to the tax and social 
security systems) and the skill structure of migrants must match labour 
market needs17. In practice, these conditions are often not met: immigrants 
tend to have lower employment rates than natives in many EU countries, and 
their unemployment rates are roughly two to three times higher on average. 
Therefore, a key challenge for the EU is to better integrate immigrants into 
the labour market18.
4.5.4  Boosting productivity is another major challenge
Productivity growth is expected to be the main driver of economic growth. 
Higher levels of investment in physical and human capital, together with 
efforts to strengthen innovation and R&D activities, could yield substantial 
productivity gains over the long run, especially against a background of 
a knowledge-based society. 
There is for instance strong evidence that higher educational attainment 
leads to enhanced labour productivity and adaptability to a knowledge-based 
economy. The higher enrolment rates in second- and third-level education 
observed in many countries, coupled with a greater focus on quality and 
efﬁ  ciency, may contribute to improved productivity in the future, albeit with 
a lag of several years, or even decades. The interaction between labour market 
and product reforms is worth highlighting in this context, as more ﬂ  exibility 
in these markets facilitates resource reallocation to more innovative and 
productive activities.
17   European Commission Green Paper of January 2005 on managing economic migration (COM 
(2004) 811 ﬁ  nal).
18  For recent work on labour migration, see   European Commission (2005b).G. Carone, D. Costello, N. D. Guardia, G. Mourre, B. Przywara and A. Salomäki 86
4.6  Concluding remarks: the need for moving forward 
right now
Ageing populations will have broad-ranging and far-reaching repercussions 
for our labour markets and economic growth. These effects start to materialise 
during the next decade, as the ECFIN-Commission projection shows. Thus, 
the window of opportunity for reforms is closing fast. 
However, ageing is not a “tsunami” that will cause a sudden drop in 
economic growth and living standard when large numbers of baby boomers 
start to retire. It is a massive challenge, but one which is slow-moving and 
progressive. Ageing is largely predictable and thus manageable provided we 
act in an efﬁ  cient and timely manner. 
The Lisbon Strategy seems to go in the right direction but might not be 
sufﬁ  cient to respond to the ageing challenges. It should also be pursued well 
after 2010. Raising the employment rates of older workers and increasing 
effective retirement ages remain a priority in order to increase the labour 
supply and to contribute to sustainable economic growth in the face of adverse 
demographic developments. This also helps ensure that retirement behaviour 
takes due account of future increases in life expectancy. While migration 
ﬂ  ows could also be used to raise labour supply, boosting productivity is a key 
challenge.
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5.0 Abstract
Conventional economic wisdom indicates that the aging process will 
cause large ﬁ   nancial unbalances to the PAYG social security systems, 
unless contribution rates increase drastically. A commonly advocated reform 
measure – at least by economists and international institutions – that may help 
to cope with this ﬁ  nancial sustainability is to postpone retirement. According 
to the political economy approach, however, decisions on pension policy go 
beyond economic theory into the realm of politics. The crucial insight of this 
literature is that pension systems need not be welfare enhancing, but rather 
politically feasible. In democratic countries, this amounts to obtaining the 
support of a majority of the Parliament or, more directly, of the electorate. 
This intuition carries an additional, powerful, consequence: normative 
analysis and policy recommendations may not be useful, unless they lead to 
the design of politically sustainable reform packages.
This paper analyzes the impact of the aging process on the political 
sustainability of current PAYG pension systems. How do political constraints 
shape the social security system in six OECD countries under population 
aging? Aging increases the dependency ratio, thereby reducing the average 
proﬁ  tability of an unfunded pension system, but it leads also to an older 
electorate, thereby increasing the relevance of pension spending on the 
policy-makers’ agenda. The simulations presented in the paper suggest that 
the political aspect dominates, as the contribution rates are set to increase. 
These simulations deliver a strong policy implication: an increase in the 
effective retirement age always decreases the size of the system chosen by the 
voters, while often increasing its generosity. 
Yet, will this policy measure be feasible in OECD countries? Simulations 
of the political feasibility of postponing retirement under aging in France, 
Italy, the UK, and the US for the year 2050 suggest that retirement age will be 
postponed in all countries, although social security contribution rates will still 
rise in all countries, but Italy. The political push to increase the retirement age 
is mainly due to a negative income effect induced by aging, which reduces the 
proﬁ  tability of the existing social security system, and thus the individuals net 
social security wealth.
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5.1 Introduction 
Virtually all countries in the world feature a pension system. An 
overwhelming majority of these countries runs a pay-as-you-go (PAYG), 
or unfunded, scheme. Contributions are collected from current workers and 
are shared among current retirees as pension beneﬁ  ts. Most PAYG pension 
systems share some common features. They are ﬁ   nanced with a special 
payroll tax, rather than – say – through general taxation; eligibility to old 
age pensions does not depend on agents’ wealth, e.g., on asset income, and 
beneﬁ  ts are paid as life annuities. Moreover, as argued by Mulligan and 
Sala-i-Martin (1999), the evolution over time of several pension systems, 
and of their characteristics, is similar in many respects. For instance, the 
size of these schemes has increased with economic growth; several systems 
have introduced provisions that induce early retirement, while the ofﬁ  cial 
retirement age did not keep up with the increase in life expectancy and 
health status. Pension systems do, however, differ across countries in several 
relevant features, such as contribution rate, beneﬁ  t formula, beneﬁ   t    indexation, 
eligibility requirements and ofﬁ  cial retirement age.
A wide body of literature has prized the introduction of these systems 
(see Diamond, 1996 and Gramlich, 1996). According to a paternalistic 
view, a pension scheme that forces individuals to transfer resources from 
youth into old-age is needed since agents are shortsighted, they may lack 
information about their future and hence they may not save enough for old 
age consumption. Moreover, even if individuals were able to look after 
their old-age needs, there may not be reliable saving instruments to transfer 
resources into the future1. Private insurance markets may also fail to provide 
the life annuity characteristic featured by the government-run PAYG systems, 
due to usual adverse selection problems.
Indeed, pension systems have recently been criticized for introducing 
several inefﬁ  ciencies in the economy. High contribution rates, i.e., payroll 
taxes, especially if almost unrelated to pension beneﬁ  ts, have been blamed 
for reducing employment (Daveri and Tabellini, 2000). The existence of 
early retirement provisions has been shown to reduce employment among the 
elderly, by inducing middle-aged workers to retire early (Gruber and Wise, 
1999 and Brondal and Scarpetta, 1988). Finally, both the high tax burden 
and the early retirement provisions may reduce the accumulation of physical 
and human capital, thereby decreasing economic growth (Conde-Ruiz and 
Galasso, 2004).
1 Historically, several systems have been transformed from fully-funded to PAYG, after that the 
existing savings had been wiped out, either by stock market crashes or by high inﬂ  ation, as in the US after 
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However, the recent utmost attention of economists, media and 
policymakers to pension systems is mainly due to the aging process, which 
undermines the ﬁ  nancial sustainability of these systems. Aging has a direct 
impact on pension systems, because it increases the proportion of recipients 
from the system – the retirees – while reducing the proportion of contributors 
– the workers. In most OECD countries, under current rules, the amount of 
revenue will not be sufﬁ  cient to cover the pension beneﬁ  ts to be awarded. 
Hence, in order to honor their commitment to pay pension beneﬁ  ts to the 
future retirees, our aging societies will have to place larger ﬁ  nancial burdens 
on the working generations or to reform the systems. Several international 
institutions – such as for instance the World Bank (1994) and the   European 
Commission (2003) – have provided detailed normative analysis with the aim 
of designing sensible reform measures in an attempt to cope with the aging 
process. A good PAYG pension system should be ﬁ  nancially sound – vis à vis 
the expected demographic dynamics – retain economic efﬁ   ciency – by 
avoiding waste of resources, for given collected revenues, and by minimizing 
individual distortions – and be equitable. Additionally, the system should be 
designed to hedge demographic, economic and political risks.
Regardless of one’s view on the reasons for the initial introduction 
of the PAYG pension systems, it is widely agreed that current pension 
reform’s measures have to meet the political support to be implemented. 
The political economy literature on social security may help to explain how 
to design reforms that are politically feasible. This literature acknowledges 
that decisions on pension policy, from the initial design of the system to 
later modiﬁ  cations, go beyond economic theory into the realm of politics. 
Contributions to political campaigns, lobbying, votes of vested interest 
groups induce career-oriented policy-makers to sacriﬁ  ce economic principles 
for their political objectives.
The crucial insight of the political economy literature is that pension 
systems need not be welfare enhancing in order to be in place, they exclusively 
need to be sustained politically. In democratic countries, this amounts to 
obtaining the support of a majority of the Parliament or, more directly, of 
the electorate. This intuition carries an additional, powerful, consequence: 
normative analysis and policy recommendations may not be useful, unless 
they lead to the design of politically sustainable reform packages.
This paper follows this approach and provides a quantitative assessment of 
the future political sustainability of the current systems. Speciﬁ  cally, political 
sustainability identiﬁ  es the existence of political majority willing to support 
the pension system in all its current features (retirement age, contribution 
rate, beneﬁ  t calculation method, etc.). If the social security system is mainly 
viewed as a saving mechanism – transferring resources from young into old 
age – the aging process has a major economic and political effect on social  Vincenzo  Galasso 96
security. The economic effect consists of the increase in the ratio of retirees to 
workers – the dependency ratio. Since the average long run return of a PAYG 
social security system is given by the sum of population and productivity 
growth, aging reduces the proﬁ  tability of the system, thus leading the agents 
to downsize the system. Yet, aging has also a direct political impact, by 
making the electorate older and thereby increasing the relevance of pension 
spending on the agenda of the policy-makers.
The simulations of the political economic model (see Galasso and Profeta, 
2004) indicate that the political effect dominates the economic effect, so 
that the size of the social security system is expected to increase in all 
countries, albeit with some differences. Spain, the fastest aging country, 
faces the largest increase in the social security contribution rate, although the 
largest contribution rate, 50%, emerges in Italy. These simulations deliver a 
strong policy implication: an increase in the effective retirement age always 
decreases the equilibrium social security contribution rate, while often 
increasing the system generosity.
This policy implication is thus in line with the conventional economic 
wisdom. Population aging needs to be accompanied by an increase in the 
retirement age. Yet, will voters be willing to postpone retirement? The 
simulations of our political economic model provide a positive answer. 
Postponing retirement may become feasible in the future because of the 
political push of aging. In countries with large social security systems, such 
as most developed economies, which also feature generous early retirement 
schemes, aging may provoke a major negative income effect by reducing the 
individuals’ pension net wealth. In fact, the increase in the dependency ratio 
reduces the proﬁ  tability of systems for all future generations, who hence obtain 
a worse deal from the social security. Furthermore, if the reduction in the 
social security return takes the form of lower pension beneﬁ  ts, a substitution 
effect also arises, since the pecuniary incentive to retire decreases, which 
pushes toward postponing retirement. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the aging process 
and the forecasted impact on the social security systems; Section 5.3 brieﬂ  y 
reviews the literature on the political economy of pension systems, and then 
provides a quantitative assessment of the future political sustainability of 
the pension system in six OECD countries. The role of the early retirement 
provisions is examined in section 5.4, which evaluates also the political 
feasibility of increasing the retirement age in four OECD countries. Section 
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5.2   Aging and Social Security 
The current aging process is mainly due to the combination of an increase 
in life expectancy and a decrease in fertility rates. While fertility rates are 
believed to recover – at least partially – their post-war levels, OECD countries 
expect to enjoy a further increase of life expectancy at birth, moving from an 
average of 74.1 year for males and 80.6 for females in 2000 to respectively 
79.3 and 84.7 years in 2050.
These two elements will induce a substantial increase of the share of 
elderly people. Figure 5.1 shows that the proportion of elderly individuals, 
i.e., those older than 65 years, over the total population will rapidly increase 
until 2035; while remaining almost constant or increasing at a lower rate 
after that date. This aging process will be especially accentuated for Italy and 
Spain, and less dramatic in the UK and the US. 
Figure 5.1  Percentage of Elderly in the Total Population
Another measure of the aging process is provided by the old age 
dependency ratio – deﬁ  ned as the ratio of persons aged 65 or more to the 
persons aged 20 to 64. According to OECD projections, the average old age 
dependency ratio in the OECD countries will increase from 23.8 in the year 
2000 to 49.9 in 2050. This demographic process does, however, differ across 
countries: as shown in table 5.1, Spain and Italy experience the largest growth 
of the dependency ratio, France and Germany are close to the OECD average, 
while the UK and the US are well below average. Vincenzo  Galasso 98






 United  Kingdom 26.6 45.3
 United  States 21.7 37.9
OECD Average* 23.8 49.9
* Average of main OECD Countries
Source:   Eurostat, US Census and EC (2000)
The old age dependency ratio, however, does not correspond to the ratio 
of retirees to workers, due to the existence of early retirement provisions. 
Retirement policies are a crucial element to determine the structure of the 
labor market and the design of the pension systems. In the majority of 
countries around the world, there exists a legal retirement age at which the 
elderly are induced or required to exit the labor market before they can collect 
their pensions (see Social Security Throughout the World). However, this 
ofﬁ  cial retirement age does not correspond to the effective retirement age, due 
to the existence of early retirement schemes. Interestingly, the data suggest 
that this early retirement phenomenon has been timely related to the aging of 
population, that is, the labor force participation of the elderly has decreased 
over time, as population has aged (Costa, 1998). As a consequence, this labor 
market trend – extensively studied by Gruber and Wise (1999) and Brondal 
and Scarpetta (1998) – exacerbates the aging process, as the proportion 
of retirees per workers becomes even higher than the old-age dependency 
ratio, and thus raises an additional element of concern vis-à-vis the ﬁ  scal 
sustainability of the social security systems. According to Latulippe (1996), 
in 1990 the average effective retirement age for males in OECD countries was 
62.2 years, down from 68.5 years in 1950. 
5.2.1  Projected Pension Spending
Despite the aging process, governments are conﬁ   dent that the reform 
measures implemented in the 90s are sufﬁ  cient to achieve the long run ﬁ  nancial 
sustainability of the system. This is what emerges from an EC and OECD 
joint effort – with the member countries – to produce projections of pension 
spending as percentage of   GDP over the next ﬁ  fty years. Table 5.2 shows 
the ofﬁ  cial projections provided by each country’s government, as reported 
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employment and policy factors. Italy stands out as the most striking case: 
despite having the largest demographic effect – capable of increasing 
spending by 10% of   GDP – pension spending is expected to decrease in the 
year 2050, due to the projected increase in the employment rate of elderly 
workers and thanks to the measures introduced by the Amato-Dini reforms. 
Also the UK is expected to reduce its pension spending, as policy measures 
counterbalance a mild aging effect. All other countries forecast an increase in 
the amount of resources devoted to pensions. In Spain, a strong demographic 
effect is even magniﬁ  ed by a policy that extends pension eligibility, while in 
Germany and France the reform measures are not strong enough to neutralize 
the aging process. Not surprisingly, in the US the increase in spending is 
below the OECD average.
Table 5.2  Official Projections of Old Age Pension Expenditures over   GDP









France 12.1 15.9 7.6  – 0.5  – 3.4 0.4
Germany 11.8 16.8 6.4  – 0.7  – 2.7 2.1
Italy 14.2 13.9 10.1  – 3.2  – 5.5  – 1.5
Spain 9.4 17.4 8.6  – 2.6 0 2.0
 United Kingdom 4.3 3.6 1.7 0.1  – 2.5 0.1
 United States 4.4 6.2 2.4  – 0.1  – 0.2  – 0.3
Source: OECD (2002)
5.3   The Political Sustainability of Social Security
5.3.1 An  Overview
The main contributions in the literature on political economy of pension 
systems analyze the institution of the unfunded pension systems and their 
development into the most widespread instrument of social insurance. The 
main challenge in this line of research is to understand why pension programs 
– transferring resources from young and middle-aged workers to the elderly 
– exist; why some of them are so generous; why they differ widely across 
countries at similar stage of economic development; and – last, but not least 
– how they will react to the current aging process, and hence which pension 
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The building block of these political economic models consists in 
determining the individual preferences over the pension system, by 
characterizing how the system affects the individual agent’s economic 
well-being. Then, a political mechanism – typically a direct or political 
election – will provide an aggregation of these preferences into a policy. This 
paper concentrates on a voting model, in which pension systems arise if there 
are sufﬁ  cient economic reasons for at least a majority of the electorate to 
support them; and may be reformed if a majority of voters decides to do so.
While retirees clearly support pension systems, which award them a beneﬁ  t 
at no (current) cost, according to Galasso and Profeta (2002), there exist at 
least four economic factors that may lead young and/or middle aged agents to 
support a pension system: (i) dynamic inefﬁ  ciency; (ii) reduced time horizon 
in evaluating the pension program; (iii) within-cohort redistribution elements; 
and (iv) crowding-out effects of the aggregate savings by the pensions.
Since Samuelson's (1958) and Aaron's (1966) seminal work, it is known 
that pensions may improve the welfare of every individual if the economy 
is dynamically inefﬁ  cient. In other words, every young agent would ﬁ  nd 
it more convenient to invest in a PAYG system than in alternative saving 
mechanisms, if the implicit rate of return from pensions – determined as the 
sum of the population growth rate and the per-capita growth of the economy 
– is larger than the real rate of return from capital accumulation.
In a seminal paper, Browning (1975) argued that, even in a dynamically 
efﬁ  cient economy, adult individuals may support pensions, since they only 
value current and future contributions to, and beneﬁ  ts from, the system, while 
taking past contributions as a sunk cost. In other words, adult individuals 
do not consider the entire cost of their pensions, since they only focus on 
a reduced time horizon.
Tabellini (2000), and later Casamatta et al. (1999) and Persson and 
Tabellini (2000), suggested that some young individuals may favor positive 
pensions because of a within-cohort redistribution element. In fact, although 
pension systems provide on average a lower rate of return than alternative 
saving mechanisms, some (low-income) individuals may face a higher return, 
due to the existence of this element of redistribution within generation. With 
(near-to) ﬂ  at pension beneﬁ  ts, agents obtain different returns from the pension 
system, depending on their income. In particular, high-income agents pay 
large contributions – and enjoy a below average return from the system – while 
low-income agents pay lower contributions and their return is above average. 
Finally, Cooley and Soares (1999) and Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) 
claimed that individuals evaluating social security policies are sufﬁ  ciently 
aware to be able to take into account the effects of the policies on the stock 
of capital, and thereby on factor prices. They argue that the existence of 
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tends to crowd out capital, and thus reduces real wages and increases real 
returns to capital. This creates a redistribution in favor of assets-holders 
(“capitalist”) and against individuals who rely on labor income (“workers”).
5.3.2   Individual Preferences and Voting Behavior
The political support to pension systems depends on the decision of every
individual, who, as a political agent, votes over the size of the system – that is, 
over the contribution rate. According to the political economy literature surveyed 
above, this choice will typically depend on her individual characteristics, such 
as age and income, and on the main features of the system.
How do individuals vote to express their preferences over social security? 
Consider a one-time election, whose outcome is binding in all future periods 
(see Galasso and Profeta, 2002, for a discussion of repeated elections). 
A PAYG pension system imposes a cost to the young – the contribution – and 
provides a transfer – the pension beneﬁ  t – to the elderly. Retirees will hence 
always support such a system, whereas workers may be willing to incur in 
a current cost only if they will be sufﬁ  ciently compensated by future pension 
beneﬁ  ts. More generally, every individual, in taking her voting decision over 
the size of the system, will consider her current and future contributions to 
the system and her future beneﬁ  ts in order to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the pension as a saving instrument. In particular, every voter determines the 
amount of resources that she would like to transfer into the future through the 
pension system – her most preferred size of the system – by comparing her 
overall return from the system to the returns available on the capital market 
from assets with comparable risk. 
As previously argued, and initially suggested by Browning (1975), past 
contributions to the system do not affect the agents’ voting decision, since they 
could not be appropriated by the voters, were the system to be abandoned. 
Thus, they represent a sunk cost. Hence, middle aged and elderly individuals 
are more favorable to social security systems, as they will almost exclusively 
enjoy beneﬁ   ts in their remaining time horizon. Figure 5.2 describes the 
individual’s residual horizon when taking her voting decision. Vincenzo  Galasso 102
Figure 5.2  Voter's Time Horizon
These individual voting decisions are then aggregated in a simple majority 
voting. To the extent that preferences are single-peaked, the equilibrium 
outcome of the voting game coincides with the most preferred size by the 
median voter2.
5.3.3  The Economic and Political Effects of Aging
Conventional wisdom suggests that pension expenditure – as a fraction 
of   GDP – increases as population ages, since the number of individuals who 
may claim old-age pension beneﬁ  ts increases. This evidence is supported by 
several studies – see Tabellini, 2000, Perotti, 1996, Breyer and Craig, 1997 
among others – describing how the size of pension system increases with the 
proportion of elderly people in the population3.
Political economy models address the effect of the aging process on the 
size of pension spending under a different perspective. According to these 
models, pension systems are determined by a political game among successive 
generations of voters, who may be willing to support the system depending 
on some economic factors, as argued in the previous section. Aging affects 
these economic determinants as well as the relative political power of the 
individuals in the different age groups.
The ﬁ  rst three economic factors analyzed in section 5.3.1 deal with the 
internal rate of return from the pension system for the individual voters. 
The average long run internal rate of return of a PAYG pension system 
is given by the sum of the population and the productivity growth rate. 
Hence, a decrease in the population growth rate, associated to an increase 
in the survival probability for the elderly, leads to an older population, and 
reduces the proﬁ  tability of the system as a saving device. Individual voters 
would then have to reduce the size of the system, by substituting their claims 
2  See Galasso and Profeta (2002) for a detailed description of the majoritarian voting game on pensions, 
as well as of other political institutions.
3 This result is particularly strong when the size of social security is measured as the share of social 
security expenditure of   GDP (Breyer and Craig, 1997), or as the share of social security and welfare 
expenditure of   GDP (Tabellini, 2000, Perotti, 1996), or as the proportion of social security and welfare 
expenditure on total government spending (Tabellini, 2000). See also recent evidence by Disney (2007). Vincenzo  Galasso 103
towards future pensions with more private savings. According to this effect, 
the contribution tax rate – and hence the average size of a pension beneﬁ  t 
– should decrease. 
As population ages, however, so does the electorate (see the next section). 
This indirect effect of population aging may have important repercussion on 
the political sustainability of pension system, as it leads to an increase in the 
political inﬂ  uence of the elderly voters, and hence in the relevance of pension 
spending on the agenda of the policy-makers. In fact, in a majoritarian 
voting game, the increased relevance of the elderly voters translates into 
more political power – as measured by their share of votes – to individuals 
who are close to retirement age, and hence who will only consider a reduced 
time horizon in evaluating the social security program (Browning, 1975). 
According to this effect, the pivotal voter will become an older person, who 
will favor an increase in the contribution tax rate. In this case, however, the 
average size of a pension beneﬁ  t needs not to increase, as aging leads to 
a contemporaneous increase of the dependency ratio. In other words, despite 
the increase in the tax rate, there will be fewer workers and more recipients 
– i.e., retirees – and the pension beneﬁ  t per retiree may indeed decrease. 
Figure 5.3 summarizes this effect by reporting the length of the contribution 
and of the beneﬁ  t periods for Italy in 1992 and in 2050 for different retirement 
ages.
Figure 5.3  Voter's Time Horizon
5.3.4   Aging of the Electorate 
A synthetic measure of the aging of the electors is given by the median 
age among the voters. In 1999, the median age among electors – adjusted for 
the different turnout rates at election by age – was between 44 years in Spain 
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age among voters is displayed in ﬁ  gure 5.4. The expected increase is striking. 
In 2050, the median age will be between 53 years – in the UK and the US 
– and 57 years in Spain. Unsurprisingly, Spain and Italy, which undergo 
the most dramatic aging process, face the largest change in the median age, 
respectively 13 and 11 years, while in the US and in the UK, where the 
demographic dynamic is less extreme, the median age increases by 6 and 
8 years respectively.
Figure 5.4  Median Age among Voters
5.3.5  Some Results on the Political Sustainability of OECD Pension 
Systems
This section builds on previous work by Galasso and Profeta (2004) to 
present a quantitative assessment of the effects of the aging process on the 
political sustainability of the current pension systems in six OECD countries: 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK and the US. 
As previously argued, two aspects of the aging process are crucial to the 
analysis of the political sustainability of pension systems. On one hand, the 
rise of the dependency ratio reduces the average long term returns from the 
pension system. Agents are thus induced to decrease the size of the system, 
by reshufﬂ  ing their portfolio in favor of more private savings. On the other 
hand, aging increases the political inﬂ  uence of the elderly voters, and hence 
the relevance of pension spending on the agenda of the policy-makers. The 
latter effect leads to larger systems. 
The simulations of the politico-economic model (for a description of the 
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that the political effect dominates. The increased political inﬂ  uence of the 
elderly voters will lead to a larger pension system, albeit not necessarily to 
more generous pension beneﬁ  ts, due to the increase in the dependency ratio4.
In fact, the replacement rate would decrease everywhere but in the UK and 
the US. With no changes in the retirement ages, which remain at their 2000 
levels, the contribution rates would raise in all countries: in Spain – one of the 
fastest aging countries – the contribution rate would raise the most, although 
the largest tax rate would still be in Italy (50%). 
Interestingly, the effects of a change in the retirement age on the size of 
the systems would be sizeable. An increase in the effective retirement age 
leads to a reduction of the contribution rate, since it increases the contribution 
period for the median voter, while reducing the period during which she 
will draw the pension beneﬁ  ts (see ﬁ  gures 5.2 and 5.3). An increase in the 
retirement age to 65 years is particularly effective in France and Italy – where 
the initial effective retirement age was only 58 years – with a reduction in 
the contribution rate of around 12%. In the other countries, the decrease 
would be more moderate, but still sizable in Germany and Spain. Notably, 
despite reducing the contribution rate, this policy also manages to increase the 
generosity of the system, i.e., the replacement rate, in all countries but the US. 
This is because the social security dependency ratio, i.e., the ratio of retirees 
to workers, is reduced. Germany and Italy would enjoy the largest effect.
5.4   The Role of Retirement
5.4.1 An  Overview
The results of the simulations examined in the previous section suggest 
that a raise in the effective retirement age would be pivotal in reducing the 
expected increase in pension spending. Postponing retirement has a double 
effect in a politico-economic environment: it counterbalances the aging 
process, by reducing the ratio of retirees to workers, and thus increases the 
overall proﬁ  tability of the system; but it also decreases the continuation return 
from the system for each individual, since it rises the number of working 
years – and thus the remaining contribution period, while reducing the 
residual life at retirement – and thus the period during which pension beneﬁ  ts 
are collected. 
According to the simulations’ results in table 5.3, the latter effect 
dominates. Moreover, the extent to which contribution rates are reduced by 
an increase in the retirement age depends on the magnitude of the shift taking 
place between the contribution and the beneﬁ  t period. On average, an increase 
4  For a detailed discussion of the country-speciﬁ  c features of the social security system, and of their 
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of one year in the effective retirement age reduces the equilibrium tax rate by 
around one and half percentage point.
Several studies – see among others Gruber and Wise (1999) and Blöndal 
and Scarpetta (1998) – showed that individuals’ decisions to retire early 
represent the rational response to the incentives provided by the pension 
systems: most individuals leave the labor market as soon as they are entitled 
to collect a pension beneﬁ  t, due to the large implicit tax imposed on continuing 
to work after early retirement age.
Other studies have tried to quantify the cost of these provisions in terms 
of the lost output, because of the lower labor participation rates. According 
to Herbertsson and Orszag (2003), in 1990, the potential output lost due to 
male early retirement ranged between 0.1% of   GDP in Iceland and 12.7% in 
Belgium, with a OECD average loss of 5.3%. They estimate these costs to 
set between 1.3% in Iceland and 15.9% in Belgium in 2010, with a OECD 
average of 7.4%












2000 47 58 22.4% 49.2%
2050 56 58 31.3% 41.9%
2050 56 65 19.7% 47.9%
Germany
2000 46 61 23.8% 68.3%
2050 55 61 37.7% 55.4%
2050 55 65 32.6% 81.2%
Italy
2000 44 58 38.0% 73.6%
2050 56 58 50.0% 55.5%
2050 56 65 38.0% 74.2%
Spain
2000 44 62 21.3% 67.9%
2050 57 62 45.5% 64.6%
2050 57 65 40.7% 77.3%
 United 
Kingdom
2000 45 63 14.5% 75.8%
2050 53 63 33.2% 95.2%
2050 53 65 31.1% 114.3%
 United  States
2000 47 63 9.7% 41.9%
2050 53 63 21.6% 55.7%
2050 53 65 18.3% 53.9%
Source: Galasso and Profeta (2004) Vincenzo  Galasso 107
Early retirement provisions5 have thus complemented the aging process 
in increasing the ratio of retirees per worker, and ultimately in exacerbating 
the ﬁ  nancial distress of the pension systems. Moreover, they may be held 
responsible for a sizeable output loss.
Why then there has been such a wide spread adoption of the early 
retirement, despite these negative impacts? Understanding the reasons behind 
their introduction represents the initial step to examine how these provisions 
may be amended in order to increase the effective retirement age.
Some explanations have recently been put forward. Gruber and Wise 
(1999) suggest – albeit not endorse – that early retirement may have been 
created to encourage elderly people’s exit from the labor force in an attempt 
to provide more job opportunities for young workers – a popular justiﬁ  cation 
among politicians. Alternatively, these provisions may have been adopted 
to accommodate a secular pattern of decreasing labor force participation. 
Following Caballero and Hammour (1998), it could be argued that early 
retirement represented an instrument to increase the share of the production 
appropriated by the labor factor, in particular in the late sixties, when Europe 
experienced a period of tensions and strikes. 
Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2003 and 2004) suggest instead that the 
adoption of early retirement was due to labor market shocks, which gave rise 
to the appearance of a signiﬁ  cant group of redundant or unemployed elderly 
workers, who were not yet entitled to an old age pension. These individuals 
were allowed to withdraw from the labor market on a pension transfer, 
through different instruments, such as formal early retirement provisions, 
disability pensions (with weaker eligibility criterion) and “unemployment 
pensions” for unemployed elderly workers.
Data provided in 1986 by the Economic Commission for Europe at 
the United Nations on the institutional features (retirement age, eligibility 
criterion) of the initial early retirement provisions in ﬁ  fteen OECD countries 
(see table 5.4) seem to conﬁ  rm this view. Almost everywhere in Europe, 
between 1961 and 1977, generous early pathways from the labor market 
were offered to redundant or unemployed elderly workers, who were allowed 
to collect beneﬁ  ts under a wide array of welfare schemes, such as special 
pensions to unemployed elderly workers (UP in table 5.4), disability beneﬁ  ts 
awarded on the basis of labor market considerations (DU) and special 
contracted pensions for redundant workers (RW). In the 70s and 80s, new 
5  The term early retirement should be considered quite extensively. In fact, in several countries, such 
as Germany, Sweden or the Netherlands, early exit from the labor market occurs by drawing on disability 
or unemployment beneﬁ  ts, whose eligibility is often made contingent on labor market conditions, rather 
than on the ofﬁ  cial early retirement pension. According to Gruber and Wise (1999), the proportion of men 
receiving disability or unemployment beneﬁ  ts at age 59 is 21% in France, 22% in Belgium, 24% in Sweden, 
27% in the Netherlands, 33% in the UK and 37% in Germany, as opposed to only about 12% in   Japan and 
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eligibility criteria were introduced, namely early retirement in exchange for 
the employment of young unemployed worker (YE). 
Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2003 and 2004) also suggest that the political 
support in favor of early retirement hinges on the existence in these 
provisions of an element of intragenerational redistribution, due to the utility 
from leisure. While we may expect leisure to be equally valued across ability 
types, the foregone labor income is lower for less productive individuals, 
who therefore ﬁ  nd it more convenient to retire early. This retirement behavior 
leads to the continuous creation of groups of workers with incomplete 
working history, which guarantees the future political constituency for this 
provision. In particular, even young and middle-aged workers may be willing 
to support early retirement, as they expected to beneﬁ  t from these early 
pathways from the labor marker later in their working carrier. The increase in 
the effective retirement age analyzed in the simulations at section 5.3.5 would 
hence break this implicit intergenerational social norm, and would be opposed 
by low-income young and middle-aged workers, i.e., the perspective early 
retirees, and by actual early retirees.
This section analyzes the individual preferences over the effective 
retirement age – for a given level of the social security contribution 
rate. Economic theory suggests that agents should form their preferences 
by evaluating several elements. First, they will consider the individual 
labor-leisure trade-off of the retirement decision, as described above. Second, 
they need to assess the aggregate impact that a change in the mandatory 
retirement age of all individuals has on the pension beneﬁ  ts, by modifying the 
dependency ratio. Finally, possible general equilibrium effects of a change in 
the retirement age on rate of return and on wages should also be considered. 
According to these motivations, elderly workers or retirees will clearly 
choose the retirement age in order to maximize their pension beneﬁ  ts. For 
every retiree, this amounts to be the youngest pensioner, so as to minimize the 
number of people with whom to share resources. The preferences of younger 
individuals are more complex to determine as all the elements described 
above need to be considered. In particular, young individuals may be induced 
to set low retirement ages in order to anticipate their retirement period, 
although this would lead to obtaining a smaller pension at retirement. Since 
the factor that prevails cannot be determined a priori, individual preferences 
over retirement age cannot be ordered according to age. Unlike in section 
5.3.2, the median voter over the retirement age does not typically coincide 
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Table 5.4  Early Retirement Institutions
Country Retirement Age 
(male) Programme Condition for eligibility
Normal Early (Year of 
Adoption)
Austria 65
55 UP (1961) unemployed 1 year for economic or 
structural reasons
60 RW (1961) in certain sectors after 35 years of 
service
Belgium 65
55 RW (1974) unemployed for at least 1 year (in 
certain cases ER age below 55)
60 YE (1976)
employer must replace the worker 
with a young one who must work for 
at least 1 year.
60 UP (1978) unemployed for at least 1 year
 Canada 65 60 ER  (1987)
Denmark 67 18 DU (1977)
earning capacity that is permanently 




person who has received UB for 200 
days in previous 60 weeks (ER age 
reduct temporarily to 55)








60 RW (1962, 
1972)
workers made redundant for economic 
reasons
55 RW (1977, 
1979, 1980)
workers made redundant for economic 
reasons
55 YE (1982) youth or unemployed must be hired 
for 2 years.




protection of workers in the steel 
industry undergoing restructuring
Germany 63 – 65
60 UP (1973) unemployed for at least 52 weeks
60 DU (1973) 35 years of contributions and unable to 
work also for market reasons
63 ER (1973) 35 years of contributions
59 – 58 RW (1979, 
1981, 1982)
applied to certain sectors (steel, 
automobile, metal chemical)
58 YE (1984) vacancy must be filled by a person 
outside the firm Vincenzo  Galasso 110
Country Retirement Age 
(male) Programme Condition for eligibility
Normal Early (Year of 
Adoption)
Italy
60 ER (1965) 35 years of contributions
DU (1965) related to market contributions
55 RW (1979) unemployment due to economic crisis 
or industrial reoganization
58 YE (1984) company signs a collective agreement 
to increase employment acoordingly
 Japan 65 60 ER  (1973)
Norway 67 18 DU (1971)
working capacity reduced by at 
least 50%, account is also taken of 
likelihood of finding employment
Spain 65
60 AF (1967)
<60 DU (1972) related to labor market conditions
YE
(after 1972)




60 DU (1970) working capacity 1/2 also on grounds 
of redundancy
60 UP (1972) unemployment benefit has been paid 
for a maximum period




FPP (1970s) depends on specific plan
62 – 64 YE (1977) employer must replace retiree by 
someone from unemployment register




55 FPP (1970s) depends on specific plan
62 ER (1977) note: new calculation of benefits 
increases generosity
Sources: Economic Commission for Europe (1986), Gruber and Wise (1999), Casey (1992).
Legend: RW = pension to workers made redundant for economics reasons; UP = awarding of the 
pension requires a period of unemployment; DU = disability pension awarded also according to 
labor market conditions or to unemployed workers; AF = actuarially fair ER provision; ER = general 
early retirement provision; FP = firms' pension plans; YE = awarding of the pension requires the 
employment of a young worker.
Clearly, the individual preferences on the retirement age are largely 
affected by the social security contribution rate. In particular, a change in 
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modify the voters’ decision over the retirement age. A higher contribution 
rate reduces the workers’ net income, and – through the budget constraint 
– increases the total amount of resources available to the retirees and thus the 
pension beneﬁ  ts. This will hence reduce the opportunity cost of retirement, 
and will lead more voters to reduce the effective retirement age. However, 
a raise in the contribution rate leads also to another income effect, which 
counterbalances this reduction in the retirement age. In fact, since social 
security represents a saving device, which is dominated by alternative assets, 
savers (especially young individuals) would prefer to have little social 
security and more private assets. An increase in the contribution rate goes 
instead in the opposite direction and decreases the overall income of the 
young, thereby making them poorer and hence inducing them to postpone 
retirement. Again, which among these opposing effects will prevail cannot be 
established a priori. The quantitative evaluation at the simulations in section 
5.4.4 indicates that the retirement age is decreasing in the social security 
contribution rate in all countries but the UK.
5.4.3   The Political System6
In this new political environment, individuals express their preferences 
over both the social security contribution rate and the retirement age. 
Individual preferences are then aggregated through a simple majority voting 
model, as in section 5.3. 
Clearly, the politics of pensions involve more complex decision processes 
than a simple majority voting model may mimic. Yet, a simple median voter 
model is in line with the view that electoral concerns represent the key 
factor for policy-makers dealing with large welfare programs (see Pierson, 
1996). As such, simple majority voting represents the minimal political 
environment where to analyze these electoral concerns. Moreover, it has the 
clear advantage of providing a coherent and transparent analysis of the impact 
of the demographic dynamics on the political process.
However, the complexity of the voting scenario, when the policy space 
is bi-dimensional, may prevent a simple solution of the voting game to 
arise. To ensure that the voting game has interesting properties, following 
Shepsle (1979), some institutional restrictions on the political system 
needs to be imposed. This political scenario is characterized by a set of 
institutional arrangements (a committee system, a jurisdictional arrangement, 
and an assignment rule) – that allows all the voters to have jurisdiction on 
the two issues – social security contribution and retirement age – but only 
issue-by-issue. This notion of issue-by-issue voting (see Shepsle, 1979, 
6  For a recent political-economy likterature on early retirement see Fenge and Pestieau (2005), Lacomba 
and Lagos (2000), Casamatta et al. (2002), Cremer and Pestieau (2000) and Cremer et al. (2002). Vincenzo  Galasso 112
for a detailed description) allows to capture the electoral concerns by the 
politicians, and to retain the ﬂ  avor of the median voter theorem. 
By creating an issue-by-issue voting, the policy space is separated into two 
issues and one median voter may be identiﬁ  ed for each issue. Effectively, this 
bi-dimensional voting game amounts to characterizing two reaction functions 
for the two median voters. A reaction function describes the decision of the 
median voter over the social security contribution rate for a given retirement 
age; while another reaction function characterizes the decision of the 
median voter over the retirement age for a given social security contribution 
rate. The intersection of these two reaction functions identiﬁ  es a political 
equilibrium7.
5.4.4  Some Results on the Political Sustainability of Postponing 
Retirement
The methodology used to provide a quantitative evaluation of the political 
feasibility of postponing retirement in graying societies consists of two stages. 
In the former stage, the political economic model is calibrated to capture the 
main economic, demographic and political aspects, and the institutional 
elements of the different social security systems in France, Italy, the UK and 
the US, around the year 2000, which is taken to represent the initial steady 
state. In the latter, the calibrated version of the model is simulated, given the 
forecasted values of demographic, economic and political variables for the 
year 2050, and the effective retirement age which arises as a new political 
equilibrium, as well as the social security contribution rate, are calculated.
For each country, the model is calibrated to match some long standing 
economic regularity (the capital-output ratio), the equilibrium social security 
contribution rate and the equilibrium effective retirement age in 2000, with 
the contribution rate and the effective retirement age chosen by the median 
voter on the respective issue. 
During the simulation exercise, the calibrated model is fed with forecasted 
values of economic, demographic and political variables for the year 2050 in 
order to capture closely the aging process. With this new set of parameters, 
the model evaluates the political feasibility of postponing retirement and 
the political sustainability of the social security system – by calculating the 
retirement ages and social security contribution rate chosen by the respective 
median voters in 2050.
The driving force of the differences between the 2000 and the 2050 steady 
states is thus the aging process that modiﬁ  es the demographic balance of the 
social security as well as the political representation of the different generations 
7 For a technical description of the political economy model and of its calibration, and for a more 
detailed comment on the simulation results’ see Galasso (2006b). Vincenzo  Galasso 113
of workers and retirees. The impact of population aging on the determination 
of the social security contribution rate has been discussed in section 5.3.3. 
Although two opposing economic and political effects emerge (see Razin et 
al., (2002), and Galasso and Profeta, (2004 and 2007)), the simulation results 
reported in table 5.3 suggest that the political push dominates. Hence, aging 
increases the social security contribution rate for a given retirement age8.
When evaluating how aging affects the individual preferences over 
retirement (for a given the social security contribution rate) two main effects 
arise. On one hand, aging has been shown to reduce the average rate of 
return of the social security system. Due to the large size of the system, this 
generates a large negative income effect – a reduction in the lifetime income 
for all generations – which induces individuals to postpone retirement. 
Moreover, for a given level of the social security contribution rate, aging 
will reduce also the pension beneﬁ  ts’ replacement rate, as fewer resources 
will have to be shared among more retirees. This negative substitution effect 
reduces the pecuniary incentives to retire early and leads again to an increase 
in the retirement age, thereby reinforcing the previous effect9.
The results of the simulations on the political feasibility of postponing 
retirement in an aging environment are shown in table 5.5. For the four 
countries examined here – France, Italy, the UK and the US – the year 2000 
calibration is reported at the ﬁ  rst line; while the following line(s) characterize 
the political outcomes for the year 2050.
Table 5.5  Retirement Age and Contribution Rates. Results of Simulations








2000 47 58 22.4%
2050 56 67 27.1%
Italy
1992 44 58 38.0%
2050 56 67 34.9%
 United  Kingdom
2000 45 63 14.5%
2050 53 70 27.1%
 United  States
2000 47 63 9.7%
2050 53 68 13.5%
2050 53 69 11.9%
Two crucial results emerge. First, there is everywhere a large raise in 
the retirement age chosen by the median voter, with respect to the initial 
8 In the context of this issue-by-issue voting game, this amounts to an upward shift of the reaction 
function of the contribution rate with respect to the retirement age.
9 In the context of this issue-by-issue voting game, this amounts to an upward shift of the reaction 
function of the retirement age with respect to the contribution rate. Vincenzo  Galasso 114
equilibrium in 2000. Second, in all countries, but Italy, the social security 
contribution rate and the generosity of the pension beneﬁ  t increase as well. 
Unsurprisingly, France and Italy are forecasted to feature the largest 
increase in the effective retirement age – from 58 to 67 years. In Italy, this 
is mainly due to strong aging process, which gives raise to a large negative 
income effect. Interestingly, the large increase in the retirement age carries 
with it a reduction in the social security contribution rate, which drops to 
34.9%. This reduction in pension spending – and in the replacement rate 
– is in line with the EC-OECD estimates (see table 5.2). Figure 5.5 provides 
a graphical representation of the outcome of the political process in Italy in 
1992 and in 2050, but displaying the reaction functions in the initial and ﬁ  nal 
steady state. The dots indicate the points where these reaction functions cross 
– and thus the equilibrium outcomes of the political game. 
In France, pension spending will increase from 22.4% to 27.1%, due to the 
impact of the aging process on the median age, despite retirement age being 
largely postponed. Also in the   United Kingdom, the aging of the electorate 
will produce a large increase in the social security contribution rate to 27.1%, 
while retirement age will increase by seven years. In the   United States, 
the aging process, and its negative income effect, are expected to be more 
moderate. The equilibrium retirement age will range from 68 to 69 years, and 
the corresponding contribution rate between 11.9% and 13.5%.
Figure 5.5  Political Equilibria in Italy Vincenzo  Galasso 115
5.5   Conclusion
According to the political economy approach, decisions on pension policy 
go beyond economic theory into the realm of politics. This new literature 
carries some crucial insights. First, pension systems need not be welfare 
enhancing in order to be in place, they only need to be sustained politically, 
which, in democratic countries, is equivalent to obtaining the support of 
a majority of the Parliament or, more directly, of the electorate. Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, normative analysis and policy recommendations 
may not be useful, unless they lead to the design of politically sustainable 
reform packages.
In the context of this political economy approach, the effects of the aging 
process on the PAYG pension systems are analyzed. Conventional wisdom 
suggests that aging affects the ﬁ   nancial sustainability of these systems, 
since it induces an increase in the proportion of retirees – i.e., the recipients 
from the system – while decreasing the proportion of workers – i.e., the 
contributors to the system. Systems are not ﬁ   nancially sustainable since 
under the current rules, revenues will not be sufﬁ  cient to cover the pension 
beneﬁ  ts. Hence, either contribution rates will have to be raised, in order to pay 
pension beneﬁ  ts to the future retirees, or pension beneﬁ  ts will have to be cut. 
The political economy approach to pension suggests that this decision will be 
determined by the voters through the political process. Stated differently, any 
reform to current pension systems will have to meet the political support of 
the electorate to be implemented. 
The aging process affects the political sustainability of current PAYG 
pension systems through two channels. On one hand, aging increases the 
ratio of retirees to workers, the dependency ratio, thereby reducing the 
average proﬁ  tability of the pension system. On the other hand, the entire 
electorate becomes older, and hence the relevance of pension spending on the 
policy-makers’ agenda increases. 
Simulations’ results on how political constraints shape the social security 
system in six OECD countries under population aging suggest that the political 
aspect will dominate, hence leading to an increase in pension spending. In 
particular, the size of the systems, as measured by the contribution rates, will 
increase, while their generosity, as measured by the pension’s replacement 
rates, may decrease, due to the increase in the dependency ratio. 
A clear policy implication emerges from these simulations. An increase in 
the effective retirement age always decreases the size of the system chosen 
by the voters, while often increasing its generosity. The paper discusses the 
political feasibility of this policy measure, by analyzing the political role of 
the early retirement provisions since their initial institution during the late 60s
and early 70s, and by forecasting the future political feasibility of this policy. Vincenzo  Galasso 116
The simulations on the simultaneous political determination of social 
security contribution rate and retirement age indicate that – when all political 
constraints are considered – the retirement age is expected to increase in all 
countries, thereby reducing the increase in the social security contribution 
rates usually associated to the aging process (see for instance Galasso and 
Profeta, 2004). The political demand for postponing retirement is mainly 
due to the aging process. In fact, population aging leads to an increase in 
the retirement age because of a negative income effect. By reducing the 
proﬁ   tability of social security, aging decreases the individual net social 
security wealth – thereby inducing them to retire later.
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6.0 Abstract
Our note uses existing demographic projections and mortality 
statistics for the G-10 country populations to derive estimates of future 
retirement-ﬁ  nancing-related bond demand over the next four decades. The 
underlying theoretical framework is a stylised life-cycle investment model in 
which households optimally save by investing in either a risky or a riskless 
asset. Demand for the latter is our empirical measure of future demand for 
high-quality ﬁ  xed-income bonds. Under a set of restrictive assumptions, the 
note ﬁ  nds that demand for such bonds will grow continuously from today, 
to almost one and a half times the current level in 2050. Demand growth 
will decelerate until 2030, however, then remain ﬂ  at for a few years before 
accelerating during the last decade under consideration here. This pattern 
mainly reﬂ  ects the entry of baby boom generations into retirement. Should 
there be gradual   longevity improvement beyond that already assumed in 
current demographic projections, there would be higher bond demand. The 
increase in demand due to such a shock would be small, however. If there 
were only a small increase in the age of mandatory entry into retirement 
– which appears to be a realistic assumption – the effect of the   longevity 
shock on bond demand would be essentially undone.
6.1 Introduction
Pension funds place an increasingly sharper focus on risk management. 
This development has been ongoing for some time, but was reinforced 
by the experience of the post-2000 ﬁ  nancial market developments, which 
included an equity market correction and a decline in interest rates, which 
led to signiﬁ  cant funding difﬁ  culties at corporate deﬁ  ned-beneﬁ  t pension 
plans. These experiences, together with recent regulatory and accounting 
changes, which tend to make funding difﬁ   culties more transparent, have 
led managers of deﬁ  ned-beneﬁ   t pension funds to sharpen their focus on 
asset-liability management. While the debate about the relative merits of bond 
versus equity-investments remains ongoing, there is growing recognition that 
asset-liability matching considerations imply that bonds may provide a better 
investment for deﬁ  ned-beneﬁ  t pension liabilities than equities. But it has 
been recognised for some time now that there may be a “scarcity” of suitable 
pension fund investments. In this context, attention has focused especially on 
government bonds, given their limited credit risk. 
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While most of that discussion has been couched in qualitative terms, 
recent empirical estimates by the G-10 (2005) illustrate that under a number 
of simplifying assumptions such “scarcity” can indeed be large, as current 
potential demand from pension funds and life insurance companies may 
exceed the current supply of G-10 country government bonds by a wide 
margin. In a related empirical study, Schich and Weth (2006) ﬁ  nd  that 
potential “scarcity” may be greatest in the segment of long-term bonds 
with terms-to-maturity from 10 to 30 years. The present note is related to 
that empirical work, focusing on the empirical question of how future bond 
demand may develop given expected future demographic developments. More 
speciﬁ  cally, it provides a ﬁ  rst attempt to addressing questions such as: Given 
current demographic projections, will demand for high-quality ﬁ  xed-income 
instruments increase and, if so, by how much? How would improvements in 
  longevity affect the demand for such instruments? How would these estimates 
vary if parameters such as the assumed (effective) age of entry into retirement 
are changed? The note does not focus on “scarcity” per se, however, as it is 
based on an equilibrium modelling approach, where demand for and supply of 
riskless assets are equilibrated through the interest rate. The present note goes 
beyond these earlier studies, however, in that it uses a dynamic approach to 
estimating potential demand for government bonds for retirement-ﬁ  nancing 
purposes. By contrast, the approach taken in the earlier paper was essentially 
a static one that compares estimates of current pension promises with 
G-10 government bonds outstanding. The present note uses demographic 
projections and mortality statistics for the G-10 country populations to 
derive estimates of (retirement-ﬁ  nancing-related) bond demand until 2050, 
using a stylised life-cycle investment model as a theoretical framework. In 
particular, it uses a simpliﬁ  ed version of an overlapping generations model 
following Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and augments it by uncertain 
lifetime and a rule of (portfolio) choice between a risky and riskless asset, 
as suggested by Campbell and Viceira (2002). The latter asset is assumed to 
represent high-quality ﬁ  xed-income instruments such as government bonds.
Under a set of restrictive assumptions, the note ﬁ  nds that demand for such 
bonds will grow continuously from today, to a level one and half times the 
current one in 2050. Demand growth will decelerate until 2030, however, then 
remain ﬂ  at for a few years before accelerating during the last decade under 
consideration here. This pattern reﬂ  ects the entry of baby boom generations 
into retirement. Should there be a   longevity improvement, there would be 
higher bond demand. The increase in demand due to such a change would be 
small, however. If there were only a small increase in the age of mandatory 
entry into retirement – which appears to be a realistic assumption – the effect 
of such a gradual   longevity-shock on bond demand would be essentially 
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changes in the age structure of populations, with baby boomers moving out 
of the labour force (with bond demand assumed to be a positive function of 
output). The portfolio shift by ageing populations from risky into riskless 
assets may be empirically less important.
6.2   Estimation approach
To model portfolio investment of households over their life cycle and 
expected growth of bond demand, we follow Auerbach and Kotlikoff 
(1987) in using a multi-period overlapping generations framework where 
future economic variables are perfectly foreseen by households and ﬁ  rms in 
competitive markets.1 The model is a simpliﬁ  ed version of the economy of 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) in that we restrict preferences to a constant 
relative risk aversion utility function and assume that utility is derived 
from consumption but not from leisure, in that workers of different ages 
supply the same amount of labour, and that the economy essentially consists 
of a production sector and a household sector.2 We augment the model, 
however, by introducing lifetime uncertainty and a rule of portfolio choice 
between a risky and riskless (one-period-lived) asset, following Campbell 
and Viceira (2002). Current and future conditional probabilities to survive 
are assumed to be known. A system of nonlinear equations is solved which 
relates predetermined variables (e.g. demography-driven labour supply, 
mortality-driven span of life) as well as technological and taste parameters to 
endogenous behavioural variables such as consumption or saving in the form 
of either a riskless or a risky asset. Risky asset holdings are, on aggregate, 
assumed to constitute productive capital. The demand for the riskless asset 
is the main focus of our note. It provides us with an estimate for demand for 
high-quality ﬁ   xed-income instruments such as government bonds. Figure 
6.1 illustrates the pattern of bond demand as a function of the age of an 
individual.
1  In our framework, there are 75 overlapping generations: each year one cohort leaves the labour force 
to enter retirement, a new generation of 20-year-old takes its place, and the surviving part of the 95-year-old 
retirees dies. Some speciﬁ  c parameter assumptions are shown in the annex. More details on the theoretical 
model and simulation assumptions are not shown here to save space, but they are available on request from 
the contact author.
2  The role of government is limited to issuing bonds and paying interest on them by imposing taxes on 
labour income. Thus, there is no explicit pension, insurance or social security system. This assumption is 
made to keep the model simple.Sebastian Schich and Mark Weth 122
Figure 6.1  Illustration of the pattern of individual households'          bond holdings 
over their life-times
Aggregating over all individuals of a cohort and over all cohorts alive, we 
obtain a measure of aggregate bond demand, which is a function of   longevity 
(e.g. past, current and expected future conditional probabilities to survive), 
age of entry into retirement and labour productivity. We use demographic 
data for the Group of Ten (G-10) countries obtained from the 2004 revision 
of the United Nations (UN) World Population Prospects in their medium 
variant projections. Based on these data and on information on conditional 
probabilities to survive available from the Human Mortality Database
(HMD), we estimate the relative weights of all generations (cohorts) alive 
today and in future years. The resulting estimates of the future working-age 
population labour force developments in levels and growth rates under 
different assumptions regarding the effective age of retirement are shown in 
Figures 6.2a and 6.2b.Sebastian Schich and Mark Weth 123
Figure 6.2a  Estimates of future labour force in G-10 countries (levels)
Figure 6.2b  Estimates of future labour force in G-10 countries (growth rates)Sebastian Schich and Mark Weth 124
6.3 Results
Figure 3 shows the estimated pattern of equilibrium bond demand in the 
baseline scenario until 20503. It illustrates that under the speciﬁ  c assumptions 
made here retirement-ﬁ   nancing-related demand for bonds will increase 
continuously from today over the next several decades. By 2030 demand 
is projected to exceed current demand by about one quarter. Growth rates 
of demand will, however, gradually decline over the next three decades, 
mainly reﬂ  ecting the entry of baby boomers into retirement. Speciﬁ  cally, as 
the contribution of employment to output growth is projected to decrease 
from around 2020 onwards, as a result of the entry of baby boomers into 
retirement, bond demand will decelerate in line with output. Around 2030, 
most baby boomers will have entered retirement (assuming a retirement entry 
at 65 years) and are assumed to start their capital decumulation (dissaving). 
Thereafter, this baby boomer-related factor will gradually become less 
important as a determinant of output growth, with such growth being 
increasingly determined by labour productivity growth (which is exogenous 
to our model). In 2050, bond demand is projected to exceed current demand 
by almost one half. Next, the effect of various shocks to this baseline scenario 
are discussed.
Figure 6.3  Projected future bond demand (in levels and growth rate) 
Assumption: constant ratio of bond supply to output
3  In the baseline scenario it is assumed that labour productivity grows constantly at an annual rate of 
one per cent, working households enter retirement at the age of 65 years, and mortality rates are ﬁ  tted to the 
United Nations medium variant projections for life expectancy at birth.Sebastian Schich and Mark Weth 125
To see how a variation in labour productivity growth assumptions affects 
the equilibrium values in our model, we run simulations for a “low” (0.5 per 
cent) and a “high” (1.5 per cent) productivity growth scenario (as opposed to 
1 per cent as is assumed in our baseline scenario). Figures 6.4a and 6.4b show 
that when labour productivity growth is high, the growth rates of bond demand 
are higher than in the baseline scenario, which is based on the assumption of 
more moderate productivity growth. By contrast, when productivity growth 
is low, growth rates of bond demand are lower. Also, the variation in growth 
rates of bond demand over time is more limited when productivity growth is 
high, as the effect of baby boomers entry into retirement (and thus on output 
growth) is less pronounced. By contrast, when labour productivity growth 
is low, growth rates of bond demand vary more noticeably as a function of 
demographic developments. For example, in the latter scenario bond demand 
growth decelerates substantially and it reaches a trough close to zero around 
2035, before accelerating again.
Figure 6.4a  Bond demand for different labour productivity assumptions 
(levels)
  Assumption: constant ratio of bond supply to outputSebastian Schich and Mark Weth 126
Figure 6.4b  Bond demand for different labour productivity assumptions 
(growth rates)
As the date of entry of baby boomers in retirement inﬂ  uences the estimated 
pattern of bond demand, different assumptions regarding the effective age of 
entry into retirement are considered next. Figures 6.5a and 6.5b illustrate 
the change in bond demand estimates as a function of variations of the 
assumption regarding the effective age of entry into retirement. The baseline 
scenario assumes entry into retirement at 65 years, while the alternative 
scenarios consider either 60 or 70 years (with such changes becoming 
effective immediately rather than gradually). When individuals expect to enter 
retirement only at the age of 70 years rather than at 65, they will reduce their 
retirement savings, as they expect to spend less time in retirement (i.e. ﬁ  ve 
years less). Unlike in the case of a productivity shock (as described before), 
the effect of such a “retirement-entry shock” on the level of bond demand 
is immediate. Current bond demand would be about 5.6 per cent lower than 
in the baseline scenario in the case of later entry into retirement, and bond 
demand in 2050 would be about 8 per cent lower. Note that a reduction in 
the effective retirement age by the same number of years, i.e. from 65 to 60, 
would imply a relatively more important change in bond demand, as the latter 
would increase by 8 per cent today and 13 per cent in 2050.Sebastian Schich and Mark Weth 127
Figure 6.5a  Bond demand for different assumptions regarding effective age of 
entry into retirement (levels)
Assumption: constant ratio of bond supply to output
Figure 6.5b  Bond demand for different assumptions regarding effective age of 
entry into retirement (growth rates)
Varying our assumptions regarding   longevity allows us to consider the 
effect of what could be considered “  longevity shocks”. Expected mortality or 
  longevity is assumed to correspond to the United Nations (2004) projections Sebastian Schich and Mark Weth 128
over the projection period in our baseline scenario, but in the following we 
consider the effects of positive and negative changes to this scenario. Two 
modelling approaches are adopted. The ﬁ  rst one is perhaps more realistic 
than the second one, as it would be consistent with rather gradual effects of 
possible medical progress. First, this shock is modelled as a shift in (expected) 
mortality rates that implies an immediate shift in life expectancy at birth by 
one year and a gradual increase afterwards4. Figures 6.7a and 6.7b illustrate 
that a positive (negative) shock to   longevity entails a somewhat larger 
(smaller) demand for bonds. The increased demand in the case of a positive 
  longevity shock reﬂ  ects the longer period of time spent in retirement, which 
necessitates higher savings before retirement and thus also higher savings in 
form of bonds. The effect on bond demand of such a   longevity shock is rather 
limited, however, and the patterns of growth rates are close to each other 
(Figure 6.7b). Moreover, the bond demand impact of this   longevity shock 
could be offset by a change in the retirement-entry age of less than one year. 
This difference reﬂ  ects that variations in   longevity have a more limited effect 
on the size of the labour force than variations in the effective retirement age 
do, as labour force variations are the major driver of bond demand. 
Figure 6.6  G-10 Life expectancy at birth in baseline scenario and in the case 
of a   longevity shock
* Baseline scenario based on population-weighted averages of United Nations (2004) country-specific 
medium variant projections for the Group of Ten (G-10) countries. Source: United Nations World 
population prospects – The 2004 revision.
**) Shift in mortality rates that implies an immediate deviation in life expectancy at birth (in 2005) 
by one year, and a gradually increasing deviation from the baseline scenario thereafter.
4 Current life expectancy at birth as reported by the United Nations (2004) lies at 78.9 years for the 
population-weighted average of the Group of Ten countries.Sebastian Schich and Mark Weth 129
Second, we assumed a sudden “drop” in expected mortality rates that 
corresponds to an immediate improvement in life expectancy at birth by 
almost ﬁ  ve years, perhaps, as a result of radical medical advances. In this case, 
the impact on bond demand would be substantial. Indeed, to “neutralize” the 
effect of such a shock on bond demand by changes in effective retirement age, 
the latter would have to rise by almost ﬁ  ve years. We conclude that should 
expected   longevity increase, bond demand growth would accelerate over 
the next decades compared to the baseline scenario. In the – perhaps – more 
realistic case of a gradual improvement, only a small increase in effective 
retirement age (by less than one year) would sufﬁ  ce to bring bond demand 
back close to a situation without a   longevity shock, so there would be no 
change in the relative prices of bonds. 
Figure 6.7a  Bond demand for different   longevity assumptions (levels)
  Assumption: constant ratio of bond supply to outputSebastian Schich and Mark Weth 130
Figure 6.7b: Bond demand for different   longevity assumptions (growth rates)
6.4 Concluding  remarks
There is a view that demand for high-quality assets such as G-10 
government bonds is likely to increase over the next few decades, especially 
given current demographic developments, quantitative evaluations of such 
effects are not readily available. In this context, a recent major study on 
ageing, pension systems and ﬁ  nancial markets produced by a G-10 working 
group (Group of Ten, 2005) concluded that in the future “more resources are 
being channelled to capital markets to provide for retirement”. The study 
also highlighted that managers of pension funds emphasise that additional 
ﬁ  nancial instruments, including bonds, are needed to help them better manage 
ageing-related risks. It did stop short of providing empirical assessments of 
these issues, however, although it included estimates of potential “scarcity” of 
pension fund investments. The present note complements the G-10 study by 
providing a quantitative assessment of potential future demand developments. 
It is based on the view that it is useful to adopt a life-cycle framework as 
a theoretical basis and data on demographical projections to derive estimates 
of future retirement-ﬁ  nancing related bond demand. The results presented 
here are preliminary, however.Sebastian Schich and Mark Weth 131
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Annex 6.1  Model Calibration
This appendix brieﬂ  y describes key parameter assumptions and settings 
which are underlying the simulations that are presented in this note5. Table 
6.A1 lists the variables which are endogenous to our model. They comprise 
behavioural variables such as consumption and holdings of riskless asset 
(bonds) and risky assets (equity or capital employed in the production function) 
as well as asset returns, the portfolio share that is invested in the riskless asset, 
and output. Table 6.A2 lists key parameter assumptions and predetermined 
variables. Note that with respect to labour productivity, mortality, and the 
age of entry into retirement, different parameter constellations are considered 
which form our scenarios (Table 6.A3).
Table 6.A1  Endogenous variables6
Aggregate bond demand (aggregate bond holdings) in year Ĳ
Stock of aggregate private capital (aggregate equity holdings in year Ĳ
Output of the production process in year Ĳ
Individual consumption of a member of cohort k in year Ĳ
Individual holdings of one-period-lived riskless bonds in year Ĳ
Individual holdings of the risky asset (equity) in year Ĳ
Individual human wealth in year Ĳ
Weight of one-period-lived riskless bonds in year Ĳ in the financial 
portfolio of a member of cohort k
Weight of one-period-lived riskless bonds in year Ĳ in the total portfolio of 
a member of cohort k
Rate of return on the individual financial portfolio from year Ĳ to year Ĳ + 1
Rate of return on the risky asset* from year Ĳ to year Ĳ + 1
Rate of return on one-period-lived riskless bonds** from year Ĳ to year Ĳ + 1
*   We set the initial rate of return on the risky asset at 7%
** We set the initial rate of return on the riskless asset at 3%
5  Details on the theoretical framework and on the simulation assumptions are not shown here to save 
space. They are available on request from the contact author.
6  For all years Ĳ under consideration with Ĳ  2005Sebastian Schich and Mark Weth 133
Since the riskless rate of return is endogenous, an assumption is required 
regarding the time path of bond supply. To equilibrate supply and demand 
for riskless bonds, we assume that the supply of riskless bonds grows at the 
same rate as output in the production sector, corresponding to a constant 
debt-to-output ratio. This assumption is made in all simulations carried out 
in this study.
Table 6.A2  Parameters and predetermined variables
Ȗҏ = 2 Coefficient of relative risk aversion
į = 0.96 Subjective discount factor
Ș = 0.3 Constant returns to scale
Ȝ = 0.06 Rate of depreciation of private capital (equity)
ıeq² = 0.07 Variance of the rate of return on risky asset (equity)
cov()=0.005 Covariance between the rate of return on the risky asset and the marginal 
rate of substitution
cov() = 0 Covariance of the rate of return of the risky asset and wages (human wealth 
regarded as non-tangible safe asset)
Nworkforce, Ĳ Labour supply determined by (projected) demographics, mortality and by the 
assumption on the mandatory age of entry into retirement
pk,Ĳ Probability of a member of cohort k to survive from year Ĳ to year Ĳ + 1, 
conditional on having survived up to year Ĳ
Tr Age of entry into retirement
AĲ Efficiency level of labour (depending on assumed labour productivity growth)
        
Referring to lifetime utility, the coefﬁ  cient of relative risk aversion Ȗ and 
the subjective discount factor į are exogenously set at Ȗ = 2 and į = 0.96. 
Referring to the production process, we set the rate of capital depreciation in 
the production process at Ȝ = 0.06 and the returns to scale at Ș = 0.3. Referring 
to the portfolio decision, we regard human wealth as a riskless asset, implying 
a zero correlation between labour income and the return on equity. 
As we claim that bond demand is a function of productivity (AĲ),   longevity 
– e.g. conditional survival rates of different cohorts at different points in 
time (pk, Ĳ) – and the age of entry into retirement (Tr) as a policy variable, 
we compare the simulation results for different scenarios. Table 6.A3 brieﬂ  y 
describes our (alternative) assumptions regarding labour productivity growth, 
mortality, and the mandatory age of entry into retirement.
Regarding labour productivity, we assume a growth rate of one per cent 
annum in the baseline scenario. Since this assumption could be debated – we 
compare this baseline scenario to a pessimistic (0.5%) and an optimistic 
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the latter is closer to the   European Commission (2006)7. Unlike the   European 
Commission we hold, however, the growth assumption on labour productivity 
constant over time.
With respect to the age of entry into retirement, we compare the outcomes 
in the baseline scenario (65 years prevailing throughout the next decades) to 
an immediate switch to a ﬁ  ve years higher (lower) retirement age of 70 (60) 
years. Similar to our productivity scenarios, our setting disregards the case of 
a gradual change in the retirement-entry age over the next decades. 
As regards   longevity8, we ﬁ  tted the conditional probabilities to survive to 
the projections for life expectancy at birth as reported by the United Nations9,
which serve as a baseline in our framework, assuming that rational agents 
expect these probabilities to be true. We deﬁ  ne a positive (negative)   longevity 
shock as a gradually increasing deviation from this baseline projection. It 
is modelled as a shift in expected mortality rates that implies an immediate 
upward (downward) shift in life expectancy at birth by one year (in 2005) and 
a gradual increase afterwards.
Table 6.A3  Scenarios
1. Growth of labour productivity
Baseline scenario:  1.0% p.a.
“Low productivity” scenario: 0.5% p.a.
“High productivity” scenario: 1.5% p.a.
2. Age of entry into retirement
Baseline scenario:   65 years
"Low entry age" scenario: 60 years
"High entry age" scenario: 70 years
3. Longevity (conditional probabilities to survive)
Baseline scenario: fitted to 2004 projections of the UN
“Negative health shock”: life expectancies lower than projected by UN
“Positive health shock”:  life expectancies higher than projected by UN
7 In its early 2006 Special Report on the impact of ageing on public expenditure, the   European 
Commission projects an increase in labour productivity growth in the EU15 from 1.3 per cent to 1.7 per 
cent over the next 25 years
8  Note that the probabilities to survive pk,Ĳ imply that expected   longevity is a function of time and of 
the age structure of the population.
9  United Nations (2004): World Population Prospects – The 2004 Revision.135
I’m all for progress; it’s change I don’t like
Mark Twain
7.0 Abstract
Given uncertainties about the long-term ﬁ  nancing of age-related social 
outlays, citizens may set aside savings for the old days. While such a behavior 
is most sensible at the individual level, it does not mean that promoting 
individual long term savings plan has to be the cornerstone of the public 
policy strategy to cope with ageing. Increased individual savings would face 
major shortcomings if it was to be the sole or key answer to the collective 
ageing challenge. The purpose of the paper is not to provide a global, 
balanced assessment of the role private pensions should play but to present 
and discuss the shortcomings of fully funded schemes from a non technical, 
policy-making point of view, and leaving aside their merits.
7.1 Introduction
Given uncertainties about the long-term ﬁ  nancing of age-related social 
outlays, citizens may set aside savings for the old days. This behavior is 
sensible at the individual level but it does not mean that promoting individual 
long term savings plans has to be the cornerstone of the public policy strategy 
to cope with ageing. Increased individual savings face indeed major limits 
as sole or key answer to the collective ageing challenge. The purpose of 
the paper is not to provide a global, balanced assessment of the role private 
pensions should play but to present and discuss the limits of fully funded 
schemes from a non technical, policy-making point of view, and leaving 
aside their merits. The structure is as follows. Section 7.2 provides the policy 
framework derived from long term projections. Sections 7.3 to 7.7 do brieﬂ  y 
present and discuss the aforementioned shortcomings. Section 7.8 gives the 
conclusion.
7.2 The  challenge
Ageing is likely to increase signiﬁ  cantly age-related social expenditures 
in Europe. In the EU-25 area outlays for pensions, health care and long-term 
7  Sensible individual behavior, 
wrong collective policies – Why 
promoting private savings is only part 
of the right ageing public strategy 
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care are expected to increase by 2.5 pp of   GDP by 2030 and 4.4 pp by 2050. 
In the Euro area, ﬁ  gure are even slightly higher respectively at 2.8 pp and 
4.6 pp, with increases by 2050 in excess of 7 percentage points in Belgium, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain (table 7.1). Other recent sources 
points towards even higher increases such as +6% in Europe over 2005 – 2050 
estimated by   Standard & Poor’s (Kraemer & Mates (2006)). 
Table 7.1  Projected changes in selected age-related public expenditure 





Pensions + 1.3 + 2.2 + 1.6 + 2.6
Health care + 1.0 + 1.6 + 1.0 + 1.5
Long-term care + 0.2 + 0.6 + 0.2 + 0.5
Total + 2.5 + 4.4 + 2.8  + 4.6
Source:   Economic Policy Committee and     European Commission, 2006.
There is a broad consensus among economists that structural reforms will 
have to be implemented in order to widen the funding basis, mainly through 
a higher participation rate, and slow down the trend increase in outlays, 
through higher effective retirement age and health care selectivity. While the 
population is aware that pay-as-you-go social security schemes are put under 
strain when fertility rates and life expectations are changing radically, political 
support for structural reforms is hard to get. Problems will have to become 
even more tangible before such a support can be gathered and even once 
reforms will be seen as politically possible they will most likely be spread 
over time with grand-fathering clauses protecting retired and close to retire 
voters. Grand-fathering clauses will be presented as a fair way to handle past 
social security commitments and individuals’ expectations but as a matter of 
fact will be driven by the political weight of older citizens, knowing that the 
age of the median voter and of the median trade union member are largely 
above 40 and increasing.
As needed social security and labor market reforms are likely to be neither 
rapidly decided nor frontloaded, the aging burden on younger generations 
will be even heavier than what demographics would require from rigid   PAYG 
systems. In turn, with the prospect of “not enough, too late” reforms, younger 
generations will anticipate both an increasing ﬁ  scal pressure and declining 
social protection. The latter would mean, as far as health care is concerned, 
the development of queues in the public regime, higher personal co-payments, 
and/or increased selectivity in the public coverage, and for pensions, declining Etienne de Callataÿ 137
replacement rates, postponed ofﬁ  cial retirement age and/or higher penalties 
in case of early retirement. In addition, younger generations will also face 
the uncertainty about the future shape of social security system and their 
own long term ﬁ  nancial needs, as the ﬁ  nancial risks of dying very old and/or 
having to rely on long term care over a very long time span life will increase 
with life expectancies. 
Young generations, being risk averse, anticipating at best a stagnating 
disposable income and facing the   longevity risk, will smooth their consumption 
patterns out by increasing their savings rates. Given that such a behavior is 
most sensible at the individual level, policy makers could be inclined to 
focus the answer to be given to the ageing challenge on promoting individual 
savings, either through employer sponsored schemes or through individual 
private schemes. Additional ﬁ   scal incentives in favor of private pension 
schemes do not require political courage, appear as relatively cheap for the 
budget and seem to be an appropriate way to achieve a rebalancing in pension 
provision in countries where most of the elderly income is coming from 
unfunded public schemes. 
For the authorities to promote through tax incentives private, funded 
schemes to be combined with unfunded public schemes may make senses, in 
particular in terms of risk diversiﬁ  cation, but caveats of private savings have to 
be taken into account. The purpose of this paper is to provide a non-technical 
overview of these caveats.
7.3  Shortcoming #1: the asset meltdown issue
The most popular limit of private savings as a way to address the ageing 
challenge is that ﬁ  nancial markets could fail to transfer purchasing power 
over time. An increase in the savings rate would be self-defeated through 
a decline in the rate of return. Using a ebbs and ﬂ  ows image, it is feared that 
the baby boomers would be all saving simultaneously, pushing asset prices up 
and yields down, and that they would draw on savings also simultaneously, 
leading towards an asset price meltdown. 
Such a fear appears overstated. Between 2000 and end 2002 (in the 
US)/ early 2003 (in Europe), equity markets have collapsed without any 
demographic factor being at play. This development and all the large swings 
observed on the ﬁ   nancial markets over short lapses of time show that 
demographics is not the key driver for asset valuation. The risk premium 
observed on equity markets between 2003 and 2005 cannot be considered 
as stretched, such that investors would not all be buying at too expensive 
prices. That baby boomers turning 60 would all sell their assets at about the 
same time leading towards an asset price meltdown is dismissed by Poterba 
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expectancies and expected future expenditure patterns and the uncertainty 
relating to family support, payment of public pension, provision of public 
health care, and taxation of income, assets, and consumption. Nowadays, in 
the US, the net wealth does not decline after the age of 65 but is rather stable. 
Nevertheless, the risk of some asset price pressure, in particular if the annuity 
markets were to grow, cannot be entirely neglected (De Leus (2006)).  
The asset meltdown theory has recently received support from the ﬁ  xed 
income market where what appeared as low long term real interest rates in the 
US at a time of economic expansion was explained by large savings in   Japan, 
  OPEC countries and emerging markets chasing USD T  -bills and depressing 
yields. As more savings would imply lower interest rates, there would be 
a brake on the intergenerational transfer of ﬁ  nancial savings (but not on the 
transfer of physical and human capital). 
7.4  Shortcoming #2: brake on structural reforms
To promote long-term private savings could act as a brake on structural 
reforms pension regimes do need. Current pension systems suffer from 
various fundamental problems. The most common ones are as follows:
a lower labor participation rate: most public pension schemes lack actuarial 
neutrality, as the penalty for those retiring early do not fully reflect the social 
cost of early retirement; it leads to early retirement, that is jeopardizing the 
financing of the social security system and contracting the labor force;
discriminations across regimes; for instance, civil servants do often enjoy 
a privileged retirement regime such that their life-cycle income is higher 
than in the private sector but without that such differential helps attracting 
and retaining the best human resources due to liquidity constraints and 
shortsightedness; financial resources are not properly allocated; 
inter-generational inequality, given that the non sustainability of the current 
regime will lead towards a declining rate of return on pension contributions 
that cannot be justified as a way to smooth out lifetime disposable income 
over the cohorts; 
a tax on labor; pension financing is based on labor income but pension 
benefits do not provide a market conform rate of return for large chunks 
of the labor force; as a result social contributions for pensions are partly 
labor income taxes; it leads towards a larger tax wedge on labor; it implies 
unemployment traps and other forms of labor supply retrenchment, 
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Ageing makes current public pension schemes not sustainable. This long 
term challenge should push for reforming them thoroughly, with immediate 
positive effect on potential output. 
If the promotion of private savings is presented as the answer to the ageing 
challenge, the pressure for reforming public schemes is alleviated.
7.5   Shortcoming #3: suboptimal consumption pattern
The macroeconomic effect on savings and growth of fully funded schemes 
and of the transition from   PAYG schemes towards such schemes has been 
an issue for much debate since the equivalence principle put forward by 
  Samuelson (1958). Macroeconomic issues such as the impact of additional 
savings on interest rates and exchange rates will not be discussed here. 
When reliance on private savings forms the key part of the policy answer 
to the ageing challenge, consumption patterns may be suboptimal. It derives 
from the     longevity risk. People do not know how long they will live and how 
much they will have to spend for old-age care (health-care related outlays, 
nursing homes, etc). Being risk averse, people will over-save for the case 
of living very old with large health and dependence related expenditures. 
Consumption will not be properly smoothed over the life cycle, bequests 
will be too large and economic growth may be slowed down. The problem 
would not arise if ﬁ  nancial markets were providing efﬁ  cient ways to share the 
risks of getting very old and dependant among private individuals. Annuities 
could be even       indexed against a cost-of-living       index speciﬁ  c for the elderly. 
Unfortunately, existing annuities and care insurance schemes are far from 
being satisfactory, even when looking at the product offering for rather young 
cohorts where the adverse selection phenomenon should not be an issue. 
While relying more on private savings would require better risk-sharing 
arrangements, the current trend within the pension fund industry is to 
transfer back the   longevity risk from corporations to the individual. Indeed, 
corporations are increasingly replacing deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  ts schemes by deﬁ  ned 
contribution schemes. It is understandable that it is not up to any private 
company to bear the   longevity risk of its workforce but it is an even worse 
situation, from a welfare point of view when individuals have to bear it 
personally. Indeed individuals cannot rely on company-wide risk sharing and 
have no possibility, when cashing in their private pension capital at time of 
retirement, of transforming it into an annuity on reasonable terms. 
The underdevelopment of the annuity market may be explained by the 
following factors:
information asymmetry and adverse selection made supplier reluctant or 
the pricing of annuities unattractive;
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prudential authorities supervising financial intermediaries may deter the 
supply of such products given that they are risky;
tax rules may discourage annuities, for various reasons, one being the 
frontloading of tax receipts (a flat rate one-off tax on capital at time of 
retirement instead of recurrent tax revenue spread over the time span of 
annuities)1;
tax uncertainties may discourage annuities, when individuals anticipate 
that future budgetary imbalances may lead to higher taxes on pension 
income and/or more selectivity in outlays, based on official incomes (e.g., 
subsidies on nursing care restricted to those with pension income below 
a given threshold);
shortsightedness and liquidity constraints may also lead to a preference for 
capital vs. annuities. 
Not only the tax distortion against annuities should be abolished but 
there is even ground for having positive discrimination in favor of annuities. 
Annuities provide the collectivity the guarantee that the pensioner will be 
ﬁ  nancially self-supporting, not having to rely on social assistance ﬁ  nanced 
by the taxpayer or the worker.
There is a logical link between this shortcoming and the previous one. 
Structural reforms send the citizens the reassuring message that long-term 
issues are being addressed in order to make sure that pensions and health 
care regimes will be sustained. As a result, individuals may lower their 
precautionary savings. In the absence of reforms, savings may be excessive. 
The potentially disruptive effect of private pension schemes on life-cycle 
consumption patterns can therefore play not only through the     longevity risk 
when annuities are underdeveloped but also through the brake on structural 
reforms of the labor market and the social security system. 
7.6  Shortcoming #4: the cost of altering behaviors 
A forth limit against making from the promotion of individual savings, 
through employer schemes or directly, the cornerstone of the ageing policy is 
that the policy tools that could be used to promote long-term private savings 
are unsatisfactory. 
Individual behaviors regarding long term savings could be currently 
biased by a lack of information. It can be the case if citizens do underestimate 
the magnitude of the globalization and ageing challenges; in that case, if 
they had perfect foresight or were better informed, they would save more 
1 Tax frontloading can also be observed with real estate annuities: in Belgium the high real estate 
transaction tax (10% in 12.5% in most cases) is always due upfront, irrespective of the purchase being made 
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in order to smooth their consumption over their life cycle. In such a setting 
the ﬁ  rst best solution for the government remains to implement the desirable 
structural reforms in order to properly address these challenges but if reforms 
are deemed impossible a second best solution for the government would be to 
increase the aggregate savings ratio. How to reach a higher savings ratio has 
to be discussed in order for the policy measures not to become detrimental. 
What matters from an economy-wide perspective is overall national 
savings, made of government, corporate and household savings. A higher 
aggregate savings ratio can be achieved through the budget or through private 
savings2. The ﬁ  rst way for the authorities for boosting savings is through 
smaller deﬁ  cits or even surpluses. Of course, what matters is the ﬁ  scal balance 
adjusted for physical and human investments that are effectively generating 
future returns. A higher budgetary surplus, excluding investments, appears to 
be the safest way for promoting savings as it is directly under the control of 
the authorities but the so called Ricardian equivalence with public savings 
crowding out private savings has to be taken into account. 
A second way for the authorities to promote savings is through information. 
People may be underestimating their lifetime expectancies, overestimating the 
public pension they will receive when they retire, underestimating age-related 
outlays (how much does it cost for a room in a nursing home?), exaggerating 
their wage increase and savings potential before retirement, etc. Governments 
should proper inform citizens about all these parameters. The purpose is not 
to create panic as panicking is utterly inefﬁ  cient (why to act if anyway it is 
too late?) but to avoid altogether the Coué method, or the healing power of 
autosuggestion, governments may be tempted to apply to please shortsighted 
voters while creating a feel good factor.
A third way to promote savings is through compulsion. Indeed information 
may not be enough to overcome shortsightedness and liquidity constraints. 
If somebody at age 30 is convinced that his wage will increase by 10% in 
real terms per annum until he retires despite information about the average 
wage increase in the economy and about the impact globalization may exert 
on wages, he is unlikely to save much. Mandatory savings increase savings 
by the poor (Kohl and O’Brien (1998)). Compulsion may have some positive 
effects, as for instance making school attendance mandatory for children. In 
the case of long term savings, next to the compulsory social insurance for all 
wage earners, we could have compulsory occupational or individual private 
schemes.
However such compulsion would fail to take into account the large 
diversity of the population. While school education may be thought to be good 
for – almost – any child, mandatory private savings may not be appropriate 
2 "The United States is working to raise national saving by cutting the ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit and increasing 
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for those who own already enough assets (or do expect large inheritance) or 
those who are facing hard liquidity constraints, such as households investing 
heavily into education or housing. It can be said that compulsory savings 
either do change the savings pattern but not the savings level or do increase 
savings but for those who may have good reasons for not saving more for the 
time being3.
Even the simple questions of the compulsory savings being a ﬂ  at amount 
or a percentage of income and being based per capita, per household or 
per wage-earner are hard to answer. Obligations fail to take into account 
all individual speciﬁ  cities … and if obligations are ﬁ  ne tuned in order to 
accommodate for some speciﬁ  cities they create distortions and red tape. For 
instance mortgage repayments would have to be deducted from the amount 
of the compulsory long-term savings but such an exemption would have to 
be calibrated (what about low quality housing that would fall apart or require 
major repair work after a couple of decades?) and controlled.
A forth way to promote savings is through incentives. In many industrial 
countries households’ long-term private savings, being not only occupational 
and individual pension schemes but also real estate investment, enjoy 
a favorable tax treatment. However tax incentives, while being popular, are 
a very poor policy instrument. As compulsory measures they fail to take 
into account individual speciﬁ   cities and distort inter-temporal individual 
preferences but in addition they have an opportunity cost in terms of lost tax 
revenues and are regressive from an income distribution point of view. As it 
is common with tax incentives, incentives in favor of long term savings can 
be captured by intermediaries, in this case ﬁ  nancial institutions, that could 
be charging higher transaction and management fees. On top of that, as with 
compulsory measures, tax incentives appear to have more impact on the 
composition of savings than on the overall size of savings (Kohl and O’Brien, 
(1998)).
Instead of granting ad hoc tax incentives for savings, governments could 
revisit the way public outlays are ﬁ  nanced. As a matter of fact, current policies 
are often schizophrenic, with tax incentives for long-term savings co-existing 
with a large part of the budget being ﬁ  nanced by income taxes that are taxing 
savings twice. A rebalancing from income tax towards consumption tax 
would support savings.
Tax rules may also alter the ﬁ  nancial structure of corporations. In most 
countries debt ﬁ  nancing is de facto promoted vs. equity ﬁ  nancing. On the one 
hand, to base a savings strategy on corporations is difﬁ  cult to consider given 
that corporation net savings are hard to control and volatile, as experienced 
over the last decade, and given that large corporations are transnational while 
3  In Australia, since compulsory superannuation was introduced, the national savings rate appears to 
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tax rules are set at the domestic level. On the other hand, business-friendly 
policies and tax neutrality are favorable to corporation savings.   
7.7  Shortcoming #5: the drawbacks of how private long 
term savings are channeled out
Aﬁ  fth limit is that the way long term private savings are managed has 
drawbacks. These drawbacks are of four different kinds: (i) their inﬂ  uence on 
ﬁ  nancial markets; (ii) their governance; (iii) their administrative costs; and 
(iv) their interaction with other policies.
There is a concern that pension funds could interfere with a proper 
functioning of ﬁ  nancial markets. If pension funds have great merits in allowing 
professional management, risk diversiﬁ  cation, and favorable transaction fees 
and in empowering shareholders to pressure for better corporate governance, 
they do at the same time present the risk of promoting herding behavior 
and market concentration (Bini Smaghi, (2006)). At this stage there is no 
strong evidence about herding behavior. It is hard to claim that a recent 
episode of ﬁ  nancial turmoil on the markets originated from a brutal shift 
in asset allocation by pension funds driven by markets mood more than by 
facts. Institutional investors may be more “patient investors” than private 
individuals due to a heavier decision process, less liquidity due to their larger 
size, and more rationality in the investment process. It can be added that 
brutal shifts could also be generated by changes in regulation decided by 
prudential authorities. If for instance the latter ones were to impose a shift out 
of equities towards bonds in the aftermath of an equity market crash, tensions 
would be exacerbated. However it is fair to acknowledge that an agency 
problem may arise from interests of managers not being aligned with those 
of investors. For instance, asset managers may be prone to take more risks as 
their reward structure may be biased towards short term performance. A way 
to avoid this misalignment is through benchmarking but then there is a risk 
of herding behavior. 
Along the same line the case for pension fund abusing their market power 
is not established4. There are numerous claims in the popular press that large 
pension funds have pushed for restructurings leading towards socially painful 
lay offs but the role of pension funds as active shareholders with interest well 
aligned with those of smaller shareholders can be seen positively with strong 
arguments in favor of promoting an even more active role. What is true is that 
pension funds, if becoming too large, can affect the direction of the markets 
in which they are operating.
4 At the end of 2004, the European Federation for Retirement Income represented more than EUR 3.3 
trillion managed for future second pillar pension payments (EFRP (2006)). It is said that 40% of outstanding 
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An important issue at stake is the guarantee public authorities do or do not 
provide to pension funds, with the risk of moral hazard in case of guarantee 
and of social problems and possible conﬁ  dence crisis in case of no guarantee 
(Bodie and Merton, (1993)). The case for no State guarantee but with control 
through transparency and clear and enforceable investment and governance 
rules appears as the most compelling.   
Regarding the governance, the Maxwell case and other affairs have been 
much commented. Thanks to the IFRS accounting principles, assumptions 
about valuation of assets and liabilities have now to be made transparent. 
Rates of returns, the methodology for computing them, fees, and other 
key features of all long term savings instruments have to be transparent to 
promote competition. 
Regarding administration costs, while the public sector is barely a model 
of efﬁ  ciency in many countries, private pension schemes could suffer not 
from political ills but from their size and their need to compete for customers. 
There are ﬁ  xed costs in setting up, managing and controlling pension funds, 
pooled assets could be managed more efﬁ   ciently (more expertise, lower 
transaction costs), and marketing expenses can be signiﬁ  cant, as evidenced 
in Chile. 
Finally pension funds can interfere with public policies as the interests 
of pension funds may not be aligned with the general interest. The   European 
Commission has promoted the transnational portability of pension rights but 
nowadays deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  ts schemes still have an adverse effect on workers’ 
mobility. For too long deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t schemes have acted, intentionally or 
not, as a loyalty program as the acquired rights accumulation process is not 
strictly correlated with contributions but does speed up over time, i.e. with 
the number of years serving the same employer. Another case of conﬂ  ict 
of interest is the retirement age. In Belgium, for instance, private pension 
schemes do not penalize early retirement as they should based on actuarial 
fairness (de Callataÿ (2002) and de Callataÿ and Wouters (2005)). It comes 
from the fact that unit labor costs are higher for older workers as wages 
increase with age or seniority while productivity is exhibiting a bell-shape 
form over the worker’s career. As a result, employers have no incentive in 
designing pension funds in a way to retain older workers at work while the 
cost of early retirement is largely borne by the society.  
7.8 Conclusion
Ageing has to be addressed through a combination of means. Vocational 
and individual long term savings plans have deﬁ  nitely a role to play and 
ﬁ  nancial risk-sharing instruments are desirable. However the paper has shown 
the shortcomings of relying excessively on private savings. While most critics Etienne de Callataÿ 145
of the role private savings can play have focused on the asset meltdown 
scenario, there are other dangers policy makers have to be aware of.   Private 
savings should complement, not substitute ﬁ  scal orthodoxy and structural 
reforms, their design should not lead to distortions that would go against the 
general interest, and their promotion should be based more on information 
than on compulsion or tax privileges. In addition authorities should address 
the issues of the possible brakes they themselves put on the development of 
the annuity markets.
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8.0 Abstract
Implicit pension debt involved in existing pay-as-you-go public pension 
schemes is nowadays seen as an important determinant of the long-term 
sustainability of general government ﬁ  nances. Explicit updated calculations 
regarding its size are however largely lacking. The present paper takes up 
the lessons that emerge from the relevant literature and estimates the amount 
of implicit pension debt for the German Statutory Pension Scheme under 
its current legal framework as well as over the series of reforms that have 
been enacted during the last ﬁ  fteen years. It is demonstrated that, through 
these reforms, implicit liabilities have been substantially reduced but are 
nevertheless still sizeable. Even if future contribution rates are increased as 
prescribed by current rules, there will be a notable gap in the German public 
pension scheme’s total balance sheet.
8.1 Introduction
Conventional economic wisdom has it that a public pay-as-you-go 
pension scheme inevitably involves an implicit type of government debt (for 
early references that received much attention at an international level, see 
van den Noord and Herd (1993, 1994))1. This debt is introduced when the 
system is phased in and, by deﬁ  nition, starts to pay out beneﬁ  ts immediately 
based on current contributions. During an initial phase, beneﬁ  ts accrue to 
individuals of retirement age who have not – at least, not over their entire 
active life span – contributed to ﬁ  nancing the scheme. In the extreme case 
of a pure pay-as-you-go scheme, funding for these beneﬁ  ts fully exhausts 
the contributions collected among those who are currently active, and none 
of the contributions are accumulated. Instead, early contributors are given 
the promise – or, in most cases, a legal entitlement – that they will receive 
a pension later on. As these outstanding beneﬁ  ts will, in turn, be ﬁ  nanced 
from future contributions that are collected using the coercive power of public 
authorities, they fully conform to the notion of public debt.
Once the system is matured, meaning that all existing pensioners have 
a full life-time record of contributions, the implicit debt will be simply rolled 
over from one generation to another. Within an overall system of revolving 
1 We are well aware that, probably all over the industrialised world, economists have brought forth 
similar ideas much earlier at a national level, when existing pay-as-you-go pension systems were inaugurated 
or extended to an almost universal coverage after or even before the Second World War.
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loans, part of the debt is continuously redeemed by paying out pension 
beneﬁ  ts, while current contributions always turn into fresh debt (see Sinn 
(2000) or Fenge and Werding (2003) for further details). There is thus always 
a certain amount of beneﬁ  t entitlements that will become effective only in the 
future, but arise from contributions that have already been made.
Within the total balance sheet of a given public pension scheme, there are 
mainly two types of “assets” by which the implicit pension debt is effectively 
covered. First, in a partially funded system, where some fraction of the 
contributions is continuously accumulated to prefund for future beneﬁ  ts, 
there can be a substantial stock of ﬁ  nancial reserves. Second, whatever the 
remainder of the implicit debt, it should be next to automatically covered 
by future contributions. However, calling these contributions an asset is 
an elusive concept, and accounting for them in any practical calculations 
regarding the size of the implicit pension debt requires a lot of care to avoid 
tautological conclusions and to allow for meaningful comparisons. We will 
keep this in mind and return to a number of details involved throughout the 
following considerations.
8.2  Lessons from the literature and the discussion so far
Early attempts at measuring the size of implicit pension debt for 
a limited number of industrialised countries were relatively rough in their 
methodology (see Hagemann and Nicoletti (1989), van den Noord and Herd 
(1993, 1994), or Kuné et al. (1993)). Not surprisingly, the results turned 
out to be a multiple of current   GDP in most cases and often dwarfed the 
ﬁ  gures for explicit government debt and the debt ratios ofﬁ  cially recorded. 
There has been a limited number of follow-up studies, some conducted at an 
international level2 and a larger number dealing with single countries only3.
At the same time, other authors pointed to ambiguities and possible sources 
of misinterpretation in any of the approaches taken in this strand of literature 
(see, e.g. Haveman (1994), Franco (1995) or Disney (2001)).
Most of the subsequent work therefore turned to developing other 
indicators to address the role of public pay-as-you-go pensions, now amended 
by other types of government expenditure, for the long-term sustainability 
of public ﬁ  nances4. For instance, EU-level authorities are currently working 
2  See, for instance, Chand and Jaeger (1996) or Frederiksen (2001).
3  For a survey, see Franco et al. (2005, Section 5, especially Table 4).
4 See, e.g., Leibfritz et al. (1995) and Roseveare et al. (1996) whose work was extended, and much 
reﬁ  ned, for the comparative study documented in     OECD (2001, ch. 4, 2002). This latter study was prepared 
in co-operation with the EU Economic Policy Committee (2001) and, unlike all earlier work done in this 
area, is based on country-level projections prepared by national experts.
The host of studies based on the “Generational-accounting” methodology suggested by Auerbach et 
al. (1991) is based on a parallel idea. Yet, like in the more recent     OECD projects, numerous government 
budget items other than pension expenditure enter the notions of implicit debt and ﬁ  scal sustainability 
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on new, sophisticated measures of ﬁ  scal sustainability (see EU Economic 
Policy Committee (2003)) that are meant to support the EU-wide consultation 
process regarding sound ﬁ  scal policies and the observation of the criteria of 
the “Stability and Growth Pact”, with a particular focus on the Eurozone 
countries. Unfunded liabilities of public pension schemes are an important 
ingredient in calculating any of these indicators, but explicit calculations 
regarding the aggregate size of implicit pension debt are so far not part of 
these efforts.
To some extent, this may have to change in the future, mainly because 
not including this type of debt within the accounting framework for the 
public sector creates opportunities to manipulate ofﬁ  cial ﬁ  gures on current 
public deﬁ  cits and debts wherever these are under external surveillance. For 
instance, on several occasions during the last years the EU had to deal with 
cases where national governments took over unfunded pension liabilities 
from private, often formerly state-owned, corporations against the payment 
of a notable lump sum. With current accounting standards, such lump-sum 
payments reduce the current budget deﬁ  cit, while the additional liabilities 
are nowhere recorded5. This may be part of the reasons why, in a current 
initiative, the EU Commission is preparing a report, due by the end of 2006, 
on how implicit liabilities could be included in the monitoring devices related 
to the Stability and Growth Pact (see EU Commission (2006), Section 2.2.2). 
Another, and probably more important, aspect is that international rating 
agencies have recently stressed their interest in including the amounts and 
future trends of implicit pension debt in the criteria for their country credit 
ratings (see Kraemer et al. (2005); Kraemer and Mates (2006)). If these are 
serious ambitions, relevant not just in cases of obvious ﬁ  ddling with explicit 
debt ﬁ  gures, then national governments themselves might become interested 
in determining and publishing the relevant data.
At the same time, one has to acknowledge that accounting for implicit 
pension debt is not as straightforward as it may seem from our introductory 
remarks. The discussion that has unfolded over the last ﬁ  fteen years provides 
equity. See Auerbach et al. (1999) or Kotlikoff and Raffelhüschen (1999) for collections and surveys of 
applied work in this area.
5 In a news release of 21 October 2003,   Eurostat conﬁ  rmed that this incomplete, hence misleading, 
accounting procedure is fully in line with the existing rules. Changing these rules might therefore be the 
only way out if the practice sketched above were adopted on a larger scale. Note that, while misperceptions 
of annual deﬁ  cit ﬁ  gures could be avoided by not accounting for the lump-sum payment, misleading changes 
in accumulated debt were still next to inevitable if one would not want to introduce multiple time series 
regarding actual vs. notional public debt.
In a sense, the practice sketched here runs counter to one of the standard objections to ofﬁ  cially 
accounting for implicit pension debt, namely that, in contrast to government bonds recorded as explicit 
debt, entitlements to receive unfunded pensions cannot be traded (Franco 1995). While this may be true for 
individuals who are future beneﬁ  ciaries, it does not equally apply to the government or other sponsoring 
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a number of important lessons that will have to be dealt with in any related 
effort.
First, there are effectively different notions of implicit pension debt (see 
Holzmann et al. (2000)), at least two of which are really important: those 
based on accrued-to-date liabilities (ADL) and on open-system liabilities 
(OSL). ADL is essentially what was sketched in the introduction of this paper, 
viz. outstanding beneﬁ  t entitlements linked to past and current contributions, 
to be determined “as if” the scheme under scrutiny were closed for new 
accruals starting, say, the next year. Among the alternative deﬁ  nitions, ADL is 
certainly closest to the notion of explicit government debt. On the other hand, 
the concept may fail to fully capture larger shifts in future pension ﬁ  nances 
that can be due to massive changes in the population structure (“demographic 
ageing”) or, no less important, to policy responses that become effective 
only gradually, over a long transition period. For this reason, other measures 
have been devised that address the expected continuation of the scheme and 
augment ADL measures by beneﬁ  ts linked to future contributions. In the 
limiting case, long-term projections regarding the pension scheme’s budget 
can be extended to cover an inﬁ  nite (“open”) time horizon, in order to fully 
spell out the implications of current pension law in terms of OSL-type 
measures6.In this paper, for reasons that should become clear as we go along, 
we will present estimates regarding both kinds of measures for the German 
Statutory Pension Scheme.
Second, international comparisons regarding the size of implicit pension 
debt are very difﬁ   cult to make. The problem is not so much that, in 
attempting to do so, one has to deal with lots of speciﬁ  c details of each of the 
pension schemes covered when preparing projections of future beneﬁ  ts (and 
contributions) – a point suggesting that one should involve national experts 
in one way or another in order to obtain reliable results. The main obstacle is 
that there is a deep-rooted conﬂ  ict between reliability and comparability of 
projections for pension schemes in different countries. Going a long way in 
harmonizing assumptions regarding a host of relevant aspects of individual 
behaviour and macroeconomic developments is likely to yield implausible, 
if not misleading, projections for some of the countries involved. On the 
other hand, with assumptions that are not fully harmonized to take care of 
country-speciﬁ  c features, it is difﬁ  cult to assess what is effectively compared 
in such exercises: cross-country differences in institutions, such as the legal 
framework of national pension schemes, or differences in behaviour and in 
general economic conditions. What can be accomplished much more easily 
are comparisons that cover just one country over time, capturing the impact 
6 An alternative is to estimate the size of ADL not only for the current year, but as a time series of 
annual ADL ﬁ  gures over an extended time period into the future, as in Oksanen (2005). With the detailed 
simulations entering our ADL calculations below, however, this would be a difﬁ  cult task. Martin  Werding 151
of changes in the legal framework, including the potential effects of future 
reforms. Therefore, this is what we will effectively restrict our attention to in 
this paper, assuming that our observations from Germany may involve some 
lessons, direct or indirect, for other countries as well. Hopefully, this is still 
true even if we acknowledge a further lesson that arises from the existing 
literature.
Third, when attempting to measure implicit pension debt, the appropriate 
perspective to be taken and the issues and subissues to be looked at 
vary substantially by systems and, hence, by countries. For instance, in 
a  pay-as-you-go pension scheme with notionally deﬁ  ned  beneﬁ  ts  (NDB), 
such as the German one, it is really the implicit debt involved in future 
beneﬁ  t entitlements that is of highest importance. By contrast, in notionally 
deﬁ  ned contributions (NDC) schemes, such as those in place in Italy and 
Sweden following major reforms enacted in these countries in the 1990s7,
projecting future contributions is at least equally important. In the former 
case, contributions basically have to adjust to meet existing liabilities – and 
one may ask, whether this appears to be realistic –, while in the latter case, 
future pension beneﬁ  ts are the main political variable that has to adjust to 
expected revenues – and one might be interested in whether these beneﬁ  ts 
are likely to be adequate. In other words, setting up a full-scale balance sheet 
including a projected “contribution asset” makes a lot more sense for the new 
NDC-type public pension schemes (see, for instance, Settergren 2005) than 
for traditional NDB schemes. In the following, we will therefore primarily 
focus on implicit (AD and OS) liabilities involved in the German public 
pension system, accounting for expected future contributions only to the 
extent that this is needed – in a way that is hopefully instructive, even though 
some of our ﬁ  ndings turn out to be highly country-speciﬁ  c.
In the remainder of this paper, we will discuss in some more detail the 
conceptual issues involved in estimating implicit pension debt (Section 8.3) 
and then present updated estimates for the German Statutory Pension Scheme 
as it has evolved over a series of consecutive reforms taken since the early 
1990s (Section 8.4). Section 8.5 concludes with a summary of our main 
observations.
7  For relevant descriptions, see Franco (2002) and Palmer (2002).
Note that the distinction between DB-type and DC-type schemes was originally developed for private, 
funded schemes, mainly for employer-based pension plans. However, the discussion about the Italian and 
Swedish pension reforms has shown that it can be meaningfully applied to unfunded pension schemes as 
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8.3 Conceptual  issues
8.3.1 Deﬁ  nition of liabilities
The calculations we will present in this paper are based on two different 
notions of implicit pension debt, viz. accrued-to-date liabilities as well as 
open-system liabilities. The deﬁ  nitions of these two concepts are as follows.
Accrued-to-date liabilities (ADL) are given, for each point in time, by the 
present values of (a) outstanding beneﬁ  t entitlements of current pensioners 
plus (b) future beneﬁ  t entitlements of the active population to the extent 
that these are linked to their past and current contributions. Here, “beneﬁ  t 
entitlements” refer to the full package of beneﬁ   ts – disability pensions, 
old-age pensions and survivor pensions – that regular contributors are entitled 
to receive simply by paying the standard rate of contributions. Determining 
the extent to which future beneﬁ  ts are “linked to” contributions already made 
is relatively easy in (“Bismarckian”) pension schemes with an explicit, and 
largely proportional, link between earnings or contributions on the one hand 
and beneﬁ  t entitlements on the other. But even in the other limiting case of 
so-called ﬂ  at-rate (or “Beveridgean”) pensions, beneﬁ  ts are usually assessed 
based on periods of contributions (or residence, if nothing else) on a simple 
pro-rata basis, so that existing accruals can be identiﬁ  ed in some sense.
Open-system liabilities (OSL) include parts (a) and (b) of the deﬁ  nition 
of ADL. They add the present values of (c) future beneﬁ  t entitlements of the 
currently active population that will arise from their future contributions, 
to be paid over the regular course of a working life, and (d) future beneﬁ  t 
entitlements of all future contributors, estimated with an inﬁ  nite time horizon. 
Against the ADL deﬁ  nition, the inclusion of future beneﬁ  t entitlements that 
are not yet accrued is meant to reﬂ  ect the expectation that the scheme under 
scrutiny will be continued based on the current legal framework – without 
an arbitrary choice of the relevant time horizon, that is, virtually forever. 
Note that the extension to an inﬁ  nite time horizon does not raise fundamental 
technical problems: even if beneﬁ  ts are expected to grow on real terms, their 
discounted present values will usually decline and converge towards zero, so 
that the sum of all future beneﬁ  t entitlements should be ﬁ  nite.
By their deﬁ  nition, ADL measures correspond to acute liabilities that are 
very close to any conventional deﬁ  nition of explicit government debt. When 
assessed on relative terms, for instance, as a percentage of current  GDP, they are 
mainly a function of the “system participation rate”, that is, the fraction of the 
active population that is actually covered by the public pension scheme, and of 
the “quasi-replacement rate” of average beneﬁ  ts over average wages (for further 
details, see Fenge and Werding (2003)). For instance, the implicit pension debt 
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the labour force, than for universal systems that cover the entire labour force, 
or even the entire population. At the same time, ADL debt should be higher for 
relatively generous, earnings-related pension schemes than for basic pension 
schemes that guarantee only a minimum level of old-age income. Interestingly, 
features by these two dimensions are usually combined in such a way that 
comparing ADL measures across countries does not necessarily lead to patterns 
that are easily predictable. Also, note that changes in the ADL-to- GDP ratio that 
are a result of demographic ageing do not have a clear sign8. Their movement 
mainly depends on how labour productivity, hence wages, respond to changes 
in the population structure and on how this feeds through to current and future 
beneﬁ  ts. While the former is a matter of technology and economic conditions, 
the latter is an institutional feature that can be manipulated deliberately in order 
to contain the amount of implicit pension debt.
By and large, all of these properties also extend to the OSL deﬁ  nition of 
implicit pension debt. As was already mentioned, the main advantage in using 
this broader deﬁ  nition is that the ADL measure may be too narrow to fully 
capture the impact of long-term demographic change, or of policy responses 
that take effect only over long transition periods. The timing of prospective 
changes still matters for the present values entering OSL-type debt measures, 
but important parts of future developments are no longer cut off based on 
a strict “accrued-to-date” rule. An important difference is that, while estimating 
ADL based on outstanding beneﬁ  ts can be meaningful in itself, OSL measures 
are obviously incomplete if they are not accompanied by parallel estimates 
regarding future contributions. Note that, if future contributions are taken into 
account as well, the analysis of OSL measures, then called “open-system net 
liabilities”, effectively tries to exploit the inter-temporal government budget 
constraint that is at the core of recent sustainability analysis (see Blanchard 
(1990), Auerbach et al. (1991)). As was already mentioned, however, this 
should be done in a non-tautological way, i.e., not just highlighting the simple 
ex-post identity of beneﬁ  ts and contributions that the pay-as-you-go mechanism 
ultimately rests on.
8.3.2  Accounting for contributions
From a technical point of view, estimating future contributions is no 
more difﬁ  cult than estimating future beneﬁ  ts is9. In doing so, however, one 
8 Only if demographic ageing comes about as a large group of “baby boomers” gradually working 
them-selves through the age distribution, it is highly likely that ADL per   GDP increases substantially in the 
years when the relevant age cohorts are approaching retirement.
9 Accounting for future contributions is, of course, difﬁ   cult if beneﬁ   ts are tax ﬁ  nanced,  using 
revenues from the general government budget. The ADL deﬁ  nition of implicit pension debt that is based 
on out-standing beneﬁ  ts alone is unaffected by this difﬁ  culty. To determine OS net liabilities, one could 
forecast the revenues needed to fund future beneﬁ  ts based on the percentage of   GDP which is currently 
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has to be careful regarding what kinds of results can be used for meaningful 
comparisons to the size of outstanding pension liabilities and for meaningful 
comparisons across different scenarios. Here, we will ﬁ  rst discuss a more 
fundamental issue, then the application to both ADL and OSL measures of 
implicit debt.
In some countries, current contribution rates are ﬁ  xed by law, and any 
changes in these would require new legislation. These contribution rates 
can certainly be used as a benchmark to see whether the respective pension 
scheme is viable at current parameter values or, conversely, what portion 
of future beneﬁ  ts cannot be covered at current contribution rates. In other 
countries, however, the current law does not ﬁ  x the contribution rate but, 
instead, deﬁ  nes a rule by which the rate has to be adjusted if otherwise the 
annual budget would be unbalanced. A naïve “current policy scenario” would 
then conclude that implicit pension liabilities, whatever their size, are always 
covered and that net liabilities are zero. Results of this kind could never be 
compared across countries, even not across different scenarios constructed 
for the same scheme. Again, keeping the contribution rate constant at its 
current level offers a useful benchmark and leads to results that are much 
more telling.
Parallel estimates regarding pension liabilities and future contributions are 
possible for ADL-type measures of implicit pension debt. Here, they make 
sense if the results are to be compared at an international level. At least, for 
reasons explained in the preceding section, directly comparing ADL-to-  GDP 
ratios across countries may be less instructive than comparing only those 
parts of ADL that are not covered by contributions at current rates. With the 
ADL deﬁ  nition of implicit pension debt, one has to take into account that, the 
more one moves into the future, an increasing fraction of contributions will 
be needed to ﬁ  nance for beneﬁ  ts other than those already accrued at present. 
Proportional corrections are thus needed in order not to overstate the present 
value of relevant future contributions.
Parallel estimates for implicit liabilities and future contributions are 
actually required with respect to OSL-type measures. Interpreting the sum of 
all future beneﬁ  t entitlements that will potentially arise in an existing public 
pension scheme over an inﬁ  nite time horizon as an unconditional measure 
of current implicit public debt would not make sense. Estimating the present 
value of all future beneﬁ  ts is thus useful only if one is also able to determine 
the extent to which these liabilities can be covered at some benchmark rate 
of contributions collected over the same, inﬁ  nite time horizon. Again, current 
contribution rates offer an obvious benchmark that can be used for this purpose. Martin  Werding 155
8.3.3  Estimating implicit pension debt
What are the main ingredients needed to calculate the size of implicit 
pension debt, and of future contributions that could be used to cover it, for 
a  given pension scheme? It should be clear that most of the information 
entering such calculations is forward-looking, spanning relatively long periods 
of time, so that the ﬁ  nal results are effectively based on a host of assumptions 
and involve a high degree of uncertainty. The results should be based on 
reliable long-term ﬁ  nancial projections for future expenditure and revenues of 
the pension scheme under scrutiny, probably covering a multitude of baseline, 
sensitivity and policy scenarios. These projections, in turn, require long-term 
demographic scenarios, information regarding labour-force participation 
and actual coverage of the pension scheme both among the active and the 
retired population as well as assumptions regarding future developments in 
any of these areas. Assumptions regarding future wage growth and a proper 
modelling of beneﬁ  t assessment and relevant       indexation rules are also very 
important for the estimation of implicit pension debt.
To estimate ADL-type measures of implicit pension debt, long-term 
projections regarding the pension scheme’s budget actually have to be 
more detailed than for OSL measures. The reason is that, according to the 
narrower deﬁ   nition of ADL, one has to distinguish throughout between 
beneﬁ   t entitlements already accrued at the time the calculation refers to 
and entitlements that will accrue only in the future. Therefore, information 
regarding beneﬁ  ts already awarded has to be related, in some way, to the age 
structure of those in retirement. Ideally, a detailed record is also needed of past 
and future work biographies of members who are still active. Assumptions 
regarding their future work biographies are at least relevant to determine 
transitions into retirement. Also, to isolate the existing insured – those 
still active and those already retired – from future members of the pension 
scheme in broader projections, one also needs a demographic scenario with 
zero-immigration that reaches about 60 years into the future.
Estimating OSL measures of implicit pension debt requires rougher 
projections only, covering annual ﬂ  ows of all future beneﬁ  ts and contributions 
at an aggregate level, regardless of whom they accrue to or who is paying for 
them. However, any long-term projection necessarily has some maximum 
time horizon. The ﬁ  nal year should be in a sufﬁ  ciently remote future that 
expected future changes – mainly those regarding demographic aspects, 
labour-force participation and institutional features of the pension scheme – 
are fully captured. Ideally, there should even be a ﬁ  ctitious no-further-change 
period during which the economy and the pension scheme can be expected to 
adjust to something like a new “steady state”. Using the textbook formula for 
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into ﬁ  nite numbers, ﬁ  nal year results for beneﬁ  t expenditure and contribution 
revenues can then be used to estimate their open time-horizon present values, 
taking as given the discount rate as well as the (ideally, next to constant) 
growth rates of these aggregates over the ﬁ  nal decade.
Note that assumptions regarding interest rates are very important for 
estimating the size of implicit pension debt. Usually, they are not so much 
relevant for the ﬁ  nancial projections themselves, at least not if the pension 
scheme under scrutiny does not entail any substantial reserves that could 
earn compound interest over time. Yet, the present values of projected future 
beneﬁ  ts and contributions are highly sensitive to the discount rate which 
enters these calculations. Basically, the rate that is used for this purpose 
should correspond to the interest rate paid on long-term government bonds. 
As this rate does usually not ﬂ  uctuate a lot in the short and medium term, 
its current value may offer an acceptable proxy. In any case, the longer the 
time horizon covered by the estimates, i.e., with OSL-type measures more 
than with ADL measures, the more the ﬁ  nal result will be inﬂ  uenced by this 
particular assumption.
8.3.4  Interpreting the results
An important aspect to note is that, whatever deﬁ  nition is used, implicit 
pension debt can be really sizeable. With the narrow ADL-type deﬁ  nition, the 
amount of implicit debt involved in a broad-based pension scheme, covering 
a substantial fraction of the labour force of a given country, or even the entire 
population, corresponds to a projected stream of old-age income, based on 
beneﬁ  t entitlements already accrued, for all current pensioners and workers, 
or for the entire adult population, over their remaining life time, that is, 
a period of about 60 years or more. With extended deﬁ  nitions that are more 
forward-looking, the size of implicit pension debt increases much more. Even 
“net” liabilities corrected for future contributions to be collected at current 
rates can exceed current   GDP by factors much larger than unity in cases of 
rapid population ageing.
Up to a point, if accounting for implicit pension debt in ofﬁ  cial statistics of 
public-sector ﬁ  nances were adopted as a new standard, politicians, the public 
administration, all kinds of outside observers and the greater public would 
simply have to get used to such high ﬁ  gures and to new levels of total public 
debt. In itself, including implicit debt in ofﬁ  cial records does not at all change 
the current and prospective situation of public ﬁ  nances. It just makes visible 
what was already there and, perhaps more importantly, renders any hidden 
transfers from explicit deﬁ  cits and debts to implicit ones impossible. However, 
some attention is needed regarding precisely what deﬁ  nition of implicit pension 
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Calculating OSL-type measures of implicit debt is useful for reasons 
explained earlier on. But, by their deﬁ  nition, they are not comparable to 
existing explicit debt. ADL measures, net of any ﬁ  nancial assets included 
in the pension scheme’s balance sheet, are actually the only candidate for 
such amendments. The fact that their size is, so far, mostly estimated by 
researchers and inofﬁ  cial bodies using long-term projections for the pension 
scheme’s budget that are sometimes more, sometimes less rough in their 
construction should not be a real obstacle to taking this concept to ofﬁ  cial 
use. At least in the case of the German public pension scheme, it should be no 
problem for the pension administration, with unrestricted access to a rich set 
of administrative data, to start calculating very hard ﬁ  gures regarding current 
ADL on a yearly basis using a very limited amount of assumptions that could 
be determined publicly and monitored externally.
However, in spite of all the similarities that have been pointed out so 
far, there are also important differences between explicit government debt 
and implicit pension liabilities. The main difference is not, or not in the ﬁ  rst 
place, that implicit pension debt is based on mandatory arrangements, not on 
voluntary contracts (see Franco (1995)). Yet, one of the implications is that, 
in sharp contrast to explicit debt, the amount of implicit debt can be altered 
through one-sided decisions of the debtor. We will see in the following that 
simply by changing pension law, estimated amounts of implicit debt of the 
German Statutory Pension Scheme have been reduced substantially over the 
course of the last ﬁ  fteen years. For industrialised countries, defaulting on (part 
of) their explicit liabilities in a similar fashion is hardly an option. There are 
thus good reasons always to keep ﬁ  gures for implicit debt separate from those 
for explicit government debt. Still, providing reliable information regarding 
the former type of ﬁ  gures would deﬁ  nitely be useful, if only to demonstrate 
the necessity of reforms and to highlight their effects.
8.4  Implicit pension debt in Germany
8.4.1  The German Statutory Pension Scheme: some basic 
features
The German Statutory Pension Scheme is a prototypical social insurance 
scheme based on “notional individual accounts”, with a strong link between 
individual contributions – or, rather, earnings – and individual beneﬁ  t 
entitlements. Furthermore, it is of the traditional NDB-variant of pay-as-you-go 
public pension schemes where, in the absence of pension reform, beneﬁ  ts 
are assessed and annually up-rated based on pre-determined rules, while 
contribution rates are then adjusted year by year to meet the resulting 
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meant to isolate the scheme against business-cycle ﬂ  uctuations of current 
contribution revenues, it nowadays holds virtually no ﬁ  nancial reserves10.
The Statutory Pension Scheme is a “categorical scheme” that does not 
cover the entire labour force. There is a separate public scheme for civil 
servants11; private, but mandatory, schemes exist for some groups of the 
self-employed12; individuals in dependent employment with earnings below 
the social insurance threshold (about 15 % of average wages of the insured) 
have no insurance cover at all and may be entitled to receive means-tested 
social assistance beneﬁ  ts at old age if they never moved out of this status over 
their entire active life-span. Currently, the Statutory Pension Scheme covers 
about 70 % of the active labour force. About 85 % of the population that has 
completed the statutory retirement age, being 65 or older, has at least some 
amount of beneﬁ  t entitlements in this scheme.
The link that the German public pension scheme establishes between 
individual earnings and individual pension beneﬁ  ts is largely linear across 
all earnings brackets as well as over the period covered with contributions. 
In each year, individual earnings that are subject to contributions – between 
a lower and an upper earnings threshold – are converted into “pension points” 
reﬂ  ecting their ratio to average earnings of all insured individuals in the same 
year. When individuals enter retirement, the sum of these pension points, 
which then represents an up-rated average of life-time earnings, is simply 
multiplied with a current nominal “pension value” to obtain monthly beneﬁ  ts. 
Disability pensions are assessed in a similar fashion, based on ﬁ  ctitious 
extensions of the beneﬁ  t entitlements actually accrued until age 60. Survivor 
beneﬁ  ts are basically some percentage of beneﬁ  t entitlements of the deceased 
spouse or parent, with additional rules governing reductions if survivor 
beneﬁ  ts coincide with own, non-derived beneﬁ  t entitlements of the survivor. 
All in all, there is thus little redistribution involved in the system, and 
expected future beneﬁ  t entitlements can be related very clearly to individual 
contributions made in each year of active labour-force participation13.
The nominal value attached to pension points is subject to annual 
up-ratings that can be basically described as wage       indexing. The general 
set-up of the scheme described here has been largely unchanged since 1957, 
when the scheme was redeﬁ  ned for the post-war period. Later on, it took 
10 According to latest ofﬁ  cial ﬁ  gures, reserves were about EUR 1.8 bn at the end of 2005, just enough 
to cover pension expenditure for three days.
11 Note that, in Germany, civil servants form a particular sub-group of public-sector employees. 
“Regular” public employees are also covered in the Statutory Pension Scheme.
12 Other groups of the self-employed are compulsory members of the Statutory Pension Scheme 
for a limited number of years. All other individuals in self-employment have to seek private cover on 
a voluntary basis.
13  Of course, for the sake of simplicity, we leave out many details here. A comprehensive description of 
the German Statutory Pension Scheme, together with lots of comparative information regarding the systems 
in other EU countries, can be found in the   European Commission’s database MISSOC_online
(via http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/social_protection/missoc_en.htm). Martin  Werding 159
German politicians a while to address the fact that their country is now 
among those hit most strongly by demographic ageing. Since the early 1990s, 
however, there has been a series of reforms, becoming effective in 1992, 2001 
and 2004, that were meant to make the scheme more sustainable in the face 
of expected long-term changes in the population structure. In these reforms, 
a number of measures were taken – limiting options for early retirement, 
tightening access to disability pensions, reducing survivor beneﬁ  ts, etc. – that 
contribute to their total effect. However, what really makes a difference across 
the several steps to reform are the precise       indexation mechanisms applied to 
annual beneﬁ  t up-ratings. Since we will look at the effects of any of these 
reforms in the following, Table 8.1 lists the       indexation rules entailed in the 
different arrangements.
Table 8.1  Indexation rules involved in the past and current legal framework
Legal  Framework    Indexation  mechanism
Pre-1992 law Pure gross-wage       indexation
Pension reform act 1992 Pure net-wage       indexation (gross wages minus average
tax rate and all employees’ social insurance contributions)
Pension reform act 2001 Modified net-wage       indexation (gross wages minus 
pension contributions and a “recommended” rate of 
precautionary savings)
Pension reform act 2004 Modified net-wage       indexation augmented with a “sustainability 
factor”, to reduce up-ratings if the “system dependency” (i.e., 
pensioner-to-contributor) ratio has increased
Source: Author’s compilation.
Another change that is important for our estimates is that, starting from 
1999 at the latest, the Statutory Pension Scheme is no longer exclusively 
ﬁ   nanced from contributions. Before, the scheme had received a subsidy 
from the federal government’s budget meant to cover a limited amount of 
non-contributory beneﬁ  ts14. Over the entire 1990s, there were discussions 
whether the subsidy was actually large enough to fully cover these kinds of 
beneﬁ  ts, and it was increased repeatedly on an ad-hoc basis, also removing 
up-ward pressure on the contribution rate. In 1999, this policy was put on 
aﬁ  rmer footing, accompanied by another substantial increase of the subsidy. 
It nowadays covers about 20 percent of total beneﬁ  t expenditure, so that 
current cost rates (needed to cover regular beneﬁ  ts) are well above current 
contribution rates. At the same time, consumption taxes and, mainly, energy 
taxes were increased to raise the additional tax revenues needed. The rationale 
14  For instance, pensions paid to “war victims” who are now quickly dying out or “minimum pensions” 
guaranteed for individuals with at least 35 years of (very low) contributions, a programme that was phased 
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behind these changes was to reduce non-wage labour costs implied in higher 
contribution rates, thus limiting unfavourable incentive effects regarding 
employment. While this idea may be defendable in itself, it is a strategy exactly 
opposite to the introduction of “demographic buffer funds”, such as the OASDI 
Trust Funds in the US, that has been chosen in other industrialised countries.
In the 2004 reform, the government postponed decisions regarding another 
element of reform that had been strongly recommended by an ofﬁ  cial reform 
commission (see Kommission (2003)), viz. an increase in the statutory 
retirement age. After the 2005 election, however, it is now highly likely that 
this plan will be adopted in Spring 2007, while the new “grand” coalition 
has indicated no other plans for further pension reform. The schedule that 
had been suggested, a gradual increase from age 65 to 67 between 2011 and 
2035, may even be speeded up a bit, now being likely to unfold between 2012 
and 2030. We will include this option, based on the revised schedule, in our 
following projections and estimates as an additional reform scenario.
8.4.2  Long-term projections: methodology and assumptions
The long-term projections entering our estimates regarding the size of 
implicit pension debt involved in the German Statutory Pension Scheme are 
prepared using the CESifo Pension Model (2006 version), a comprehensive 
accounting model that meanwhile covers expenditure and revenues of all 
branches of the German social insurance system. Among other things, it 
provides all the information that is needed to estimate ADL and OSL-type 
measures of implicit pension debt (see Section 8.3.3)15. Calibration of the 
model is based on observations taken from past and current data that is available 
for up until 2005. The demographic scenario that enters the simulations 
is taken from ofﬁ   cial projections prepared by Statistisches Bundesamt 
(2003), spanning the period until 2050. Also, assumptions regarding future 
developments of labour-force participation rates (differentiated by gender 
and age) and unemployment rates imply that any expected changes in these 
parameters eventually level out until 2050. Explicit projections then cover 
the period until 2100, the time from 2050 onwards essentially being a period 
of convergence. Table 8.2 summarises the main assumptions and, in addition, 
a number of intermediate results regarding labour market outcomes and 
economic performance. All in all, for the period until 2050, these assumptions 
are meant to reﬂ   ect a meaningful “baseline” scenario for the future 
development of the German economy and for the German social insurance 
system that is neither particularly optimistic nor pessimistic.
15 The richness in details covered in this model has its cost. Most importantly, it does not capture 
gen-eral-equilibrium effects and, in particular, it does not include any endogenous labour-supply responses 
to expected large increases in social insurance contributions. In this sense, any of the long-term scenarios 
derived from this model could be regarded as overly optimistic. Martin  Werding 161
It has been demonstrated through earlier applications that the results 
obtained from the CESifo Pension Model are not too sensitive to changes in 
assumptions regarding productivity growth – at least, if results are expressed 
on relative terms: as future levels of pension beneﬁ  ts, future contribution 
rates, or future expenditure-to-  GDP ratios, etc. (see Werding and Blau (2002) 
or Werding and Kaltschütz (2005)). The reason is that, in the current legal 
framework, pension beneﬁ  ts still are basically       indexed to wages, so that any 
growth in the latter simply feeds through to the former. Also, in themselves, 
projected developments of pension beneﬁ   ts and contributions should not 
be affected by different assumptions regarding real interest rates16, simply 
because the scheme does not hold any ﬁ  nancial reserves. However, changes 
in interest-rate assumptions – or, speaking more generally, changes in the 
difference between interest rates and productivity growth – are very likely 
to affect both the size and level of implicit pension debt. In the following, 
we will therefore address the sensitivity of our ﬁ  nal results to this particular 
assumption. At the same time, we will refrain from conducting a larger set 
of sensitivity analyses – based on changes in assumptions regarding life 
expectancy, migration, labour force participation, unemployment, and so 
forth – as these would lead to results that are easily predictable and, with 
changes in single parameters only and with plausible ranges of variation, 
never make a fundamental difference.
Last but not least, the CESifo Pension Model can be easily adjusted to reﬂ  ect 
the various legal arrangements that the German Statutory Pension Scheme has 
been subjected to over the last ﬁ  fteen years. Important intermediate results 
of our projections – those regarding future beneﬁ  t levels and contribution 
rates – that enter our calculations regarding the size of implicit pension debt 
in Germany are summarised in an Annex to this paper. It is immediate from 
these results (see Figures 8.A.1 through 8.A.3) that, over the course of the 
next four decades, the Statutory Pension Scheme’s budget will be under 
substantial pressure which mainly arises from the projected consequences 
of demographic change. At the same time, the reforms enacted over the last 
ﬁ  fteen years make a huge difference with respect to how the burden involved 
in population ageing is allocated to pensioners and contributors, implying that 
there is also a massive impact on the intergenerational distribution.
From a public pension scheme that may have been overly generous 
in terms of future beneﬁ   t levels under the pre-1992 law, the Statutory 
Pension Scheme has now evolved into a system where adequacy of beneﬁ  ts 
may really become an issue in the period after 2025. For this reason, the 
2001 reform also introduced a new framework for supplementary private 
16  The real interest rate assumed in our “baseline” scenario, a constant 3.5 percent p.a. throughout the 
projection horizon, is based on an average of actual observations made from 1991 onwards. This conforms 
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savings that were meant to partly compensate for the beneﬁ  t reductions, 
encompassing subsidies, tax incentives and new regulation regarding suitable 
ﬁ  nancial products. In addition, a major effect of an increase in the statutory 
retirement age which may be enacted in the near future would be to secure 
future pensioners a higher level of beneﬁ  ts that they are entitled to receive 
for a shorter period of time, not so much a further reduction in total beneﬁ  t 
expenditure. In spite of all the reforms, however, contribution rates and, even 
more so, current cost rates must still be expected to increase substantially over 
the next thirty to forty years.
8.4.3  Implicit pension debt: accrued-to-date liabilities
Building on the ﬁ  nancial projections summarised in the Annex, we are able 
to calculate estimates regarding the size of implicit pension debt involved in 
the German Statutory Pension Scheme under the different legal arrangements 
mentioned above. In doing so, we will ﬁ  rst look at implicit debt in terms of 
accrued-to-date liabilities (ADL). In Section 8.3.2 it was pointed out that, in 
this case, it is really the entire present value of outstanding beneﬁ  t entitlements 
already accrued, net of the very limited amount of ﬁ  nancial reserves of the 
German public pension scheme (see footnote 10), that can be interpreted as an 
additional stock of public debt. Table 8.3 reports the main results.
Table 8.3  Accrued-to-date liabilities, 2006
Implicit pension debta)
EUR bn per GDPb)
Pre-1992 law 6,992 304.5%
Pension reform act 1992 6,444 280.6%
Pension reform act 2001 6,163 268.4%
Pension reform act 2004 5,939 258.7%
2004 reform + pension age 67 5,873 254.2%
a)   Net present value of pensions already awarded and pension entitlements accumulated until 2006, 
incl. disability and survivor benefits, over the remaining benefit period, minus existing reserves.
b)    Per   GDP in 2006 as predicted by the Ifo Institute in Summer 2006, amounting to 
EUR 2,296.2bn.
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The results included in table 8.3 conﬁ  rm that the long-term ﬁ  scal risks 
associated with the Statutory Pension Scheme under the conditions of expected 
demographic change in Germany have been substantially reduced through the 
reforms enacted since 1992. Estimated values for implicit pension debt in 
terms of ADL measures have gone down from over 300% of current   GDP 
to about 260%17, i.e., by about one seventh, through a series of adjustments 
in the     indexation   mechanism and a number of other changes in the legal 
framework. An interesting observation is that, on top of the latest reform, an 
increase in the statutory retirement age would have only a small effect on the 
ADL debt measure. The reason is not only that the suggested schedule is very 
gradual. Furthermore, for those affected, this reform essentially means they 
receive higher beneﬁ  ts for a shorter period of time – two effects that appear 
to almost cancel out each other.
As was explained in section 8.3.2, we may compare these implicit liabilities, 
which are effectively all unfunded, to revenues that would be available for 
covering the relevant beneﬁ  t payments if the contribution rate were held 
constant, thus approaching the deﬁ  nition of a comprehensive balance sheet 
of the German Statutory Pension Scheme (see ﬁ   gure 8.1). Keeping the 
contribution rate constant (at its current level of 19.5%) is required in such 
calculations in order to make the gaps between implicit pension liabilities 
and future contributions comparable across the different scenarios18. Again, 
we can see how the consecutive reforms have contributed to closing these 
gaps. Also, there are small differences in the shares of total annual revenues 
which can be used for ﬁ  nancing beneﬁ  t entitlements already accrued, so that 
the present values of future contributions entering these calculations are not 
perfectly equal across scenarios. Still, with an NDB-type scheme like the 
German one, the most interesting piece of information obtained here relates 
to the full level of outstanding, unfunded liabilities.
Nevertheless, we would like to highlight an important implication of the 
difference between ofﬁ  cial contribution rates and actual cost rates implied 
in the current law (see Section 8.4.1 and the annex of this paper). Before, 
we have argued that, for a pure pay-as-you-go public pension scheme with 
a closed budget, comparing existing liabilities to future revenues at projected 
contribution rates would not make sense: by deﬁ  nition, the two ﬁ  gures should 
17  To check for sensitivity of these results with respect to the interest rate assumed, we can also report 
results for the alternative case where the real interest rate is set to 3% (in brackets: 4%) throughout the entire 
projection horizon. Implicit debt in terms of ADL is then 330% (283%) of   GDP for the pre-1992 law, and 
279% (241%) of   GDP for the current legal framework, as after the 2004 reform.
18  Since there are rules by which contribution rates will effectively have to rise, at different speeds, the 
results shown in Figure 1 do not necessarily imply that the Statutory Pension Scheme’s budget has been, 
or still is, unbalanced in the sense that an important fraction of outstanding beneﬁ  ts will not be covered 
by future contributions. We will return to this interesting aspect in a minute. Whether it is plausible that 
the projected contribution rates shown in Figure 8.A.2 would have materialised, or will materialise, is 
a different issue, though. Martin  Werding 165
exactly cancel out. Things are different with the German public pension 
scheme under the current law. Figure 8.2 shows that, even if contribution rates 
were increased as projected by our model (see Figure 8.A.2), there would be 
a gap between beneﬁ  t entitlements already accrued and future contributions 
that will be available for covering these entitlements. Under to the current 
law, this gap will have to be ﬁ  lled by annual tax-ﬁ  nanced subsidies from the 
federal government’s budget.
Figure 8.1  Accrued-to-date liabilities and future contributions, 2006
Source: CESifo Pension Model (2006 version).
In spite of some similarities, one might be reluctant to account for implicit 
pension debt – currently around 260% of GDP   for Germany, according to the 
estimates presented here – in exactly the same way as one does for explicit 
government debt – about 68% of GDP   by the ofﬁ  cial, or explicit, German 
government debt ratio. At least, one should certainly not simply add up or 
confuse these two numbers. However, the ratio of about 28% of GDP19 that 
we have now identiﬁ  ed as a fraction of total implicit pension debt, based on 
beneﬁ  t entitlements already accrued, which will not be covered by future 
contributions is very closely akin to explicit debt measures. According to 
the current law, it creates a liability for future tax-payers who will have to 
fund the federal government’s budget so that it can continue to subsidise the 
German public pension scheme. The only difference is, once more, that the 
relevant laws could be changed in such a way that the burden is shifted on to 
future contributors or pensioners.
19 With alternative assumptions regarding the future real interest rate (see footnote 17), this ﬁ  gure 
varies between 25.5% and 30% of   GDP. Martin  Werding 166
Figure 8.2  Accrued-to-date liabilities and future contributions under the 
current law
Source: CESifo Pension Model (2006 version).
8.4.4  Implicit pension debt: open-system liabilities
In line with the reﬂ  ections made in Section 8.3.1, we can also proceed to 
calculating the size of implicit pension debt in terms of open-system liabilities 
(OSL). In doing so, we are moving away from producing implicit debt 
measures which, at least conceptually, can be compared to current explicit 
government debt. On the other hand, we obtain a more complete picture of 
the long-term implications of pension reforms. In this case, we indeed have to 
compare implicit liabilities to future contributions (collected at current rates) 
and focus on net liabilities (see also Section 8.3.2). Following the procedures 
for estimating open-system liabilities over an inﬁ  nite time horizon described 
in Section 8.3.3, we arrive at the ﬁ  nal results illustrated in Figure 8.3. Martin  Werding 167
Figure 8.3  Open-system net liabilities, 2006
Source: CESifo Pension Model (2006 version).
The picture we obtain is basically the same as with ADL-type measures, 
but total (“gross”) debt measures as well as changes across the different 
scenarios become a lot higher now. Implicit gross pension debt in terms 
of OSL measures now varies between 706% and 503% of current GDP,   by 
between one fourth and one third, that is20. Net pension debt – i.e., gross debt 
net of future contributions that could be collected at current rates – varies 
between 422% and 190% of GDP, by   more than one half. These OSL debt 
results are a clear indication that pension reforms already enacted have 
had a sizeable impact on the long-term sustainability of the German public 
pension scheme.
Also, our calculations now show a modest effect of increasing the 
statutory retirement age which is due to the fact that, at each point in time 
until inﬁ  nity, there will be fewer pensioners than under the current law. In 
addition, the net present value of future contributions increases against the 
other scenarios because all individuals have to pay contributions, at constant 
rates, for a longer period of time now. When compared to the results for 
the 2004 law, however, the additional effect of an increase in the retirement 
age is a lot weaker than was predicted by the German Council of Economic 
Advisors (Sachverständigenrat (2003)) in their annual report for 2003–04. 
The estimates presented there are probably missing the fact that, when 
20  If, alternatively, the real interest rate is set to 3% (in brackets: 4%), implicit debt in terms of OSL 
is 890% (583%) of   GDP for the pre-1992 law, and 640% (425%) of   GDP for the current legal framework. 
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combined with the “sustainability factor” introduced in the 2004 reform, 
increasing the retirement age implies stronger beneﬁ  t up-ratings. The reason 
is that the future pensioner-to-contributor ratio tends to grow more slowly, so 
that the mechanism for moderating annual pension     indexation   that has been 
intentionally created through this factor becomes less effective.
Figure 8.4  Open-system liabilities vs. future contributions under the current 
law
Source: CESifo Pension Model (2006 version).
As with implicit pension debt in terms of ADL, we may also compare 
future pension liabilities to contributions that, under the current law, could be 
collected if rates were regularly adjusted in line with our earlier projections 
(see Figure 8.4). Again, there is a gap between future beneﬁ  ts and contributions 
even under these assumptions, which should usually imply a balance sheet in 
full equilibrium. According to our estimates, this gap amounts to no less than 
151% of current GDP21.   On the other hand, because of the inﬁ  nite projection 
horizon and the conceptual differences between acute explicit government 
debt and the extremely forward-looking, OSL-type measures of implicit debt, 
this should not be considered a similarly “hard” number of additional public 
debt falling on the federal government’s budget and future taxpayers as the 
parallel result based on the ADL measure.
21 With alternative assumptions regarding the future real interest rate (see footnote 17), this ﬁ  gure 
varies between 124% and 193% of   GDP. Martin  Werding 169
8.5 Conclusion
This paper was motivated by a two-fold ambition. First, we wanted to 
take up some of the lessons emerging from the literature on implicit pension 
debt. In spite of some limitations and ambiguities, we do think that explicit 
calculations regarding its size are useful to obtain a fuller picture regarding 
the long-term sustainability of public ﬁ  nances. Calculations of this kind may 
actually be needed in the light of recent practices of shifting public liabilities 
between the categories of explicit and implicit government debt. Institutions 
that have an interest in externally monitoring national public ﬁ  nances – such 
as the EU Commission under the EMU’s Stability and Growth Pact or 
international rating agencies – may therefore push national governments in 
the direction of including implicit debt ﬁ  gures in their ofﬁ  cial public sector 
accounting systems.
Towards this end, agreements may have to be made regarding the precise 
concept of implicit liabilities that should be covered by such calculations, 
as well as regarding common procedures, comparable assumptions and the 
application of any of these to different national public pension schemes. Here, 
we tried to describe some of the major issues that may become relevant and 
made suggestions for some of the fundamental choices that will have to be 
made. Things may in fact become much more complicated, if calculations 
of this kind are to be extended to cover not only public pension systems, but 
a larger array of social protection schemes, including national systems of 
ﬁ  nancing health care and long-term care. Yet, most of the issues raised here 
will most likely reappear in this broader context in one way or another.
Second, we wanted to demonstrate that calculations of this kind are 
feasible, and that their results can be really telling. To this end, we used 
up-dated and rather detailed estimates regarding the size of implicit debt 
involved in the German Statutory Pension Scheme as an illustrative example. 
In fact, we may have generated an irritating amount of results in the applied 
part this paper, keeping track of several changes in the legal framework of the 
German pension scheme and going through a number of differing deﬁ  nitions 
and perspectives. Two results and an observation may actually be worth 
keeping in mind.
The two main results of our calculations are that, given all the assumptions 
for our projections regarding the future development of the pension scheme’s 
budget (and a “baseline” discount rate set at 3.5% p.a.), implicit pension debt 
in Germany under the current legal framework is either about 260% of GDP 
when   assessed in terms of “accrued-to-date” liabilities, or about 207% of 
GDP when   assessed in terms of “open-system net liabilities”. Actually, these 
two ﬁ  gures do not differ substantially, while both of them compare rather 
unfavourably to the ofﬁ  cial ratio of explicit debt to GDP of   close to 70%. In  Martin  Werding 170
addition, one of our main observations is that the size of implicit pension debt 
in Germany has been notably reduced by pension reforms already enacted 
during the past 15 years. It could still go down a bit more by another reform 
that is close to being legislated – viz., an increase in the statutory retirement 
age. One should, however, keep in mind that, considering the strong trend 
of demographic aging in Germany, there is now little room left for further 
adjustments within the current system that could reduce implicit pension 
debt and improve the pension scheme’s long-term sustainability even more. 
The reason is that, following the latest reform, adequacy of annual pension 
beneﬁ  ts may become an issue as soon as the German baby boomers enter 
retirement.
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Annex 8.1    Long-term projections for the German 
Statutory Pension Scheme – Intermediate 
Results
Our estimates regarding the size of implicit pension debt in Germany are 
based on long-term ﬁ  nancial projections for the Statutory Pension Scheme 
prepared with the CESifo Pension Model (see Section 8.4.2). The following 
ﬁ  gures highlight the most important intermediate results obtained from the 
model with respect to (i) future trends in beneﬁ  t levels (or “quasi-replacement 
rates” comparing standardised beneﬁ  t entitlements to current average gross 
wages; see Figure 8.A.1), (ii) pension contribution rates (as ofﬁ  cially 
determined for each year; see Figure 8.A.2) and (iii) actual cost rates (which 
would be required to actually cover the pension scheme’s contributory beneﬁ  ts 
and balance its annual budget; see Figure 8.A.3) under any of the different 
policy scenarios considered in this paper. In these ﬁ  gures, we effectively 
concentrate on the time period until 2050 for which we are actively making 
assumptions and are not just keeping track of further internal adjustments.
Figure 8.A.1 Level of pension benefits, 1957–2050
a)   Based on standardised benefit entitlements that are derived from a full life-time work record 
with average earnings throughout and on current average wages of the active insured, all gross 
of income taxes and social insurance contributions. (Note that, for obvious reasons, pensioners 
are exempted from paying contributions to the public pension scheme and to unemployment 
insurance, but have to pay contributions for public health insurance and public long-term care 
insurance.)
Source: Deutsche Rentenversicherung; CESifo Pension Model (2006 version). Martin  Werding 174
Figure 8.A.2 Contribution rates, 1957–2050
Source: Deutsche Rentenversicherung; CESifo Pension Model (2006 version).
Figure 8.A.3  Annual cost rates, 1957–2050
Source: Deutsche Rentenversicherung; CESifo Pension Model (2006 version).175
9.0 Abstract
This paper aims to assess the impact of ageing on household portfolios 
in Italy and hence ultimately on ﬁ  nancial markets. To this end, the analysis 
is carried out in two steps. First, the dimension of population ageing in Italy 
is assessed by means of both historical and forecast data on the structure of 
Italian population. Second, based on data taken from the Banca d'Italia Survey 
of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) over the last decade, we analyse 
the average household portfolio in relation to demographic characteristics. 
The main ﬁ  ndings are: ﬁ  rst, Italy turns out to be one of the countries most 
affected by ageing; second, ﬁ   nancial choices of Italian households are 
sensibly affected by age. Thus, the exceptional ageing in Italy might have 
relevant consequences on the Italian ﬁ  nancial market.
9.1 Introduction
Ageing can sensibly affect ﬁ  nancial markets, since elderly people usually 
have lower saving rates and higher average risk aversion. Thus, ageing 
is going to bring about a progressive evolution of ﬁ   nancial needs and 
investment requirements, which may in turn translate into changes in prices 
and returns of existing ﬁ  nancial instruments and in the need for new ones. 
A lively debate on the ﬁ  nancial effects of ageing is ongoing among both 
academics and practitioners and has originated a vast literature constituted 
by both theoretical and empirical contributions. The latter in particular have 
sensibly increased over the last few years, also fostered by the increasing 
availability of suitable survey-datasets. Furthermore, a particular strand of 
this empirical literature has recently focussed on the effects that ageing may 
have on ﬁ  nancial asset returns and portfolio allocations: see, among others, 
Yoo (1994), Poterba (2001, 2004), Davis and Li (2003) and Ameriks and 
Zeldes (2004). 
These works are far from being homogeneous with regards to both the 
methodology used and the results obtained. As for the methodology, the 
empirical investigations are carried out using different approaches, which in 
the present paper are grouped into three main categories and are addressed as 
follows: (i) the “explorative approach”, which analyses and interprets trends 
in survey data; (ii) the “econometric approach”, which runs time-series or 
panel data analyses; and (iii) the “simulation approach”, which performs 
empirical simulations on suitably structured overlapping-generation models. 
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As for the results, while some authors report signiﬁ  cant effects of ageing on 
ﬁ  nancial markets (e.g Yoo, 1994), others ﬁ  nd only a weak, if any, relationship 
between demographic and ﬁ   nancial variables (e.g. Poterba 2001, 2004). 
Moreover, up to date empirical studies analyse the Italian case only rarely 
and quite marginally and this despite Italy is, together with   Japan, one of the 
countries where the ageing phenomenon is more accentuated. 
Based on the latter observation, the speciﬁ  c aim of this paper is to asses 
the impact of ageing on household portfolio allocation in Italy. To this end, 
the analysis is carried out in two steps. 
First, the ageing in Italy is analysed by means of both historical and 
forecast data on the structure of Italian population. More speciﬁ  cally, the 
phenomenon of ageing is described using data on the evolution of median 
age as well as dependency ratios over the last ﬁ  fty years. In addition, data 
on birth, mortality and immigration rates are employed to better identify the 
main causes of the demographic evolutions occurred in Italy. 
Second, the effects that the demographic characteristics of Italian 
households may have on their ﬁ  nancial portfolios are studied. We follow 
Guiso and Jappelli (2001) and employ data taken from subsequent issues 
of the Banca d'Italia Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). Our 
analyses differ from the previous one by Guiso and Jappelli (2001) in three 
extents: ﬁ  rst, we consider a subsequent period of time; second, we propose a 
different risk-classiﬁ  cation of ﬁ  nancial assets and third, we reﬁ  ne the analyses 
by separating households by both age-classes and Net Wealth quartiles, 
thereby testing the robustness of age-effect on ﬁ  nancial choices.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section the main stylized 
facts about ageing in Italy are analysed and discussed at a comparative level 
with respect to the rest of the world and in particular with Europe. The 
investigation over the effects of ageing on household portfolios in Italy is 
presented in section 9.3. The ﬁ  nal section concludes. 
9.2  Population ageing around the world and in Italy
Although population is a world-wide phenomenon, its size sensibly differs 
across countries. The ﬁ  rst step of our research assesses the magnitude of the 
phenomenon in Italy with respect to other developed countries and in particular 
to the European ones. Data are taken from two international databases, 
namely those provided by United Nations (UN), for the comparison with the 
major world-regions, and   Eurostat, used instead for the analyses speciﬁ  cally 
focussed on Italy1.
1  Data are available on the United Nation Population Division website: http://esa.un.org/unpp/ and on 
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The changes in the population age-structure can be assessed by means 
of different measures, which can either relate only to the demographic 
structure of the population, and are thus univocally deﬁ  ned, or depend also 
on institutional factors (e.g. pension systems) beside the demographic ones. 
As for the former type of measure, the most widespread ones are: the median 
age, the average age and the life expectancy at birth. As for the latter, the most 
well known is probably the old-dependency ratio that is the relative amount 
of retired people to the working-age population.
9.2.1   A comparative analysis
The comparative analysis of the demographic evolution occurring in 
Europe and in the rest of the world is performed using data over the period 
1950  –  2050 and taken from the UN demographic dataset2. In particular, 
here we focus on the following demographic measures: (i) median age; (ii) 
life-expectancy; and (iii) old-dependency ratio, deﬁ  ned as the ratio of aged 
65 or more to aged 15 – 64. Main ﬁ  ndings are summarised in Figure 9.1 and 
in table 9.1. 
Figure 9.1  Old-dependency ratio from 1950 to 2050: major world-regions.
Data Source: United Nations Population Prospects. 
2 Both UN and   Eurostat databases provide several demographic “projections variants”, obtained 
combining different hypotheses on fertility, mortality and net migration rates. Data used in the following 
analyses refer to the variants refereed to as the most likely for the future in the two databases, namely 
“Constant-fertility” for UN and “Baseline” for   Eurostat.Marianna Brunetti and Costanza Torricelli 178
Table 9.1  Past, present and future demographic measures: major 
world-regions
World-Zone Years Median Age Life
Expectancy Old-dependency ratio
Africa
1950 19 38.4 6
2005 18.9 50 6
2050 18.6 65.3 8
Asia
1950 22 41.4 7
2005 27.7 68.7 10
2050 32.8 76.9 23
Europe
1950 29.7 65.6 13
2005 39 74.3 23
2050 50.1 80.7 51
Latin America
1950 20.2 51.4 7
2005 25.9 72.9 10
2050 33.1 79.4 25
North America
1950 29.8 68.8 13
2005 36.3 78.2 18
2050 40 82.7 33
Oceania
1950 28 60.4 12
2005 32.3 75 15
2050 35.9 80.5 28
 Japan
1950 22.3 63.9 8
2005 42.9 82.8 30
2050 56.2 88.3 77
Data Source: United Nations Population Prospects. 
The most severe population ageing is being experienced by   Japan and 
Europe: in both countries median age and old-dependency ratios have 
increased much more than in the rest of the world. We thus restrict our attention 
to these two areas and we disaggregate the analysis for the 25 countries of the 
European Union to further focus on the case of Italy. For reasons of space we 
report only the old-dependency ratio: Table 9.2 ranks countries according to 
the value expected for this demographic indicator in 20503.
3  Similar tables made according to other demographic measures (available upon request) are consistent 
with table 9.2Marianna Brunetti and Costanza Torricelli 179
Table 9.2   Old-dependency ratios.
Country 1950 2005 2050 Country 1950 2005 2050
 Japan 8 30 77 Lithuania 15 23 52
Italy 13 30 75 Malta 10 20 52
Spain 11 24 72 Belgium 16 27 50
Czech Republic 12 20 64 France 17 25 48
 Slovenia 11 22 64 Estonia 17 24 47
Austria 16 25 58 Finland 11 24 47
Greece 11 27 57 Netherlands 12 21 45
Portugal 11 25 57 Sweden 15 26 44
Slovakia 10 17 57 Ireland 18 16 43
Latvia 18 25 55  United  Kingdom 16 24 40
Poland 8 18 55 Cyprus 10 18 38
Germany 14 28 54 Denmark 14 23 38
Hungary 11 22 53 Luxembourg 14 21 36
Data Source: United Nations Population Prospects. 
Two observations are in order. First, the process of population ageing seems 
to be quite strong in several of the new EU members, especially   Slovenia and 
Czech Republic4. Second, Italy is the sole country whose projections are as 
high as   Japan’s. 
In fact, Italy is ﬁ  rst together with   Japan for the future value of median age, 
which by 2050 is expected to attain the value of 56.2 in both countries. The 
same holds for old-dependency ratio, whose value is second only to   Japan. 
As for life expectancy in 2050, Italy (85.1) is third after   Japan (88.3) and 
Sweden (85.5), whereby the latter already experiences one among the highest 
life expectancies in Europe. 
In sum, two separate conclusions can be drawn. First, Europe emerges 
together with   Japan as one of the world areas most afﬂ  icted by population 
ageing. Second, within Europe Italy deﬁ  nitely emerges for the strength of the 
undergoing transformations of its age-structure. 
4 A huge debate is currently ongoing on the population ageing in the Eastern European countries and 
on the policy implications that it may have on the whole European Union. See, among others, Kucera et al. 
(2000) and the studies performed within the research program “Demographic & Social Change in Eastern 
Europe” carried out by the Department of Development Sociology of Cornell University, the Demography 
and Geodemography Department of the Charles University of Prague and the Department of Sociology of 
the University of Bucharest in Romania together with the Universities of Central Florida and Kansas State 
and the Echo Survey Sociological Research Institute (Hungary).Marianna Brunetti and Costanza Torricelli 180
9.2.2  What is peculiar in Italy?
In order to better understand the peculiarity of the Italian case we analyse 
in deeper details the following features: 
1) the past and future dynamics median age, life expectancy and 
old-dependency ratio;
2) the distribution of different age-classes over the entire population at 
different points in time, namely 1950, 1975, 2005, 2025 and 2050. Initially, 
the standard three age-classes are considered, i.e. young, middle-aged and 
old, whereby the deﬁ  nitions of each category are as in the previous section. 
Then, the population age-structure and its evolution are further detailed and 
twenty 5-year age-classes are considered rather than the three macro-classes 
considered so far. 
3) the factors that typically underlie demographic transitions, i.e. fertility, 
mortality and migration. The trend of each factor is observed over the last 
50-year period, in order to see if and to what extent each element has a role 
in the Italian ageing. Note that for this point we turned to   Eurostat dataset as 
it supplies more detailed demographic measures.
As for the ﬁ  rst point, Table 9.3 reports the past (1950), the current (2005) 
and the projected future values (2050) for Italian median age, life expectancy 
at birth and old-dependency ratio. 
Table 9.3  Main demographic measures for Italy, 1950 – 2050.
Demographic Measure 1950 2005 2050
Median Age 29 42.3 56.2
Life Expectancy 66 80.6 85.1
Old-dependency Ratio 13 30 75
Data Source: United Nations Population Prospects.
Since the mid of last century Italian median age has risen from 29 to 
42.3 years and a similar increase is expected to occur by 2050, when it is 
projected to reach 56.2 years. Analogously, life expectancy has also increased 
(on average three months every year) and a further enhancement is estimated 
over the next 50-year period. The most remarkable change has been recorded 
by the old-dependency ratio, jumped from 13 in 1950 to 30 in 2005 and 
expected to more than double by 2050 when, according to UN projections, in 
Italy there will be around 75 retired every 100 working people.
As for the dynamics of different age classes, the dramatic Italian 
demographic evolution is highlighted by Figure 9.2, where the shares of 
young, middle-aged and old people over the entire Italian population are Marianna Brunetti and Costanza Torricelli 181
plotted at ﬁ  ve different points in time, two in the past (1950 and 1975), one 
current (2005) and two in the future (2025 and 2050).
During the last 50 years, the share of middle-aged has remained almost 
unchanged while young people have decreased by more than 10 percentage 
points. Conversely, the proportion of elderly has undergone a progressive 
enlargement, raising from the 12.2% of the total Italian population of 1950 
to the 25,6% reached in 2005. The projections for the next 50-year period 
point towards a further enhancement of the phenomenon. The working-age 
population is likely to shrink more and more relatively to inactive individuals 
and in particular to elderly people: the greying population is enlarging up to 
35% in 2025 and to more than 45% by 2050, when they will be nearly as 
numerous as middle-aged people. 
Figure 9.2  Shares of young, middle-aged and old individuals in Italy.
Data Source: United Nations Population Prospects.
Figure 9.3 represents the Italian demographic evolution more in detail 
as smaller age-classes, of 5 years each, are used. The distribution of Italian 
population is represented at various points in time, namely 1950, 1970, 1990, 
2010, 2030 and 2050. The baby boom, occurred in Italy during the 1960s, 
is clearly visible as the population peak, which represents the baby boomers 
generation, moves as a wave: in 1970s it corresponds to the very young 
(around 10 – 14 years old) part of the population, at the beginning of the new 
century it represents the middle-aged (30 – 34) and late-middle-aged (45 – 49) 
and at the end of 2050s those aged around 75 – 79: thus, up to the mid of this Marianna Brunetti and Costanza Torricelli 182
century the baby boomers will still represent the most conspicuous age-class 
of the population, being almost 4 million people.
Figure 9.3   Italian population distribution by age-classes: evolution.
Data Source: United Nations Population Prospects.
Finally, in order to single out the major causes of this exceptional 
demographic transition, we examine the three main factors that drive 
demographic changes: i.e. fertility, mortality and migration ﬂ  ows. In fact, 
population ageing might stem from a relative decrease in fertility, a relative 
lower mortality (i.e. greater   longevity) and/or a relative decline in the net 
migration. The directions that each factor is expected to take to lead to 
population ageing are summed up in the third column of Table 9.4.
In order aim to clarify which among them has played the major role in the 
Italian ageing experience, the historical evolution of each factor is observed 
over the last 50-year period (15-year for migration) by means of different 
measures. More speciﬁ  cally, fertility is assessed by means of birth rate (ratio 
of births to average population) and total fertility rate (average number 
of children born to a woman), mortality by means of life expectancy and 
death rate (ratio of deaths to average population) and migration ﬂ  ows by net 
migration (difference between immigrants and emigrants) and net migration 
rate (net migration to country population)5.
5 Others measures could have been considered. Fertility measures include the absolute number of 
births and the net (gross) reproduction rate, i.e. the average number of daughters that would be born to Marianna Brunetti and Costanza Torricelli 183






Birth rate Ļ  – 10.1
Total fertility rate Ļ  – 1.04
Mortality
Death rate Ļ + 0.8
Life expectancy Ĺ + 14.6
Migration
Net migration flows Ļ + 170,000
Net migration rate Ļ + 0.3%
Note: data for migration refer to the period 1985 – 2000 only. 
Source: authors’ computations on   Eurostat Demographic Database.
Figure 9.4 plots the evolution of absolute number of (live) births and of 
the birth rate from 1950 to 2005. Both births and birth rate follow an “s” 
pattern. First, a peak is highlighted between 1955 and late 1960s, which 
clearly denotes the baby boom occurred in Italy after the Second World War. 
Immediately after, there is a substantial drop which makes the birth rate more 
than halve before stabilizing around the current level of 8.2. A very similar 
pattern is followed by the total fertility rate (see Figure 9.5). According to the 
expectations, all the indicators examined point towards a substantial decline 
in fertility.
Figure 9.4  Absolute number of births and birth rate in Italy, 1950 – 2005.
Note: values for births are on the left scale; those for birth-rate are on the right-hand-side one.
Data Source:   Eurostat Demographic Database.
a woman subjected to the current fertility and (neglecting) mortality conditions. Similarly, mortality can 
be assessed by means of the absolute number of deaths. Here, we select relative rather than absolute and 
complete rather than partial measures (e.g. reproduction rates consider the number of daughters only).Marianna Brunetti and Costanza Torricelli 184
Figure 9.5  Total fertility rate in Italy, 1950 – 2005.
Data Source:   Eurostat Demographic Database.
Figure 9.6 plots life expectancy and the death rate in Italy over the period 
1950 – 2005. While the latter has only slightly increased over the last 50 years 
(by 0.8 percentage points), life expectancy has risen form the 66 years that 
a newborn in 1950 was expected to live to the current 80.6 years, thereby 
more than offsetting the negative effects that the death rate increase could 
have had on population ageing. 
Figure 9.6   Life Expectancy and death rate in Italy, 1950 to 2005.
Data Source:   Eurostat Demographic Database. 
Finally, the number of immigrants, the number of emigrants and the net 
migration rate over the period 1985  –  2000 are plotted in Figure 9.7. While 
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immigrants has progressively increased, reaching more than 200,000 units. 
As a result, net migration ﬂ  ows have boosted from around zero in the late 
1980s to more than 170,000 net migrants recorded in 2000. As a consequence, 
net migration rate jumped from zero to 0.3. 
Figure 9.7   Immigrants, emigrants and net migration rate in Italy, 
1985 – 2000.
Note: values for immigrants and emigrants (columns) can be read on the left scale; those for the net 
migrants (line) on the right-hand-side one.
Data Source:   Eurostat Demographic Database.
The distribution of immigrants and emigrants by 5-year age-group has 
been examined for each year of available data (from 1989 to 2000 included). 
However, since the distribution seems to remain unchanged across all years, 
in what follows we report only the results referred to the most recent data, 
i.e. 2000. 
As reported in Figure 9.8, net migration typically occurs during 
working-age: in effect, in 2000 the most conspicuous group of net migrants 
was aged between 30 and 34 years, and more than 68.5% of all net migrants 
were between 25 and 50. According to this evidence, the increase in net 
migration ﬂ  ows recorded in Italy in the last years has mitigated the effects of 
population ageing by widening the working-age population6.
6  The mitigating effect that an increased net migration has on population ageing is only temporary. As 
time goes by in fact immigrants grow older and join the domestic retired population. Additionally, evidence 
suggests that immigrating households tend to adapt their fertility choices to those of the destination country, 
thereby cancelling out the initial dampening effect on ageing. On this issue and speciﬁ  cally for Italian case 
see, among others, Martire and Zincato (2005) and reference therein.Marianna Brunetti and Costanza Torricelli 186
Figure 9.8  Net migrants in Italy in 2000, by 5-year age-classes.
Data Source:   Eurostat Demographic Database.
To sum up, in the last 50-year period (restricted to a 15-year period for 
migration) in Italy: net migration ﬂ  ows have sensibly increased, mortality has 
undergone only a small decline (death rate has increased but life expectancy 
has also considerably lengthened) and fertility has recorded a signiﬁ  cant drop. 
Based on this evidence, the reduced fertility is thus recognised as the main 
determinant for the unique Italian population ageing.
9.3  Ageing and portfolio choices of Italian Households
In this section we present some evidence on the relationship between 
demographic dynamics and household ﬁ  nancial portfolio in Italy. To this end, 
we ﬁ  rst frame our analysis within the existing literature and then we illustrate 
methodology, dataset and results. 
9.3.1.  The approach and the literature 
In order to test the relationship between demographic changes and 
household ﬁ   nancial portfolio three different approaches are in principle 
possible: (i) the “explorative approach”, in which trends in survey data 
are analysed and interpreted; (ii) the “econometric approach”, which 
essentially runs time-series or panel data analyses; and (iii) the “simulation 
approach”, which carries out empirical simulations on suitably structured 
overlapping-generation models. In this paper we take the ﬁ  rst approach to Marianna Brunetti and Costanza Torricelli 187
depict what has changed so far in the ﬁ  nancial portfolios of Italian households 
and whether these changes can be traced back to demographic factors. 
The literature on the issue is not yet vast and, as far as we know, Guiso 
and Jappelli (2001) is the only empirical contribution speciﬁ  cally focussed 
on the Italian case. As a ﬁ  rst step, the authors provide a detailed account of 
Italian household portfolio evolution since the beginning of 1990s, using 
data from the 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998 editions of the Banca d'Italia 
Survey of Household Income and Wealth. Next, they try to depict the primary 
determinants of its composition. The authors group the various ﬁ  nancial assets 
in three main categories: safe (e.g. bank accounts), fairly safe (e.g. T-Bills and 
similar) and risky (e.g. stocks, long-term government bonds and mutual funds) 
and use this classiﬁ  cation in both the “explorative” and the “econometric” 
analyses. As for the former, they observe the trends of the portfolio shares 
invested in each category along the period under analysis and report that the 
composition of Italian household portfolio has dramatically changed. More 
speciﬁ  cally, the share of safe and fairly safe assets has reduced from 45.7% to 
25% while that of risky assets is higher than ever before: at the beginning of 
1990s stocks represented around 16% of total ﬁ  nancial wealth while at the end 
of the decade they represented around 47%. According to the authors, several 
“macroeconomic” circumstances may have taken part in these changes: the 
decline in short-term bond nominal yield coupled with the increase of equities 
returns that characterize the entire 1990s, the liberalization of capital market 
which encouraged international diversiﬁ  cation starting from 1989, the birth 
of mutual funds in 1984 and the privatisation in 1992 which most likely 
boosted market capitalization, as well as the social security reforms which 
fostered the development of life insurances and pension funds. Nevertheless, 
speciﬁ  c household features, such as wealth, education and age may also have 
affected these changes in portfolio allocation. Guiso and Jappelli (2001) 
thus focus on the 1989 – 1995 period and study whether or not these factors 
played a role in determining the riskier portfolio allocation. They distinguish 
between the decision concerning whether or not to hold risky assets, referred 
to as “participation decision”, and the (subsequent) one regarding the ﬁ  nal 
portfolio allocation, named “allocation decision”. The authors report that that 
age, wealth and education may actually have determined the participation 
decision. As for age in particular, they report hump-shaped proﬁ  le: the share 
of people investing in risky assets increases from around 15% of the young 
(i.e. those aged less than 30) to almost 20% of the middle-aged (between 30 
and 59 years old) and then falls once again to around 10% for the 60 – 69 and 
to less than 7% for the over-70s. Conversely, the decision concerning the ﬁ  nal 
portfolio allocation seems to be affected by none of these factors. The authors 
turn then to an econometric analysis based on both cross-sectional and panel 
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with wealth and education, may have a substantial inﬂ  uence on the choice 
concerning whether or not to invest in risky assets, while once this decision 
is taken these factors only slightly affect the ﬁ  nal portfolio allocation7.
9.3.2 Methodology 
Data span over the 1995 – 2004 decade and are taken from the Historical 
Archive of the Banca d'Italia Survey of Household Income and Wealth 
(HA-SHIW). Among other things, the dataset offers a detailed picture of 
the ﬁ  nancial portfolio held by the interviewed households, as it provides the 
amounts (expressed in Italian lira until 2000 and in Euro thereafter) invested 
in a variety of ﬁ  nancial assets. 
In order to allow a better comparability across time, we translate amounts 
into percentages. Furthermore, all the assets are grouped into different classes 
according to their risk proﬁ  les, in order to avoid reporting residual items 
separately and to allow thus a clearer exposition. In the risk classiﬁ  cation, 
the focus is centred on two kinds of risks only, namely credit risk and market 
risk.
As for the former, we distinguish two different levels. Speciﬁ  cally, the 
“Lower” level is assigned to ﬁ  nancial assets issued by both the domestic 
sovereign (i.e. Italian government) and by banks, securities ﬁ  rms  and 
cooperatives, based on the always more stringent supervising regulations 
introduced by the Basel II Accord and of the several security provisions 
provided for by the law speciﬁ   cally aimed to make banks and ﬁ  nancial 
systems as safe as possible. The “Higher” level is instead associated to all 
the assets issued by the remaining agents, basically corporations. Foreign 
activities are treated separately as the amounts provided by the HA-SHIW are 
not distinguished by resided and non-residents issuers, so that a more precise 
credit-risk classiﬁ  cation for these assets is not possible. 
As far as market risk is concerned, three main forms are considered, i.e.:
Exchange-rate risk, concerning the foreign activities only
Interest-rate risk, associated with all bonds securities
Price risk, associated to stocks and shareholdings
7  Guiso and Jappelli (2001) argue that participation costs, such as minimum investment requirements, 
transaction and information costs are quite substantial in Italy and may thus interpret these results. 
Participation costs do not directly change with age; however, only investors who are holding risky assets 
for a relatively long time will actually face them. Conversely, those who need more liquid assets, i.e. those 
with a higher probability of liquidating risky assets, will be more reluctant to buy. As a consequence, 
households with short-term liquidity needs are less likely to buy assets that require ﬁ  xed entry costs. 
Typically, households with liquidity needs are either those young facing liquidity constraints or high 
income variability, or those retired, who face uninsured health risks. In sum, health risk and credit market 
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In addition, a fourth market-risk category, referred to as “mixed”, is 
created for those kinds of investments where bonds (interest-rate risk) and 
stocks (price risk) are mixed together (see Table 9.5).
Table 9.5  Financial assets classification, by credit and market risk
          Market
Credit
 –  Interest 




































 –  Foreign
Assets
Note:   Shaded cells indicate comparable risk-profiles: light grey denotes safer assets, more intense 
grey indicates fairly safe assets and dark grey gathers the risky ones. 
Six main ﬁ  nancial-asset groups beside cash are thus identiﬁ  ed8:
1. DEPOSITS: lower credit risk and no market risk
2. GOVERMENT BONDS: lower credit risk and interest-rate risk 
3. CORPORATE BONDS: higher credit risk and interest-rate risk 
4.   MANAGED INVESTMENTS: lower credit risk and mixed 
market-risk
5. STOCKS: higher credit risk and price-risk 
6. FOREIGN ASSETS: exchange-rate risk
Two observations are in order. First, in the following analyses values for 
life-insurances and pension funds will be presented separately, as the focus 
of this study makes their single evolutions particularly interesting. Second, 
following Guiso and Jappelli (2001) ﬁ  nancial assets will be in some cases 
8 This  classiﬁ  cation is only indicative as it neglects all the other forms of risk that actually characterize 
ﬁ  nancial assets, such as liquidity risk. On the other hand, a more rigorous classiﬁ  cation was not possible 
because of lack of information. As an example, the risk proﬁ  les of government bonds may be high or 
low depending, among other things, on their time-to-maturity. The data however do not provide any 
information about the duration of these instruments, so that all government bonds have to be placed in the 
same risk-class. Nevertheless, this simpliﬁ  cation seems consistent with the perceptions of the majority of 
households, which typically associate a comparable level of risk to all government bonds.Marianna Brunetti and Costanza Torricelli 190
further grouped in three risk-categories: “clearly safe”, “fairly safe” and 
“risky”. Differently from the previous study, clearly safe assets include cash 
and deposits, fairly safe assets include government bonds and managed 
investments and risky assets comprise corporate bonds, stocks and foreign 
activities (see Table 9.5)9.
The survey data analysis will thus be articulated into three phases. 
As a ﬁ  rst step, the evolution of the average portfolio of Italian households 
is observed across all the ﬁ  ve waves considered. The aim of this ﬁ  rst step is 
twofold: on one hand, it will highlight the main features of the average Italian 
household portfolio and in particular its low degree of diversiﬁ  cation. On the 
other, it allows examining whether and to what extent the average allocation 
of ﬁ  nancial wealth has actually changed over the last decade.
In order to depict a possible age-effect on Italian household portfolio, 
the households are then divided into six age-classes (<30, 30  –  39, 40  –  49, 
50  –  59, 60  –  69 and >70) and for each of them the average portfolio is 
examined. The placement in the age-classes is made according to the age of 
the head-of-the-household10.
Household ﬁ  nancial choices are affected by many other elements beside 
age: among these, the overall economic condition certainly plays a focal role. 
Based on this observation, we further reﬁ  ne the analysis in Guiso and Jappelli 
(2001) by dividing the households into both age-classes and Net Wealth (NW) 
quartiles, whereby NW is deﬁ  ned as the sum of real and ﬁ  nancial activities 
net of the ﬁ  nancial liabilities11. In this way, the robustness of the age-effect 
on household ﬁ   nancial portfolio is tested even under different economic 
conditions. In addition, the top 5% richest households are separately studied, 
in order to see whether the age-effect persists also in extremely favourable 
economic conditions. Dividing the households into quartiles has a twofold 
utility. On one hand, it keeps the grouping comparable across time, without 
requiring adjustments for inﬂ  ation or for the shift Italian lira – Euro occurred 
in the middle of the decade under analysis. On the other, it creates four groups 
with the same sample numerousness, so that statistics computed on household 
average ﬁ  nancial portfolios are all equally statistically signiﬁ  cant. In sum, 
the last step of our analysis consists in examining the average portfolio 
9  Further details on the ﬁ  nancial asset risk-classiﬁ  cation are reported in the Annex.
10  According to the HA-SHIW, the head of the household could be either: the person who is the “most 
responsible of the ﬁ  nancial and economic choices of the household” (“declared” deﬁ  nition), the person who 
earns the highest income (“income” deﬁ  nition), or the person who represents the reference point to establish 
the relationships among all members of the household (“  Eurostat” deﬁ  nition). Here, the ﬁ  rst deﬁ  nition is 
preferred as it is probably the most appropriate for the analyses performed.
11 Alternatively, the “household income” could have been used, deﬁ  ned as the sum of the personal 
incomes of all the members, including capital and labour income as well as public transfers. Nevertheless, 
including real activities as well as eventual liabilities, the NW deﬁ  nitely provides a more complete measure 
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composition of all the interviewed households divided by age-classes and net 
wealth quartiles and to observe their evolution across the last decade. 
The data presented in this phase of the study can be read in three 
directions (see Figure 9.9): (i) if read “vertically”, the data highlight the 
differences in ﬁ   nancial allocations of households belonging to the same 
age-class but to different NW quartiles; (ii) reading the data “horizontally” 
allows depicting the possible effect of age on the composition of household 
ﬁ   nancial portfolio, since the compositions are compared across different 
age-classes but comparable economic conditions; (iii) ﬁ  nally, reading the data 
“transversally” across the SHIW waves might highlight whether the average 
portfolio allocation of households of the same age-class and net wealth 
quartile has modiﬁ  ed or not, depicting in this way a possible time-effect. 
This intertemporal reading can be particularly interesting as it might reveal 
“indirect” effects of ageing, e.g. those induced by the several radical reforms 
brought to the social security system during the last decade and called for by 
the striking ageing of the Italian population.
Figure 9.9   SHIW data: effects depicted by different reading directions.
9.3.3 Main  results 
9.3.3.1  The Italian household average portfolio in 1995 – 2004
As a ﬁ  rst step, the survey data are used to determine the average portfolio 
of Italian households in each of the ﬁ  ve waves available in the HA-SHIW 
for the decade 1995 – 2004. From this preliminary inspection it immediately 
emerges the scarce degree of diversiﬁ  cation of Italian household portfolios: 
during all the decade in fact Italian households hold on average more than 
70% of their ﬁ  nancial wealth in cash and deposits (see Figure 9.10). Marianna Brunetti and Costanza Torricelli 192
Figure 9.10  Average Household Portfolio by SHIW wave.
Source: own elaborations on HA-SHIW data.
This peculiarity was already mentioned by Guiso and Jappelli (2001), who 
for the 1989 – 1995 period reported that “the portfolios of Italian households 
span few assets. A large fraction of the sample holds very few types of ﬁ  nancial 
instruments and tends to concentrate wealth in safe assets”. This observation 
is thus conﬁ  rmed also for the decade 1995 – 2004 (see Table 9.6)12.
Table 9.6  Households holding liquidity only, by SHIW wave.
1995 1998 2000 2002 2004






















Data Source: HA-SHIW. 
Table 9.7 reports the average shares invested by Italian households in 
each ﬁ  nancial-asset category as from the waves available between 1995 and 
2004.
12 Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) perform similar analyses on US household portfolio and discard those 
units with such a low degree of diversiﬁ  cation. As the limited diversiﬁ  cation is a typical feature of Italian 
households’ portfolios, in this study all households are kept into the sample in order to get the outline of the 
average portfolio as realistic as possible.Marianna Brunetti and Costanza Torricelli 193
Table 9.7  Average household portfolio by SHIW, various editions.
Financial Assets 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004
Cash 21.75 18.15 22.20 22.57 21.12
Deposits 50.41 59.80 52.45 54.90 58.41
Government bonds 17.51 7.43 7.29 5.88 5.88
Corporate bonds 0.83 1.54 1.72 2.07 2.10
Stocks 1.14 2.40 3.49 3.19 2.61
Managed Investments 4.20 6.95 8.22 7.46 6.78
Life-Insurances 3.14 2.67 2.88 2.65 1.79
Pensions Funds 0.97 0.91 1.49 0.99 1.03
Foreign Activities 0.10 0.14 0.25 0.29 0.28
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: for each asset group, the table reports the share over total financial assets. Shares are computed 
as weighed averages using sample weights as from HA-SHIW.
Several observations are here in order. First, the share of cash has remained 
almost unchanged over the entire decade (around one ﬁ  fth of the average 
portfolio). By contrast, the incidence of government bonds has drastically 
reduced: in 2004 their share was only one third of the average value observed 
a decade before. Most likely, this change can be ascribed to the drastic 
reduction of Italian government bonds yields: in 1995 yields on short-term 
and long-term government bonds were respectively 10.7% and 12.7%, 
four years later they were respectively 2.7 and 3.7 and, after a ﬁ  rst recover 
around 2000 – 2001, both kept gradually decreasing during all the following 
years(see Figure 9.11). On the other hand, investments in corporate bonds 
have progressively increased, especially starting from 1998. The privatization 
process in this case might have played an important role: although started in 
1992, in effect, the peak of privatizations occurred at the end of 1990s13.
13  For more details on the Italian major privatizazion see, among others, Goldstein (2003).Marianna Brunetti and Costanza Torricelli 194
Figure 9.11  Mib30 and Government Bonds Yields over 1995 – 2005.
Note:   values for Mib30 (left scale) are in index points while government yields (right scale) are 
   percentages.
Data Source: Datastream
Survey data also prove that the average investment in stocks has 
undergone several changes, which in large part occurred according with the 
major market ﬂ  uctuations of the last decade. Stock share has progressively 
increased until 2000, up to more than doubling in 5-year time, and then it has 
shrunk again, along with the contraction of Italian stock market (see Mib30 
trend in Figure 9.11). 
The same holds for managed investments, whose share increased from 
4.2% in 1995 to 8.22% in 2000 and then shrunk back to 6.78% in 2004, 
although their weight has overall increased during the last decade. 
As far as precautionary savings are concerned, survey data highlight how 
the share invested in life-insurances has progressively reduced (from 3.14% 
in 1995 to 1.79% in 2004). The average share of pension funds shows instead 
a particular increase around 2000: in fact, although they were introduced by 
the Dini Reform in 1995, they were enforced by appropriate laws only a couple 
of years later. Nevertheless, the launch of this form of complementary social 
security does not seem to have worked particularly well in Italy: after the 
initial increase, the pension fund share has reduced back to around 1%, i.e. 
the very same value recorded in the year of their introduction. Furthermore, 
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funds has progressively thinned, the former are still somehow preferred with 
respect to the latter. 
9.3.3.2  The average portfolio by age
Tables 9.8 to 9.12 report the average Italian household ﬁ  nancial portfolios 
by age-class for every wave available for the last decade in the HA-SHIW.
Table 9.8  Average portfolio by age-class, 1995.
<30 30 – 39 40 – 49 50 – 59 60 – 69 >70
Cash 19.18 18.06 16.17 17.08 24.28 32.67
Deposits 58.45 52.55 50.20 51.59 47.18 48.96
Government bonds 11.01 15.35 18.59 18.96 21.05 14.98
Corporate bonds 0.84 0.65 0.94 0.99 0.92 0.62
Stocks 0.32 1.04 1.11 2.06 1.00 0.64
Managed Investments 5.01 5.75 5.62 4.67 3.52 1.57
Life-Insurances 3.53 4.97 5.48 3.51 1.57 0.38
Pension funds 1.66 1.59 1.73 0.96 0.42 0.11
Foreign Activities 0.00 0.04 0.17 0.16 0.06 0.08
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table 9.9  Average portfolio by age-class, 1998. 
<30 30 – 39 40 – 49 50 – 59 60 – 69 >70
Cash 16.78 12.27 13.70 14.93 20.62 27.47
Deposits 67.09 62.02 61.08 59.81 56.31 58.67
Government bonds 3.23 5.42 7.43 7.82 9.26 7.79
Corporate bonds 2.49 1.84 1.54 1.42 2.06 0.86
Stocks 0.94 2.83 2.79 3.12 2.31 1.43
Managed Investments 4.93 8.73 7.85 8.79 7.47 3.13
Life-Insurances 3.79 4.57 4.04 3.04 1.48 0.52
Pension funds 0.76 2.05 1.42 0.87 0.41 0.08
Foreign Activities 0.00 0.28 0.15 0.21 0.07 0.06
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Table 9.10  Average portfolio by age-class, 2000.
<30 30 – 39 40 – 49 50 – 59 60 – 69 >70
Cash 26.03 18.02 20.09 21.02 22.68 27.04
Deposits 47.28 55.31 53.40 50.64 50.83 53.34
Government bonds 5.61 5.93 6.65 8.04 8.64 7.30
Corporate bonds 0.93 1.92 1.80 1.91 2.30 1.00
Stocks 5.09 4.00 3.96 4.08 2.95 2.38
Managed Investments 9.02 8.38 8.19 9.61 8.86 6.28
Life-Insurances 3.11 3.83 3.90 2.88 2.33 1.77
Pension funds 2.38 2.30 1.71 1.52 1.22 0.77
Foreign Activities 0.56 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.18 0.11
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table 9.11  Average portfolio by age-class, 2002
<30 30 – 39 40 – 49 50 – 59 60 – 69 >70
Cash 26.77 18.86 16.87 19.14 21.54 33.17
Deposits 57.45 58.13 56.73 52.99 55.61 51.54
Government bonds 3.43 3.97 4.42 7.09 7.48 6.76
Corporate bonds 1.65 1.64 2.04 2.81 2.24 1.76
Stocks 1.15 4.09 4.19 3.59 3.61 1.29
Managed Investments 4.49 6.72 9.03 10.26 7.92 4.48
Life-Insurances 4.32 4.37 4.59 2.66 0.97 0.71
Pension funds 0.74 1.83 1.61 1.28 0.30 0.17
Foreign Activities 0.00 0.39 0.52 0.18 0.33 0.12
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table 9.12  Average portfolio by age-class, 2004.
<30 30 – 39 40 – 49 50 – 59 60 – 69 >70
Cash 22.37 15.91 19.36 16.29 22.22 29.00
Deposits 66.41 63.96 58.85 57.96 54.40 56.07
Government bonds 2.27 3.80 4.87 7.39 6.11 7.42
Corporate bonds 1.04 1.80 1.88 2.34 3.09 1.80
Stocks 0.27 1.97 3.43 3.16 3.58 1.62
Managed Investments 4.32 7.12 7.28 8.68 8.83 3.63
Life-Insurances 1.25 3.64 2.42 2.16 1.08 0.27
Pension funds 2.07 1.60 1.62 1.28 0.51 0.11
Foreign Activities 0.00 0.20 0.28 0.73 0.17 0.08
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00Marianna Brunetti and Costanza Torricelli 197
With no exception, the average shares invested in each asset category vary 
across the age-classes according with the risk-attitude changes suggested by 
the life-cycle theory. More speciﬁ  cally, the shares invested in the safest assets 
(i.e. cash and deposits) are particularly high for both very young and very old 
households: the former having not yet accumulated wealth enough to afford 
a more diversiﬁ  ed portfolio, the latter preferring less risky and more liquid 
assets to ﬁ  nance their retirement consumption. In addition, as households 
grow older the weights of government bonds tend to increase constantly, 
proving that older generally prefer fairly safe rather than risky assets. 
Conversely, the path followed by corporate bonds across the age-classes is 
humped-shaped: their shares are smaller in both young- and older-household 
portfolios and higher in those of middle-aged. The age-effect is even more 
evident when even riskier ﬁ  nancial activities are considered, namely stocks 
and foreign assets. The latter in fact appear in the ﬁ  nancial portfolios of 
middle-aged household only. Similarly, the shares invested in stocks are 
almost negligible in younger-household portfolios, peak instead in those of 
late-middle-age households, and shrink once again when the households reach 
the retirement age. The sole exception occurs in 2000, when the highest share 
invested in stocks does not belong to middle-aged rather to households aged 
30 or less. The exceptional boom experienced by the Italian stock market in 
those years may have fostered the investments in these kinds of assets both at 
a general level and speciﬁ  cally for very young households. 
Especially in the last years, managed investments seem to be the 
investment preferred by any age-class. They in fact provide a good 
compromise for the younger households and their typical trade-off between 
a higher risk-tolerance and a lower level of available wealth. On the other 
hand, the high diversiﬁ  cation that they offer makes them quite appealing also 
to middle-aged households. Overall their shares gradually decrease only with 
the retirement age and in three out of ﬁ  ve waves (i.e. 1990, 2000 and 2004) 
their average shares reduce substantially only in the very last age-class. 
Life insurances and pension funds are particular forms of managed 
investments. Their speciﬁ  c precautionary motive however affects substantially 
their distribution across the different age-classes: their weights are in fact 
larger for young and middle-aged households and lower for older ones, who 
receive from rather than pay out contributions to these instruments. Besides, 
the predominance of life insurances on pension funds is generally maintained: 
with the sole exception of households aged 30 or less in 2004 life insurance 
shares can be from 2 to 5 times those of pension funds, although the gap 
between the two forms of precautionary savings has signiﬁ  cantly reduced in 
the last years. 
In sum, the data provide evidence in favour of the life-cycle theory over 
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investors while older households tend to disinvest risky ﬁ  nancial instruments, 
abandon speciﬁ  cally focussed managed investments, such as life insurances 
and pension funds, and turn to less risky assets, such as government bonds 
and liquidity. Thus, despite the numerous changes occurred in the last decade 
(e.g. the reduced proﬁ  tability of both government bonds and deposits or the 
big ﬂ  uctuations of the Italian stock market), the ﬁ  nancial choices of Italian 
households seem to have kept consistent with the life-cycle theory, thereby 
proving the very important effect of age on the household ﬁ  nancial choices. 
Our results are not directly comparable with Guiso and Jappelli (2001). In 
fact, when analysing the age-effect on portfolio the authors pool 1989 – 95 data 
and focus on risky assets sorted according to their classiﬁ  cation. Nevertheless, 
the conclusion drawn is fully consistent with what observed by Guiso and 
Jappelli (2001), who report that “Over the life cycle the unconditional share 
of risky assets has a hump-shaped proﬁ  le”. 
Combining this conclusion with the facts on Italian population ageing 
presented in the previous section, for the next decades one may expect a 
progressive but substantial shift from risky assets towards safer ones.
9.3.3.3  The average portfolio by age and Net Wealth
The last step of our study aims to take into account one of the aspects that, 
besides age, most signiﬁ  cantly affect the ﬁ  nal household portfolio: its overall 
economic situation, here measured by means of the Net Wealth (NW). 
Tables 9.13 and 9.14 report the average household portfolios by net wealth 
quartile and age-classes for 1995 and 2004 wave respectively14.
As expected, NW plays a focal role in household portfolio choices. The 
average ﬁ  nancial portfolio of households below the ﬁ  rst NW quartile has quite 
low degrees of diversiﬁ  cation and riskyness. In 1995, at all age-classes more 
than 80% of ﬁ  nancial wealth was held in pure liquidity, i.e. cash and deposits. 
The remaining 20% was invested mainly in government bonds and, to a lesser 
extent, in managed investments and precautionary savings, i.e. life insurance 
and pension funds. The same holds for 2004, whereby the only difference is 
that managed investments (around 3  –  4% depending on the age-class) tend 
to prevail on government bonds (2 – 3%). Riskier activities such as corporate 
bonds, stocks and foreign activities generally remain outside these portfolios. 
Most likely, the ﬁ  nancial choices of households in the ﬁ  rst NW quartile 
are mainly shaped by the ﬁ  nancial constraints they face, which force them 
towards very safe and liquid ﬁ  nancial activities. 
Turning to households falling within the two central quartiles, both the 
average degree of diversiﬁ  cation and riskyness progressively increase. In both 
14 The intermediate waves have also been examined and generally lead to very similar conclusions. 
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waves reported the aggregate share of cash and deposits reduces of around 10 
percentage points. Conversely, both government and corporate bonds become 
more relevant: note however that while in 1995 government bonds were also 
the 18 – 20% of the total ﬁ  nancial wealth, in 2004 they merely reach 6 – 8%. 
The incidence of managed investments also increases in the intermediate 
household portfolios, reaching for younger households peaks of 8% in 
1995 and of 11% in 2004. Besides, the weight of the precautionary savings 
increases too: in both waves in fact, the aggregate share of life insurances 
and pension funds increases by a couple of percentage points with respect 
to the ﬁ  rst quartile. Nevertheless, two important differences arise comparing 
data for 1995 and those for 2004: ﬁ  rst, the gap between the average shares of 
life-insurances and pension funds has generally reduced; second, the aggregate 
share of these two forms of complementary social security has overall reduced 
(from around 6 – 7% in 1995 to no more than 3 – 4% in 2004). 
The highest degrees of diversiﬁ  cation and riskyness are displayed by the 
portfolios of households above the third quartile. Financial resources are 
in this case drained from totally safe activities, i.e. cash and deposits, and 
directed instead towards riskier activities, such as stocks, whose shares for 
the ﬁ  rst time go beyond the 2%. Yet, managed investments are those that 
generally increase the most moving upward across NW, reaching for richer 
households also 10  –  14% of the total ﬁ   nancial wealth. Finally, note that 
the relative weights of life insurances and pension funds turn back to be 
unbalanced: across the whole decade in fact richer households seem to prefer 
life-insurances to pension funds. 
Guiso and Jappelli (2001) also examined the wealth-effect on portfolio. 
However, they sort households into wealth (ﬁ   nancial plus non-ﬁ  nancial 
activities) rather than NW quartiles. Accordingly, they include into the 
portfolio also non-ﬁ  nancial assets. On the other hand, they focus only on the 
effect of wealth, while in this step of our analysis portfolios are examined 
distinguishing by both NW quartile and age-class. Hence, a straight 
comparison is not really feasible. Yet, the evidence found is qualitatively 
consistent: ﬁ  nancial allocation is affected by the level of wealth and, in 
particular, the wealthier the household, the riskier and more diversiﬁ  ed the 
portfolio.
The “horizontal” reading of the data highlights how, despite the observed 
discrepancies due to different economic conditions, age can still have a 
relevant effect on the allocation of household ﬁ  nancial wealth (see Figures 
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Table 9.13  Average portfolio by Net Wealth quartile and age-class, 1995. 
Data Source: HA-SHIW.
Quartile Assets <30 30 – 39 40 – 49 50 – 59 60 – 69 >70
Below 1st 
Cash 28.19 35.84 35.26 41.60 47.23 47.37
Deposits 61.21 50.43 49.53 48.04 41.24 46.89
Government bonds 5.29 5.02 5.73 3.94 8.01 5.03
Corporate bonds 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00
Stocks 0.00 0.07 0.20 0.85 0.37 0.00
Managed Investments 1.96 1.53 2.00 2.21 0.72 0.61
Life-Insurances 2.68 5.59 4.90 2.55 1.79 0.10
Pension funds 0.67 1.23 2.38 0.63 0.64 0.00
Foreign Activities 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Between 1st 
and 2nd 
Cash 18.86 14.81 19.67 24.77 32.38 36.51
Deposits 44.02 54.31 52.62 52.79 50.07 45.32
Government bonds 18.51 17.82 16.86 14.72 13.65 15.35
Corporate bonds 3.58 0.60 0.15 1.36 1.27 0.78
Stocks 0.36 1.13 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.69
Managed Investments 8.55 4.82 2.50 1.66 1.07 1.19
Life-Insurances 2.80 5.11 6.77 4.10 1.33 0.15
Pension funds 3.32 1.31 1.31 0.47 0.07 0.02
Foreign Activities 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Between
2nd and 3rd 
Cash 10.17 10.14 11.55 12.25 14.27 18.42
Deposits 67.80 55.81 52.75 57.45 56.51 59.19
Government bonds 9.99 19.74 20.67 19.57 24.07 18.92
Corporate bonds 0.13 0.84 1.12 0.65 0.47 0.18
Stocks 0.67 1.07 1.06 1.88 0.30 0.70
Managed Investments 4.81 5.93 6.21 3.16 2.70 1.38
Life-Insurances 4.53 4.62 5.05 3.47 1.02 0.59
Pension funds 1.89 1.85 1.54 1.40 0.65 0.41
Foreign Activities 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.17 0.01 0.22
Above 3rd 
Cash 2.85 6.35 5.01 5.48 7.63 7.13
Deposits 57.77 49.33 47.84 50.12 43.54 49.56
Government bonds 20.45 21.97 27.38 27.92 35.65 34.97
Corporate bonds 0.00 1.06 1.05 1.13 1.65 1.36
Stocks 1.03 2.15 1.79 2.82 1.45 1.38
Managed Investments 10.42 12.61 9.75 7.76 7.48 3.73
Life-Insurances 5.27 4.11 4.82 3.55 1.98 1.61
Pension funds 2.20 2.29 1.81 1.07 0.41 0.17
Foreign Activities 0.00 0.13 0.55 0.15 0.21 0.09Marianna Brunetti and Costanza Torricelli 201
Table 9.14  Average portfolio by Net Wealth quartile and age-class, 2004. 
Data Source: HA-SHIW.
Quartile Assets <30 30 – 39 40 – 49 50 – 59 60 – 69 >70
Below 1st 
Cash 29.32 25.82 35.48 35.06 45.34 38.65
Deposits 59.40 61.40 55.52 55.31 47.49 56.18
Government bonds 3.07 1.82 1.76 2.80 1.99 3.07
Corporate bonds 0.00 1.18 0.29 0.03 1.16 0.14
Stocks 0.00 1.39 0.64 0.24 0.54 1.17
Managed Investments 3.94 4.32 4.09 3.29 2.38 0.70
Life-Insurances 0.87 3.05 1.43 2.34 0.76 0.04
Pension funds 3.39 0.99 0.80 0.84 0.34 0.06
Foreign Activities 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00
Between
1st and 2nd 
Cash 16.60 9.75 18.17 20.74 26.71 35.30
Deposits 73.26 75.42 63.64 61.85 55.68 54.10
Government bonds 0.63 2.89 3.81 7.45 4.89 7.10
Corporate bonds 2.40 1.20 1.80 0.67 2.83 0.60
Stocks 0.12 1.24 1.26 0.50 1.29 0.97
Managed Investments 4.23 5.22 6.02 5.52 7.08 1.76
Life-Insurances 1.84 2.07 3.30 1.51 1.13 0.09
Pension funds 0.92 2.18 1.60 1.50 0.18 0.04




Cash 21.89 9.48 15.77 12.70 15.82 24.38
Deposits 72.17 63.48 61.50 64.89 60.45 59.04
Government bonds 0.26 6.92 7.06 6.78 6.93 8.30
Corporate bonds 0.52 1.54 1.96 2.43 2.73 2.11
Stocks 1.28 1.50 2.75 2.52 4.18 0.71
Managed Investments 2.97 11.03 6.05 6.86 7.64 4.71
Life-Insurances 0.09 3.53 2.34 2.24 1.15 0.44
Pension funds 0.82 1.95 2.17 1.48 0.94 0.23
Foreign Activities 0.00 0.58 0.39 0.10 0.17 0.09
Above 3rd 
Cash 13.17 13.27 7.80 6.80 10.13 12.12
Deposits 72.50 54.41 56.12 53.82 56.00 58.83
Government bonds 1.94 4.80 6.37 11.13 9.10 11.78
Corporate bonds 0.09 4.59 2.98 4.24 4.44 4.90
Stocks 0.00 3.50 8.75 4.89 5.60 3.44
Managed Investments 7.98 10.63 12.70 14.36 12.91 7.75
Life-Insurances 3.08 6.60 2.97 2.42 1.00 0.83
Pension funds 1.23 1.76 1.87 1.16 0.63 0.09
Foreign Activities 0.00 0.45 0.44 1.19 0.19 0.27Marianna Brunetti and Costanza Torricelli 202
Figure 9.12  Asset shares grouped by riskyness, by NW quartiles and age-
class, 1995
Below 1st quartile
Between 1st and 2nd quartile
Between 2nd and 3rd quartile
Above 3rd quartile
Source: own elaborations on HA-SHIW. Marianna Brunetti and Costanza Torricelli 203
Figure 9.13   Asset shares grouped by riskyness, by NW quartiles and age-
class, 2004
Below 1st quartile
Between 1st and 2nd quartile
Between 2nd and 3rd quartile
Above 3rd quartile
Source: own elaborations on HA-SHIW. Marianna Brunetti and Costanza Torricelli 204
In both waves and regardless of the NW quartile, the aggregate share of 
the cash and deposits (safe assets) undergoes a decline during the middle-age, 
when resources are generally drained from safer assets to ﬁ  nance riskier 
and more rewarded investments. As from the retirement age-class (60  –  69) 
however the weights of safe assets progressively increase. Consistently, 
the aggregate shares of riskier activities, such as corporate bonds, managed 
investments, stocks and foreign activities display a humped-shaped pattern. 
On the other hand, the average shares held in government bonds gradually 
increases along with the age-class, substantiating the stronger preference of 
these assets by older rather than younger households. 
A separate situation arises instead for the top 5% richer households (see 
Table 9.15 and Figure 9.14). Their average portfolio does not reﬂ  ect the 
predictions of life-cycle theory. As the household grows older cash, deposits 
and government bonds reduce rather than increase. Furthermore, corporate 
bond share behaves irregularly: in 1995 they literarily boost in the portfolios 
of households aged 70 or more, and in 2004 they ﬁ  rst drop between the ﬁ  rst 
and second age-class and then progressively increase along with age. In 
addition, the shares of managed investments and stocks remain quite high 
during the whole life-cycle and do not signiﬁ  cantly shrink with the retirement 
age.
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Table 9.15  Top 5% richer households: average portfolio of by age-class in 
1995 and 2004.
1995 <30 30 – 39 40 – 49 50 – 59 60 – 69 >70
Cash 1.11 3.87 5.64 3.68 1.80 2.34
Deposits 51.76 50.21 37.13 41.23 29.72 39.85
Government bonds 24.75 20.67 21.66 27.55 40.48 31.41
Corporate bonds 0.00 0.34 7.61 2.18 1.90 7.44
Stocks 0.00 3.65 6.90 7.45 8.18 5.32
Managed Investments 11.92 14.03 11.23 12.12 14.51 12.33
Life-Insurances 10.45 6.83 7.66 3.77 2.81 0.38
Pension funds 0.00 0.40 1.90 1.10 0.35 0.03
Foreign Activities 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.93 0.25 0.90
2004 <30 30 – 39 40 – 49 50 – 59 60 – 69 >70
Cash 3.00 1.93 3.67 3.55 6.84 2.45
Deposits 49.79 54.21 53.07 44.55 41.49 43.72
Government bonds 23.89 8.74 8.42 6.61 8.72 17.39
Corporate bonds 17.18 1.82 5.82 5.99 6.06 9.62
Stocks 1.38 11.19 10.04 14.45 11.19 9.05
Managed Investments 1.87 11.42 14.53 16.75 23.31 16.93
Life-Insurances 0.20 9.67 2.09 2.49 1.87 0.10
Pension funds 2.68 1.02 2.25 1.42 0.16 0.51
Foreign Activities 0.00 0.00 0.10 4.19 0.36 0.22
Data Source: HA-SHIW
Most likely, for these households the net-wealth effect more than overcomes 
that of age on ﬁ  nancial assets allocation. As highlighted by Table 9.16 in fact 
the NW of these households is extremely high: falling within the top 5% in 
1995 (2004) meant have a NW of almost ITL 950m (EUR 700,000). 
Table 9.16  Net wealth quartiles boundaries, by SHIW wave.
Quartile 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004
I 29,871,950 41,700 50,500 23,000 30,500
II 157,993,890 181,232,370 197,204,440 108,500 138,026.37
III 335,224,250 353,075,000 380,000 215,814.76 262,813.22
Top 5% 936,125,840 1,005,278,240 1,100,100 589,965.62 689,105.05
Note: values up to 2000 are expressed in Italian lira while those for 2002 and 2004 are in Euro. 
Data Source: HA-SHIW. Marianna Brunetti and Costanza Torricelli 206
In sum, with the sole exception of top 5% richer households, for which 
most likely ﬁ  nancial choices are mainly shaped by net-wealth rather than 
age, the average composition of Italian household portfolios seems to be 
signiﬁ  cantly inﬂ  uenced by age. Furthermore, the evidence suggests a double 
robustness of this result. On one hand, age-effect on ﬁ  nancial asset allocation 
is maintained even under signiﬁ  cantly different economic conditions, as it is 
observed across all the Net Wealth quartiles examined. On the other, it has 
endured through time despite the numerous changes occurred on the Italian 
ﬁ  nancial market during the last decade, since the inﬂ  uence of age on the 
average portfolio is revealed by all the waves considered. 
9.4 Conclusions
This paper focuses on the dynamics of population ageing in Italy and on 
its impact on the household portfolio allocation, with the ﬁ  nal aim to provide 
indications about the evolutions that the Italian ﬁ  nancial markets may face in 
the years to come. The analysis has been carried out in two steps. 
First, we examined the phenomenon of ageing in Italy and its main causes. 
It turned out that Italian population is undergoing the most pronounced ageing 
in the world after   Japan (projections for 2050 point towards the amazing 
picture of 75 retired every 100 working people) and that it probably stems 
from a drop in fertility. 
Based on this, we turned to the effects that ageing might have on the 
average portfolio of Italian households. As in Guiso and Jappelli (2001) data 
are taken from ﬁ  ve waves of the Banca d'Italia SHIW. As highlighted in the 
paper, this study differs from Guiso and Jappelli (2001) in three extents: (i) 
a subsequent period of time is considered; (ii) a different risk-classiﬁ  cation 
of ﬁ  nancial assets is proposed; and (iii) the analysis is reﬁ  ned by separating 
households into age-classes and Net Wealth quartiles at a time, thereby testing 
the robustness of age-effect on ﬁ  nancial choices under different economic 
conditions. Going throughout the average portfolio allocation it emerged 
that several changes occurred over the period 1995 – 2004: government bond 
share reduced while corporate bonds have generally increased, especially 
since 1998. Most likely, the reduction of Italian government bonds yields 
on one hand and the privatization process on the other might be at the basis 
of these portfolio adjustments. Besides, while the incidences of stocks and 
managed investments have in large part oscillated according to the major 
market ﬂ  uctuations of the last decade, life-insurances and pension funds have 
recorded constant but opposite trends: the former have shrunk in favour of the 
latter, thereby reducing (but not annulling) the gap between the two forms of 
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Examining the average portfolio by age-classes it turned out that the 
average shares invested in each asset category tend to be consistent with 
the risk-attitude changes suggested by the life-cycle theory. Middle-aged 
households hold riskier portfolios, while older ones tend to disinvest risky 
ﬁ  nancial instruments and turn to safer assets, such as government bonds 
and liquidity. Thus, the ﬁ   nancial choices of Italian households remained 
signiﬁ  cantly affected by age despite the numerous changes occurred between 
1995 and 2004. Although the results obtained here are not directly comparable 
with that reported by Guiso and Jappelli (2001), a comparison with their 
results is in order. On the whole, the evidence found is qualitatively consistent, 
although a few differences in the average allocations emerge. Generally, in 
fact, Guiso and Jappelli (2001) report shares for cash remarkably lower than 
ours (up to 10 percentage points); on the contrary, they generally report as 
higher life-insurances shares. 
Finally, the average portfolio is further examined dividing the Italian 
households by both age-classes and NW quartiles, in order to take into account 
also the inﬂ  uence that the overall economic condition of the household has 
on its ﬁ  nancial choices, which was already observed by Guiso and Jappelli 
(2001). With the sole exception of extremely rich households (i.e. top 5% 
richer ones), the age-effect seems to persist even under signiﬁ  cantly different 
economic conditions. We thus conclude that the age-effect on ﬁ  nancial 
choices seems to be robust to both different economic situations and to the 
market changes occurred during the decade under analysis. 
Combining this conclusion with the facts on Italian population ageing, we 
expect for the next decades several changes on the Italian ﬁ  nancial market. In 
particular, it is likely a progressive but substantial shift from risky assets, such 
as stocks and corporate bonds, towards safer ones, i.e. managed investments, 
government bonds and deposits.
Unfortunately, a more precise forecast on what is going to happen can 
not be obtained from this kind of analyses. Probably, an “econometric” 
approach, such as that taken by Poterba (2004) or Davis and Li (2003) 
would be more appropriate to complete our analysis. In fact, it could help to 
assess quantitatively the relationship between demographic and household 
portfolios changes and thus to estimate how the projected demographic 
structures might modify future ﬁ  nancial asset returns. This issue is thus left 
to further research.
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Annex 9.1    Clearly safe, fairly safe and risky ﬁ  nancial 
assets.
In analysing the composition of Italian household portfolio over the period 
1985 – 1998, Guiso and Jappelli (2001) ﬁ  nd it useful to group ﬁ  nancial assets 
according to their risk-proﬁ  le. In particular, they distinguish: (i) “clearly safe” 
ﬁ  nancial assets, including currency, transaction accounts and certiﬁ  cates of 
deposit; (ii) “fairly safe” ﬁ  nancial assets, gathering Treasury bills and the life 
insurances; and (iii) “risky” assets, including stocks, long-term government 
bonds, corporate bonds, deﬁ  ned contribution pension plans, mutual funds and 
other forms of managed investments.
Here, a different sorting is proposed. In Table 9.A.1 we recall the six 
major categories attained by joining together assets sharing similar credit Marianna Brunetti and Costanza Torricelli 210
and market risks (see Section 9.3.2) and shade the cells to indicate the three 
different risk-proﬁ  les: light grey denotes “totally safe” assets, more intense 
grey “fairly safe” assets and dark grey “risky” assets.
Table 9.A.1  Financial assets groups, by credit and market risk.
        Market
Credit
 –  Interest 
Rate Mixed Price Exchange
Rate








 –  Foreign
Assets
Cash and Deposits are considered “totally safe” because both are subject 
to a relatively lower level of credit risk and are free of market risk, whereby 
the latter is intended as the risk of changes in price and thus disregards the risk 
of a change in the interest rates at a macroeconomic level. Government Bonds 
and Managed Investments are instead gathered into the “fairly safe” group, 
given that the credit risk is still relatively lower but they also are subjected 
to some forms of market risk. The three remaining categories are grouped 
together and referred to as “risky”, as they are either subjected to a relatively 
higher credit risk (corporate bonds and stocks) or exposed to exchange rate 
risk (foreign assets). 
Table 9.A.2  Risk-categories of financial assets: comparison.
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Two are the main differences between the alternative classiﬁ  cations. 
First, long-term government bonds are here moved from the risky to the 
fairly safe category. As argued by Guiso and Jappelli (2001), “the large and 
increasing government debt leads investors to attach a non-zero probability 
of default even on short-term government bonds. But this has changed after 
the dramatic ﬁ   scal stabilization started in 1996”. Based on this reduced 
risk-proﬁ   le, the shift from risky to fairly safe assets appears reasonable. 
Second, while Guiso and Jappelli (2001) isolate life-insurances into the fairly 
safe category and gathered all the remaining managed investments in the 
risky one, here all forms of managed investments are classiﬁ  ed as fairly safe. 
Aggregate data split life-insurances from other kinds of insurances, including 
pension funds, only starting from 2003: a separate treatment for two forms 
of complementary social security is thus unfeasible. Furthermore, the choice 
of Guiso and Jappelli (2001) stemmed from the observation that “until 1995 
[…] most funds were in stocks”. However, they admit that “the availability of 
a large number of money market and balanced funds in the late ‘90s tends to blur 
our deﬁ  nition”. Hence, also considering the high diversiﬁ  cation that typically 
characterises managed investments, they are here classiﬁ  ed as fairly safe.213
10.0 Abstract
This paper discusses whether or not it is useful for policymakers to aim 
at the creation of a large international asset position when preparing for the 
ageing of the population. It looks into the relation between the balance of 
payments of countries and their international investment position. It appears 
that a large national savings surplus is no guarantee at all for a strong net asset 
position. This point is illustrated by The Netherlands: a country with huge 
national savings surpluses that failed to build up a strong net international 
asset position.
10.1 Introduction 
The Netherlands is one of the few countries in the world, and the only 
country in the Eurozone, with a well-developed capital-based system of 
old age provisions. The Dutch pension system was established shortly after 
the Second World War. As participation in the system is compulsory for all 
employees in both the private and the public sector, this system has resulted 
in a high level of collective savings. The country as a whole has had a savings 
surplus for decades. The current account of the balance of payments, which 
is by deﬁ  nition identical to the national savings balance, has been in surplus 
for most of the years after the war. Since 1982, the country has accumulated 
current account surpluses to an amount of more than EUR 300 billion. In spite 
of this, at the end of 2004 the country’s net external asset position amounted 
to just EUR 36 billion.
This article deals with the question why the Dutch, in spite of their huge 
savings surpluses, have failed to build up a large net international asset 
position. It starts with a brief description of the institutional environment, the 
economic performance and the balance of payments. Section 10.3 describes 
the development of the international investment position (IIP). In section 
10.4, I will explain why the Dutch international investment position has 
deteriorated rapidly in the second half of the 1990s. Section 10.5 summarises 
and discusses the consequences for economic policy.
10  Ageing, National Savings and the 
International Investment Position: 
The Experience of the Netherlands.
Wim W. BoonstraWim W. Boonstra 214
10.2 A high savings economy
10.2.1 The Dutch pension system
The Dutch system of old age provisions is based on a so-called three pillar 
system. The ﬁ  rst pillar is a public pension system, the AOW1. This is a general 
system for every Dutch citizen of 65 years or older and it is organised as 
a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. The allowance is quite low, i.e. a gross 
monthly amount of EUR 942 for single persons and EUR 646 per person for 
couples. The premium of the AOW is paid by workers. The second pillar, 
which is the most important part of the system, is a supplementary pension. 
This is an obligatory system, in which in principle every employee has to 
participate. The pension premium is paid by employees, and their pension 
beneﬁ  ts increase with every working year. Traditionally, the potential pension 
allowance amounted to 70% of the last wage after 40 years of work. However, 
increasingly pension contracts are being based on the average wage during 
the working life, the so-called middle wage system (‘middelloon stelsel’). The 
third pension pillar consists of private savings. The ﬁ  scal regime stimulates 
private pension savings to complement the collective pension savings.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe the Dutch pension system 
in more detail. This is extensively discussed in the literature [Kuné (2005), 
Canton et al. (2004)]. Here it sufﬁ  ces to say that there is a well-developed 
pension-industry in the Netherlands, which over the years has resulted in the 
formation of huge pension funds. At the end of 2005, total national pension 
savings amounted to EUR 675 billion (2004: EUR 550 billion), which was 
125 % (112%) of Gross Domestic Product (  GDP). The largest Dutch pension 
fund, the ABP (for public sector employees), is the second largest in the 
world, with total assets of EUR 191 billion (end 2005) [ABP (2006)].
The high degree of collective savings has resulted in a structural national 
savings surplus. Bikker (1994) has estimated that up to 40% of the Dutch 
surplus on the current account can be attributed to the pension savings. 
In a  debate in Dutch policy circles in the early 1990s, several leading 
academics concluded that this national savings surplus is necessary with the 
aim of preparing for the future ageing of the population [Bovenberg (1991), 
Duisenberg (1992), Kolnaar (2005)]. A recent study on the impact of ageing 
on the Dutch public Finances by the Dutch National Bureau for Economic 
Policy Analysis concludes that, in a scenario of otherwise unchanged policies, 
the government budget will need a structural surplus of 3% of   GDP in 2011 in 
order to deal with the ﬁ  nancial consequences of ageing. Such a policy would 
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lead to even higher surpluses on the current account, which is considered 
a positive development [van Ewijk et al.(2006)].
10.2.2 The function of an external surplus
A capital based system of old-age provisions is only marginally better than 
a PAYG system in a scenario in which all savings have to be reinvested in the 
domestic economy. This can be seen if one does not look only at the ﬁ  nancial 
consequences of ageing, but also at the real effects. The basic difference 
between both systems lies in the fact that in a PAYG system the pensioners 
are dependent on the working population. The premiums paid by the labour 
force form the income of the retired. In a scenario of an ageing population, 
a decreasing group of workers will have to pay for a growing number of 
pensioners. For the working population, this will lead to a growing ﬁ  nancial 
burden and sooner or later they will no longer be prepared to pay the bill. 
From a ﬁ  nancial point of view, a capital based system solves most of the 
problems of a PAYG-system. Working people save for their own old-age 
provision, leading to savings surpluses and a build-up of pension wealth in 
the years in which the working group is at its largest. Once the non-working 
population takes the upper hand, pension funds will start to distribute their 
wealth to the pensioners, who pay for their own non-productive years. From 
this point of view it is clearly a superior system.
In a closed economy high pension savings may lead to lower interest rates 
and higher investment, and thus to a higher production capacity in the future 
(plus more capital per worker in the future, leading to higher wages and 
leaving everybody better off). However, once the population starts to age, 
ultimately the expenditures of the retired would be matched by a relatively 
shrinking economic base. Ageing leads to a relative decline of the productive 
potential of a country, which will be even more pronounced in a scenario 
in which the active part of the population starts to shrink in absolute terms. 
The combination of increasing expenditure by pensioners and a shrinking 
real economic base will result in higher inﬂ  ation. The distribution question 
between workers and pensioners returns in a different shape than in a PAYG 
system, although basically it is the same problem [Koopmans (1993)].
Therefore, cross border investments need to play a role in this system. 
Once a country starts to build up international assets with the aim of saving 
for the ageing of the population the situation can improve considerably. First, 
net foreign assets may be expected to result in a positive ﬂ  ow of capital 
income, adding to domestic production. When the increase in the number 
of retirees results in an increase in spending, the trade balance may be 
expected to gradually deteriorate, turning from positive into negative during 
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moment when the current account will turn into the red as well. Once the 
current account turns into deﬁ  cit, this can be ﬁ  nanced by eating into the 
foreign assets. This reasoning forms the basic justiﬁ  cation for the large Dutch 
national savings surplus [Bovenberg (1991)]. And it is for this reason as well 
that today the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (Centraal 
Planbureau (CPB)) is still very positive towards the creation of high surpluses 
on the current account. It argues, just as Bovenberg did in 1991, that structural 
national savings surpluses will create a ﬁ  nancial buffer for future deﬁ  cits on 
the trade balance.
The implicit assumption is, of course, that other countries such as 
developing or emerging economies are prepared to run savings deﬁ  cits and 
build up foreign debt. The productive employment of the savings surpluses 
of industrial countries in emerging economies helps to expand their economic 
potential. Once they start to repay their debt they will need savings surpluses 
themselves, which creates the space for the ageing industrial countries to run 
current deﬁ  cits.
10.2.3  The Dutch balance of payments
a) Current account 
The Netherlands have a very open economy, which is illustrated by high 
export and import ratios. The country is the sixth exporter in the world which 
is, given the relatively small size of the economy, a remarkable position 
[WTO (2005)]. The Dutch current account of the balance of payments is 
characterised by large structural surpluses. Its surplus is both in absolute 
and relative terms traditionally amongst the largest of the world. In the years 
we will investigate more closely, 1987 – 2004, the cumulative surplus on the 
current account amounted to EUR 245 billion.
b) Financial account
The openness of the Dutch economy can also be read from the ﬁ  nancial 
account of the balance of payments. On the one hand, this is characterised 
by large outﬂ  ows of capital, in the form of direct investments, portfolio 
investments and other ﬂ  ows. On the other hand, the Dutch economy is also 
an important receiver of foreign capital. More than 7000 foreign companies 
have established subsidiaries in the Netherlands. Moreover, foreign investors 
have invested huge amounts of assets in Dutch treasury and corporate bonds 
and in the shares of large Dutch companies. Wim W. Boonstra 217
Figure 10.1   Financial account: gross outflow of capital
Figure 10.2   Financial account: gross inflow of capital
Note: FDI = foreign direct investment.
Data Source figures 1 and 2: website DNB, November 2006.
In spite of its small size, the Netherlands are the home of some prominent 
multinational companies, such as Philips Electronics, Royal Dutch/Shell, 
Unilever and Ahold and large ﬁ  nancial institutions like ABN AMRO, Aegon, 
ING and Rabobank. When one looks at net cross-border ﬂ  ows, then one can 
conclude that the Dutch are important net global investors.Wim W. Boonstra 218
c)  Dutch International investment position
As a result of the huge net outﬂ  ows of investment capital one would 
expect the Netherlands to be an important creditor nation. Initially, the 
surpluses indeed translated into net foreign assets, although their size 
appeared to be disappointingly low. At its peak, in 1988, net foreign assets 
amounted to EUR 59 billion (27.3%   GDP), although from that year the ﬁ  gure 
started gradually to decline, despite large current account surpluses. In 1998 
the country became a net debtor. In 2002 the international investment position 
reached a low of minus EUR 113 billion (24.4%   GDP), after which a strong 
recovery took place. At year-end 2004, the net foreign asset position was 
EUR 36 billion (7%   GDP) positive. This is more or less equal with that year’s 
current account surplus.
Figure 10.3  Net International Investment Position of the Netherlands 
(1986 – 2004)
Source: website DNB, November 2006
The question to be answered is: what are the reasons why the Dutch failed 
to build up a strong net external asset position, in spite of their high level of 
(institutionalised) savings. Before going to answering this question, I will ﬁ  rst 
explain what the driving factors behind the international investment position 
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10.3  The international investment position and the balance 
of payments
Most textbooks explain the international investment position (IIP) of 
a country from its balance on the current account [Pugel and Lindert (2000); 
Sawyer and Sprinkle (2006)]. A country with a savings surplus builds up 
international assets (or runs down debts), while deﬁ  cit countries run down 
reserve assets or build up foreign debt. For many developing countries and 
emerging economies this equation may still hold. Most countries that have 
run into debt problems in the past, such as Mexico and other Latin American 
countries, ﬁ  rst experienced a long period of current deﬁ  cits.
For industrial countries, however, the current account balance is no longer 
the only or even the most important explanatory factor for the development of 
the IIP [Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005), Boonstra (2003)]. This is illustrated 
by ﬁ  gure 10.4, showing the annual change in the net IIP of the Netherlands, 
decomposed in the balance on the current account and ‘other factors’. It 
appears from this ﬁ  gure that in most years these other factors are the dominant 
determinant of changes in the net Dutch IIP. Section 10.4 will give a detailed 
analysis of these other factors.
Figure 10.4   Change in International position (1987 – 2004)
Data source: website DNB, November 2006.
The reason behind the decreasing importance of the current account 
balance for the development of the net IIP is the emergence of large cross 
border holding of assets between countries. In the process of globalisation, 
companies have invested in other countries, both by establishing new plants Wim W. Boonstra 220
and by buying foreign companies. Investors have diversiﬁ  ed their portfolios 
over currencies and countries. This process of international investment is 
increasingly independent of national savings balances. If the outﬂ  ow  of 
capital exceeds the national savings surplus (if any), the difference can easily 
be ﬁ  nanced on the global ﬁ  nancial markets. Today, these investment ﬂ  ows 
are much larger than trade ﬂ  ows and are certainly much larger than current 
account balances. For example, even today the US, already by far the largest 
debtor in the world, is borrowing heavily abroad, not only in order to ﬁ  nance 
its current account deﬁ  cit but also to ﬁ  nance a net outﬂ  ow of direct and equity 
portfolio investment [Gourinchas and Rey (2005), Boonstra (2006a, b)]. 
This process has led to a situation in which the industrial countries are 
connected with huge gross cross-border investment positions, which is 
illustrated by ﬁ  gures 10.5 and 10.6. Therefore, the return on these cross-border 
positions becomes increasingly a determining factor of its own. It is important 
to realise that a large part of these returns is not registered on the balance 
of payments. Flows of dividends, interest payments and repatriated proﬁ  ts, 
of course, are registered on the income balance (a component of the current 
account) of the balance of payments, and efforts are being made to register 
reinvested proﬁ  ts as well on this balance. But adjustments of the book value 
of foreign direct investment and gains and losses on cross-border holding of 
securities do not result into cross-border cash ﬂ  ows and are therefore outside 
the scope of the balance of payments. As a result of the huge cross-border 
holdings, these capital gains or losses increasingly explain the movement of 
the international investment position, overshadowing the importance of the 
balance of payment ﬂ  ows.
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Figure 10.6  Gross Foreign Liabilities (% GDP)
Figure 10.7  Change in net IIP and Cumulative Current Account
Source of figures 5 to 7: IMF, International Financial Statistics, April 2006 and yearbook 2005.
Note: Data over period 1981 – 2004, except France (1990 – 2004) and Switzerland (1984 – 2004).
Figure 10.7 illustrates this effect for a number of industrialised countries. 
It appears that especially for small open economies, such as the Netherlands 
and Finland, the cumulative current account balance is overshadowed by the 
change in the international investment position.
An important determining factor is the behaviour of the exchange rate. 
Again, the US is a good example. In the years 2002 – 2004 this country had 
a cumulative deﬁ  cit on its current account of USD 1,671 billion. In spite of 
this dazzling ﬁ   gure, its net international investment position deteriorated 
by only USD 202 billion. This can be explained by a gain on its external 
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by the so-called “currency effect” [BEA (2006)]. This is caused by the fact 
that a large part, estimated at 70%, of US foreign assets are denominated in 
foreign currency, while US liabilities are for the greater part denominated in 
dollars.
This development has, as expected, turned into its reverse in 2005. In that 
year, a relatively strong dollar has caused net currency losses on US foreign 
assets of more than USD 390 billion. 
However, the exchange rate is only one of a range of factors that in today’s 
world determine the return on cross-border assets. Sometimes a country 
becomes a victim of its own success. A strong performance of the local stock 
exchange can translate into an increasing foreign liability position. This is 
illustrated by the Finnish experience. In spite of a rather strong balance of 
payments performance, the net IIP of Finland deteriorated substantially due 
to the success of Nokia, because of the proﬁ  ts gained by foreigners on their 
holdings of Nokia shares2.
In case of the US, such effects also play a major role. In 2005 US investors 
made a net proﬁ  t on their international investment position of more than USD 
1,000 billion. This happened in spite of the country’s net liability position. 
Behind this superior performance is the large difference in composition 
between US foreign assets (mainly direct investment and portfolio equity 
investments) and its liabilities (overwhelmingly consisting of low yielding 
bonds). As a result, in 2005 the net IIP of the US deteriorated by only USD 
110 billion, in spite of a current account deﬁ  cit of USD 792 billion and the 
earlier mentioned currency losses of foreign holdings of more than USD 
390 billion.
To summarise, the net result on the international investment position of 
a country is the sum of its current account balance, plus the balance of the 
capital gains (or losses) on its assets abroad minus the capital gains (or losses) 
made by foreign investors its domestic market. Determining factors of these 
capital changes are the size of cross-border assets and liabilities in relation 
to   GDP, their composition (distribution across categories, such as direct 
investments, portfolio equities and bonds, and bank loans) and the relative 
success in investing abroad compared to the success of foreign investors in 
the home market. 
In the next section of this article I will analyse the driving factors behind 
the Dutch international investment position. We will do this by breaking 
2 The Finnish example also illustrates the complex relationship between national wealth and the 
international investment position. The rise in value of Nokia shares will also have increased the wealth 
of this company’s Finnish shareholders. Their increased wealth will almost certain have contributed to 
economic growth via positive wealth effects, leading to increased production and a higher Finnish GDP. 
Although the country has become richer thanks to Nokia, its external position in equity investment 
deteriorated from minus USD 21.9 at year-end 1996 to minus USD 206 billion at the end of 1999. However, 
thanks to the global collapse in IT-shares, the Finnish external position in equities improved to minus USD 
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down the international investment position into its major components, i.e. 
direct investments and portfolio equity and debt investments. Next, I will 
analyse the underlying developments of each individual component. 
It is important to realise, however, that this approach has its limitations, 
because events can have compensating effects across investment categories. 
This can be illustrated by an example from the Dutch experience. Ahold, 
a major Dutch company, has suffered serious losses on its direct investments 
in the US. This is part of the explanation of the poor Dutch performance in 
the category direct investment in the year 2002. However, these losses have 
contributed to a fall in the share price of Ahold on the Amsterdam stock 
exchange. Given the fact that a substantial part of the shares of Ahold was 
in foreign hands, a considerable part of the capital loss on Ahold shares 
was shared by foreign investors. From the Dutch perspective this was 
a positive factor for the relative return on cross-border equity holdings, which 
contributed to a substantial improvement of the net IIP in 2003. 
10.4  The Dutch international investment position
Figures 10.1 and 10.2 in section 10.3 illustrate the in- and outﬂ  ows of 
capital to and from the Netherlands. Initially, these ﬂ  ows were dominated by 
cross border direct investments. Later, from the mid 1980s onwards, portfolio 
investment ﬂ  ows took the upper hand.
10.4.1 Direct investment
Foreign direct investments aim at the acquisition of a controlling stake 
in a foreign company. They differ from portfolio investments in this respect, 
because portfolio investors usually do not aim at controlling the ﬁ  rm in which 
they invest. Direct investments involve so-called greenﬁ  eld  investments 
(the establishment of new production plants) and mergers and acquisitions. 
Moreover, they also include intra-company ﬁ  nancial transactions (such as 
loans) between the parent company and the foreign subsidiaries. 
The Dutch have a long history of investing abroad. The ﬁ  rst registered 
Dutch foreign direct investment goes back to 1626, when the Dutch West Indian 
Company bought the island of Manhattan (for an amount of 60 guilders) from 
a group of local inhabitants. Van Nieuwkerk (2005) estimates the Dutch net 
foreign asset position at the end of the 18th century at more than 2.5 billion 
guilders, which at the time would have been equivalent to some 1,000% of 
  GDP. In the 19th century, Dutch investors were on a very large scale involved 
in high risk investments in the building of US railways. However, in today’s 
deﬁ  nition not all of these foreign assets were direct investments3. Before the 
3 In today’s deﬁ  nitions these investments would be categorized as portfolio investment.Wim W. Boonstra 224
Second World War the Dutch were still among the largest investors in the US 
[Van Nieuwkerk and Sparling (1985), Van Nieuwkerk (2005)]. Today, with 
total assets in direct investment (2004) of EUR 439 billion, the Netherlands 
ranks number 6 in the global ranking of investing countries. Related to   GDP, 
the country is second only after Belgium and Hong Kong.
The Netherlands is also host to many foreign companies. Several thousand 
of them have invested in the country, as they see the Netherlands – with 
its large harbours (Rotterdam, Amsterdam) and Schiphol airport – as an 
important gateway to Europe. This makes the country also one of the most 
important recipients of foreign direct investment [Hogenbirk (2002)]. 
10.4.2 Foreign direct investment by Dutch companies
Figure 10.8 illustrates the net outﬂ  ow of Dutch foreign direct investments 
and the net change in its international direct investment position for the period 
1987 – 2004. The difference between the two is the net result (capital gain or 
loss) on its direct investments abroad. Figure 10.8 illustrates that the Dutch 
have suffered large capital losses, especially at the end of the 1990s and the 
beginning of the new millennium. 
Figure 10.8   Change in net FDI position
Data source: website DNB, November 2006.
These proﬁ  ts and losses have become larger and more volatile towards the 
end of the period. This illustrates the larger size of the investment stock, but 
also the fact that many of the large direct investment ﬂ  ows in the second half 
of the 1990s involved the takeover of quoted companies. In the past, many Wim W. Boonstra 225
foreign direct investment assets were valued at historical costs, but today they 
are valued at market value4.
In tables 10.1 and 10.2, the foreign direct investment ﬂ  ows from the 
Netherlands are analyzed more in detail. Table 10.1 summarises the changes 
in stock between 1986 and 2004, decomposed into balance of payment ﬂ  ows 
and other factors. The last column gives the average annual capital gains and 
losses during this period. 















Dutch Foreign Direct 
Investment 57.2 462.9  – 81.2 438.9  – 2.56
Foreign Direct 
Investment in the 
Netherlands
33.2 321.0  – 9.2 345.0  – 0.07
Dutch net FDI 
position 24.0 141.9  – 72.0 93.9
Data source: website DNB, November 2006.
Table 10.2 shows the size of the outﬂ  ow to the most important destination 
countries and the change in book value of the foreign assets in these countries. 
These other factors consist of the impact of currency ﬂ  uctuations,  the 
depreciation of goodwill, and capital gains or losses on foreign assets5.
Table 10.2 illustrates that the losses suffered by Dutch investors were largely 
concentrated in the US. The largest part of this ﬁ  nds its origins in currency 
losses (not in table). The weakness of the dollar during the years 2002  –  2004 
alone has cost Dutch companies over EUR 40 billion in currency losses on 
assets in the US. In addition, over the whole period more than EUR 18 billion 
was lost due to amortization of goodwill and other losses on assets in the US. 
This outcome is supported by empirical evidence on the micro level6.
4 Another ‘loss’ in the category of direct investment abroad can be explained by the payment of 
goodwill. Goodwill payments are registered in the ﬁ  nancial account of the balance of payments as a foreign 
direct investment, but are usually immediately written off by the parent company. Therefore, they are not 
reﬂ  ected in the value of the foreign asset acquired and registered in the analysis of this article registered 
as a loss.
5 The capital gains and losses on a foreign assets or liability are calculated as the difference between 
the actual value at the end of year T (as reported by DNB) and theoretical value (actual value of the direct 
investment position at the end of year T–1 plus the balance of payments ﬂ  ows investments in year T).
6 For example, in 2001 and 2002 Ahold had to take losses on its US participations, especially US 
Foodservice, of USD 1.65 billion. Numico lost USD 1.8 billion on Rexall Sundown, Unicity and GNC. 
VNU lost almost USD 0.9 billion over the period 2000 – 2002 in amortization of goodwill. This list is far 
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Table 10.2  Dutch foreign direct investment: regional performance 
(1987 – 2004) 
Investment Flows Change in Value Difference
 United  States 109.1 45.6  – 63.5
Belgium 43.3 35.1  – 8.2
Luxembourg 21.9 24.0 2.1
 United  Kingdom 39.3 58.8 19.5
Germany 36.6 27.7  – 8.9
France 27.1 25.0  – 2.0
Italy 12.8 11.6  – 1.2
Spain 12.7 17.3 4.5
Switzerland 22.3 26.7 4.4
Other 137.7 109.7  – 28.0
Total 462.9 381.7  – 81.2
Source: own calculations based on data from DNB as reported in November, 2006. 
Germany is an interesting case as well. Dutch telecom operator KPN 
lost USD 6.6 billion and USD 14 billion in 2001 and 2002 respectively on 
its German participation in e-Plus. This illustrates also that the practice of 
valuing direct investments against market value has resulted in increased 
volatility in the value of participations. However, this also means that (parts 
of) it may be recovered in later years, which, in the case of Germany indeed 
happened. On the positive side, substantial capital gains were realized in the 
United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, in Spain, Switzerland and Belgium. 
All in all, the conclusion is that of the ﬂ  ow of EUR 463 billion of foreign 
direct investments by Dutch companies, EUR 81 billion was lost due to 
currency losses, the amortisation of goodwill and other capital losses7.
10.4.3 Foreign Direct Investment in the Netherlands 
As stated earlier, the Dutch economy is also a major recipient of direct 
investment from abroad. In the period 1987 – 2004 the inﬂ  ow of foreign direct 
investment amounted to EUR 321 billion. The change in the value of the stock 
of foreign direct investment amounted to EUR 312 billion, which results in 
a valuation change made by foreign investors of minus EUR 9 billion (table 
10.1). The annual average capital loss in this period amounted to a negligible 
7 Note also the remarkably large “other losses” in the category “other”. There is no feasible explanation 
at hand. Further research here is necessary.Wim W. Boonstra 227
0.07%. This illustrates that foreign investors in the Netherlands fared better 
with their direct investments than their Dutch counterparts. 
To summarise, our ﬁ  ndings show that net direct investment abroad by 
Dutch companies between 1987 and 2004 amounted to an impressive total 
of EUR 142 billion. The improvement of the Dutch international direct 
investment position was much smaller (EUR 70 billion), however, due to 
large net capital losses by Dutch investors abroad of EUR 72 billion.
10.4.4 Equity portfolio investment
Dutch equity investors were relatively late in investing abroad. Initially, 
the Dutch pension funds invested overwhelmingly in Dutch State Loans. Only 
after the privatization of the public sector pension fund ABP in the middle 
of the 1980s they started to expand their equity portfolios. Once they were 
permitted to invest abroad, this has resulted in a substantial outﬂ  ow of equity 
capital to foreign markets. Figure 10.9 illustrates the net foreign investment in 
equities by Dutch investors. It also shows that in most years the ‘other’ factors 
have dominated the development in the net international equity position. 
Figure 10.9  Change in net equity position
Data source: DNB, November 2006.
Our detailed analysis of the development of the Dutch external position in 
equities starts with the year 1986, the ﬁ  rst year in which we can distinguish 
between balance of payment ﬂ  ows of cross border investment in equities and 
in bonds (table 10.3). At the end of 1986, Dutch investors owned foreign Wim W. Boonstra 228
equities for a total amount of EUR 18 billion. In the years 1987 – 2004 they made 
net investments of EUR 216 billion in foreign equities. In addition, they made net 
capital gains on their portfolio of foreign equities totalling EUR 91 billion.
Foreign investors, on the other hand, owned EUR 37 billion in Dutch 
equities at the end of 1986. They invested in total EUR 68 billion in Dutch 
equities, but made in addition capital gains of an impressive EUR 163 billion. 
At the end of 2004, they owned EUR 268 billion in Dutch equities. 
In short this means that although net cross border purchases of Dutch equity 
investors exceed foreign purchases of Dutch equities by EUR 148 billion, the 
Dutch net international position in cross border equity holdings improved 
relatively little with EUR 77 billion. This was due to the fact that foreign 
capital gains on Dutch shares exceeded Dutch capital gains on foreign shares 
by EUR 72 billion.















Dutch investments in 
foreign equities 18.0 216.2 91.1 325.3 8.24
Foreign investments in 
Dutch equities 37.0 68.1 162.6 267.7 12.30
Dutch net cross border 
position in equities  – 19.0 148.1 (*)  – 71.5 57.6
(*) A negative sign means that foreign capital gains on Dutch equities are larger than Dutch capital 
gains on foreign equities.
Data source: DNB, November 2006.
The capital gains made by Dutch investors on equities abroad amounted 
to an annual average of 8.24%. However, one must realise that the Dutch 
currency over the largest part of this period, the Dutch guilder, was one of the 
strongest currencies in the world. Measured in nominal trade weighted terms, 
the annual appreciation of the guilder against the rest of the world amounted 
to an annual average of 0.73%. After correction for this structural currency 
loss the capital gains made by Dutch equity investors abroad amounted to an 
annual average of 8.97%. However, even this yield is overshadowed by the 
result of foreign equity investors in the Dutch market. Their annual average 
capital gains amounted to 12.30%. 
Foreign results on investments in Dutch equities have structurally 
exceeded the investment result of Dutch equity investors abroad. Several 
explanations have been mentioned for this phenomenon. One very important Wim W. Boonstra 229
explanation is the fact that on average the Dutch stock markets in most years 
had outperformed most foreign markets. A second possible explanation, 
suggested by Kusters (1997; 1998) is that foreign investors outclassed their 
Dutch counterparts. It is indeed a fact that foreign investors structurally 
outperformed the average performance of the AEX (the Dutch stock index, 
   r e ﬂ  ecting the average market performance) [Boonstra (2005)]. However, 
there is a good explanation for this. It is likely that foreign investors 
have concentrated their investments in Dutch equities in the large Dutch 
multinational companies, such as Ahold, Royal Dutch/Shell, KPN and Philips 
Electronics, the internationally best-known Dutch stocks. During a large part 
of the period 1997 – 2004 these stocks were among the star performers of the 
Dutch stock exchange. Indeed, after collapse in the price of KPN and Ahold 
in early 2002 foreign investors failed to outperform their Dutch counterparts. 
The poor performance of the Dutch stock exchange in the years 2002 and 2003 
resulted, quite paradoxically, in a strong improvement of the Dutch external 
wealth position. In those years the losses of foreign investors in their holding 
of Dutch shares exceeded the losses of Dutch equity investors abroad.
10.4.5 Bond portfolio investments
Figure 10.10 illustrates the net change in the international investment 
position in bonds, subdivided in net balance of payments ﬂ  ows and ‘other’ 
changes. It appears that in most years the balance of payment ﬂ  ows dominated 
the other factors.
Figure 10.10   Change in net position in bonds
Data source: website DNB, November 2006Wim W. Boonstra 230
Dutch holdings of foreign bonds amounted at year-end 2004 to EUR 
452.3 billion, up from EUR 18.7 billion at the end of 1986. This increase of 
nearly EUR 434  billion can be decomposed in balance of payments ﬂ  ows 
of EUR 393 billion and a cumulative capital gain of EUR 41 billion. Annual 
average capital gains on bonds were 2.35%. 
In this case, foreign bond investors in the Netherlands were beaten by 
Dutch bond investors abroad. Foreign capital gains on Dutch bonds were 
on average 1.10%. The Dutch net international investment position in bonds 
deteriorated over the period 1986  –  2004 by EUR 43 billion. This is fully 
explained, however, by the fact that the inﬂ  ow of foreign investment in Dutch 
bonds exceeded the outﬂ  ow of Dutch investments in foreign bonds by EUR 
56 billion. This was partly compensated by the fact that Dutch capital gains 
on bond holdings abroad exceeded foreign capital gains on Dutch bonds by 
EUR 13 billion (table 10.4).












Dutch investments in 
foreign bonds 18.7 393.1 40.5 452.3 2.35
Foreign investments in 
Dutch bonds 19.3 449.1 27.0 495.3 1.10
Dutch net cross border 
position in bonds  – 0.6 (**)  – 56.0 (*) 13.5  – 43.0
Data source: website DNB, November 2006.
If we correct the capital gains made by Dutch investors on their bond 
portfolio for the currency loss, estimated at an average of 0.73% per year, 
their capital gain net of currency losses amounted to an annual average of 
3.08%, well above the capital gain made by foreign investors on Dutch 
bonds. This can be explained by the convergence in interest rates within 
Europe in the run up to EMU. As yields on foreign bonds converged to Dutch 
levels (already amongst the lowest in Europe), Dutch investors could make 
substantial capital gains on their portfolio of foreign bonds.
Dutch bond investors did a relatively good job abroad, although part of it 
was spilt by currency losses. Nevertheless, on balance they made a net gain 
of almost EUR 31 billion.Wim W. Boonstra 231
10.4.5 The total return on cross border assets 
In the previous sections we limited the discussion on the yield made on 
cross border portfolio investments to the capital gains. This can be justiﬁ  ed as 
we tried to explain the change in the Dutch international investment position 
that cannot be traced back to balance of payments ﬂ  ows. Payments of proﬁ  ts, 
dividends and interest are usually registered on the income account, which is 
included in the balance on the current account. 
However, the disadvantage of this approach is that it fails to give complete 
information on the relative investment performance of Dutch and foreign 
cross-border investors. Therefore, for the sake of completeness, we discuss 
in this paragraph brieﬂ  y the total returns made by Dutch investors on their 
international securities portfolio and the other way around.
Table 10.5   Total yield on foreign securities

































1986 – 2004 381.7 307.3 433.6 311.8 230.7 476.0
Balance of 
payment flows 462.9 216.2 393.1 321.0 68.1 449.1
Capital gains (+) 
or losses (–)  – 81.2 91.1 40.5  – 9.2 162.6 27.0
Dividend/interest
payment 222.0 28.6 111.4 145.6 60.9 120.3
Total yield 140.8 119.7 151.9 136.4 223.5 147.2
Capital gain 
return (%)  – 2.56 8.24 2.35  – 0.07 12.30 1.10
Dividend/interest
payment (%) 6.99 1.68 6.66 7.66 2.80 6.12
Total return incl. 
currency effect (%) 4.43 9.92 9.02 7.59 15.1 7.23
Currency
gains/loss (%)  – 0.73  – 0.73  – 0.73 N/A N/A N/A
Total return without 
currency effect (%) 5.16 10.40 9.75
Data source: DNBWim W. Boonstra 232
The results are summarised in table 10.4. The ﬁ  rst conclusion is that the 
total return on Dutch foreign direct investments is structurally lower than the 
return made by foreign investors on their Dutch direct investment. This is due 
to the large capital losses made by Dutch companies abroad, especially in the 
US. Moreover, it appears that foreign equity investors, compared with their 
Dutch counterparts, not only had superior capital gains, but they received 
higher dividend yields as well. However, in the category bonds, results of 
Dutch investors were boosted by relatively high interest income. This reﬂ  ects 
the low inﬂ   ation and low interest rate environment of the Netherlands. 
Coupons of foreign bonds were usually substantially higher than coupons 
on Dutch bonds. In addition, international convergence of interest added to 
capital gains made by Dutch bond investors abroad.
10.5  Summary and conclusions
The Netherlands have a high level of institutionalised savings, due to its 
capital based pension system. This has contributed to a structural national 
savings surplus, which was invested abroad. Despite its massive cumulative 
surplus of EUR 245 billion over the period 1987  –  2004, the country has 
failed to emerge as a major credit nation. To the contrary, the Dutch net 
international investment position over this period deteriorated on balance by 
EUR 14 billion. 
Table 10.6   Summary: Change in Dutch net IIP and its components, 
1987 – 2004 (EUR billion)
Cumulative current account balance 245
Cumulative balance on the capital account  – 16
Cumulative errors and omissions  – 56
Corrective cumulative balance on the current account (*) 174
Change in international investment position  – 14
Net capital gain (+) or losses (–)  – 188
of which:
net losses in direct investment abroad  – 72
net losses in portfolio equity investment  – 72
net gains in portfolio bond investment 14
net losses in ofﬁ  cial reserves  – 13
net other gains (+) or losses (–)  – 45
(*) calculated as the sum of the current account, the capital account and cumulative errors and 
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This article has explored the most important mechanisms behind this 
disappointing development. It appears that for industrial countries, due to 
the very large cross border positions in direct and portfolio investments, 
the capital gains and losses on cross border assets and liabilities have much 
more impact on the net international investment position than the balance on 
the current account. In this respect, the Dutch experience mirrors that of the 
  United States of America. Although the large current account deﬁ  cits have led 
to a gradual deterioration of the US net international investment position, the 
rate of deterioration is much slower than one would expect. 
Table 10.6 summarizes the Dutch experience. It shows that huge net 
losses on foreign direct investments and to a lesser extent on its cross border 
holdings of equities and bonds form a large part of the explanation. In case 
of the direct investments, there were massive losses by Dutch companies in 
the US. As concerns the cross border holdings of securities, foreign equity 
investors usually realized higher capital gains on their portfolio holdings 
of Dutch securities than the other way around. To put in another way: the 
Netherlands were punished for a relatively good performance of the Dutch 
stock exchange by a deterioration of its international investment position. In 
addition, the Dutch have paid a high price for the strength of their currency, 
which resulted in huge currency losses on foreign assets.
In total, an amount of assets comparable with the total size of the Dutch 
public debt has gone up in smoke in a couple of decades. This is an unintended 
and irrational way of spending national wealth, which however has gone 
largely unnoticed. Even today, many Dutch policy makers still think that the 
country has a large net international asset position as a result of the huge 
cumulative current account surpluses of the past [Van Ewijk et al. (2006)]. 
The lack of a visible substantial net foreign asset position is attributed to 
statistical problems.
10.5.1 Lessons to be learned
The Dutch experience shows that, in today’s integrated world markets, 
a strong balance of payments is no guarantee at all for a strong international 
investment position. Especially for small, open economies with large cross 
border assets and liabilities the size of the national savings surplus can easily 
be dwarfed by the net capital gains or losses on the international investment 
position.
As a result, one can put large question marks at the wisdom of a policy 
that aims to generate huge national savings surpluses by the creation of 
a high degree of institutionalised pension savings and/or budget surpluses. On 
a more general level: under worldwide funded pension systems, net pension 
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higher aggregate consumption) would have to come from lower interest rates 
and higher investment. For individual countries, such a savings policy is only 
rational in a world in which other countries have saving deﬁ  cits, due to a high 
level of productive investments. Only when countries are confronted with the 
ageing of their populations in an asynchronous way the creation of structural 
savings surpluses can help in the preparation for the ageing phenomenon. 
Under that scenario, countries with a relatively fast ageing population can 
invest their surpluses in more dynamic, younger emerging countries. Only 
then one will be able to create a useful ﬁ  nancial buffer in anticipation of 
future trade deﬁ  cits.
However, today almost all emerging economies have savings surpluses 
themselves, which makes it for industrialised countries with a savings 
surplus difﬁ  cult, if not impossible, to ﬁ  nd a productive employment for it. 
If all countries start to create savings surpluses at the same time, they will 
simply add to the ‘global savings glut’ which ultimately disappears into the 
world’s large black hole: the US deﬁ  cit on the balance of payments [Bernanke 
(2005)]. In the case of the Netherlands a large part of the cumulative national 
saving surpluses already has disappeared in this black hole, from which most 
of it probably will never reappear. And once the dollar starts to depreciate 
further, future losses may be even larger.
Today, the policy debate in the Netherlands still focuses to a large extent 
on the question how to prepare the public ﬁ  nances for the challenges posed 
by the ageing of the population. This, indeed, is a major challenge, given the 
high ambition level of the Dutch social security and pension systems. There 
is no doubt that in the future budget surpluses will be the norm, and deﬁ  cits 
the exception. 
At the same time, however, the beneﬁ  ts of the creation of a large national 
savings surplus are taken for granted by policy makers. In my opinion, it 
is very important that policy makers, when preparing for ageing, not only 
concentrate on public ﬁ  nances but also face the question how to create a 
business climate in which the private sector can employ the public savings 
surpluses in a productive way. The Dutch experience shows, that it is far from 
certain that the creation of extremely large national savings surpluses is of any 
help in meeting the challenges of ageing.Wim W. Boonstra 235
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11.0 Abstract
The following study analyzes the impact of demographic developments in 
Austria (and in the     OECD) on funded pension provision in Austria. It does 
so by integrating demographic developments into a standard growth model, 
linking the results to the accumulation and annuitisation of funded pensions. 
Furthermore, the simulations introduce the possibility of the international 
diversiﬁ  cation of investments and consumption as well as the integration of 
real capital markets. The simple structure of the model allows us to conduct 
a number of sensitivity analyses. Furthermore, it helps to identify the the 
underlying interactions at work in obtaining the overall results. The key 
results of this study are the following: (1) Households’ net supply of savings 
and the demand for capital by the corporate sector (net investment) both 
need to be integrated into the empirical and theoretical analysis of the impact 
of demographic developments on ﬁ  nancial markets. Focusing solely on the 
relative supply and demand for ﬁ  nancial assets within the household sector 
(as is done in the asset meltdown literature) does not provide the adequate 
conceptual framework. (2) Funded pension provision is exposed to two 
demographic risks: decrasing birth rates and increasing   longevity. On the 
one hand, lower expected growth rates of the input labour are expected to 
exert downward pressure on long-term real interest rates and future funded 
pension income. Increasing   longevity further reduces future funded pension 
income. (3) On the other hand, decreasing future net savings relative to net 
investment partly exert upward pressure on the long-term real interest rates. 
The net impact is evaluated based on a simulation exercise. (4) In public 
discourse, the superiority of funded pension provision is argued on the basis 
of demographic change, which is supposed to make public pension provision 
unsustainable. The model and the simulations in this paper highlight the 
impact of demographic change on funded pensions and its dynamics as well 
as quantify the order of magnitude of this impact. The negative impact of 
demographic change on funded pension provision is non-negligible. 
11.1 Introduction
The need to cut down beneﬁ   ts in public pay-as-you-go systems is 
defended by the inevitable impact of demographic change. At the same time, 
private funded pension provision is tax subsidized in many     OECD countries 
(i.e. Austria), as if it were not subject to the negative impact of demographic 
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change. This paper questions the implicit assumption that private pension 
provision would not be negatively affected by demographic change. Its impact 
on funded pensions is frequently discussed in economic literature on the basis 
of the “asset meltdown” hypothesis. According to this theory, an increase in 
the share of pensioners as a percentage of the total population (or relative to 
the working age population) triggers a decline in asset prices, as pensioners 
dissave in old age and, owing to this demographic development, there might 
be fewer economically active persons that actively save than dissvares who 
act as sellers in the capital markets. Following a methodical critique of this 
hypothesis, an alternative conceptual framework is presented. Within this 
framework, the main mechanisms are identiﬁ  ed that are of cardinal importance 
for the interaction between demographic developments and funded pension 
provision. Since some of the effects identiﬁ  ed work in opposite directions, 
their relative signiﬁ  cance within the conceptual framework is examined by 
means of quantitative simulations. The purspose of the simulations is to 
provide an insight into the relative strength of the opposing effects at work 
and should be interpreted as forecasts.
The paper is structured along the following lines: Section 11.2 provides 
a brief overview over the expected demographic developments in Austria 
until 2050. Section 11.3 presents a summary of the main instruments of 
private pension provision in Austria. Section 11.4 discusses the literature on 
the impact of demographic change on the macroeconomy and on ﬁ  nancial 
markets (i.e. long-term real interest rates). In section 11.5, demographic 
change is integrated in a neoclassical growth model with Harrod-neutral 
technological progress to analyse its impact on the long-term returns of 
funded pension provision (i.e. the long-term real rate of interest). Section 11.6 
links the long-term real interest rate to funded pension provision. In section 
11.7 the model dynamics are simulated based on data, on which the Austrian 
Committee for Long-Term Pension Sustainability relied as well. Section 11.8 
summarises and concludes the paper.
11.2  Demographic Developments in Austria
According to Statistics Austria (2003), the Austrian population is projected 
to grow modestly from 8.13 million to 8.21 million until 2050 thanks to 
positive migration growth, in particular (Table 11.1).Stefan W. Schmitz 241
Table 11.1  Population Structure in Austria from 2000 to 2050
2000 2020 2050 2000 2020 2050
Age in thousands in %
0 to 14 1,351 1,180 1,087 16.64 14.17 13.25
15 to 65 5,510 5,455 4,782 67.85 65.5 58.27
over 65 1,260 1,693 2,337 15.51 20.33 28.48
Source: Statistics Austria (2003).
Despite positive migration growth, a signiﬁ  cant change in the population’s 
age structure is expected. The share of people of employable age (15 to 65) 
will fall from 67.85 percent in 2000 to 65.5 percent in 2020 and amount to 
only 58.27 percent in 2050. In addition, the share of children and adolescents 
(aged 0 to 14) will decline from 16.64 percent (in 2000) to 14.17 percent (in 
2020) and fall to 13.25 percent in 2050. According to Statistics Austria, the 
birth rate is expected to be constant between 2002 and 2050 with 1.4 births 
per woman aged 15 to 45. Until the year 2050, life expectancy at birth will 
increase from 75.8 years (for men) and 83 years (for women) in 2002 to 80.2 
and 88 years, respectively. The life expectancy of 60-year-olds will rise from 
20.1 (for men) and 24.2 (for women) to 25.5 and 29.4 years, respectively. 
Two demographic factors are of particular interest for the following 
analysis: (1) the long-term average rise in the number of economically active 
people and (2) the ratio of not economically active to economically active 
persons. The average rise in the number of economically active persons over 
the respective preceeding 20-year period will fall steadily from 0.3 percent 
(in 2002) to –0.16 percent (in 2030) to then rise back slightly to –0.05 percent 
by 2050. The ratio of not economically active to economically active persons 
will increase from about 83 percent (in 2000) to some 97 percent in 2050.
11.3  Funded Pension Provision in Austria
What is the extent of funded pension provision in Austria? Table 11.2 
shows that, in the period from 1999 to 2005, passbooks on which a total of 
some EUR 114 billion were the most important savings vehicle (23.57 million 
savings accounts of domestic nonbanks, of which around 5.67 million were 
building loan contracts). However, no distinction can be made between 
long-term pension provision in the form of the passbook and short-term 
saving motives. Traditional life insurance with some 9.5 million individual 
and group policies (in 2003) and a premium reserve fund of around EUR 
46 billion (in 2005) is widely used. Since 1999, savings products geared more 
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for retail funds (about EUR 112 billion, including some 83,000 contracts of the 
tax-subsidized ‘Prämienbegünstigte Zukunftsvorsorge’1 offered by investment 
companies, KAGs), unit and       index-linked life insurance policies (including 
another 686,000 contracts of the ‘Prämienbegünstigte Zukunftsvorsorge’ 
offered by insurance companies) and pension funds (about EUR 11 billion 
and some 440,000 beneﬁ   ciaries, including prospective beneﬁ  ciaries)  has 
grown following the debate on the stability of the public pension system. At 
EUR 696 million, the volume of severance funds is still low despite some 
3.3 million qualifying periods, as these funds were introduced only in 2003.
Table 11.2  Key Long-Term Saving Vehicles in Austria from 1999 to 2005 
(EUR million)


















105,869 102,942 110,841 110,481 114,472 112,806 113,863
Building society 
savings
15,998 16,278 16,644 16,504 16,923 17,680 17,945
Retail funds**  –  68,142 74,076 73,483 81,187 90,654 112, 716
Of which pension 
investment funds
 –  217 179 238 373 711
Sources: FMA, OeNB, OeKB, Austrian occupational pension fund association, adapted by FMA 
2004; * Estimated reinsurance values for 2005. Domestic insurance companies excluding small 
mutual insurance companies. ** Retail funds minus investment by mutual funds in domestic 
investment certificates.
The volume of funded pension options (in particular, pension funds, 
severance funds and ‘Prämienbegünstigte Zukunftsvorsorge’) is therefore 
relatively high overall given that they were introduced rather late compared 
to other countries (i.e. Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, US). Nevertheless, 
the combined investments of funded pension provision already amount to 
1  This third-pillar product was introduced in 2003.Stefan W. Schmitz 243
some 25 percent of   GDP, which ranks Austria 15th among OECD countries 
with respect to the relative size of funded pension provision.2 For a while, 
the accumulated contributions and the number of contracts will remain well 
below those of savings and building loan contracts. In the next few decades, 
however, funded pension provision will make considerable advances and gain 
in relative importance, as these are long-term capital accumulation products 
with increasing coverage and partly compulsory membership for employees 
(severance funds). 
To analyze the impact of demographic developments on funded pensions, 
there are basically two starting points: (1) Consumption by not economically 
active persons arises from property rights and social security claims on 
national income that is generated by economically active persons, thereby 
inducing nonconsumption by the latter – provided the consumption is not 
funded by capital income. (2) The decline in the number of economically 
active persons impacts on economic growth, capital productivity and the 
demand for capital. The ﬁ   rst correlation is generally discussed primarily 
within the framework of the “asset meltdown” hypothesis and largely in 
isolation from the second. In this study, a conceptual framework is developed 
to facilitate the integrated analysis of both these effects.
11.4  The Impact of Demographic Change on the 
Macroeconomy and on Financial Markets: 
The Literature
The following section analyses the literature on the impact of demographic 
change on the macro-economy and ﬁ  nancial markets. A number of recent 
studies analyse the impact of demographic change on the macro-economy.3
The main issues investigated are: how will ageing affect GDP growth per 
capita and labour productivity. 
The OECD (2005) analyses the impact of demographic change on economic 
growth in France, Germany, Japan and the USA. It projects that demographic 
change will have a modestly negative impact on GDP growth per capita. In 
order to take into account policy responses to demographic change, the study 
2  OECD (2006). Latest data refers to 2004.
3  Inter alia Börsch-Suppan, Köke, Winter (2004), EPC/EC (2006), Kozu, Sato, Inada (2003), McCarty, 
Neuberger (2003), OECD (2005), Young (2002). The approaches are very similar in all the studies. They 
utilise a general equilibrium approach based on an overlapping generations-model (OLG). The supply side 
of the economy is modelled as standard aggregate production function based on two inputs (capital and 
labour) and increases in aggregate labour productivity (capital deepening and total factor productivity) as 
well as in the quality of labour. Under the assumption of perfect competition on output and input markets the 
real wage and the real rate of interest are the marginal productivities of labour and capital, respectively. The 
household sector is partitioned into overlapping generations. Each generation is modelled as maximising 
lifetime utility based on a standard utility function and an intertemporal budget constraint under certainty. 
The rationality assumptions underlying this approach are extreme as is the convention to abstract from 
uncertainty. The simulations based on these OLG-models utilise demographic projections until 2050.Stefan W. Schmitz 244
analyses the impact of pension reforms that encourage personal long-term 
savings as well as policies that aim at increasing participation rates, individual 
labour productivity and the quality of labour. In all four countries   GDP growth 
per capita is projected to average about +1.4 to +1.6 percent per annum until 
2050,4 which implies that living standards double over the next 45 to 50 years. 
A comparison of these results with a baseline scenario (with an average GDP 
growth rate of about 1 percent) highlights the signiﬁ  cant positive impact of 
policy responses to increase participation rates, individual labour productivity 
and the quality of labour.5 For the EU-25 EPC/EC (2006) projects GDP growth 
per capita to average +1.7 percent until 2050. It declines from 2.4 percent 
(2004 – 2010) to 1.9 percent (2011 – 2030) and, ﬁ  nally, to 1.2 (2031 – 2050). 
According to EPC/EC (2006) and     OECD (2005) the contribution of 
a declining labour input (employees × average hours worked per year) to 
GDP growth per capita will be very modest.6 In addition, the data published 
in Timmer, Ypma, van Ark (2003) shows that the growth contribution of 
labour input in the EU-15 was negative in the period 1980  –  1995 (–  0.2 
percentage points per annum on average). Daveri (2001) estimates the growth 
contribution of labour to be –  0.46 percentage points p.a. on average in the 
period 1991  –  99. Doppelhofer (2006) presents data for the     OECD covering 
the period 1960 to 2000. The average   GDP per capita growth rate was 2.69 
percent p.a., of which 2.46 percentage points were attributed to total factor 
productivity growth, 0.61 to education (human capital growth), 0.19 to capital 
deepening, and – 0.57 percentage points to labour input. Table 11.3 compares 
historical values of   GDP per capita growth rates in the Euro-area with the 
data in EPC/EC (2006). Over the period 1980 to 2005 the average growth 
rate was 1.75 percent p. a. slightly above the projected value of 1.5 percent 
p.a. The historical impact of labour productivity growth was 1.9 percent p.a. 
and slightly higher than projected value of 1.6 percent p.a. The historical 
contribution of labour input was – 0.2 percent p.a., twice the projected value 
of -0.1 percent p.a. The projected growth rates of   GDP per capita are higher 
for the period 2004 to 2030 than the historical values, because the contribution 
of labour input is projected to be even higher in the next 25 years than in the 
past. The modest impact of demographic variables over the very long horizon 
until 2050 is largely due to the fact that population growth affects   GDP growth 
per capita only via the growth rate of labour input, i.e. the participation rate 
4  This is roughly in line with average   GDP growth per capita in Western Europe (AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, 
DE, IT, NL, NO, SE, CH, UK, GR, IE, PT, ES) in 1973 – 1998 with 1.78 percent per annum (Maddison 
2001, Table A1-d).
5  See also Maddaloni et al. (2006).
6  In the EU-25 the contribution of the declining share of working age population is  – 0.3 percentage 
points and is mostly compensated for by an increase in the employment rate (+0.2 percentage points). In FR 
and in the USA the direct impact of labour input growth rate on   GDP growth per capita amounts to +0.1 and 
+0.6 percentage points per annum until 2050. The corresponding values for DE and JP are  – 0.1 and  – 0.7 
percentage points, respectively.Stefan W. Schmitz 245
among the working age population, the unemployment rate, and hours worked 
need to be taken into account in addition to demographic variables.7
Table 11.3  Projected   GDP per capita growth rates in the Euro-area set in 
relation to historical values for the period 1980 to 2005*
  GDP per capita Labour productivity Labour input
Historical values
1981 – 90 2.0 2.5  – 0.5
1991 – 95 1.1 2.3  – 1.2
1996 – 00 2.5 1.7 0.9
2001 – 05 1.2 0.7 0.5
Historical average 1.75 1.9  – 0.15
Projections**
2004 – 30 1.8 1.6 0.2
2004 – 50 1.5 1.6  – 0.1
Source: * Gomez-Salvador et al. (2006, Table 2, page 22); * *EPC/EC (2006, Table 2  –  10, 2  –  12 
and 2 – 13).
What accounts for the projected decline in GDP   growth per capita if not 
demographic change directly? Latzer and Schmitz (2002) review studies on 
growth accounting which show that GDP   growth in the EU in 1980  –  2001 
was driven by the dynamics of the capital stock and labour productivity 
(capital deepening and total factor productivity) rather than by the evolution 
of labour input. The low contribution of labour input was largely due to a low 
utilisation of labour in the EU. Comparing the data in EPC/EC and     OECD 
with the results in Timmer, Ypma and van Ark (2003, p. 49, 50) demonstrates 
that the lower growth rates in the projections until 2050 are largely due two 
sources: (i.) the lower projected growth of labour productivity (Table 11.4) 
and (ii.) the lower contribution of the growth of capital services (capital 
deepening) than in the past. The latter is a consequence of the assumption that 
capital per efﬁ  ciency unit remains constant from 2030 to 2050 in the EPC/EC 
(2005) study and after 2080 in the     OECD (2005) study. Timmer et al. estimate 
that the growth rate of the capital stock was 3.54 percent p.a. in 1980 – 2001 
in the EU and exceeded the growth rate of efﬁ  ciency units of roughly 2.2 
(Timmer et al. (Tables 6, 10, 11)). The EPC/EC assumes that the growth rate 
7  In 1950 – 1998 the employment rate in 12 Western European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) remained 
stable at around 43.5 percent of the population, while the hours worked per capita dropped by 27.3 percent 
(Maddison 2001, Table 3  –  7). The development of working hours outweighed the impact of population 
growth on total hours worked per year (– 8.5 percent over the entire period), so that the 12 Western European 
countries already experienced a decreasing labour input from 1950 to 1998.Stefan W. Schmitz 246
of labour productivity is 1.7 percent p.a. and the growth rate of labour supply 
is – 0.07 percent p.a. (2003 – 2050). Therefore, the implied growth rate of the 
capital stock is 1.63 percent p.a. for the period 2003 to 2050, which is well 
below the historic value of 3.54 percent p.a. The     OECD assumptions imply 
that the growth rate of the capital stock of around 0.9 to 1.3 percent p.a. for 
FR, DE, JP and the USA for the period 2001 – 2050. This is below the implied 
historic values for the period 1980 to 2000 according to Jorgensen (2001, 
Tables 3.3 and 3.8) which are 2.8 percent (FR), 3.3 percent (DE), 3.9 percent 
(JP) and 2.9 percent (USA). Historically the growth rate of the capital stock 
substantially exceeded the historic growth rates of the efﬁ  ciency units which 
ranged from 1.3 (JP), 1.4 (FR), to 1.5 (USA) 1.6 (GE) percent p.a.
Table 11.4:   Sources of average aggregate labour productivity growth per 
annum in the European Union (EU-15) from 1980 – 2001 and 













productivity 2.28 2.43 1.37 2.06 1.7
of which Contribution 
of capital 
deepening
1.16 1.30 0.90 1.12 0.60
Contribution
of total factor 
productivity
1.12 1.14 0.46 0.94 1.10
Sources: *Timmer, Ypma, van Ark (2003) [excl. LU] and **EPC/EC (2005). The data in this table 
can deviate from the data in Table 4, which refers to the Euro area only. 
Börsch-Suppan, Düzgün and Weiss (2005) discuss a large number of 
studies from different ﬁ  elds on the impact of ageing on labour productivity. 
They conclude that neither the gerontological nor the organisational or 
economic analyses reveal a systematic relationship between ageing and 
individual labour productivity. Furthermore, studies that investigate the 
effects of potential ageing-induced changes in individual labour productivity 
on aggregate labour productivity cannot identify a relationship. 
To sum up, the quantitative studies of the impact of demographic change 
on the macro-economy conclude that demographic change has a negative 
impact on GDP   per capita growth in 2004 – 2050. But the results are mainly 
due to the assumption of low productivity growth, while the contribution of 
the development of labour input is only very modestly negative and in some 
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Europe; it has been shrinking since WWII. The projections are driven by low 
assumptions concerning capital accumulation and total factor productivity 
growth. But since the growth contribution of labour was signiﬁ  cantly negative 
since 1980, the projected results are still around the GDP   per capita growth 
rates of recent history. But the projections allow for another conclusion: they 
emphasise the positive impact of policies that aim at increasing participation 
rates, individual labour productivity and the quality of labour.
We distinguish two main approaches to investigate the impact of ageing 
on ﬁ   nancial markets: one rests on simulations based on highly stylised 
general equilibrium OLG models and the other on the econometric analysis 
of historical data8.
Based on the simulation approach,     OECD (2005) ﬁ  nds that the impact 
of demographic change on the long-term real rate of interest relies largely 
on policy responses in the area of public pay-as-you-go pension systems. If 
the burden of adjustment in public pension system rests entirely on rising 
contribution rates, the simulated real rate of interest would fall in all countries 
from around 4.5 percent in 2000 by 0.3 – 0.7 percentage points until 2025. In 
FR and the USA it would again increase afterwards. In DE and JP it would 
basically ﬂ  atten out at 3.7 – 4.0 percent. If the burden of adjustment in public 
pension systems rests on signiﬁ  cant reductions of the replacement ratio for 
new beneﬁ  ciaries, perfectly rational households adjust their savings rates 
immediately9. This ampliﬁ  es the substitution of labour by capital (capital 
deepening) and reduces real interest rates by 0.9  –  1.2 percentage points to 
3.3 – 3.6 percent until 2025. Real rates tend to stabilise at these lower levels in 
FR and the USA, but continue to decline markedly in DE and JP. The results 
suggest that if shifts to funded pensions increase long-term savings, it has 
a non-negligible, negative impact on real interest rates. 
The simulations allow for neither international diversiﬁ  cation of ﬁ  nancial 
assets nor for the international integration of input and output markets. 
Börsch-Suppan, Köke and Winter (2004) suggest that international diversiﬁ  cation 
further reduces the impact of ageing on ﬁ  nancial markets, but that this comes 
at the price of increased uncertainty due to political and exchange rate risk10.
International diversiﬁ  cation in the accumulation phase would be accompanied by 
a balance of trade surplus and by a balance of trade deﬁ  cit in the de-accumulation 
phase to avoid adverse effects of ageing on the terms of trade. 
McCarthy and Neuberger (2003) conclude that the results of the simulation 
studies on the impact of ﬁ  nancial markets are very sensitive to the way policy 
8  Bosworth, Bryant, Burtless (2004), Davis, Li (2003), England (2002), Geanakoplos, Magill, Quinzii 
(2002), Maddaloni et al. (2006), Miles (2002), Poterba (2004), Young (2002).
9  The     OECD assumes that the replacement ratio were optimal for households in the previous regime, 
which is not obvious, as participation in the public system was not voluntary.
10 However, one has to bear in mind that many of the companies listed on national stock exchanges 
represent portfolios of internationally diversiﬁ  ed activities themselves. Thus, the focus on the portfolio 
shares of national markets underestimates the degree of diversiﬁ  cation.Stefan W. Schmitz 248
responses are accounted for in the models. In most studies demographic 
change reduces real returns by 0.2  –  0.45 percentage points by 2020, which 
is low compared to the volatility of real returns in the past. The modest 
impact on ﬁ  nancial markets is due to the effects of two opposing forces: On 
the one hand, the net marginal product of capital is expected to decline due 
to an increase in capital intensity and, on the other hand, the long-term real 
interest rate is projected to increase owing to the impact of structural change 
in the population on savings. Most simulation studies ﬁ  nd that the ﬁ  rst effect 
outweighs the second. However, given that real returns have an impact on 
funded pensions and the ensuing annuities over a period of up to 60 years, 
even a modest, negative impact of ageing on long-term real interest rates 
leads to non-negligible losses for beneﬁ  ciaries in funded pensions compared 
to a scenario without demographic change.
Econometric studies of the relationship between demographic variables and 
the prices/returns of ﬁ  nancial assets, respectively, yield ambiguous results. 
In some studies the impact is implausibly high; in others the coefﬁ  cients of 
demographic variables are not signiﬁ  cant at all11.
To sum up, the simulation studies project downward pressure on the 
long-term real rate of interest and real returns on ﬁ  nancial markets. The 
econometric studies cannot identify a systematic relationship between ageing 
and prices/returns on ﬁ  nancial markets. 
This study is not based on the conceptual framework of overlapping 
generations, as the results are very sensitive to the structural and parameter 
assumptions12. Furthermore, they endogise a lot of macro-variables and make 
it hard to conduct sensitivity analyses with respect to these macro-variables 
(e.g. participation rates). Instead, the real impact of demographic developments 
and the dissaving momentum of different generations are integrated into 
a  growth theory framework. Furthermore, this conceptual framework 
integrates contrary effects arising from both the change in demographic 
structure (growing overall consumption by not economically active persons) 
and the decline in population (especially in the working age population and the 
demand for real capital) on the long-term real interest rate.
11 The econometric studies encounter a number of methodological problems: (1) the speciﬁ  cation of 
the variables representing demographic change (e.g. absolute or relative cohort sizes, average age) is not 
trivial and strongly inﬂ  uences the results. (2) The number of observations and thus the statistical validity of 
the results in the econometric analysis tend to be overstated. In time series studies that cover the period after 
WW II usually some 50 to 60 years of yearly data are included. As demographic change is gradual, yearly 
data on demographic change in this period does not represent 50 to 60 independent data points on ageing. 
(3) The studies attempt to correct for other determinants of savings or prices/returns on ﬁ  nancial markets, 
such as   GDP growth and real interest rates. The simulation studies discussed above identify a systematic 
relationship between demographic change and these variables. Therefore, the inclusion of demographic 
variables and macro-variables violates the assumption of independence of explanatory variables in regression 
analysis. (4) As demonstrated above, policy responses have a signiﬁ  cant impact on the relationship between 
demographic change and growth. The econometric studies fail to account for this result.
12  McCarthy and Neuberger (2003).Stefan W. Schmitz 249
11.5  Demographic Developments and Real Interest Rates: 
The Model
The impact of demographic developments on the long-term average 
real interest rate can be conceptually represented by a neoclassical growth 
model13. Since primarily the effects arising from a change in the rise of the 
number of economically active persons are to be analysed for real variables, 
a supply-oriented conceptual framework is best suited to the problem. 
The model is guided by a large number of simplifying assumptions: In the 
long term, prices are assumed as having sufﬁ  cient ﬂ  exibility to ensure an 
equilibrium in goods, ﬁ  nance and labor markets in each period. In addition, 
the analysis disregards many other possible inﬂ  uencing factors for real interest 
rates. Since this concerns a model that operates with real parameters, potential 
monetary factors do not play a role. In other words, above all, monetary 
policy, inﬂ  ationary expectations and ﬁ  nancial market volatility are excluded 
on heuristic grounds. Moreover, a closed economy is assumed (although 
that assumption is relaxed in the simulations). The analysis conﬁ  nes itself to 
the correlation between demographic developments and output potential, as 
well as to marginal capital productivity. It is also assumed that technological 
progress is exogenous and not factor-related, i.e. that it is solely a function 
of time and increases the productivity of the overall amount of the relevant 
factor and not only in the latest period of newly created units. The purpose of 
the model is to establish a conceptual framework to uncover the mechanics 
that are at work. The simplicity is an advantage in this respect and it also 
allows looking at various inﬂ  uencing factors such as productivity growth, 
participation rates and international long-term average real interest rates. The 
results should not be interpreted as forecasts or projections.
11.5.1  What is the Interaction between Demographic Variables and 
the Real Interest Rate in the Neoclassical Growth Model? 
The equilibrium growth path for exogenous, factor-related Harrod-neutral 
technological progress is derived from an output function of a general form 
as follows:
       (1)
This function is consistently differentiable in all instances and satisﬁ  es 
some additional conditions: output per unit of labor and marginal capital 
stock per unit of labor are deﬁ  ned as y and k so that  . In addition, 
13  The corresponding model can be found in any textbook on macroeconomics and grwoth theory. The 
representations selected here follows Mankiw (1997) and Frenkel and Hammer (1999).Stefan W. Schmitz 250
marginal capital productivity per unit of labor is positive   but is 
negative  as the capital stock per unit of labor increases and for 
.
Output Y(t) in period t is a function of 1) the level of technological 
knowledge AK(t) determining capital productivity, 2) capital stock K(t), 3) the 
level of technological knowledge AL(t) determining labor productivity, and 4) 
labor supply L(t) in the period. Only Harrod-neutral technological progress 
satisﬁ  es the conditions of equilibrium growth: technological progress leaves 
both the capital coefﬁ  cient   and the functional income distribution 
between labor and capital unchanged. Harrod-neutral technological progress 
is deﬁ  ned as labor-boosting technological progress that leaves the capital 
productivity unchanged but increases the productivity of the overall amount 
of the factor labor. From this it follows that  . If AK(t) is 
normalized to 1, a starting point for the analysis is derived as follows:
) ( ) ( ), ( ) ( t L t A t K F t Y
L          ( 2 )
       (3)
Due to the linear homogeneity of the output function, 
– labor productivity per efﬁ   ciency unit – can be given as a function 
f[•] of capital intensity per efﬁ  ciency  unit   and 
simpliﬁ   ed to the labor productivity function per efﬁ  ciency  unit 
. Capital productivity per efﬁ   ciency unit is deﬁ  ned  as 
.
Let us analyze the long-term equilibrium growth rate, deﬁ  ned as constant 
capital stock over time per efﬁ  ciency unit. If the capital intensity per efﬁ  ciency 
unit is differentiated by time, is remodeled and set to equal zero, this yields the 
correlation between total national saving and national investment in a state of 
equilibrium growth (equations 4 to 6). A constant saving rate 0<s<1, constant 
rise in the number of economically active persons with the rate  ,
a constant aggregate depreciation rate of  , and Harrod-neutral technological 
progress of   are assumed:
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      (5)
      ( 6 )
Sufﬁ  cient levels of total national saving are required to keep the capital 
stock per efﬁ  ciency unit constant. In other words, depreciation needs to be 
ﬁ  nanced from this as does additionally required capital stock for additional 
efﬁ  ciency units, which consist of both additional labor owing to the rise 
in the number of economically active persons and technological progress 
(equation 6). Along the equilibrium growth path, national output per efﬁ  ciency 
unit and capital stock per efﬁ  ciency unit are constant over time. Output per 
unit of labor and per capita income Y/L increase with the labor productivity 
that is equal to the rate of technological progress  , . National 
income Y increases with both labor productivity and the rise in the number of 
economically active persons  .
11.5.2  How can structural population change be integrated into the 
model?
The standard model assumes that the population consists solely of 
economically active persons. This conceptual framework is not suitable for 
analyzing the economic effects of structural population growth. Consumption 
by not economically active persons also needs to be ﬁ  nanced from national 
income, irrespective of the form of underlying claim thereon. This could be 
social security legislation and the Pension Fund Act, as well as a ﬁ  nancial 
claim. The national dependency ratio dep, the ratio of not economically active 
to economically active persons, is multiplied by real consumption rep per 
not economically active person relative to national income per economically 
active person. From this can be calculated the share of consumption by not 
economically active persons as a percentage of national income per efﬁ  ciency 
unit. The constancy of the variable rep is assumed on heuristic grounds, so 
that the real consumption per not economically active person increases in 
proportion to national income per economically active person14. National 
income per efﬁ  ciency unit can therefore be broken down into the individual 
components of consumption per efﬁ  ciency  unit  , consumption by not 
14 The variable rep is determined primarily in accordance with social security legislation and social 
policy. Constancy assumes that cuts in the public pension system will basically be compensated by private 
provision. Only a small portion (consumption by beneﬁ  ciaries from funded pension provision) depends 
on the real interest rate. Roughly 50 percent of not economically active persons will be pensioners in 
2020. If around half of these receive from the second or third pillar a supplementary pension covering a 
quarter of their average consumption, this will be equivalent to only 6.25 percent of the consumption by 
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economically active persons   and saving per efﬁ  ciency 
unit . It is assumed on heuristic grounds that 
not economically active persons do not save. It follows from equation (6) that 
total saving has to be equal to the demand for real capital. Consequently, for 
consumption per efﬁ  ciency unit accounting for structural population growth, 
equation 7 can be derived as:
   (7)
11.5.3  Is there a Saving Rate for which long-term consumption per 
efﬁ  ciency unit is maximized?
For any saving rate, there is a constant capital stock per efﬁ  ciency unit and 
constant income per efﬁ  ciency unit which satisfy equation (6). Consumption 
by not economically active persons is determined in accordance with social 
security law and ﬁ  nancial claims based on property rights. On this basis, 
the share of income of economically active persons may be calculated 
as a  percentage of national income, a portion of which the latter save. 
Economically active persons are not indifferent to the level of the saving 
rate. They make their saving decision such that their long-term level of 
consumption is maximized. If the saving rate is too high, the capital stock 
is too large and their consumption is lower despite higher output, as more 
output needs to be invested in maintaining the equilibrium capital stock. If 
the saving rate is too low, gross marginal capital productivity will exceed the 
level required to maintain the equilibrium capital stock and, by increasing the 
saving rate, additional capital can be saved until maximum consumption is 
attained.
In equations (8) and (9), therefore, the optimum consumption per efﬁ  ciency 
unit  is derived in accordance with the optimum capital stock per efﬁ  ciency 
unit , with a potentially positive time preference rate of households being 
disregarded:
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       (9)
Equation (9) shows that gross marginal capital productivity must be equal 
to the sum of the growth in the number of economically active persons  ,
technological progress   and depreciation  , divided by the portion of the 
share available for both consumption and saving by economically active 
persons as a percentage of national income so that the latter do not have to 
spend more than is necessary to maintain the capital stock and can consume 
more.
11.5.4  What Impact Do Demographic Developments Have On Gross 
Marginal Capital Productivity? 
The decline in growth in the number of economically active persons is 
included in the model by  . Structural growth is integrated into the 
conceptual framework by the rise in consumption by not economically active 
persons owing to the dependency ratio dep increasing to dep1 (including 
increased aggregate consumption and, thus, ‘dissaving’ by pensioners).
As equations (10) and (11) show, the impact of demographic developments 
on the long-term average real interest rate are not clear:
          (10)
                  ( 1 1 )
The derivations of gross marginal capital productivity in accordance with 
both the rise in the number of economically active persons (equation 10) and 
the dependency ratio (equation 11) have the same positive sign. Since the Stefan W. Schmitz 254
former decreases and the latter increases, contrary effects on the long-term 
average interest rate are generated. The heuristic assumption according to 
which not economically active persons do not save does not affect the result 
in principle15. It should be borne in mind that the dependency ratio for the 
economy as a whole increases less steeply than is frequently presented in 
debate. The decrease in the youth dependency ratio and the increase in the 
participation rate of 15- to 65-year-olds partly offset the increase in the 
old  -age dependency ratio.16 The increase in the participation rate has two 
effects on the share of not economically active persons as a percentage of the 
economically active, as it both increases the number of economically active 
persons and reduces the number of not economically active persons to the 
same extent. As a result, particularly the permanent level effect of the increase 
in the participation rate counters not economically active persons’ growing 
consumption induced by demographic change. By contrast, the transitory 
increase in the participation rate (but not the level thereof) has an impact on 
economic growth. The former affects growth only insofar as it inﬂ  uences 
the rise in the number of economically active persons, i.e. only until a new 
constant participation rate has been reached. 
In short, in the neoclassical growth model, the following can be said 
for the effects of a decline in the rise of the number of economically active 
persons: the optimal capital intensity per efﬁ  ciency unit increases, and the 
factor labor is partially substituted by the factor capital. The net marginal 
product of capital – i.e. the long-term average real interest rate – can, on the 
one hand, decline due to a broadening of the capital base but, on the other 
hand, can increase owing to structural change in the population. The growing 
consumption by not economically active persons (a form of dissaving) 
increases long-term average real interest rates, as this reduces the total net 
saving available for investment purposes. Which of the two effects prevails 
is further analyzed below by means of a simulation based on Austrian data. 
Total output per efﬁ   ciency unit and capital stock per efﬁ   ciency unit are 
constant over time. Output per economically active person and per capita 
income Y/L rise in tandem with labor productivity  . National 
income Y increases in parallel with both labor productivity and the rise in the 
number of economically active persons  . However, it now 
grows at a slower rate than when the number of economically active persons 
15  For equation (9) the inclusion of a positive saving rate of not economically active persons   gives 
rise to only a minimal adjustment, which does not affect the results in equations (10) and (11):
        (9a)
16  Tichy (2005) underlines that the demographic development of the dependency ratio until 2050 is not 
unusual in historical terms, but that the low values of the 1990s were atypically low.Stefan W. Schmitz 255
grows more rapidly. If   (for  ), national income could even 
decline.
Although the model is not very sophisticated, it does indicate the most 
important inﬂ  uencing factors of demographic developments on the long-term 
average real interest rates. The key points of criticism about the neoclassical 
model relate to two assumptions, in particular: the rate of technological 
progress is exogenous, and the economy it applies to is a closed economy.
Neoclassical growth theory places considerable importance on the 
exogenous rate of technological progress, as this determines per capita 
income growth. The more recent growth theory17 endogenizes the rate of 
technological progress. This is why quantitative analysis uses scenarios that 
assume future productivity growth ﬂ   uctuating between 1.25 percent and 
2.25 percent a year. In the model, it is assumed that the rate of technological 
progress is independent of demographic developments based on the evidence 
discussed in section 12.4.
The model’s most restrictive assumption is deﬁ  nitely that of a closed 
economy. As a result, the long-term average real interest rate may fall 
irrespective of demographic developments in the rest of the world. Since in 
many other     OECD countries (e.g. Germany, Italy,   Japan, Spain, the U.S.A., 
as well as the CEE countries) demographic developments are similar to 
Austria’s, long-term average real interest rates are also expected to decline in 
these countries. In this way, the advantages of international diversiﬁ  cation and 
integration are moderated. Idiosyncratic risks (country risks, currency risks 
and political risks) frequently associated with investments in the countries 
with the fastest population growth often render these countries rather 
unattractive for long-term pension provision in Austria.18 However, even if 
pension provision were fully diversiﬁ  ed internationally, this would not be 
enough to avert the impact of demographic developments on the real interest 
rate in Austria. If annuities that have beneﬁ  ted from internationally diversiﬁ  ed 
assets are pay-out and consumed in Austria, the previously negative capital 
balance would turn positive, which would lead to a real appreciation of the 
home currency and again to lower returns to pension capital, unless the 
balance of trade truns negative at the same time, such the real exchange 
rate remains unaffected. As Börsch-Suppan et al. (2003) therefore explain, 
both investment and consumption should be internationally diversiﬁ  ed, i.e. 
especially in the form of capital exports during the accumulation phase and 
goods imports during the decumulation phase. If, however, the hypothesis 
of fully integrated global ﬁ   nancial and real capital markets is assumed, 
a globally uniform net marginal capital productivity would be generated. It 
would be independent of demographic developments in Austria. If Austria’s 
17  Inter alia Romer (1986, 1990).
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net marginal capital productivity cannot fall below the standard international 
level, the required capital deepening will not therefore take place to readjust the 
structure of consumption in the face of a shrinking labour input. The result is 
a suboptimal capital stock and a suboptimal level of Austrian national income. 
The relatively low degree of ﬁ  nancial and real capital market integration is 
known in economics as a Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. In addition, the extent of 
investment portfolios’ international diversiﬁ  cation is surprisingly low19.
11.6  Real Interest Rates and Funded Pension Provision
The funding principle facilitates intertemporal income transfer between 
years of gainful activity and those of retirement by the acquisition of assets 
(especially ﬁ  nancial assets). Assets are acquired from current savings over 
the period of gainful activity. At the end of this period, annuities are acquired 
using the accumulated wealth. What is the relationship between future 
annuities and net marginal capital productivity?
With real constant annual individual net savings S and an expected long-term 
average real interest rate r (after tax and additional asset management fees), 
after  years pension capital PC can be derived from equation (12):
       (12)
With given real constant annual individual net savings S, the pension 
capital PC attained after   years decreases if the expected long-term average 
interest rate r (after tax and additional asset management fees) is reduced:
            (13)
        (14)
Inequation (14) is valid, as the annual average net return is smaller than the 
last period’s interest income discounted over a single period. This results from 
the compound interest effect, whereby the capital stock is far higher at the start 
of the last period compared with the ﬁ  rst period. If the expected long-term 
average real interest rate r (after tax and additional asset management fees) 
is reduced, the required real constant net savings S has to increase in order to 
attain the given target pension capital PC after   years.
19  Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001).Stefan W. Schmitz 257
For an expected long-term average real interest rate r (after tax and 
additional asset management fees), pension capital PC, which is required to 
receive a constant real annual annuity R over TR years, can be obtained from 
equation (15):
   (15)
If, before entering retirement, one has saved a capital stock of PC at the 
end of the saving period and the expected real interest rate r (after tax and 
additional asset management fees) falls owing to demographic developments, 
this will affect the constant real annuity R:
       (16)
            (17)
        (18)
Inequation (18) is valid, as the annual average net return is greater than the 
discounted real interest rate of a single period due to the compound interest 
effect. If the long-term average real interest rate r falls owing to demographic 
developments, the annual annuity R will also fall for a given pension capital 
PC. A decline in the long-term average real interest rate has a twofold effect 
on funded pension provision, decreasing both the pension capital saved and 
the resulting annuity.
11.7  Demographic Developments and Real Interest Rates: 
The Simulation
The model shows that the impact of demographic change on funded 
pensions is complex and two opposing forces are at work. The following 
simulations provide a rough approximation of the order of magnitude of the 
net-impact. The variables and assumptions employed in the simulations are 
listed below (Table 11.5). In accordance with the expectations of the Austrian 
Committee for Long-Term Pension Sustainability (2002), I assume a rate of 
technical progress   of 1.75 percent p.a. The rate of depreciation   enters 
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macro-models. The growth rate of the number of economically active persons 
 is calculated as the 20 year average around the years 2000 and 2020, 
respectively, in order to reﬂ  ect the equilibrium approach taken in the model. 
The calculations are based on demographic projections of Statistik Austria 
(2003) and on the assumptions of a 75 percent (Stockholm-Barcelona target) 
and a 70 percent participation rate, respectively. The variable   enters 
the simulations with a value of 0.3 percent p.a. for 2000 and 0.07 percent 
for a participation rate of 75 percent p.a. [and with   –  0.016 p.a. percent at 
a participation rate of 70 percent] for 2020. Throughout the simulations 
I assume that hours worked per economically active person remain constant. 
The total dependency ratio dep (all not economically active persons in percent 
of economically active persons) decreases from 82.3 to 74.7 percent20. This is 
due to the raising participation rate and decreasing unemployement among not 
economically active persons in the age group 15 to 65. These affect the ratio 
in two ways: they decrease the numerator and increase the denominator of the 
ratio dep. The replacement rate rep for all not economically active persons 
(not only pensioners!) is now about 25 percent of GDP   per capita in Austria21.
We assume it remains constant, in principle. That implies that once the future 
evolution of funded pension provision and the growing number of pensioners 
in second and third pillar pension systems, the aggregate replacement rate will 
be somewhat reduced due to demographic change to roughly 24.22 percent. 
The world long-term real interest rate remains constant in the simulations 
at the simulated level of the single long-term real interest rate in the model 
based on the data for 2000. This reﬂ  ects the – very restrictive – assumption that 
demographic change would be conﬁ  ned to Austria. Demographic projections 
do not support this assumption, so that we will conduct sensitivity analyses 
based on lower world interest rates. The administrative fee of 1 percent of 
contributions and the asset management fee of 1.5 percent of funds under 
management are approximations based on evidence from Austrian funded 
pension products22. The simulation is based on the assumption that   longevity 
at retirements is 22 years in 2000 and 24 years in 202023.
The simulations assume that individuals start to contribute to funded 
pension provision at the age of 30. The approximations of the international 
20 The treatment of below 15 year olds is ambiguous. On the one hand, one can argue that children 
are a cost factor and that their consumption is foregone consumption of their parents. On the other hand, 
one can argue that children are part of the family and that their consumption also provides utility for their 
parents. Furthermore, the replacement rate for children would have to be considerably below that of not 
economically active persons aged 15+. If have conducted the simulations with and without the inclusion 
of children in the not economically active persons. The main results presented are those without them. 
However, interesting results for the simulation that include them are referred to in footnotes where they are 
of interest. Basically, the inclusion raises the level of interest rates but also increases the negative impact of 
demographic change on the long-term average real rate of interest and on the real annuity R somewhat.
21  Source: Hauptverband der Sozialversicherungsträger and own calculations.
22  Source: OeNB Financial Stability Report 7 (2006, 31) and Schmitz (2006).
23  Source: Statistik Austria (2003) average for males and females.Stefan W. Schmitz 259
integration of real capital markets (60 percent) and of the international 
diversiﬁ  cation of pension investments and of the consumption of pensioners 
(50 percent) are based on Börsch-Suppan, Ludwig, and Winter (2003). The 
numbers imply that the long-term real rate of interest cannot fall more than 
40 percent of the difference between the world interest rate and the stimulated 
domestic interest rate below the world interest rate and that 50 percent of the 
contributions yield a rate of return equal to that in the rest of the world24.
Since the diversiﬁ  cation of the consumption of future pensions is assumed 
to be equally high, there are no negative effects on the term of trade when 
international assets are divested. The interest rate employed in the simulations 
for 2020 for the accumulation phase equals the weighted average of the 
simulated long-term real interest rate in 2000 and that in 2020, in order to take 
into account the long-term horizon of funded pension provision. Since the 
largest changes in the long-term real rate of interest are projected until 2020 
and evolve rather ﬂ  atly afterwards, the future interst rate is weighted twice 
as heavily as the current rate (ratio of 1:2) to reﬂ  ect that long-term interest 
rate will remain low for most of the 35 years of the accumulation phase. For 
the annuity phase the long-term real interest rate simulated for 2020 forms 
the basis of the calculations. It is important to bear in mind that international 
integration and diversiﬁ  cation and averaging across time severely reduce the 
impact of demographic change on funded pensions. 
24 This assumption is only reasonable as long as the share of funded pensions is modest, otherwise 
the large surplus in the capital balance and a large surplus in the trade balance could have destabilising 
effects.Stefan W. Schmitz 260
Table 11.5 The variables and assumptions employed in the simulation
Baseline
(Based on demographic 
conditions in the year 
2000) (1)
Scenario
(based on demographic 
conditions in the year 
2020) (2)
Rate of technical progress 
in % –   2 1.75
Depreciation rate in %  –   44
Yearly growth rate of 
economically active persons* 
in % –  
0.3 0.07
[– 0.016]
Population aged 15 to 65 years 5,510,265 5,455,161
Participation rate in % 67.4 75
Economically active persons 3,713,919 4,091,371
Not economically active persons 
aged 15 to 65 years 1,796,346 1,363,790
Population aged 65+ years 1,259,798 1,692,914




Replacement rate in % of the 
gross-income of economically 
active persons (incl. taxes and 
net-savings) – rep
25 24.22
World long-term real interest 
rate in % 3.93 3.93
Administrative fee in % of 
yearly contributions 1% 1%
Asset management fees in % of 
assets under management 1.5% 1.5%
Integration of real capital 
markets in % N/A 60
International diversification 
of pension investment and 
consumption of pensioners in %
N/A 50
*Average over the previous 20 years based on the assumptions of 75 percent [and on the assumption 
of a future participation rate of 70 percent, respectively].
Sources: WIFO, OeNB, Statistik Austria, Kommission zur langfristigen Pensionssicherung, own 
calculations.
The results of the simulation are sensitive to the incorporation of 
the international integration of real capital markets and the international 
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(Table 11.6). Compared to the baseline scenario (column 1) demographic 
change reduces pension capital accumulated at retirement by EUR 1,328 
(– 2.1 percent). This results in a reduction of the real annuity per month from 
EUR 316.30 to about EUR 288.50 (– 8.8 percent)25. The simulated long-term 
real rate of interest in 2000 is 3.93 percent, which is roughly in line with the 
long-term average of the Austrian secondary interest rate of 4.12 percent 
over the period 1986 to 2004. The long-term real rate of interest relevant 
for funded pensions (that is, the weighted average of the 2000 value and 
the simulated value for 2020 with international integration) falls by 0.11 bp. 
The real effective rate during the decumulation phase falls by 0.16 bp. The 
evolution of the long-term real rate of interest (without averaging but taking 
into account integration and diversiﬁ  cation) is in line with ﬁ  ndings in the 
literature26. It falls from 3.93 percent in 2000 to a low of 3.55 percent in 2019 
and increases slightly to 3.62 in 2032, where is ﬂ  attens out. The impact of 
demographic change on funded pensions is non-negligible. 













(in EUR) 64,414 63,086 1,328 2.1
Real annuity R/











N.B. world real interest rate 3.93, participation rate 75 percent and productivity growth 1.75 percent, 
  longevity 24 years at age 65.
If   longevity at retirement turns out to be lower than the expected 24 years, 
the reduction of the monthly annuity decreases to 4.0 percent (from 8.8 percent). 
If on the other hand   longevity increases to 26 years, the real annuity shrinks 
further from EUR 288.50 to EUR 276.20, which amounts to a total decline 
due to demographic change of 12.7 percent (Table 11.7). Unsurprisingly, 
25 Including children in the simulations lead to a reduction of pension capital by 3.1 percent and of 
pensions by 9.8 percent.
26  See section 11.4 and Börsch-Suppan, Ludiwg and Walter (2003), Winter (2003) and Miles (2002).Stefan W. Schmitz 262
an increase in   longevity has a strong impact on funded pensions with each 
additional year reducing pensions by about 2 to 2.5 percentage points. An 
increase in   longevity inﬂ  uences future pensions via two channels: ﬁ  rst, if 
  longevity increases (decreases), the share of elderly not economically active 
persons grows (shrinks). This has a negative (positive) effect on aggregate 
savings and raises (lowers) the long-term real interest rate. That would push 
funded pensions up. Second, increased (decreased)   longevity directly reduces 
the annuity paid out of a given level of pension capital. This would push 
funded pensions down. The second effect clearly dominates. 
Table 11.7   The impact of increasing   longevity 
Life expectancy at 65 (average m/f) 22 24 26
Pension Capital PC (in EUR) 62,926 63,086 63,252
Real annuity R/month (in EUR) 303.5 288.5 276.2
Reduction of Pension Capital PC rel. to 
basic scenario 2.3 2.1 1.8
Reduction of Real annuity R rel. to basic 
scenario 4.0 8.8 12.7
Effective long-term real rate of interest 
(accumulation phase) 3.81 3.82 3.84
Effective long-term real rate of interest 
(decumulation phase) 3.75 3.77 3.79
N.B. world real interest rate 3.93, participation rate 75 percent and productivity growth 1.75 percent, 
  longevity 24 years at age 65.
In order to gauge the impact of international integration of real capital 
markets and of the diversiﬁ   cation of pension investment and of the 
consumption of pensioners, we rerun the simulations without them (Table 
11.8). That resulted in an overall decrease of pensions of almost 22 percent 
as a consequence of demographic change. Relative to the simulated scenario 
the cut in pensions amounts to an additional 12.9 percentage points. This 
effect is partly due to diversiﬁ   cation (4.5 percentage points) and partly 
due to integration (8.4 percentage points). One must bear in mind that the 
demographic scenarios for the EU and many     OECD countries do not different 
much from the Austrian scenario, so that the beneﬁ  ts of integration and 
diversiﬁ  cation are likely to be overly optimistic. Overall, integration and 
diversiﬁ  cation have substantial repercussions on the impact of demographic 
change on funded pensions without, however, eliminating them even without 
taking into account demographic change in the EU and     OECD countries. 
Furthermore, international diversiﬁ  cation leads to a capital account surplus 
and an accompanying surplus in the balance of trade during the accumulation 
phase. Later on, during the decumulation phase it would lead to a large Stefan W. Schmitz 263
capital account deﬁ  cit and an accompanying balance of trade deﬁ  cit. If funded 
pensions account for a large share of GDP, such large shifts in the external 
position of a country can have substantial destabilising effects. 
Table 11.8  The role of international diversification of pension investment 
and consumption of pensioners and integration of real capital 
markets
2020 without 












diversiﬁ  cation 
and integration 
(3) – (1)
Pension Capital PC 
(in EUR) 58,095 61,155 63,086 4,991
Real annuity R/month 
(in EUR) 247.8 261.9 288.5 40.7
Reduction of Pension 
Capital PC rel. to 
basic scenario
9.8 5.1 2.1  – 7.7
Reduction of Real 
annuity R rel. to basic 
scenario
21.7 17.2 8.8  – 12.9
Effective long-term 
real rate of interest 
(accumulation phase)
3.38 3.66 3.82 0.44
Effective long-term 
real rate of interest 
(decumulation phase)
3.11 3.52 3.77 0.66
N.B. world real interest rate 3.93, participation rate 75 percent and productivity growth 1.75 percent, 
  longevity 24 years at age 65.
The simulations are based on the assumption of future productivity growth 
of 1.75 percent per annum. On the one hand, a fall in the growth rate of labour 
productivity to 1.5 percent per annum reduces simulated pensions by a further 
1.3 percentage points to 10.1 percent (Table 11.9). If on the other hand future 
labour productivity growth picked up to 2 percent per annum, the impact 
of demographic change on funded pensions would be partly cushioned. 
Pensions would fall by 7.5 percent rather than by 8.8 percent. An increase 
of productivity growth to 2.25 percent per annum would further reduce the 
impact of aging by another 1.3 percent, so that pensions would be reduced by 
6.2 percent rather than 8.8 percent. Productivity growth has a strong impact 
on the impact of demographic change on funded pensions, but higher trend 
growth would not sufﬁ  ce to keep pensions constant in the face of it.Stefan W. Schmitz 264
Table 11.9   Sensitivity analysis with respect to future productivity growth 
Future productivity growth 1.50 1.75 2 2.25
Pension Capital PC (in EUR) 62,604 63,086 63,573 64,064
Real Annuity R/month (in EUR) 284.5 288.5 292.6 296.7
Reduction of Pension Capital PC rel to 
basic scenario 2.8 2.1 1.3 0.5
Reduction of Real annuity R rel to basic 
scenario 10.1 8.8 7.5 6.2
Effective long-term real rate of interest 
(accumulation phase) 3.78 3.82 3.86 3.90
Effective long-term real rate of interest 
(decumulation) 3.71 3.77 3.83 3.89
N.B. world real interest rate 3.93, participation rate 75 percent.
A lower than expected participation rate of 70 percent would further reduce 
the growth rate of the economically active population from 0.07 percent per 
annum to  – 0.16 percent per annum. This drives the long-term real of interest 
even further down, as it further increases capital intensity and decreases the 
marginal productivity of capital. However, this is counterbalanced by the 
effect of an increase in the consumption of not economically active persons 
and the ensuing decrease in savings, which put upward pressure on long-term 
real interest rates. The second effect prevails, but the fall in the interest rate 
is only 4 bp lower in accumulation phase than in the main scenario and 3 bp 
lower in the decumulation phase (Table 11.10). This attenuates the cut in 
pensions by some 0.7 percentage points (from 8.8 to 8.1 percent). 
Table 11.10  Sensitivity analysis with respect to future participation rates 
Future Participation Rates 0.70 0.75 Difference 
(1) – (3)
implying  – 0.016 0.07  – 0.086
Pension Capital PC (in EUR) 63,346 63,086 260
Real annuality R/month (in EUR) 290.7 288.5 2.2
Reduction of Pension Capital PC rel. to basic 
scenario 1.7 2.1  – 0.4
Reduction of Real annuity R rel. to basic 
scenario 8.1 8.8  – 0.7
Effective long-term real rate of interest 
(accumulation phase) 3.86 3.82 0.04
Effective long-term real rate of interest 
(decumulation phase) 3.80 3.77 0.03
N.B. world real interest rate 3.93, participation rate 75 percent.Stefan W. Schmitz 265
The simulations assume that the future world real interest rate would 
remain constant at 3.93 percent. However, as demographic change affects 
all     OECD countries this assumption is untainable. The sensitivity analysis 
suggests that a fall in the world long-term real of interest in 2020 from 
3.93 to 3.60 percent reduces pensions by a further 6.3 percentage points, 
so that they would be cut by some 15.1 percent relative to a world without 
demographic change (Table 11.11)27. A fall of another 20 bp would lead to an 
overall reduction of pensions by 18.6 percent. International integration and 
diversiﬁ  cation make funded pensions in Austria very sensitive to the world 
long-term real rate of interest and to demographic change in the countries into 
which Austrian pension funds diversify (i.e.     OECD countries and Central and 
Eastern European Countries CEECs). 
Table 11.11  Sensitivity analysis with respect to future world real 
 interest  rates
Future world real interest rate 3.40 3.60 3.93
Pension capital PC (in EUR) 58,837 60,393 63,086
Real annuity R/month (in EUR) 257.4 268.7 288.5
Reduction in Pension Capital PC rel. to basic scenario 8.7 6.2 2.1
Reduction in Pension Capital R rel. to basic scenario 18.6 15.1 8.8
Effective long-term real rate of interest 3.34 3.50 3.82
N.B. participation rate 75 percent and productivity growth 1.75 percent.
The following picture emerges when we put the various pieces together: 
demographic change in Austria and in the     OECD countries would lead 
to a reduction of future pension capital by 6.2 percent and future funded 
pensions in Austria by 15.1 percent relative to a world without demographic 
change.
11.8 Summary
The review of the literature demonstrated that the long-term projections 
of the impact of demographic change on per capita growth are biased by the 
assumption of future low productivity growth and of a lower growth rate of 
capital. The direct impact of demographic change is very limited. In addition, 
a look at the data reveals that potential labour input has already been falling 
since the 1950s due to the decrease in hours worked per economically active 
person.
27 Including children in the simulations reduces pension capital by 9 percent and pensions by 18 
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A simulation for 2020 based on equations (9), (12) and (16), using 
demographic data provided by Statistics Austria (2003) and the Austrian 
Committee for Long-Term Pension Sustainability (2002), shows the following 
key results28:
The two contrary effects of demographic developments largely offset 
each other. In the model, however, demographic developments trigger 
a decrease in long-term average real interest rates in Austria. This decrease is 
a long-term phenomenon. The simulation results in the model are therefore 
not fundamentally dependent on the choice of year (2020). In the scenario to 
which the highest probability of event is allocated, future productivity growth 
will fall to 1.75 percent a year and the participation rate will rise to 75 percent. 
Despite international diversiﬁ   cation in the investment of funded pension 
provision, consumption by pensioners and partial integration of ﬁ  nancial and 
real capital markets, demographic developments will have a negative impact 
on funded pension provision, even if one assumes that they would conﬁ  ned 
to Austria: the long-term average real interest rate during the accumulation 
phase would fall by about 11 bp and during the decumulation phase by 16 bp, 
the pension capital at the end of the saving period will be some 2.1 percent 
lower and the annual pension will be down by approximately 8.8 percent 
relative to a world without demographic change.
Since in many other     OECD countries (e.g. Germany, Italy,   Japan, Spain, 
the U.S.A. and the CEE countries), demographic developments are similar 
to Austria’s, a decline of the long-term real interest rate is also anticipated in 
these countries, thus moderating the merits of international diversiﬁ  cation and 
integration.29 This is supported by the studies cited in section 3 and a study by 
Miles (2002), in which the European real interest rate of 3.95 percent (2000) 
falls to 3.66 percent in 2020 and to around 3.50 percent in 2050. Based on 
a world long-term real interest rate of 3.60 percent demographic change 
reduces pension capital by 6.2 percent and pensions by 15.1 percent. The 
impact of international demographic change on funded pensions in Austria is 
non-negligible.
The results are sensitive to a number of parameters: (i.) International 
diversiﬁ   cation and integration reduce the demographic risk of funded 
pension provision. However, if the degree of international diversiﬁ  cation 
and integration is signiﬁ  cant, the dependency of funded pension provision 
on international real interest rate trends (and international demographic 
developments) is very high. (ii.) An increase in   longevity has a strong impact 
28 The quantitative results of the impact of demographic developments on long–term average real 
interest rates and funded pension provision which are derived from the model are used to represent two 
things: ﬁ  rst, the magnitude of the contrary effects arising from capital deepening and growing consumption 
by not economically active persons on long-term average real interest rates and, second, the demographic 
risk of funded pension provision. These results are not forecasts of future trends in Austrian real interest 
rates.
29 Poterba  (2004).Stefan W. Schmitz 267
on funded pensions with each additional year reducing pensions by about 2 
to 2.5 percentage points. Further sensitivity analyses show that the impact 
of demographic developments on funded pension provision is (iii.) reduced 
by a rise in productivity growth and (iv.) strengthened by an increase in the 
participation rate. 
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12.0 Abstract
This paper presents the impact of demographic changes on pension and 
health care expenditures, which inﬂ  uence government debt sustainability over 
the short-, medium- and long-terms. It has been attested that an increasing 
proportion of the elderly population in  Slovenia will boost pension expenditures 
as well as health care expenditures by the year 2050. It would result in debt 
unsustainability over the projected period in the no-policy-change scenario. 
Changes in the pension and health insurance system together with higher 
economic growth and a higher employment participation rate could mitigate 
unfavourable demographic trends.
12.1  Introduction
There is growing concern regarding public debt in most European Union 
(EU) member states, and long-term debt sustainability is becoming a primary 
economic policy issue. Currently, Slovenian government debt is still low by 
international standards, and far below the Maastricht Treaty reference value. 
However, unfavourable demographic trends in particular might seriously 
endanger debt sustainability in the future. 
Available population projections unambiguously reveal an increasing 
proportion of the elderly population. The Slovenian population is about to 
become the seventh oldest in the world by the year 2050, second only to 
Italy in the EU. The elderly population will boost pension expenditures as 
well as health care expenditures since they require more health care services. 
Furthermore, long-term sustainability is also threatened by low fertility rates, 
leading to an ever-smaller working-age population to support the increasing 
number of pensioners. 
The main purpose of this paper is to examine debt sustainability in the 
short-, medium- and long-terms, and to identify potential sources of debt 
unsustainability in   Slovenia’s case. The paper focuses particularly on how the 
ageing population affects debt sustainability. Given the endogenous interest 
payments and debt dynamics, long-term constraints imposed on the ﬁ  scal 
primary balance are derived.
The applied method consists of calculating debt sustainability coefﬁ  cients 
(gaps) in various plausible macroeconomic and policy scenarios of future 
economic environment. It is contained in two steps. First, a bottom-up approach 
involving a detailed analysis of past and future expenditures, revenues and 
12  General Government Debt 
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factors affecting the ﬁ  scal balance, such as demographic changes, to derive 
plausible paths for the future primary balance and government debt levels. 
These ingredients are used in the second step to calculate short-, medium- 
and long-term debt sustainability coefﬁ  cients, introduced by Blanchard et 
al. (1990) and used by the   European Commission. All the coefﬁ  cients are 
calculated under three different pension indexation rules and eight alternative 
macroeconomic scenarios. 
The results demonstrate that general government gross debt would 
experience a worrisome increase taking into account only pensions and 
health care expenditures, which are going to deteriorate due to the ageing of 
the population. This leads to the conclusion that the present ﬁ  scal policy is 
unsustainable in the long run. 
Further on, the results acquired by the sensitivity calculations with 
alternative scenarios ﬁ   rst attest that demographic changes have a strong 
impact on future pension and health care expenditures. Second, it is observed 
that ﬁ  scal policy is very important for long-term debt sustainability. Third, it 
is shown that the response of government debt in   Slovenia is stronger with 
respect to growth rate and participation rate changes than to interest rate 
changes in the long run. This means that strong economic growth would 
lead to rapid improvement in public ﬁ  nances. Fourth, it is demonstrated 
how estimates of long-term debt sustainability are acutely sensitive to the 
projections of health care expenditures. 
Short-term debt sustainability coefﬁ  cients indicate that the present ﬁ  scal 
policy could lead to deterioration in sustainability indicators. However, 
the need for ﬁ  scal adjustments, a tax increase or expenditures decrease, is 
not substantial in the short run. Medium-term coefﬁ  cients show that ﬁ  scal 
adjustments would be needed in almost all examined cases and the needed 
adjustments are stronger than in the short-term. Finally, long-term debt 
coefﬁ   cients indicate that either primary surpluses or signiﬁ  cantly  higher 
economic growth and proper ﬁ  scal policy are necessary in   Slovenia if ﬁ  scal 
policy is to maintain a sustainable government debt level.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 12.2 reviews the concept of 
government debt and debt sustainability, and applies it to the Slovenian 
case. Section 12.3 introduces the debt sustainability coefﬁ  cients.  Section 
12.4 presents macroeconomic assumptions and demographic forecasts for 
  Slovenia, and also analyzes the evolution of future pension expenditures 
assuming three different pension growth scenarios. Finally, it comprises 
the projections of future health care expenditures, differentiating between 
elderly health care expenditures. The results are presented and commented 
on in Section 12.5. Section 12.6 summarizes the main ﬁ  ndings and provides 
guidance for further research.Hana Genorio 273
12.2 Government Debt in   Slovenia: Where do we stand?
This section ﬁ  rst looks at some deﬁ  nitions of government debt and debt 
sustainability, and second, presents an analysis of the current debt dynamics in 
  Slovenia. Regarding the Maastricht criterion on debt,   Slovenia does not pose 
any problems of non-compliance. However, this does not assure long-term 
debt sustainability.
12.2.1 Concepts and deﬁ  nitions
Public ﬁ   nances are sustainable if and when the government meets 
its obligations when they arise in the future, contributing to a stable 
macroeconomic environment that will promote economic growth in the long 
run. However, debt sustainability is not simply a matter of avoiding debt 
accumulation. It also requires keeping the tax burden at a reasonable level, 
and not restraining essential public expenditures such as investment and 
R&D1. Blanchard, who deﬁ  nes a sustainable ﬁ  scal policy as one in which the 
ratio of debt to GNP eventually converges back to its initial level, provides 
an alternative deﬁ  nition2. In order to assure debt sustainability in the long 
run, HM Treasury, for example, sets two ﬁ  scal rules: the golden rule and the 
sustainable investment rule3.
The   European Commission in turn acts to discourage unsustainable ﬁ  scal 
positions in the Euro Area via its Stability and Growth Pact, which sets 
forth that government deﬁ  cits should not exceed 3% of   GDP, and public 
debt as a proportion of   GDP should be held below 60%4. While a lot of 
attention has been given to the government deﬁ  cit ﬁ  gures until now, the 
 European  Commission5 has largely agreed that there should be more focus 
on debt sustainability. This implies that more attention should be paid to the 
medium- to long-term budgetary impact of current policies. However, the 
  European Commission states that even in assuming a Member State achieves 
a medium-term budgetary target, there still exists a risk of an unsustainable 
public policy. Therefore, long-term ﬁ  scal projections are very important for 
governments in forming their current policies6. Some experts criticize that 
the analytical and operational deﬁ  nition of sustainability as appointed in the 
Maastricht Treaty is not straightforward7. Moreover, the economic rationale 
of the ﬁ  scal reference values is under question8.
1  Costello and Regling (2003)
2  For more deﬁ  nitions on debt sustainability, see the working paper by Balassone and Franco (2000)
3  HM Treasury (2002, 2003)
4  See the Maastricht Treaty, Art. 109j and 104.
5  See   European Commission (2003b), p.35
6  See Flores, Giudice and Turrini (2005)
7  See Franco, Marino and Zoteri (2004) Buti and Sapir (1998) and Buti, Eijfﬁ  nger and Franco (2002)
8  See Buiter et al. (1993) and Eichengreen and Von Hagen (1996).Hana Genorio 274
12.2.2 Current trends
At present,   Slovenia does not exceed any of the two reference values, 
and major changes are not expected over the short-term (one year) period. 
In 2004, the deﬁ  cit ratio reached 1.9% of   GDP. The government’s objective, 
laid down in the   Convergence Programme 2004-update, is for the general 
government deﬁ  cit to reach 2.1% of   GDP in 20059. Under that scenario, the 
government deﬁ  cit should fall to 1.8% in 2006 and to 1.1% in 2007. This 
is expected to be achieved not by changing the overall ﬁ  scal burden, but 
through a gradual decline in the expenditure-to-  GDP ratio in 2005 and 2006. 
Moreover, the new government is committed to achieving a close-to-balance 
position in the medium-term and to improve the quality of ﬁ  scal policy by 
redirecting expenditures towards those programs that have a positive impact 
on economic growth.
Regarding public debt,   Slovenia today presents a much more optimistic 
picture than its deﬁ   cit ratio would suggest, with a level far below the 
reference value of 60% of   GDP. Since 2000, when the government debt 
ratio stood at 27.4%, it has increased by 2.1% over the subsequent years to 
the present time. In principle, this reﬂ  ects a sound and relatively sustainable 
medium-term ﬁ  scal position of the past budget balances. Other determinants, 
however, such as privatization transactions, restructuring of the banking 
system and valuation adjustments should also be considered. Comparisons 
with the other EU-25 countries are provided in ﬁ  gure 12.1, which shows that 
  Slovenia has the ﬁ  fth lowest government debt in the EU-25 and remains far 
below the average level. 
Figure 12.1  Government debt in % of   GDP for EU-25 in 2004
Source:   Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int
9  In the Reporting of Government Deﬁ  cit and Debt Levels, this ratio was lowered to 1.9% of   GDPHana Genorio 275
In order to better understand the debt dynamics, the breakdown of the 
Slovenian general government debt ratio is presented in Figure 2 below. 
The change in debt has been broken down into three factors: primary deﬁ  cit, 
interest-growth differential and deﬁ  cit-debt adjustment. Factors that contributed 
to the higher debt level are shown with a positive sign and vice versa. 
First, the primary balance shows general government net lending, 
excluding interest payments. A signiﬁ  cantly decreasing pattern of the primary 
balance since 2001 can be seen above. This indicates that deﬁ  cits increased 
the debt ratio in 2001, 2002 and 2004, while in 2003 a primary surplus 
contributed to debt reduction. 
Second, the interest-growth differential shows a combined effect on the 
level of interest rates and economic growth on each year’s debt level. It 
explains how much economic growth has contributed to lower debt more 
than interest payments increase it, or vice versa. Interest payments show 
government expenditures for interest on the accumulated past general 
government debt. It can be seen that the interest-growth differential has 
lowered government debt levels over the past four years. This means that 
economic growth has been higher compared to the implicit10 interest rate. The 
highest interest-growth differential was registered in 2002, when it decreased 
the government debt by around 0.6 percentage points of   GDP. Forecasts for 
  GDP growth rates are not as optimistic compared to rates from the past two 
years. From here, one may conclude that economic growth in the future may 
not contribute as much to lowering the government debt levels as it has in the 
past few years. 
Figure 12.2  Government debt dynamics in   Slovenia, 2001 – 2004 
(changes in % of   GDP)
Source: Ministry of Finance and author’s calculations.
10  The implicit interest rate is generally deﬁ  ned as current year interest payments divided by the debt 
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Third, deﬁ  cit-debt adjustment is deﬁ  ned as the difference between the 
government balance and the annual change in government debt. It captures the 
rest of the factors, such as debt takeovers, valuation adjustments, enterprise 
restructuring and privatizations, which cause government debt to change. In 
the past ﬁ  ve years a majority of the deﬁ  cit-debt adjustment in   Slovenia was 
composed of the valuation adjustments, i.e. the exchange rate adjustment, and 
debt takeovers, which are contributors to an increase in government debt. The 
major takeover happened in 2001 when the government took over debt from 
the Slovenian railways and iron industry, which amounted to SIT 89.9 billion 
or 1.9% of   GDP11. In 2002 there was a particular accrual adjustment made 
in the Notiﬁ  cation tables in order to reconcile the eleven months of VAT and 
excise duties12.
In the calculations of the future gross debt, the deﬁ  cit-debt adjustment is 
equal to zero, which is an important assumption. There are some contingent 
liabilities and government property which might inﬂ  uence the government 
debt and its sustainability in the long run. However, there is no accurate 
data available on contingent liabilities for   Slovenia. At the end of 2004 
there were 9.1% of   GDP guarantees, but this is only part of the contingent 
liabilities. Moreover, it would be more relevant to calculate net debt, where 
the government’s property is also taken into account. However, as this data is 
not available, the ESA95 deﬁ  nition of debt is used. 
It is expected that   Slovenia will continue to fulﬁ  l the two ﬁ  scal Maastricht 
criteria until the year 2007, when euro adoption occurs. Nevertheless, 
fulﬁ  lling the Maastricht criteria and joining the Euro Area does not mean that 
long-term debt sustainability has been achieved. For this purpose, the present 
working paper looks more precisely at the evolution of Slovenian long-term 
ﬁ   scal expenditures, which are likely to substantially increase due to the 
impact of demographic changes such as ageing of the population. 
12.3 Debt Sustainability Coefﬁ  cients or Sustainability Gaps
Assessing long-term debt sustainability is done using the bottom-up 
approach. This means that a profound analysis of past and future expenditures, 
revenues and other factors affecting ﬁ   scal balance, such as demographic 
changes, are included in the derivation of the primary balance and debt 
levels.
11  The data is taken from the Report on Debt Management in   Slovenia for 2001.
12  The Central Government budget only included revenues from VAT and excise duties from February 
to December, and re-applied the principle of pure cash ﬂ  ow. (Reporting on Government Deﬁ  cits and Debt 
Levels, Notiﬁ  cation of April 2003).Hana Genorio 277
12.3.1 Deﬁ  nition of debt sustainability gaps
Sustainability gaps are indicators used to assess long-term sustainability 
of public ﬁ  nance or debt sustainability13. They show the gap between the 
current budgetary policy and the policy needed to ensure sustainability. They 
can be expressed as tax gaps or primary balance gaps. Tax gaps show the 
difference between taxes needed to achieve long-term debt sustainability and 
current taxes. However, the results may be interpreted in favour of lowering 
expenditures instead of increasing tax rates. Likewise, the primary balance 
gap14, or the required primary balance gap as it is referred to by the   European 
Commission, explains what the primary balance should be, so as to achieve 
the ﬁ  scal goal of debt sustainability.
Long-term sustainability coefﬁ  cients through ﬁ  scal projections also indicate 
the evolution of a debt-to-GDP ratio over time. It may either be the evolution 
of debt so that at the end of the observed period it reaches a certain level, or 
debt evolution by putting some restrictions on other ﬁ  scal indicators.
Blanchard et al. (1990) choose three indicators to determine debt 
sustainability over a varying time horizon. These are short-term, medium-term 
and long-term gaps. The short-term indicator corresponds to one year, the 
medium-term to ﬁ  ve years and the long-term to a 40-year projected period. 
This paper performs calculations of all three indicators, using long-term gaps 
as upgraded by the   European Commission. 
The   European Commission, in its recent EPC publications15 and their 
Assessments of the Convergence Programmes, calculates three long-term 
indicators. First, they calculate the S1 indicator, which measures the required 
primary balance that ensures a debt-to-  GDP ratio of 60% in 2050. Second, the 
S2 indicator fulﬁ  ls the inter-temporal budget constraint. Third, the Required 
Primary Balance (RPB) gap, which shows the minimum required average 
cyclically adjusted primary balance as a share of   GDP over the ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve 
years of the projected period, which guarantees respecting the inter-temporal 
budget constraint of the government16.
12.3.2 Calculating sustainability coefﬁ  cients (gaps)
This paper differentiates between three types of sustainability gaps17:
short-term, medium-term and long-term. Under the long-term sustainability 
gap, two additional gaps are differentiated. 
13  cf.   European Commission (2004), Blanchard (1990) and HM Treasury (2002, 2003, 2004)
14  See also   Deutsche Bundesbank (2003), p.26 – 29
15  cf.   European Commission (2004)
16  cf.   European Commission (2005)
17  cf. Blanchard et al. (1990)Hana Genorio 278
a) Short-term sustainability gap18
Short-term sustainability gap relates to the period of one year and is easy 
to assess. 
       (1)
where  denotes the required tax ratio, t the current tax ratio, g real 
spending, h transfers, t taxes, d the primary balance, r the real interest rate, 
the real   GDP growth rate and   the current debt level.
An advantage of the short-term tax gap, as opposed to the rest of the 
sustainability gaps, is that it does not require any forecasts and only relies 
on present factual data. Moreover, a breakdown of the primary deﬁ  cit is not 
necessary.
b) Medium-term sustainability gap19
 (2)
Here, a breakdown of the primary balance into g (real spending), 
h (transfers) and t (taxes) is necessary. It relates to a ﬁ  ve-year period.
c) Long-term  gaps
Long-term debt sustainability determined by the ﬁ  scal gaps is based on 
the assumption that the debt rule is met either at the end of the projected 
period or in perpetuity. From there, what needs to be changed today in order 
to reach a required debt level in the future can be concluded. It is possible to 
determine exactly how much today’s taxes need to be increased (reduced) or 
expenditures lowered (increased) in order to cover future spending and rising 
(declining) debt levels.
The ﬁ  rst long-term gap coefﬁ  cient presented in this working paper is a tax 
gap related to the S1 coefﬁ  cient calculated by the   European Commission. The 
difference is in the target debt values. The S1 indicator is used to calculate 
the gap between current policies and those which would ensure a so-called 
“prudent” debt ratio in the long run. However, it should be noted that the 60% 
ratio is a reference value and not a target, and each country may choose its 
most appropriate level. For that reason this paper presents the S1 indicator at 
three different levels: 0%, 30% and 60% of   GDP debt levels.
18  cf. Blanchard et al. (1990), p.15, 16.
19  cf. Blanchard et al. (1990), p.17.Hana Genorio 279
The second indicator, the S2 or IBC (inter-temporal budget constraint) 
gap, calculates the difference between the currently projected tax ratio and the 
ratio required to cover future public expenditures in perpetuity, plus current 
debt. This means that the current debt must be equal to the discounted present 
value of all future primary balances, and it indicates the need for a possible 
immediate and permanent change in either revenues or expenditures. 
Budgetary projections only cover the period up to 2050 so that further 
assumptions beyond this date are needed in order to provide the IBC 
sustainability gap. Calculations in this paper assume that the primary balance 
remains constant as a percentage of   GDP at a 2050 level, implying no further 
demographic impact on the budget. The tax burden and non-age-related 
expenditures remain constant as a share of   GDP after 2050 as well. 
Sustainability gaps of zero would mean that the current ﬁ  scal policy is 
sustainable. On the contrary, a positive value indicates that a sustainable tax 
rate is higher than the current tax rate and therefore an adjustment in the ﬁ  scal 
policy is needed, either on the revenue or expenditure side. 
12.4 Assumptions for Debt Sustainability
This section discusses the inﬂ  uence of demographic changes on the two 
major budgetary expenditures, i.e. pension and health care expenditures. 
It presents assumptions on the future macroeconomic environment and 
demographic projections. It also analyses the impact of an ageing population 
on future pensions, as well as assessing the evolution of future health care 
expenditures.
12.4.1 Assumptions on the future macroeconomic environment
It is assumed for modelling purposes that future tax revenues grow in 
accordance with nominal   GDP. In addition, non-age-related expenditures and 
other age-related expenditures remain constant as a share of   GDP over the 
projected period20 as well, although it is unlikely that these items will remain 
unchanged for several decades21.
Future   GDP growth depends on labour productivity and employment 
growth. There exists the danger of a negative impact from the ageing 
population on growth potential via labour supply, unless this effect is offset 
by higher participation and productivity rates22. If the non-working population 
20  Similar assumptions were made by Costello and Regling (2003) and by HM Treasury (2002, 2003, 
2004)
21 Hauner (2005) in his research of ﬁ  scal expenditures under alternative assumptions determines 
that either keeping real non-age-related expenditures constant or keeping them constant per capita can be 
viewed as signiﬁ  cantly negative.
22  See   Kraigher (2003)Hana Genorio 280
(65+) rises faster than the working population (20 – 59) due to the ageing of 
the population, production will be left to a smaller labour force and real   GDP 
growth will fall in the long run through negative employment rates. Moreover, 
productivity tends to decline with an ageing labour force, which lowers the 
growth rate for output23. Real   GDP growth is thus predicted to decrease from 
3.9% in 2005 to 0.6% by the year 2050 for the Baseline scenario, which is 
shown in Table 12.1. 
Table 12.1   Main macroeconomic assumptions
Baseline
Scenario 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Productivity 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.0
Employment 0.2  – 0.2  – 0.9  – 0.8  – 0.8  – 0.8  – 1.0  – 1.3  – 1.3  – 1.4
Real   GDP 
Growth* 3.9 2.8 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.5 1.2 0.7 0.7 0.6
Inflation 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Real interest 
rate 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Sources: *Jongen (2004) and author’s calculations
Real   GDP growth and real interest rate projections are difﬁ  cult to predict 
over such a long period of time (to 2050). For that reason, alternative 
scenarios will give a picture of how real   GDP growth and real interest rates 
affect debt sustainability. 
Inﬂ  ation, measured as CPI, is kept constant at 2.5% over the projected 
period. Moreover, the real interest rate is held constant at 3%. The fact that 
with increasing debt levels economies usually face increasing risk premiums 
is ignored. Annual employment growth rates, presented in Table 12.1, are 
derived from the calculations explained in Annex 12.1. 
12.4.2 Demographic projections for   Slovenia
Demographic changes, resulting in increased pension and health care 
expenditures, are the most probable factor and are expected to have a negative 
impact on debt sustainability in the long run. For that reason, this sub-section 
analyzes the demographic situation in   Slovenia. 
According to population projections based on the United Nation’s World 
Population Prospects24 medium-term scenario, the overall population in 
  Slovenia is expected to fall by 17.2% from 2000 to 2050, due to low fertility 
23  Kinnunen and Kuoppamaki (1998).
24  See also Strojan-Kastelec (2005), Annex II.Hana Genorio 281
rates and a low immigration rate.   Slovenia should be even more concerned 
than similar countries as its population is about to become the seventh oldest 
in the world and the second oldest in the European Union by the year 2050. 
However,   Eurostat’s new Population Projections (2005) show a decline in 
the total population of only 4.4% by the year 2050. This substantial difference 
in population projections tells us that demographic developments are difﬁ  cult 
to predict in the long run. Nevertheless, the population age structure from 
  Eurostat’s projections, compared to the United Nation’s Prospects, differs 
only marginally. This paper only considers the United Nation’s Population 
Projections since the difference between the two projections does not affect 
the conclusions on debt sustainability.
  Slovenia currently has the sixth lowest fertility rate in the world (1.22). By 
the year 2050, it is projected to move into ﬁ  fth place. As a result, the Slovenian 
population between the ages of 15 and 59 will decrease from 65.6% of the 
overall population in 2005 to 47.2% in 2050. It is therefore evident that the 
share of older people in the total population will rise. Figure 4, on the left-hand 
scale, indicate that the sizes of the working-age population and children are 
projected to fall substantially, while on the other hand the over-60 population 
group is sharply rising25. Consequently, the median age in   Slovenia is about 
to increase from 40.2 years in 2005 to 51.9 in 2050, compared to 27.7 years 
in 1950.
Figure 12.3: Population structure by age group from 2000 to 2050
Source: United Nations World Population Prospects, the 2004 Revision.
The effect of demographic changes and the worrisome evolution of an 
ageing population in   Slovenia can be better seen by the performance of 
the elderly dependency ratio in Figure 12.4, on the right-hand scale, where 
25  This working paper, under one of the alternative scenarios, assumes that after 2010 the working age 
population will increase gradually by employing people from the 60 – 64 age group. By the year 2030, 50% 
of the population from that group will join the working age group.Hana Genorio 282
the elderly dependency ratio is deﬁ  ned as the ratio between the number of 
people aged 60+ and the number of people aged 20 to 59. It is obvious that 
the share of the older population will increase signiﬁ  cantly by the year 2050. 
The dependency ratio will in both cases more than double by the end of the 
observed period.
Figure 12.4   Slovenian population of working and retirement ages, 1995 to 
2050 (in thousands)
* Working age is 20 – 59. Retirement age is 60+.
Source: United Nations World Population Prospects, the 2004 Revision
To sum up, demographic changes in the Slovenian population will have 
a double negative effect on long-term ﬁ  scal and macroeconomic development. 
First, ageing of the population will create higher expenditures for pensions 
and health insurance. Second, it will contribute to slower   GDP growth, unless 
there are higher participation or productivity rates.
12.4.3 Pension expenditures
It is necessary to make an assessment of probable future pension 
expenditure developments, which will, due to demographic changes and 
ageing of the population, deteriorate future debt sustainability. Although it 
is not possible to exactly predict the evolution of the future population, it is 
nevertheless certain that the number of pensioners will rise relative to the 
working age population. Pension revenues are predicted to grow in line with 
employment and nominal wage growth. Hana Genorio 283
There are two indicators which help to explain the impact of the ageing 
population on pensions and ﬁ  nally on debt sustainability. The ﬁ  rst is the 
support ratio and the second is the replacement ratio26.
First, the support ratio measures the share of the employed population 
over all pensioners. The ageing of the population will cut this support ratio to 
nearly half over the period from 2005 to 2050. The current pension system, 
put in place in 2000, determines a gradual increase in the retirement age. The 
support ratio signiﬁ  cantly decreases due to the strong ageing of the population 
over the projected period. It falls from 1.5 in 2005 to 0.8 in 2050. The support 
ratio, which includes only elderly pensioners instead of all pensioners, drops 
from 2.6 to 1.0 from 2005 to 2050.
Second, the replacement ratio measures the difference in pension and 
wage growth. In order to better understand the importance of pension policy 
decisions and their effect on long-term ﬁ  scal sustainability, this paper presents 
three scenarios related to pension growth. 
Under the ﬁ  rst, Baseline, scenario (Scenario W&I) the replacement ratio 
captures pension growth, which is determined by inﬂ  ation and wage growth. 
This means that pensions are predicted to grow slower than wages, since only 
50% of the wage growth is taken into consideration for the pension increase. 
It very roughly resembles the pension indexation formula27 (Scenario R/01)
introduced in 200128, and was in use by mid-2005. By this pension legislation, 
pensions are about to grow at a slower pace than wages. Therefore, the 
replacement ratio for the R/01 Scenario would be falling gradually to the end 
of the projected period.
However, the pension       indexation formula has been changed in mid-2005, 
so that pensions are    indexed to total wage growth. This assumption is therefore 
included in the second scenario. Scenario W predicts that replacement ratios 
will remain constant over the projected period. Scenario I, which is the most 
optimistic (but not realistic), predicts that pensions would only grow in line 
with the projected inﬂ  ation rate. The replacement ratio in this scenario would 
signiﬁ  cantly decline over the period to 2050.
Figure 12.5 shows replacement rates by the three explained scenarios. 
The lowest replacement rate arises from Scenario I, while the highest by 
Scenario W.
26 Before calculating these two indicators, we have to make projections of the number of people 
employed and the number of people retired over the next 45 years. They are explained in Annex 12.1
27 Under the pension legislation, implemented in 2000, there was: (1) a gradual increase of the 
retirement age, (2) a complex system for pension indexation which had, on average, reduced the rate of 
pension indexation slightly below the rate of wage growth in 2001, (3) a gradual reduction of replacement 
rates to lower levels, (4) the introduction of retirement penalties that were about to affect certain groups of 
people who qualiﬁ  ed for retirement at an early age.
28  See also Strojan-Kastelec (2005), p. 9 – 15.Hana Genorio 284
Figure 12.5  Replacement rates by the three scenarios
Source: ZPIZ Pension Fund and author’s calculations 
The highest growth in pension expenditures is expected under Scenario 
W, while Scenario I projects a decrease in pension expenditures over the 
projected period up to 2050. The Baseline Scenario W&I resembles the 
calculations from the   Convergence Programme 2004-Update made by the 
Slovenian Ministry of Finance. Under this scenario, pension expenditures 
would increase from 13.4% of   GDP in 2005 to 16.6% of   GDP by the year 
2050.
Figure 12.6   Pension expenditures by the three scenarios in %   GDP
(UN’s projections)
Source: United Nations Population Projections, ZPIZ Pension Fund and author’s calculations Hana Genorio 285
12.4.4 Health care expenditures
Quantiﬁ  cations of the impact of demographic changes on health expenditures 
are highly uncertain. While there is a broad consensus in the literature that 
population ageing will increase health care expenditures and thus put further 
pressures on ﬁ  scal sustainability, all estimates are acutely sensitive to the 
assumptions on which they are based. Consequently, considerable care is 
needed when interpreting health care expenditure projections and sensitivity 
checks should be thoroughly examined.
Uncertainty about health care expenditure projections stems from several 
factors. First, many projections use mechanical assumptions that hold for 
the past, but might change in the future. For example, a commonly used 
assumption is a constant ratio between the health care expenditures29 of the 
elderly population (usually 65+) and of the rest (0  –  64). However, certain 
evidence presented in Jacobzone (2002) shows that age-expenditure proﬁ  les 
change over time. Second, the fact that people will be living longer is likely 
to be coupled with a better health status of the elderly population30. This 
might in turn mitigate the effects of demographic changes on health care 
expenditures31. On the other hand, others claim that morbidity postponements 
are one of the factors that will substantially increase health expenditures 
in the future32. Third, health care expenditures are also strongly driven by 
non-demographic determinants, such as new technologies in medicine and 
research, and development in the health sector. This provokes rising costs 
in pharmaceuticals as well as higher inﬂ  ation in health services. Omitting 
the technological effects on health care expenditures could result in 
underestimated projections of future expenditures.
Projections of future health care expenditures used in this paper are based 
on Slovenian Ministry of Health calculations presented in the White Book33.
The Slovenian Ministry of Health estimated additionally incurred health care 
expenditures attributable explicitly to the ageing of the population from 1993 
to 2002 and made projections up to 2015. On the basis of these calculations, it 
can be estimated that, on average, a one percentage point increase in the share 
of population aged over 65 years results in a SIT 9.6 billion increase of health 
care expenditures, measured in constant 2002 prices, and this assumption is 
applied in the paper. Another assumption applied is that the share of health 
care expenditures in   GDP would remain constant at 6% if there were no 
29  In     OECD countries, health care expenditures for elderly people are three to ﬁ  ve times higher than 
for the rest of the population (Jacobzone,(2002)).
30  For example, see HM Treasury (2002), p. 16.
31  See e.g. Schulz (2005), p.11 – 18.
32  See e.g. Lagergren (2000).
33  Ministry of Health of the Republic of   Slovenia, (2003)Hana Genorio 286
change in the age structure of the population. This paper predicts that after 
2004, revenues will be increasing in accordance with the nominal   GDP.
Figure 12.7 shows a projected evolution of health care expenditures in 
percent of   GDP from 2000 to 2050. Overall health care expenditures are 
about to increase signiﬁ  cantly as a consequence of the increased health care 
expenditures of the elderly population.
Figure 12.7  Health care expenditures with and without ageing costs
  (in % of   GDP)
Source: White Book on Health Reform, 2003 and author’s calculations
Similar results are presented by other studies (see Figure 12.8).   Kraigher 
(2003) provides two health care expenditure scenarios, depending on two 
different assumptions of the future demographic developments. The more 
pessimistic scenario comprises demographic developments almost identical 
to the one used in this paper.   Kraigher in his paper assumes that the age group 
of 0  –  54 spends 3.2% of   GDP on health care expenditures, while a person 
from the 55+ age group spends 18% of   GDP. Health care expenditures would 
exceed 9% of   GDP under the optimistic demographic developments and 
would come close to 12% under pessimistic ones by the year 2050. On the 
other hand, the update of the Convergence programme projects health care 
expenditures to reach 9.6% of   GDP in 205034.
34  The original Convergence Programme, published in May 2004, put the number at 8.9% of   GDP.Hana Genorio 287
Figure 12.8   Comparison of health care expenditures in % of GDP 
Source:   Convergence Programme 2004-update,   Kraigher (2003), White Book on Health Reform, 
2003 and author’s calculations.
Differences between various health care expenditure projections are mostly 
due to different underlying demographic and macroeconomic assumptions35.
However, it should be noted that the primary purpose of this paper is not to 
provide exact numbers for future health care expenditures, but rather to assess 
the effect of different health care projections on debt sustainability36. This can 
then be used to evaluate different ﬁ  scal policies regarding their effect on debt 
sustainability.
12.5 Results
This section presents developments in debt levels and in debt sustainability 
indicators under different scenarios, taking into account demographic changes 
and their impact on pension and health care expenditures. First, the outcome 
of the Baseline scenario under three different pension adjustment scenarios 
is presented. Second, seven alternative scenarios are introduced. Finally, 
debt sustainability gaps are calculated for all scenarios. The main conclusion 
is that a continuation of the current ﬁ  scal policy set against unfavourable 
demographic changes is very likely to result in unsustainable debt levels.
35 For example, the assumption on the evolution of the employment rate used in this paper differs 
considerably from the one used in the Convergence Programme. The sensitivity of the employment rate on 
the ﬁ  nal government debt can be seen in the simulation of the ﬁ  rst alternative scenario.
36 See Section 5.2, Figure 15 for government debt evolution with health care expenditures from the 
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12.5.1 Baseline scenario
The Baseline scenario takes into account macroeconomic assumptions 
shown in table 12.1 and pension growth in line with wages (50%) and 
inﬂ   ation (50%) (Scenario W&I). This scenario also takes into account 
a gradually increasing participation rate for the population aged 20 – 59, while 
for the population group 60 – 64 it is set to 0.
Table 12.2   Participation rates37 under the Baseline scenario
Participation
rates
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
(20 – 59) 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.75
Table 12.2 shows that 69% of the population between the ages of 20 and 59 
is employed in 2005. By the year 2050 this number is predicted to increase to 
75%. However, the participation rate could also rise because of immigration 
ﬂ  ows of the working-age population or because of the gradual increase of the 
retirement age. Immigration would mitigate the impact of falling birth rates 
and ageing of the population, providing more labour supply38.
Figure 12.9  The evolution of total Pension and Health care expenditures as % 
of GDP  , Baseline with Scenario W&I
Source: ZPIZ, ZZZS, author’s calculations
37  Employment rate is the ratio of employed people in the active population, i.e. the population under 
60 years of age and it amounts to 0.69%. For more see the section on Pensions, Section 12.4.3.
38 See Green Paper “Confronting demographic changes: a new solidarity between the generations”, 
Communication from the Commission, 16 March 2005Hana Genorio 289
Incorporating the upper predictions into calculations of future pension and 
health care expenditures, one can determine the evolution of the total elderly 
related expenditures over the next 45 years. The evolution can be seen in 
Figure 12.9. Health care expenditures would almost double over the projected 
period of 45 years. In addition, pension expenditures are about to rise from 
13.4% of GDP   in 2005 to 16.6% of GDP   by 2050. 
How important is a policy decision on pension growth for debt sustainability 
in the long run? The answer is shown in Figure 12.10 below, where debt 
evolution for the three different scenarios of the pension growth explained in 
Section 12.4.3 is presented. 
Scenario W is the one that indicates the least favourable outcome. There 
is a signiﬁ  cant difference between Scenarios W, W&I and I, which points to 
the importance of ﬁ  scal policy decisions on the evolution of the gross debt, 
and therefore on long-term debt sustainability.
Figure 12.10 Government gross debt by Baseline and three pension scenarios
Source: Author’s calculations, Ministry of Finance, ZPIZ, ZZZS
To show the sensitivity of various factors on the evolution of the government 
debt in the long run, this working paper in the next section provides seven 
more scenarios in addition to the three scenarios explained above. 
12.5.2 Sensitivity analysis 
The sensitivity analysis was carried out by assuming seven additional 
scenarios. First, the participation rate for the population aged 60  –  64 was Hana Genorio 290
increased. Second, to allow for slow and fast growth scenarios, real GDP   
growth rates were decreased and increased by 1 percentage point. Third, 
interest rates were lowered and raised by 1 percentage point from the Baseline 
scenario. Fourth, the demographic structure remained at the 2005 level. 
Finally, health care expenditures, projected by the Ministry of Finance and 
published in the   Convergence Programme 2004 update, were simulated. 
Table 12.3  Scenarios
Scenarios
1) Baseline Baseline
2) Part. rate  Increased participation rate for a group 60 – 64
3) 1 pp   Q 1 p.p. increase in productivity growth rate
4) 1 pp   Q 1 p.p. decrease in productivity growth rate
5) 1 pp   i 1 p.p. increase in the real interest rate
6) 1 pp   i 1 p.p. decrease in the real interest rate
7) Pop. 2005 level Population structure remains at 2005 level
8) C.P. health exp. Projections of the health care expenditures taken from the 
Convergence Programme 20004-update
First, the participation rate for the population group aged 60  –  64 is 
increased from 0 to gradually increasing levels in order to partly accommodate 
the labour market on demographic changes. This means that the retirement 
age will gradually increase and the population aged 60 – 64 would gradually 
prolong their working period up to age 65, thus increasing the labour supply. 
The participation rate for this age group will range from 0.1% in 2010 to 0.5% 
in 2050. It would never exceed 0.5%, since it is expected that there will be 
more disabled and ill people from this age group compared to the group aged 
20 – 59. 
Figure 12.11 shows that increasing the participation rate in the age group 
60 – 64  would  signiﬁ  cantly improve debt outcomes. Under Scenario W&I,
government debt would approach 60% only by 2026, and by 2050 it would 
be 86 percentage points of GDP   lower than in the Baseline scenario. This 
improvement was expected, since a higher participation rate means a stronger 
labour supply and consequently higher GDP   growth rates, which lowers debt 
levels. However, debt sustainability is still not assured over the projected 
period. Despite the gradual incorporation of the population aged 60 – 64 into 
the working age population, risks of unsustainable debt developments do not 
disappear.Hana Genorio 291
Figure 12.11 Government gross debt by (Part. rate  ) and three pension 
scenarios
Source: Author’s calculations, Ministry of Finance, ZPIZ, ZZZS
The subsequent scenarios concern an increase or decrease in real GDP   growth 
and real interest rate. 
Figure 12.12 below shows evolution of the government gross debt under 
all three pension scenarios and an alternative scenario with deviations from 
the growth rate assumption by 1 percentage point. 
Assuming pension growth in line with wages and a 1 percentage point 
lower growth rate from the Baseline leads to the least favourable result. On the 
other hand, assuming pension growth in line with inﬂ  ation and a 1 percentage 
point higher growth rate from the Baseline leads to the most favourable result. 
In addition, there is also a big difference between the same pension scenario 
and a different growth rate scenario. 
A signiﬁ   cant deviation of the alternative scenarios compared to the 
Baseline scenario39 tells us that growth rate plays a crucial role. In the case of 
future growth rate drops, debt sustainability will signiﬁ  cantly deteriorate. On 
the other hand, future growth rate increases would help to keep government 
debt on a more sustainable path.
39 See  Annex  IIHana Genorio 292
Figure 12.12 Government gross debt and growth rate sensitivity with three 
pension scenarios
Source: Author’s calculations, Ministry of Finance, ZPIZ, ZZZS
Figure 12.13 shows the evolution of the government gross debt under all 
three pension scenarios and an alternative scenario with deviations from the 
interest rate assumption by 1 percentage point. 
Figure 12.13 Government gross debt and interest rate sensitivity with three 
pension scenarios
Source: Author’s calculations, Ministry of Finance, ZPIZ, ZZZSHana Genorio 293
A 1 percentage point higher interest rate would increase debt in 2050 by 
more than 100 percentage points, if pensions grow in line with wages. 
A 1 percentage point lower interest rate would have a smaller impact on 
the ﬁ  nal result of government debt than an increase. In the case of pension 
growth in line with wages, this decrease would improve the debt level in 
2050 by 88 percentage points. Comparing interest rate scenarios with growth 
rates and the Baseline scenario, we can conclude that growth rate deviations 
have a stronger impact on the evolution of government debt than interest rate 
deviations. Nevertheless, the difference in the pension adjustment mechanism 
is more important. 
Figure 12.14 shows the evolution of government debt for the three pension 
scenarios and under the assumption that the demographic structure and 
the size of the population remain at the 2005 level. This scenario has been 
introduced in order to conﬁ  rm a presumed strong link between ageing of 
the population and long-term debt sustainability. Government debt in % of 
GDP   remains constant or decreases if we predict the population from 2005 to 
remain constant over the whole observed period. 
Figure 12.14 Government gross debt and Scenario (Pop. 2005 level)
Source: Author’s calculations, Ministry of Finance, ZPIZ, ZZZS
A decrease of government debt below 0% of GDP   after 2030 is 
a  consequence of the increasing nominal GDP  , which results from the 
predicted gradual increase in the participation rate and consequently higher 
labour supply and employment rates. An alternative scenario shown in 
Figure 14 indicates that demographic change will have an important impact 
on future debt sustainability.Hana Genorio 294
Finally, health care expenditures, projected by the Ministry of Finance 
and published in the   Convergence Programme 2004-update, were simulated. 
According to this scenario, health care expenditures reach 9.6% of GDP   in 
2050. Figure 15 below exposes the difference in government debt evolution, 
which results from different health care projections40. In comparison to the 
Baseline scenario, the difference of 2.2% of GDP   in health expenditures 
results in a difference of 46.4% of GDP   in government debt under all three 
pension scenarios at the end of the observed period. 
Figure 12.15   Government gross debt and Scenario (C.P. health exp.) with three 
pension scenarios
Source: Author’s calculations, Ministry of Finance, ZPIZ, ZZZS
Four main conclusions can be derived from the sensitivity analysis 
provided above. First, the sensitivity calculations show that the response 
of the government debt dynamics in   Slovenia is stronger with respect to 
the growth rate and participation rate changes than with respect to interest 
rate changes in the long run. This means that stronger economic growth 
would lead to a signiﬁ  cant improvement in public ﬁ  nances. Second, it can 
be observed from all the presented ﬁ  gures and differences between the three 
pension scenarios, that ﬁ  scal policy is very important for long-term debt 
sustainability. Third, it has been attested by the sixth alternative scenario 
that demographic changes signiﬁ  cantly deteriorate debt sustainability in the 
long run. Fourth, the last alternative scenario demonstrates that estimates of 
long-term debt sustainability are acutely sensitive to the projections of health 
care expenditures and assumptions on which they are based.
40 See section 4.4.Hana Genorio 295
12.5.3 Debt sustainability coefﬁ  cients (gaps) in various scenarios 
As explained in Section 12.4.2, this paper calculates three types of debt 
sustainability coefﬁ  cients, or gaps: short-term, medium-term and long-term. 
S1 and S2 are long-term coefﬁ   cients, and under S1 there are additional 
three scenarios. All together, including all alternative scenarios, this paper 
calculates 144 debt sustainability gaps.
Short-41 and medium-term debt sustainability gaps are presented in table 
12.4 below. The short-term sustainability gap (t* – t) indicates by how much 
the tax ratio (t*) needs to be increased (or expenditures decreased) in one 
year, in order to cover the primary deﬁ  cit (d) and the amount of (r – ș)*b0,
which stands for the product of interest-growth differential and current debt. 
This means that the tax rate must keep the ratio of debt-to-GDP   constant in 
the short-term. If the interest rate is higher than the growth rate, then this 
would deteriorate debt levels. A positive sustainability gap means that tax 
rates need to rise so as not to accumulate additional debt. For the calculation 
of sustainability gaps, the projected deﬁ  cit for 2005 and 2006 is 1.9% of 
GDP .
First, the short-term sustainability gaps for 2005 and 2006, presented in 
Table 12.4, are mostly positive but small for pension Scenarios W&I and W. 
Positive numbers indicate that there is already a need for ﬁ  scal adjustments 
in 2005 and 2006 under the majority of scenarios. Negative numbers, which 
result mainly from the third pension Scenario I, imply that current ﬁ  scal 
policy was sustainable in the short-term if pensions would rise in line with 
inﬂ  ation. 
Second, medium-term sustainability gaps give a very similar picture to 
the short-term. From Table 12.4 it is seen that the majority of the numbers 
are positive for the ﬁ  rst two pension scenarios (ﬁ  rst two columns), which 
means that under these scenarios, ﬁ  scal policy would need to be adjusted 
immediately or over the next ﬁ  ve years. 
41  See equations for short-term substainability gaps in section 12.4.2.Hana Genorio 296
Table 12.4  Short- and medium-term sustainability coefficients (gaps), 
2005 and 2006 (in %)
2005 Short term gap (2005) Medium term gap
Scenarios W&I W I W&I W I
Baseline 0.05 0.15  – 0.06 0.17 0.52  – 0.16
Part.rate 0.05 0.15  – 0.06 0.04 0.37  – 0.27
1 pp   Q  0.05 0.15  – 0.06  – 0.02 0.40  – 0.40
1 pp   Q 0.05 0.15  – 0.06 0.39 0.65 0.14
1 pp   i 0.05 0.15  – 0.06 0.19 0.52  – 0.13
1 pp   i 0.05 0.15  – 0.06 0.19 0.52  – 0.13
Pop. 2005 level 0.05 0.15  – 0.06  – 0.20 0.11  – 0.50
C.P. health exp. 0.06 0.17  – 0.04 0.24 0.59  – 0.08
2006 Short term gap (2006) Medium term gap
Scenarios W&I W I W&I W I
Baseline 0.17 0.41  – 0.06 0.68 1.14 0.26
Part.rate 0.10 0.33  – 0.12 0.49 0.92 0.09
1 pp   Q  0.07 0.35  – 0.19 0.41 0.96  – 0.10
1 pp   Q 0.28 0.47 0.10 1.01 1.34 0.69
1 pp   i 0.47 0.71 0.25 0.71 1.15 0.29
1 pp   i  – 0.12 0.12  – 0.34 0.71 1.15 0.29
Pop. 2005 level  – 0.04 0.18  – 0.24 0.14 0.55  – 0.24
C.P. health exp. 0.22 0.46  – 0.01 0.78 1.24 0.36
In the medium-term, the highest increase in current taxes would be 
needed, under the assumption of the pension’s increase in line with wages and 
one percentage point decrease in the growth rate. If pensions grow in line with 
inﬂ  ation (third column), then ﬁ  scal adjustments would rarely be needed. On 
the other hand, starting from 2006, it would be needed under six scenarios.
Third, long-term sustainability gaps, S1 and S2, are presented in table 12.5 
below. The ﬁ  rst one is calculated under the assumption that a certain debt 
level is achieved at the end of the projected period, and the second one under 
the assumption that the inter-temporal budget constraint is assured. 
Values of the S1 and S2 debt sustainability gaps, as well as of short- 
and medium-term gaps, depend on the level of the non-age and age related 
expenditures, on the current stock of gross debt, on the interest-growth 
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Table 12.5 presents S1 gaps, calculated with three different end points 
for government debt. The ﬁ  rst end point is a 0% of GDP   debt level, the 
second is 30% of GDP   and the last one is the Maastricht reference value for 
government debt of 60% of GDP  . If the difference of t* – t is positive, it means 
that   Slovenia is not able to ensure respecting the 60% (or 30% or 0%) value 
over the very long-term period, considering current ﬁ  scal policy. Therefore 
permanent adjustment of the primary balance is needed. 
The most favourable outcome of the S1 debt sustainability gap results 
from the scenario where population is assumed to remain at the 2005 level. 
Fiscal adjustment is almost not needed except under two cases, where the 
needed adjustment is not very high. This result conﬁ  rms our presumption that 
debt sustainability is strongly connected to demographic changes or ageing 
of the population.
Table 12.5  Long-term sustainability coefficients (gaps) for a period 
from 2005 to 2050 (in %)
Long-run
gaps S1_1 (0%) S1_2 (30%) S1_3 (60%)
S2 (intertemporal 
constraint)
Scenarios W&I W I W&I W I W&I W I W&I W I
Baseline 4.4 7.4 2.2 4.0 7.0 1.8 3.5 6.6 1.8 5.4 9.5 2.7
Part.rate 3.3 5.8 1.5 2.9 5.4 1.1 2.4 5.0 0.6 4.1 7.5 1.9
1 pp   Q  3.2 7.3 0.7 2.7 6.7 0.2 2.1 6.2  – 0.3 3.7 9.2 0.7
1 pp   Q 5.8 7.7 4.3 5.5 7.4 4.0 5.2 7.1 3.7 7.5 10.0 5.6
1 pp   i 4.3 7.1 2.4 4.0 6.7 2.1 3.7 6.4 1.8 5.0 8.4 2.7
1 pp   i 4.7 7.9 2.4 4.1 7.4 1.9 3.6 6.8 1.4 6.2 10.8 3.2
Pop. 2005 
level  – 0.9 0.7  – 2.1  – 1.5 0.1  – 2.6  – 2.1  – 0.5  – 3.2  – 1.6 0.4  – 2.8
C.P. health 
exp. 3.7 6.8 1.6 3.3 6.4 1.2 2.9 6.0 0.8 4.3 8.5 1.7
Table 12.5 shows S2 gaps under 24 different scenarios. The two most 
favourable outcomes, after the constant population scenario, are the scenario 
with an additional percentage point in productivity and the scenario with 
a gradually increasing participation rate, i.e. an increasing retirement age and 
therefore labour supply. Comparing these S2 gaps with the Baseline scenario 
gaps, we can see that they are lower, which tells us that higher productivity 
and an increasing participation rate improves debt sustainability in the 
long-term.
To sum up, several debt sustainability coefﬁ  cients indicate that in the 
future, either primary surpluses or signiﬁ  cantly higher economic growth and Hana Genorio 298
proper ﬁ  scal policy will need to happen in   Slovenia if ﬁ  scal policy is in favour 
of keeping government debt levels on a sustainable path.
12.6 Conclusions
Demographic changes involving a rising elderly population relative to 
the working age population deteriorates long-term debt sustainability for two 
reasons. First, it creates higher pension and health care expenditures. Second, 
it contributes to a slower GDP   growth because of the fall in the labour supply, 
unless there are higher participation or productivity rates.
Under the Baseline scenario, pension and health care expenditure 
projections up to 2050 show a signiﬁ  cant increase due to the ageing of the 
population. Pensions are modelled under three different policy scenarios, 
which give us three different patterns of the future pension evolution. First, 
the highest growth in pension expenditures is expected under the scenario 
where pensions are predicted to grow in line with wages. In 2050 they are 
projected to reach 24.1% of GDP  . In addition, under the Baseline scenario, 
where pensions grow in line with wages and inﬂ  ation, pension expenditures 
will increase from 13.4% of GDP   in 2005 to nearly 16.6% of GDP   in 2050. 
Finally, in the third scenario, where pensions are assumed to grow with the 
inﬂ  ation rate, pension expenditures decrease by 1 percentage point over the 
projected period up to 2050. Health care projections indicate a strong rise 
in health care expenditures owing to the ageing of the population as well. 
This paper estimates that health care expenditures may increase by more 
than ﬁ  ve percentage points by the year 2050 and will approach 12% of 
GDP  . The corresponding debt sustainability coefﬁ  cients show that there is 
a strong impact of the ageing population on future debt levels and that future 
ﬁ  scal sustainability is exposed to serious risks if the current system does not 
change.
Alternative scenarios lead to four main conclusions. First, the sensitivity 
analysis shows that the response of the government debt dynamics in   Slovenia 
is stronger with respect to the growth rate and participation rate changes than 
with respect to interest rate changes in the long run. This means that stronger 
economic growth would lead to signiﬁ  cant improvement in public ﬁ  nances. 
Second, signiﬁ   cant differences between the three pension scenarios 
point at the importance of the ﬁ  scal policy for long-term debt sustainability. 
According to the Baseline scenario, where pensions are predicted to grow in 
line with wages and in line with inﬂ  ation, government debt would amount 
to 314% in 2050. Under a condition that pensions grow in line with wages, 
government debt reaches 535% of GDP   in 2050, while if they are about to 
grow in line with inﬂ  ation it amounts to 161% of GDP  .Hana Genorio 299
Third, if we assume that the population over the projected period remains 
at the 2005 level,   Slovenia would not suffer any debt unsustainability 
problems. Under the scenario where pensions are about to increase with 
wages, debt would follow a constant pattern, while if they were indexed with 
wages and inﬂ  ation,       government debt would even decrease and go below 0 
in the long run. 
Fourth, estimates of long-term debt sustainability are acutely sensitive to 
the projections of health care expenditures and assumptions on which they are 
based. A comparison with the health care evolution, from the   Convergence 
Programme 2004-update, shows a difference of 2.2 percentage points of GDP   
in health expenditures, which results in a difference of 46.4% of GDP   in 
government debt under all three pension scenarios at the end of the observed 
period.
In all, there is a need to put more emphasis on debt and debt sustainability. 
To ensure debt sustainability in the long run, the demographic changes and 
macroeconomic conditions are to be assessed and taken into consideration when 
making strategic long-term decisions. Currently unsustainable policies might 
harm future generations via future ﬁ  scal and macroeconomic imbalances.
Some issues warrant further research. First, more sophisticated health 
care expenditures could be arrived at by econometric estimation. Second, the 
efﬁ  cacy of ﬁ  scal policies up to now could be assessed by calculating debt 
sustainability coefﬁ  cients for the past. Third, other factors that affect long-run 
debt sustainability, such as education and unemployment beneﬁ  ts, could be 
included in the estimation of debt sustainability coefﬁ  cients.
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Annex 12.1  Calculating the number of people employed
The number of employed people is calculated as:
,     (12.A1)
where  denotes the participation rate for the population of working ages 
20–59. It is calculated as a ratio of employed people in the active population, 
i.e. the population from 20 to 59 years of age and it currently amounts to 
0.69. The participation rate for this segment of the population is predicted 
to gradually increase to 0.75 over the projected period.   denotes the 
participation rate for the population group aged 60 to 64. In the Baseline 
scenario it is set to 0, since the present average retirement age is 58 years and 
7 months. One of the alternative scenarios predicts an participation rate of 
0.10 in 2010 and 0.30 in 2020. After 2030 and up to 2050 it remains at 0.5. 
With this it is deﬁ  ned that the retirement age will slowly increase, and after 
2030 half of the population from the group aged 60–64 will be employed. 
This also indicates a reduction in unemployment rates.   denotes the 
number of people in the age group of 20 to 59, and S
60 64 − ()  the number of 
people aged 60 to 64. 
Regarding the number of pensioners, calculations for forecasts differentiate 
between four types of pensions: old age pensions (POA), disability pensions, 
widow and family pensions, and the rest. 
The number of old-age pensioners is calculated as:





4 46 0 6 4 ) *) ) * () S
oldpensions
− ()
() ( ) + SS
65+ 60-64
 (12.A2)
where predicted pensions represents the number of persons aged 65 and over, 
plus the product of the population from age group 60 to 64 and 1 –  . In 
addition, a coefﬁ  cient for pensions is calculated as a ratio of old age pensions 
in the population of over 60 years of age. For the year 2000 it is 0.73, and 
for 2005 it is 0.79. For the years to come, it is assumed that a coefﬁ  cient for 
pensions is constant at 0.78. 
Disability pensions are predicted to grow with the growth rate of the 
overall population, since the rise of this pension group does not depend on 
the age factor. In addition, widow and family pensions are predicted to grow 
with the growth rate of the population aged 20+, because these pensions are 
mainly present among the population older than 20 years. Persons under 20 
are dependent on adults, who are eligible for the named pensions. Hana Genorio 303
Figure 12.A1  Breakdown of pensions and projections up to 2050
Source: ZPIZ, Pension Fund and author’s calculations
From Figure 12.A1 it is clearly seen that the greatest increase from 1995 
to 2050 belongs to the group of Old-age Pensions, which nearly doubles over 
the observed period. Disability Pensions were up by 1,000 from 1995 to 2005. 
However, they are about to decrease from 2005 to 2050 because of the fall 
in the overall population. In addition, Family and Widow Pensions follow 
a similar pattern. The rest of the pensions are also about to fall due to the fall 
in the population aged 20 – 64. The overall number of pensioners has risen by 
70,000 in the last 10 years and they are projected to increase by an additional 
155,000 over the next 45 years.Hana Genorio 304
Annex 12.2    Results of the alternative scenarios under three 
pension scenarios 
a)  Scenario W&I
Table 12.A1  Government gross debt in % of GDP under the assumption that 
pensions grow in line with wages and inflation
2004 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Baseline 29.5 32.2 39.7 52.5 71.5 97.5 132.2 180.5 240.6 314.0
Part.rate 29.5 31.2 35.7 43.7 55.8 72.4 96.0 129.1 172.9 228.5
1 pp   Q  29.5 30.3 34.7 42.6 54.3 69.6 89.2 115.4 146.3 181.6
1 pp   Q 29.5 34.5 46.2 65.8 95.9 138.5 198.0 283.4 395.5 540.1
1 pp   i 29.5 33.9 43.6 59.4 82.9 115.3 159.2 221.1 300.3 399.8
1 pp   i 29.5 30.9 37.0 47.9 64.5 87.0 116.6 157.0 206.2 264.4
Pop. 2005 level 29.5 29.4 26.8 21.6 14.5 5.4  – 5.4  – 18.1  – 32.5  – 49.1
C.P. health exp. 29.5 32.8 40.6 52.3 68.9 90.7 119.6 159.7 208.9 267.6
Figure 12.A2 Government gross debt evolution under eight different scenarios 
and assumption that pensions grow in line with wages and 
inflationHana Genorio 305
b) Scenario W
Table 12.A2  Government gross debt in % of GDP   under the assumption that 
pensions grow in line with wages
2004 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Baseline 29.5 34.6 47.9 70.4 104.2 150.3 212.2 297.4 404.3 535.5
Part.rate 29.5 33.4 43.1 59.5 83.6 116.2 161.2 223.1 303.9 406.1
1 pp   Q  29.5 33.2 44.4 63.7 92.0 129.5 178.0 242.8 320.8 412.6
1 pp   Q 29.5 36.4 52.2 79.1 120.1 178.0 258.5 373.0 522.7 715.1
1 pp   i 29.5 36.3 51.8 77.8 116.8 170.9 244.8 348.6 482.1 650.9
1 pp   i 29.5 33.2 44.7 44.7 94.3 134.3 186.8 257.7 344.3 447.5
Pop. 2005 level 29.5 31.6 33.2 34.3 35.1 35.7 36.0 36.2 35.9 35.8
C.P. health exp. 29.5 35.2 48.7 70.3 101.5 143.5 199.5 276.7 372.9 489.0
Figure 12.A3   Government gross debt evolution under eight different 
scenarios and assumption that pensions grow in line with wagesHana Genorio 306
c)  Scenario I
Table 12.A3    Government gross debt in % of GDP   under the assumption that 
pensions grow in line with inflation
2004 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Baseline 29.5 30.0 32.4 37.1 44.7 55.8 71.5 94.6 124.2 160.9
Part.rate 29.5 29.0 29.1 30.1 32.8 37.6 45.9 59.4 78.7 104.3
1 pp   Q  29.5 27.7 26.3 25.3 25.2 25.8 27.5 31.2 36.2 42.0
1 pp   Q 29.5 32.8 40.6 53.9 74.6 104.5 147.1 209.3 292.0 399.8
1 pp   i 29.5 31.6 36.2 43.6 54.9 70.9 93.3 125.9 168.3 222.2
1 pp   i 29.5 28.7 30.0 33.6 40.1 49.7 63.3 83.1 108.1 138.3
Pop. 2005 level 29.5 27.4 21.0 10.7  – 2.6  – 18.7  – 37.4  – 58.7  – 82.2  – 109.1
C.P. health exp. 29.5 30.5 33.3 36.9 42.1 49.0 58.8 73.8 92.4 114.5
Figure 12.A4   Government gross debt evolution under eight different scenarios 
and assumption that pensions grow in line with inflation307
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